JAMES WATLINGTON v. NEW JERSEY STATE PAROLE BOARD

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-3437-10T3

JAMES WATLINGTON,

Appellant,

v.

NEW JERSEY STATE PAROLE BOARD,

Respondent.

_________________________________________

April 2, 2013

Submitted December 5, 2012 - Decided

Before Judges Axelrad and Nugent.

On appeal from the New Jersey State Parole Board.

James Watlington, appellant pro se.

Jeffrey S. Chiesa, Attorney General, attorney for respondent (Lewis A. Scheindlin, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel; Christopher C. Josephson, Deputy Attorney General, on the brief).

PER CURIAM

Appellant James Watlington is serving a life sentence at East Jersey State Prison in Rahway. He appeals from a final decision of the New Jersey State Parole Board denying him parole for the second time and imposing a 180-month future eligibility term (FET). We affirm.

Watlington has been convicted of committing five serious offenses during four criminal episodes. In 1965, during a dispute over a card game, he murdered a man by striking him four times in the head with a hammer. He was convicted of second degree murder, sentenced to twelve to fifteen years, and eventually paroled. In 1978, during a dispute over ten dollars, he shot an acquaintance four times. He pled guilty to assault with intent to kill and carrying a weapon, and was sentenced to an aggregate ten-year prison term. Before he was sentenced, while free on bail, he murdered his son.

In 1980, following a dispute with the mother of his child, Watlington drowned his fifteen-month old son by attaching a brass elevator plate to the child's neck with a CB antenna and throwing the child into a waterway. He ultimately pled guilty to murder and was sentenced to life imprisonment with an eighteen-year period of parole ineligibility, to be served concurrently with the ten-year aggregate prison term imposed on the assault and weapons charges. In 1986, while serving his prison term, Watlington beat and repeatedly kicked a corrections officer. For that offense a jury found him guilty of aggravated assault and the trial judge sentenced him to a five-year prison term, the sentence to be served concurrently with his life sentence.

The Parole Board denied parole to Watlington when he first became eligible in 2000. He became eligible for the second time in October 2009. On September 25, 2009, a hearing officer prepared a case summary and referred the case to a two-member Board panel, which denied parole on September 28, 2009, and established a thirty-six month FET. Watlington filed an administrative appeal. The panel considered the appeal, recognized that it had decided the case under the wrong standard, vacated its previous decision, and scheduled the case for a de novo hearing.

On May 10, 2010, in a written decision, a two-member Board panel denied parole and referred the case to a three-member panel for the establishment of a FET. On July 21, 2010, the three-member panel issued a twelve-page decision that established a 180-month FET. In reaching its decision the panel considered, among other things, that Watlington's criminal record was repetitive and had become increasingly severe; that despite being paroled or released on bail for his first two offenses, Watlington had committed more crimes; and, that Watlington had minimized his conduct and had not sufficiently addressed his substance abuse problems or demonstrated any insight into the gravity of his offenses.

Watlington filed an administrative appeal. On February 23, 2011, in its Notice of Final Agency Decision, the Board upheld the decisions of both the two-member and three-member panels. This appeal followed.

In this appeal, Watlington makes the following argument:

POINT I.

THE NEW JERSEY STATE PAROLE BOARD VIOLATE[D] DUE PROCESS AND THE UNITED STATES AND NEW JERSEY CONSTITUTION WHEN IT VIOLATE[D] THE DOUBLE JEOPARDY CLAUSE.

Watlington's argument is twofold. First, he contends the Board violated his constitutional rights by increasing his FET from thirty-six to 180 months following his administrative appeal from the first two-panel decision. Second, he contends the Board acted arbitrarily and capriciously because, among other things, it undervalued or ignored crucial evidence that he presented, including the fact that he has taken responsibility for his actions.

We need not address Watlington's first argument. On December 22, 2011, we granted the Board's motion requesting that we remand this and other cases to permit it to recalculate FETs in accordance with our decisions in Righetti v. New Jersey State Parole Board, No. A-2233-10 (App. Div. Nov. 7, 2011) and St. Pierre v. New Jersey State Parole Board, No. A-411-10 (App. Div. Oct. 31, 2011). In our order granting the Board's motion requesting remand, we required that remand proceedings be completed within thirty days and we retained concurrent jurisdiction to address the merits of parole denials. We also informed the parties that if a new FET were imposed upon remand, any defendant could supplement his briefing within thirty days of imposition to address that new future eligibility term. We have no record of Watlington supplementing his brief in this appeal.

We reject Watlington's argument that the Board acted arbitrarily and capriciously by denying parole, and we affirm the Board's decision essentially for the reasons it gave in its February 23, 2011 Notice of Final Agency Decision. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(D). Watlington's argument is without sufficient merit to warrant further discussion in a written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E). We add only the following.

The Parole Board's decisions are highly "individualized discretionary appraisals." Trantino v. N.J. State Parole Bd., 166 N.J. 113, 173 (2001) (quoting Beckworth v. N.J. State Parole Bd., 62 N.J. 348, 359 (1973)). The standard of review applicable to other administrative agency decisions applies to our review of the Parole Board's determinations. Trantino v. N.J. State Parole Bd., 154 N.J. 19, 24-25 (1998). We must determine

(1) whether the agency's action violates express or implied legislative policies, i.e., did the agency follow the law; (2)whether the record contains substantial evidence to support the findings on which the agency based its action; and (3) whether in applying the legislative policies to the facts, the agency clearly erred in reaching a conclusion that could not reasonably have been made on a showing of the relevant factors.

[Id. at 24.]

"Parole Board decisions should not be reversed by a court unless found to be arbitrary . . . or an abuse of discretion[.]" Id. at 25 (internal citation omitted); Pazden v. N.J. State Parole Bd., 374 N.J. Super. 356, 366 (App. Div. 2005).

Our review of the record reveals not only that the Board applied the proper standard when it denied parole, but also that it supported its determination with ample evidence and sound reasoning. Nothing in the record suggests that the Board either abused its discretion or acted unreasonably.

Affirmed.