NEW JERSEY DIVISION OF YOUTH AND FAMILY SERVICES v. D.A.E.

RECORD IMPOUNDED

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

 

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-5327-11T3

NEW JERSEY DIVISION OF YOUTH

AND FAMILY SERVICES,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

D.A.E.,

Defendant-Appellant.

_________________________________

IN THE MATTER OF THE GUARDIANSHIP

OF I.E., a Minor

__________________________________

May 15, 2013

 

Submitted May 7, 2013 Decided

 

Before Judges Yannotti and Harris.

 

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Chancery Division, Family Part, Mercer County, Docket No. FG-11-08-12.

 

Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for appellant (Gilbert G. Miller, Designated Counsel, on the brief).

 

Jeffrey S. Chiesa, Attorney General, attorney for respondent (Lisa Puglisi, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel; John W. Tolleris, Deputy Attorney General, on the brief).

 

Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, Law Guardian, attorney for I.E. (Jeffrey R. Jablonski, Designated Counsel on the brief).

PER CURIAM

Defendant D.A.E. appeals from the May 3, 2012 judgment terminating her parental rights to her twelve-year-old son Ian,1 a child with special needs. After a review of the record, we conclude that plaintiff New Jersey Division of Youth and Family Services (the Division)2 satisfied the requisite burden of proof to support the Family Part's decision terminating D.A.E.'s parental rights. Accordingly, we affirm.

I.

The Division's initial involvement with D.A.E., which related to her then-three-year old son Thomas, began in 1986, many years before the birth of Ian. That matter was closed in 1997.

The most recent circumstances involving Ian, however, commenced in May 2000 when the Division received information that D.A.E. had twice tested positive for phencyclidine, a controlled dangerous substance, during her pregnancy. She was referred by the Division for substance abuse treatment and parenting classes.

In early June 2000, Ian was born substance free and placed in his mother's care. From then until March 2003, the Division monitored the family as D.A.E. availed herself of the services provided by the agency.

In August 2003, the Division received a new referral, this one alleging that D.A.E. was again using phencyclidine. After an investigation, the Division was unable to substantiate the allegations, and no services were requested or provided.

In July 2004, the Division received another referral concerning D.A.E.'s substance abuse, and discovered that she tested positive for phencyclidine. D.A.E. explained that she had inadvertently smoked another person's cigarette at a funeral, which had been dipped in the substance. The Division referred D.A.E. for a substance abuse evaluation but in August 2004, D.A.E. again tested positive for phencyclidine.

In September 2004, D.A.E. consented to Ian's temporary placement in a foster home, and the Division was subsequently awarded custody. Supervised bimonthly visitation between mother and child began immediately. D.A.E. was compliant with the substance abuse services provided by the Division. Meanwhile, Ian was transferred among four different foster homes between September and December 2004 due to his behavioral issues. Ultimately, Ian was placed with C.B., one of D.A.E.'s relatives.

In the ensuing months, Ian underwent several psychological evaluations. He was diagnosed with attention deficit hyperactivity disorder and oppositional defiant disorder for which medication and psychotherapy were recommended. In March 2005, Ian was placed with T.J., D.A.E.'s friend, after which Ian's behavior improved.

Also in March 2005, D.A.E. underwent a psychological evaluation with Jamie Gordon-Karp, Psy.D.3 Dr. Gordon-Karp found that D.A.E. tended "to be pollyannaish and express self-blame when things [went] wrong." Dr. Gordon-Karp articulated "some concerns about [D.A.E.'s] ability to care for [Ian] because with an IQ of sixty-six, she was "functioning in the Mentally Deficient level of intelligence." Dr. Gordon-Karp recommended parenting skills classes, unsupervised visitation, and therapy for D.A.E.

In April 2005, unsupervised visitation between mother and child began, which went well. In July 2005, D.A.E. was reunited with Ian. Her subsequent drug tests were negative. The Division continued to monitor the family, and notwithstanding Ian's sometimes-inappropriate behavior, in May 2006, the Division assessed the family as being "safe" and decided to close the case.

Three years later, however, after D.A.E.'s oldest son Thomas was shot to death, the Division received a referral that D.A.E. had been smoking phencyclidine in Ian's presence. She was referred for a substance abuse evaluation, and tested negative for controlled dangerous substances, but positive for alcohol. Allegations of neglect by inadequate supervision were unsubstantiated; however, neglect by risk of harm due to substance abuse was substantiated. D.A.E. was referred for outpatient substance abuse treatment.

Between September 15 and October 31, 2009, D.A.E. was late for three treatment sessions and failed to attend two others without explanation. She tested negative for illicit substances twice in September 2009. During November and December 2009, D.A.E. missed nearly half of her scheduled treatment sessions. Two of her urine samples were abnormally diluted.

In December 2009, Alan S. Gordon, Ed.D conducted another psychological evaluation of D.A.E. He concluded that she was "ruled by narcissistic needs" and tended to minimize her substance abuse issues. He recommended substance abuse treatment for alcoholism, drug testing, parenting skills classes, anger management classes, and assistance with job placement.

In early February 2010, at approximately 6:45 p.m., a Division caseworker conducted an unannounced visit at D.A.E.'s residence. Ian, then age nine, was home alone while his mother was allegedly grocery shopping in preparation for an impending winter storm. After about an hour and fifteen minutes, D.A.E. returned home without groceries and stumbled across the front lawn. The caseworker informed D.A.E. that she smelled alcohol on her breath, to which D.A.E. first denied ingesting any alcoholic beverages, but then explained she had consumed a forty-ounce beer with friends.

Due to D.A.E.'s relapse and failure to adequately supervise her son, the Division made an emergency removal of Ian pursuant to N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.29 and -8.30, and the child was placed in a foster home.4 He has resided there since that time.

In March 2010, D.A.E. began further substance abuse treatment. She complied with the program and all of her scheduled urine screens were negative. After successful completion of the program, she was discharged seven months later.

In April 2010, Dr. Gordon evaluated Ian. Although Ian had "a strong need to be with his mother," Dr. Gordon concluded that D.A.E. "would have to demonstrate the ability to be stable [and refrain from] . . . using illegal substances." She would also "have to recognize [Ian's] feelings, develop empathy and manage stress," especially with his special needs, which required a caregiver "to be very consistent with medication." According to Dr. Gordon, D.A.E. did "not seem to learn from experience [and] . . . seem[ed] to repeat mistakes."

In May 2010, D.A.E. began reunification services. She was expected to complete weekly individual counseling sessions, parenting group sessions, and visitation for one year. She started out with faithful attendance and was making good progress, but then began missing parenting skills classes in August 2010, which continued through December. Additionally, she missed individual counseling sessions without adequate excuses, at which time all services were terminated for non-compliance.

In October 2010, Dr. Gordon re-evaluated D.A.E. He concluded, "before [Ian] can be returned . . ., she has to comply with court orders and requests from the Division. Her compliance has been hot and cold. . . . There is always an excuse." Dr. Gordon recommended compliance with court orders, anger management classes, parenting skills classes, substance abuse treatment for alcoholism, and suitable employment.

In February 2011, D.A.E re-enrolled in substance abuse treatment. Her urine screens were consistently negative for all substances. In March 2011, the Division referred D.A.E. for parenting skills training and offered other reunification efforts. She completed a series of eight parenting classes but missed several therapy appointments. Her therapist noted, "[a]lthough [D.A.E.] has been active, open and appears motivated to participate in treatment, she is only passively willing to accept responsibility for the events that . . . caus[ed] the [Division] referral. . . . [S]he may be unable to fully benefit from therapy due to suspected cognitive limitations" and long-term substance abuse. Long-term inpatient substance abuse treatment was recommended.

In August 2011, Kinya Swanson, Psy.D conducted psychological and bonding evaluations of both D.A.E. and Ian. During the interview with Ian, the child stated that "he likes his foster parents, but wants to live with his biological mother." D.A.E. denied any addiction to alcohol, but admitted an addiction to phencyclidine. Dr. Swanson concluded that her "concerns . . . about [D.A.E.'s] ability to maintain sobriety and keep [Ian] safe from harm outweigh the benefits of reuniting [Ian] with her at this time." Specifically, Dr. Swanson believed that D.A.E. could not currently care for her son due to being unemployed, living in an unsafe neighborhood, and failing to attend an inpatient substance abuse treatment facility to address her issues.

In December 2011, D.A.E. began six months of inpatient substance abuse treatment. At the time of trial, she was receiving treatment and intended to remain in the program. She testified, "[I] made some bad choices . . . through my lifetime as [have] all my children, but since now I have been at [inpatient treatment,] I have realized and see that the things that I have put myself through even though the bereavement that I had[,] I did hurt my son." She also stated that she was "going to continue" with treatment services, had coped with the death of her son Thomas, and was committed to caring for Ian. She did not believe that her prior substance abuse negatively affected Ian.

One psychological expert, Maureen Santina, Ph.D., testified at trial. In February 2012, Santina conducted psychological and bonding evaluations of Ian and his biological parents.5 Around the same time, Dr. Santina conducted individual psychological evaluations of the foster parents and a bonding evaluation with Ian and his foster family.

Dr. Santina diagnosed D.A.E. with attention deficit hyperactivity disorder, substance abuse, and personality disorder not otherwise specified with dependent borderline and narcissistic features. She opined that D.A.E.'s interview revealed that she neither understood the severity of her substance abuse nor its impact on her family. Dr. Santina further indicated that for D.A.E. to adequately address her substance abuse and psychological issues, she would be required "to be in a program of a minimum of [twelve] to [eighteen] months followed by halfway house or other transitional supervised living prior to being living independently in the community."

Regarding the bonding evaluation between mother and child, Dr. Santina observed that D.A.E. excessively focused on herself and was insensitive to Ian, as evidenced by questioning why he had not given her a Valentine's Day gift, and accusing him of lying about his school performance. Dr. Santina opined that Ian might not have expressed his hurt feelings to his mother because he feared her.

Dr. Santina concluded that although a bond existed between mother and child, "the quality of [Ian's] attachment to his mother is an anxious ambivalent attachment" and her influence on him was negative. Nothing indicated that D.A.E. could provide stability and effectively parent Ian. Dr. Santina opined that any harm that may occur by termination of parental rights would be mitigated by the child's placement with his foster parents, who were sensitive to his emotional needs.

With respect to the bonding evaluation between Ian and his foster parents, Dr. Santina opined that Ian was bonded to them and would suffer harm if removed from their care. During the bonding evaluation and Ian's individual psychological evaluation, Ian expressed a wish to be adopted by his foster parents.

II.

On appeal, D.A.E. presents the following arguments for our consideration:

POINT I: DYFS FAILED TO ESTABLISH THAT THE STANDARD FOR THE TERMINATION OF D.A.E.'S PARENTAL RIGHTS WAS MET IN THIS CASE.

 

A. D.A.E. DID NOT CAUSE ANY IMPAIRMENT OF [IAN'S] HEALTH AND DEVELOPMENT.

 

B. D.A.E. WAS AND IS ABLE TO ELIMINATE HARM AND DELAYING PLACEMENT WOULD NOT ADD TO HARM.

 

C. DYFS DID NOT MAKE REASONABLE EFFORTS TO PROVIDE SERVICES AND THE COURT HAS NOT CONSIDERED ALTERNATIVES TO TERMINATION.

 

D. DYFS FAILED TO ESTABLISH THAT TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS WILL NOT DO MORE HARM THAN GOOD.

 

POINT II: THE TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS VIOLATED [IAN'S] CONSTITUTIONALLY PROTECTED PROCEDURAL AND SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS RIGHTS TO HAVE CONTACT WITH HIS NATURAL PARENTS (NOT RAISED BELOW).

 

POINT III: THE DECISIONS IN THIS CASE SHOULD BE REVERSED BECAUSE THE LAW GUARDIAN DID NOT ADVOCATE FOR THE WISHES AND INTERESTS OF HER CLIENT. (NOT RAISED BELOW).

We are not persuaded by these contentions.

We start with fundamental principles. "Parents have a constitutional right to raise their children." N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. F.M., 211 N.J. 420, 447 (2012). "But that right is not absolute. It is a right tempered by the State's parens patriae responsibility to protect children whose vulnerable lives or psychological well-being may have been harmed or may be seriously endangered by a neglectful or abusive parent." Ibid.

"Terminating parental rights must be used with caution and care, and only in those circumstances in which proof of parental unfitness is clear." Ibid. "[T]he cornerstone of the inquiry is not whether the biological parents are fit but whether they can cease causing their child harm." In re Guardianship of J.C., 129 N.J. 1, 10 (1992). "Presumptions of parental unfitness may not be used in [termination] proceedings . . . and all doubts must be resolved against termination of parental rights." In re Guardianship of K.H.O., 161 N.J. 337, 347 (1999).

When seeking to terminate parental rights, the Division must prove by clear and convincing evidence each of the following four factors:

(1) The child's safety, health or development has been or will continue to be endangered by the parental relationship;

 

(2) The parent is unwilling or unable to eliminate the harm facing the child or is unable or unwilling to provide a safe and stable home for the child and the delay of permanent placement will add to the harm. Such harm may include evidence that separating the child from his resource family parents would cause serious and enduring emotional or psychological harm to the child;

 

(3) [The Division] has made reasonable efforts to provide services to help the parent correct the circumstances which led to the child's placement outside the home and the court has considered alternatives to termination of parental rights; and

 

(4) Termination of parental rights will not do more harm than good.

 

[N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a).]

 

See also K.H.O., supra, 161 N.J. at 347-48. Those "four prongs are not discrete and separate, but relate to and overlap with one another to provide a comprehensive standard that identifies a child's best interests." F.M., supra, 211 N.J. at 448 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

The trial court concluded that all four factors had been proven by clear and convincing evidence. Regarding the first factor, the court cited evidence of D.A.E.'s continuing substance abuse, finding that she "has a longstanding drug abuse problem" and Ian "continued to be harmed by . . . [the] substance abuse." The court found Dr. Santina's testimony and opinions credible that D.A.E. "still did not understand the severity of her substance abuse, nor its impact upon her family as she continued to minimize her drug abuse even after . . . years of [Division] involvement with the attendant substance abuse programs."

Regarding the second factor, the court found that D.A.E. had only recently entered into inpatient treatment and ceased abusing substances, and it did not find her testimony regarding her commitment to sobriety credible. The court gave credence to Dr. Santina's conclusion that D.A.E. has a "strong negative impact upon" Ian, as demonstrated by D.A.E.'s behavior during the bonding evaluation. The court also agreed with Dr. Santina's assessment that Ian's foster parents were sensitive to his needs and would be able to mitigate any harm from his removal. Ian had a positive attachment to them and would be harmed if he were removed from their care.

With respect to the third factor, the court found that the Division had made reasonable efforts to provide services to help D.A.E. correct the circumstances that led to the placement of Ian with foster parents, and the Division had considered alternatives to termination of parental rights. The Division had provided a variety of services to D.A.E., which included parenting classes and substance abuse treatment. The Division considered the alternative placements offered by both parents, but they were not feasible.

Finally, regarding the fourth factor, the court found that the Division had proven that termination of parental rights would not do more harm than good. The court found that the credible evidence showed that Ian "continues to be harmed by the negative attachment he has with [D.A.E.]" and "is firmly entrenched in his foster family with whom he shares his daily life." The foster parents "are committed to [Ian] and proactive in addressing his multitudinous emotional and behavioral needs" and have "the ability to mitigate any harm that would result" from the termination of D.A.E.'s parental rights.

D.A.E. contends the Division did not meet its burden of proof with respect to factor one because it failed to show that D.A.E. had harmed Ian. We disagree.

To satisfy the first statutory element of the best-interests standard, the Division must show that the safety, health or development of the child has been or will continue to be harmed by the parental relationship. N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a)(1). "The harm shown . . . must be one that threatens the child's health and will likely have continuing deleterious effects on the child." K.H.O., supra, 161 N.J. at 352. Thus, the "relevant inquiry focuses on the cumulative effect, over time, of harms arising from the home life provided by the parent." N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. M.M., 189 N.J. 261, 289 (2007).

"The absence of physical abuse or neglect is not conclusive on the issue of custody." In re Guardianship of R.G. & F., 155 N.J. Super. 186, 194 (App. Div. 1977). The court must also "consider the potential for serious psychological damage to the child." N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. A.W., 103 N.J. 591, 605 (1986). "[P]arental fitness is the key." K.H.O., supra, 161 N.J. at 348 (citation omitted).

Contrary to D.A.E.'s contentions, the Division was not obliged to show that Ian was actually harmed. Rather, a showing, by clear and convincing evidence, of potential for future harm is sufficient. N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. A.G., 344 N.J. Super. 418, 440 (App. Div. 2001).

Here, the record supports the court's conclusion that D.A.E. put Ian's safety, health, or development at risk by her long history of substance abuse and non-compliance with Division-provided services. Ian was adversely affected by his mother's instability, as evidenced by his myriad behavioral issues. In addition, Dr. Santina opined that D.A.E. did not appreciate the severity of her substance abuse and would not be able to adequately parent Ian and provide him with the stability he needs, which findings are entitled to deference because the trial court found Dr. Santina credible. M.M., supra, 189 N.J. at 279.

D.A.E. next contends that the trial court's finding with respect to the second factor was not supported by the evidence. Specifically, she claims the evidence showed she had been successful in overcoming her addiction in the past and will be able to remain sober long-term. She additionally asserts that the Division did not prove that a delay in permanency would further harm Ian.

The second statutory element of the best-interests standard is that the parent is unwilling or unable to eliminate the harm facing the child, or is unable and unwilling to provide a safe and stable home for the child and delay of permanent placement will add to the harm. N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a)(2). Accord K.H.O., supra, 161 N.J. at 352. It is aimed at "determining whether the parent has cured and overcome the initial harm that endangered the health, safety, or welfare of the child, and is able to continue a parental relationship without recurrent harm to the child." Id. at 348. Thus, the second prong "relates to parental unfitness," and "may be established in several ways," id. at 352, including

indications of parental dereliction and irresponsibility, such as the parent's continued or recurrent drug abuse, the inability to provide a stable and protective home, the withholding of parental attention and care, and the diversion of family resources in order to support a drug habit, with the resultant neglect and lack of nurture for the child.

 

[Id. at 353.]

 

"The question is whether the parent can become fit in time to meet the needs of the child." N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. T.S., 417 N.J. Super. 228, 244 (App. Div. 2010), certif. denied, 205 N.J. 519 (2011).

The record supports the court's finding that D.A.E. had unresolved substance abuse problems. After exposing Ian to phencyclidine during pregnancy, D.A.E. tested positive for illegal drug use or alcohol over the ensuing decade, and nearly a year and a half after the death of her son Thomas, which suggests her substance abuse is not merely episodic and tied to depression resulting from acute personal crisis and loss. Even though D.A.E. asserts she will be able to overcome her addiction, the trial court did not find her testimony to that effect credible, which is entitled to our deference. M.M., supra, 189 N.J. at 279. Thus, contrary to her assertions, the evidence established that D.A.E. was unable to eliminate her substance abuse issues, which has endangered her child. See K.H.O., supra, 161 N.J. at 353 (noting "continued or recurrent drug abuse" satisfies second prong of best-interests standard).

Additionally, the evidence established that a delay in permanency would further harm Ian. There was no evidence demonstrating that, in the reasonably near future, D.A.E.'s circumstances would change or that her ability to parent Ian would reach an acceptable level. Rather, the evidence suggested the opposite.

D.A.E. further contends that the trial court erred by finding that the Division established the third prong because it failed to adequately consider the appointment of a kinship legal guardian as an alternative to termination of her parental rights. In addition, she claims the Division failed to adequately explain that option to the foster parents, and thus "did not make reasonable efforts to provide services."

The third statutory element of the best-interests standard requires the Division to undertake "reasonable efforts to provide services to help the parent correct the circumstances which led to the child's placement outside the home and the court has considered alternatives to termination of parental rights." N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a)(3).

With respect to "alternatives to termination of parental rights," N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a)(3), courts must determine whether a child's "'placement ensures the safety and health and serves the best interest of the child.'" N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. M.F., 357 N.J. Super. 515, 528 (App. Div. 2003) (quoting N.J.S.A. 30:4C-51). A parent "may request . . . that the court consider a . . . kinship legal guardianship arrangement as an alternative disposition," but "[o]nly the [D]ivision or the court" is permitted to ultimately decide whether to seek that alternative disposition. N.J.S.A. 30:4C-87.

The New Jersey Supreme Court has made clear that kinship legal guardianship should only be considered when adoption is not possible:

The plain language of the [Kinship] Act, as well as its legislative history, establish kinship legal guardianship as a more permanent option than foster care when adoption "is neither feasible nor likely" and "kinship legal guardianship is in the child's best interest." N.J.S.A.3B:12A-6d(3)-(4); [N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. S.V., 362 N.J. Super.76, 88 (App. Div. 2003)]. Conversely, when the permanency provided by adoption is available, kinship legal guardianship cannot

be used as a defense to termination of parental rights under N.J.S.A.30:4C-15.1(a)(3).

 

[N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. P.P., 180 N.J.494, 512-13 (2004).]

 

Here, kinship legal guardianship was not an available option because the foster parents wished to adopt Ian and he expressed a desire to remain with them. Id. at 512-13; N.J. Div. of Youth & Fam. Servs. v. T.I., 423 N.J. Super. 127, 137 (App. Div. 2011). Thus, D.A.E.'s argument that the court improperly failed to consider the concept of kinship legal guardianship is without merit. Moreover, the court was obligated to neither explain such option nor question Ian's foster parent about whether Ian's desire for continued contact with his mother was considered in the foster parents' adoption decision. Here the foster parent testified that she understood adoption would provide Ian with more stability. Her reasons for rejecting a kinship legal guardianship were thus consistent with the Legislature's stated goals.

D.A.E. lastly contends that the Division did not prove by clear and convincing evidence that termination of her parental rights would not cause more harm than good. N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a)(4). The question to be addressed is "whether, after considering and balancing the two relationships, the child will suffer a greater harm from the termination of ties with [his or] her natural parents than from the permanent disruption of [his or] her relationship with [his or] her foster parents." K.H.O., supra, 161 N.J. at 355. "This criterion is related to the first and second elements of the best interests standard, which also focus on parental harm to the children." In re Guardianship of D.M.H., 161 N.J. 365, 384 (1999). "[T]he child's need for permanency and stability emerges as a central factor." K.H.O., supra, 161 N.J. at 357. To satisfy this prong, the Division "should offer testimony of a 'well qualified expert who has had full opportunity to make a comprehensive, objective, and informed evaluation' of the child's relationship with both the natural parents and the foster parents." M.M., supra, 189 N.J. at 281 (quoting J.C., supra, 129 N.J. at 19).

"[T]he fact that the child has a strong relationship with the foster parents is not by itself enough to terminate parental rights." N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. A.R., 405 N.J. Super. 418, 439 (App. Div. 2009) (citing J.C., supra, 129 N.J. at 18-19). The child's relationship with the foster parents "'must be viewed not in isolation but in a broader context that includes . . . the quality of the child's relationship with his or her natural parents.'" Ibid. (quoting J.C., supra, 129 N.J. at 18).

Here, the evidence of D.A.E.'s unfitness, and the resultant harm to Ian, was clear. Nothing in the record indicates that D.A.E. will be able to provide her child with permanency and stability in the near future. See J.C., supra, 129 N.J. at 26 (acknowledging "the paramount need . . . children have for permanent and defined parent-child relationships"). In comparison, Dr. Santina's credible testimony opined that Ian was bonded to his foster parents and would suffer harm if removed from their care.

We disagree with D.A.E.'s contention that "[n]o expert testimony was adduced below regarding [the foster parents'] capacity to understand Ian's . . . sexualized behavior and the impact of . . . their same-sex relationship." Dr. Santina testified that both foster parents showed "a lot of insight into [Ian's] behavior [and an] understanding of his needs." Dr. Santina recommended that Ian participate in treatment through a residential program for his inappropriate sexualized behavior, to which both foster parents "were very receptive."

For the first time on appeal, D.A.E. claims (1) that Ian's due process rights to maintain contact with his mother were violated because his foster parents were misinformed about kinship legal guardianship and their decision to adopt did not account for his preferences and (2) that the law guardian failed to properly represent Ian by not advocating for reunification or kinship legal guardianship. We conclude that these arguments are meritless. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E). The record reveals that there were no material omissions in the foster parents' understanding of what their options were vis- -vis Ian, and the law guardian even-handedly advocated for Ian's best interests at all times. See N.J. Div. of Youth & Fam. Servs. v. R.M., 347 N.J. Super. 44, 70 (App. Div.) (noting that "[l]aw guardians are obliged to make the wishes of their clients known, to make recommendations as to how a child client's desires may best be accomplished, to express any concerns regarding the child's safety or well-being and in a proper case to suggest the appointment of a guardian ad litem"), certif. denied, 174 N.J. 39 (2002).

Affirmed.

 

1 We use fictional names for D.A.E.'s children.

2 The Division is now known as the Division of Child Protection and Permanency. L. 2012, c. 16, eff. June 29, 2012.

3 All of Dr. Gordon-Karp's psychological evaluations were admitted into evidence by agreement of the parties.

4 D.A.E.'s friend, B.P., was ruled out as a placement option because she was on probation for assault charges.

5 Ian's father voluntarily surrendered his parental rights, and is not part of this appeal.