NEW JERSEY DIVISION OF YOUTH AND FAMILY SERVICES v. S.S.

RECORD IMPOUNDED

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

 

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-3011-11T3

NEW JERSEY DIVISION OF

YOUTH AND FAMILY SERVICES,1

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

S.S.,

Defendant-Appellant.

____________________________

IN THE MATTER OF THE

GUARDIANSHIP OF

S.J.S., a minor.

________________________________________________________________

April 4, 2013

 

Submitted February 25, 2013 - Decided

 

Before Judges Parrillo, Fasciale and Maven.

 

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Chancery Division, Family Part, Mercer County, Docket No. FG-11-0004-12.

 

Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for appellant (Anastasia P. Winslow, Designated Counsel, on the brief).

 

Jeffrey S. Chiesa, Attorney General, attorney for respondent (Lewis A. Scheindlin, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel; Stephanie Anatale, Deputy Attorney General, on the brief).

 

Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, Law Guardian, attorney for minor (Christopher A. Huling, Designated Counsel, on the brief).

 

PER CURIAM

Defendant S.S. appeals from the termination of her parental rights to her four-year-old daughter, S.J.S. (Sonia).2 We affirm.

A four-day trial was held in November 2011, during which the Division of Youth and Family Services (Division) presented the original caseworker, Leighann Burns, the adoption caseworker, Jackie Sisson, and Amy Becker-Mattes, Ph.D., and the defense presented defendant and her godmother with whom she resided. Following the close of evidence on November 29, 2011, Judge William Anklowitz entered an order terminating defendant's parental rights and awarding guardianship of the child to the Division. In a comprehensive written decision setting forth credibility determinations, evidentiary rulings, findings of fact, and conclusions of law, Judge Anklowitz found that the Division satisfied all four prongs of the statutory "best interests" test, N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a).

The following facts were adduced from the trial record. Defendant was born in July 1992, and is the oldest of five children born to L.B., her mother. The Division has been involved with defendant and her four siblings since 1997 due to L.B.'s history of alcoholism, domestic violence, and abuse and neglect of the children. Defendant was fifteen years old when Sonia was born in March 2008.

After giving birth, defendant did not have a stable home address due to conflicts between her and her mother, and lived between her grandmother's home, her aunt's home, and her mother's home.

In 2009, while investigating an incident in L.B.'s home, the Division determined that defendant was not attending school. Division caseworker Burns recommended substance abuse treatment for L.B. and suggested that defendant attend the Mommy and Me Program through the Crossroads Program (Crossroads).

Also through Crossroads, defendant and Sonia were placed in C.E.'s foster home. Initially, defendant was the only mother at the home, but later other mothers and children came. Defendant's initial Crossroads Progress Report, dated May 6, 2009, was positive; however, after two months, her behavior changed. Defendant had socialization issues. She became disrespectful to C.E. and the other girls who attended the program. Reportedly, she had poor decision-making skills, lacked skills for setting boundaries with others, and lacked maturity in comparison with other seventeen-year-old females.

On July 2, 2009, the Division filed a verified complaint3 and was granted custody over defendant, her four siblings, and Sonia, from L.B. and the fathers of L.B.'s children in February 2010. The court continued services for defendant through that order.

On July 9, 2009, Alan Gordon, Ph.D., a psychologist, evaluated defendant and issued a report recommending individual psychotherapy, parenting skills classes, and medication monitoring. In addition, he opined that defendant must be in the Mommy and Me Program in order to parent Sonia. The Division set up services with Crossroads to address these issues.

On July 27, 2009, Edward Baruch, M.D., a psychiatrist, conducted an evaluation of defendant. Dr. Baruch concluded that in order to continue residing with C.E., defendant needed to maintain control of her behavior. He diagnosed Axis I disorders that included bipolar disorder, intermittent explosive disorder, oppositional defiant disorder, and post-traumatic stress disorder. In addition, he diagnosed Axis II disorders of mixed elements of paranoid, borderline, and avoidant personality traits. Defendant agreed to begin medication monitoring for mood stabilization. Dr. Baruch prescribed Abilify, an antipsychotic mood stabilizer, and Cogentin for treatment of her bipolar disorder. He also recommended individual counseling, anger management, vocational training at Project Teach, and a substance abuse evaluation since defendant stated that she smoked marijuana. Dr. Baruch monitored her medications from 2009 to 2011.

Crossroads required that defendant take her medications to stay in the program; however, defendant stopped taking Abilify in October 2009 without consulting with a physician. In November 2009, defendant reported that she would no longer take her medication. At a Division meeting on November 9, 2009, a Division nurse explained to defendant why she should take her medication, reminding her that it was a condition of remaining in Crossroads.

On November 10, 2009, defendant experienced a black-out and physically attacked C.E. Following this incident, C.E. took defendant for a check-up and on January 25, 2010, H. Warren Goldman, Ph.D., diagnosed defendant with a malignant brain tumor. He wrote that he wanted defendant to have surgery within the next week.

On November 17, 2009, April Piercy, program coordinator of Second Chance Homes, wrote a letter addressed to "To Whom It May Concern" documenting the problems defendant was having in Crossroads. Piercy wrote that defendant had some difficulty with outbursts and was resistant to directives from authority figures.

Given the brain tumor diagnosis, on February 9, 2010, the Division filed for protective custody of defendant, then seventeen years old, because her interactions with L.B. negatively affected her. She experienced increased seizure activity that coincided with visits with her mother, who was uncooperative in assisting the Division to address defendant's medical issues.4

On February 17, 2010, defendant had surgery to remove the tumor and remained in the hospital for six days. She returned to her foster home for a couple of weeks, then received radiation every day for six weeks followed by chemotherapy.

Her medications as of March 5, 2010 were Abilify, Cogentin, Amoxicillin, and Keppra, an anti-seizure medication. Defendant started to lose her appetite, had trouble sleeping, her hair began to fall out, and she lost weight.

On March 18, 2010, Crossroads personnel took defendant to the hospital after a therapy session because she stated that she no longer wanted to live. On March 24, 2010, Piercy told the Division that there was a concern for Sonia's safety because defendant's behavior had not improved since entering the program.

From April through May 2010, defendant became increasingly inappropriate, combative, violent, and destructive. In April 2010, C.E. confronted defendant about wearing inappropriate clothing and defendant verbally attacked C.E. and punched the wall. During this argument, defendant grabbed a knife from the kitchen counter, but C.E. quickly retrieved it.

On May 4, 2010, defendant told the Division she no longer wanted to live at Crossroads. Also on May 4, 2010, C.E. stated that it was time for defendant to leave her home. On May 5, 2010, Piercy wrote a letter addressed "To Whom It May Concern" explaining why defendant was being discharged from Crossroads.5 In making its decision to remove defendant and Sonia from Crossroads, Piercy addressed a list of incidents and deficiencies, and concluded that defendant needed a higher level of care to address her medical needs and concerns for her parenting capabilities.

After defendant was removed from Crossroads for noncompliance, the Division filed a verified complaint seeking custody of Sonia from defendant and Sonia's purported father, H.H.6 On May 7, 2010, the court ordered Sonia be placed in the care, custody, and supervision of the Division. In June 2010, defendant was ordered to have a psychological evaluation and attend parenting skills classes. In July 2010, the court ordered defendant to comply with all health and mental services as referred by the Division, and all services previously provided to defendant in her mother's case.

The New Jersey MENTOR (NJM) program was chosen for defendant because it was therapeutic, had a psychiatrist in the main office, and every service requested could be provided on-site. On July 20, 2010, the court ordered defendant to attend parenting skills classes and continue in the NJM program.

Sonia remained with C.E., who initially considered adopting the child, but later changed her mind. In September 2010, the Division placed Sonia in the foster home of N.M. and A.M.

Through the NJM program, defendant was placed in three different homes over a period of six months. Each foster parent eventually requested defendant's removal due to her aggressive and violent behavior towards the foster family, particularly the other children in the home, as well as breaches of curfew, periodic disappearances from the home, and her general disrespect and disregard for others.

Specifically, on May 24, 2010, defendant was placed with S.B. because S.B. was a cancer survivor and defendant would be the only child in the home. The Division and PEI Kids provided visits with Sonia in S.B.'s home. Defendant lived with S.B. until September 2010 when she was removed.

In September 2010, the Division placed defendant in R.T.'s home.7 On October 31, 2010, R.T. requested that the Division remove defendant from her home.

The Division placed defendant in a third home with B.B. Defendant began disappearing from the home, which caused breaks in visitation with Sonia from October 2010 to January 2011. During this time, defendant had altercations with a Project Teach student and a teacher. On December 10, 2010, B.B. gave the Program thirty days' notice to remove defendant from her home.

By January 2011, defendant was no longer welcome in the NJM program. On January 11, 2011, the court entered default against defendant for noncompliance for leaving the NJM program and not apprising the Division of her address. The judge ordered that defendant provide proof of stable, independent housing, attend full-time school, obtain full-time employment or the equivalent, and maintain her address and phone number with the Division. Further, the judge ordered that defendant complete individual therapy, anger management, and parenting classes, and maintain medication monitoring. In addition, the judge ordered the Division to assist defendant in continuing in Project Teach.

On March 22, 2011, the Division presented its plan for termination of parental rights and an adoption hearing, but the court rejected the plan because defendant and her attorney were not present in court.

On June 14, 2011, the judge accepted the Division's plan for termination of parental rights followed by adoption over defendant's request for reunification. The Division was ordered to file a guardianship complaint within sixty days, as well as continue providing services for anger management, individual counseling, medication monitoring, and parenting skills classes. Again, the judge ordered that defendant attend school full-time or maintain full-time employment or its equivalent, as well as provide proof of stable, independent housing and maintain her address and phone number with the Division.

During the trial in November 2011, Dr. Becker-Mattes testified regarding her psychological evaluation of defendant, the September 1, 2011 bonding evaluation between Sonia and her foster family, and the September 8, 2011 bonding evaluation between defendant and Sonia.8 Dr. Becker-Mattes concluded, within a reasonable degree of psychological certainty, that based on defendant's inability to benefit from therapeutic services, her acting out and disturbed behavior, troubled interpersonal relationships, noncompliance with psychopharmacological treatments for her psychological problems, questionable ability to parent a child, and the results of her psychological evaluation, defendant could not be seen as an appropriate caretaker now or at any time in the foreseeable future.

Dr. Becker-Mattes opined that Sonia's foster family loves her and has expressed a strong interest in adopting the child. She testified that Sonia responded positively to her foster parents and the two adults, and Sonia functioned well together in a collaborative and mutually satisfying manner. She then opined that a strong, positive bond exists between them. Dr. Becker-Mattes concluded within a reasonable degree of psychological certainty that it is very likely that Sonia would be harmed if removed from her foster parents' home.

As to defendant and Sonia, Dr. Becker-Mattes concluded that there was evidence that a positive relationship exists. She, however, had serious reservations about defendant's ability to independently care for Sonia. She concluded that defendant is unable to supply a child with the necessary safety, security, nurturance, and guidance that are crucial to healthy development.

Dr. Becker-Mattes finally concluded that Sonia would suffer serious and enduring harm if she were removed from her foster home regardless of whether contact with defendant continued or was terminated.

In determining that the Division satisfied the four prongs for termination of parental rights, the court made the following findings.

As to the first prong, the court found:

The record is full of instances in which [Sonia] was put at risk due to [defendant's] actions and inactions. . . . [Defendant] has created and continues to create bad relationships, continues to use drugs, and exhibits bad behavior. The risk factors that were present when this case began in 2008, including [a] bad relationship with her mother, unemployment, unstable housing, and bad behavior, continue to be risk factors today. She has shown no progress in remedying these risk factors. . . .

 

She showed no remorse when talking about these altercations. She did not regret anything about these fights . . . . It appears that [defendant] does not understand that the problems associated with her behavior, and therefore is not attempting to make any changes to improve her violent behavior.

 

. . . .

 

The bad decisions that [defendant] has made throughout this case evidences that [she] is unable to put [Sonia's] needs first.

 

As to the second prong, the court found:

[Defendant] is unwilling or unable to eliminate the harm facing the child and is unable to provide a safe and stable home for the child. The delay of permanent placement will add to the harm. The harm facing [Sonia] was remedied in the past because [Sonia] was not in the care of [defendant]. . . . [Defendant] does not have stable housing of her own. She has never paid rent or owned a residence. . . . [Defendant] has left every placement she has been in after a few months. . . . While it would be a good thing for [defendant] to find a safe haven in her godparents and be able to turn her life around with them, there is no support for the indication that this will happen. To return [Sonia] to her care based on the belief that [defendant] will continue to reside and receive the support of her godparents would be asking the [c]ourt to ignore [defendant's] history within this case. . . .

 

[Defendant] does not take responsibility for her actions. What is telling in this case is that [defendant] does not understand what her problems are as a parent. She stated there is nothing wrong with how she parents [Sonia]. She does not seem to realize that being unemployed, having no housing, and not availing herself of the services provided to her are indications of bad parenting. . . . She has never put [Sonia] first.

 

. . . .

 

[Defendant] has not followed through with any of the services provided to her. [Defendant] was referred to every service she has asked for. In January 2011, [defendant] informed the [c]ourt that she did not want to be referred to any more services. She stated that she would get her own services. However, [defendant] did not follow through with this plan. . . . She was not able to obtain services on her own.

[Defendant] testified that she gets too overwhelmed . . . to remember to call and confirm her visits with [Sonia] through PEI Kids. . . . Furthermore, [defendant] has shown that she is not mature enough to parent a child. . . . During the times that [Sonia] was in [defendant's] care, [defendant] was never the only caregiver. . . . There is sufficient evidence to show that [defendant] is unable to care for [Sonia] at this time.

 

As to the third prong, the court found that

[t]he Division has met an incredible standard of reasonable efforts in this case. Not only did the Division provide for every service that was ordered and requested throughout the three years of this case, the Division assisted [defendant] in her recovery from brain cancer. . . . Despite the fact that [defendant] was provided all of these services, [defendant] has stated that there is nothing she needs to change. She does not believe that she needs additional parenting classes. . . . [Defendant] was held in default in January 2011 for failure to comply with services. The default was never lifted because she never complied with services. . . . [T]he Division has continued to provide [defendant] with services for over [three] years in the case.

 

. . . .

A KLG arrangement is not appropriate here because adoption is feasible and likely. The foster parents are willing to adopt her. A custody arrangement is not feasible in this situation because the foster parents are not comfortable with unsupervised visitation with [defendant]. . . . When [defendant] misses visits with [Sonia], her daughter could be disappointed and upset. There is no indication that [defendant] will be consistent in her visitation in the future. Further, if such a custody arrangement were made, the foster parents would be made a target for [defendant]. [Defendant] has made several threats to others in the past. For these reasons[,] a custody arrangement is not feasible in this case.

 

As to the fourth and final prong, the court found that

 

termination will not do more harm than good. . . . Dr. Becker-Mattes claims it would cause irreparable harm if [Sonia] were to be returned to [defendant] because [defendant] would be unable to cope with [Sonia's] loss of her foster parents. Alternatively, . . . the foster parents are able to cope with [Sonia's] loss of her mother. . . . [Sonia] is over three years old. She is in need of stability. Prolonging the finality would only cause harm to [Sonia]. . . .

 

On appeal, defendant raises the following issues:

POINT I: [DEFENDANT'S] CONSTITUTIONALLY PROTECTED RIGHTS WERE VIOLATED AS THE DECISION TERMINATING HER PARENTAL RIGHTS WAS DIRECTLY BASED UPON HEARSAY AND OTHER UNRELIABLE EVIDENCE AND SHE WAS DENIED FAIR NOTICE OF THE STATE'S CASE AGAINST HER.

 

A. Documents Not Properly Admitted as [Division] Records.

 

1) Crossroads Letters and Discharge Report.

 

2) Handwritten Letters From

Foster Mother.

 

B. Hearsay Testimony by Caseworker Burns.

 

C. Untrustworthy Reports of Non-Testifying Experts.

 

D. Historical [Division] Reports Involving [Defendant's] Mother.

 

POINT II: THE DECISION TERMINATING [DEFENDANT'S] PARENTAL RIGHTS WAS ERRONEOUS BECAUSE THE TRIAL COURT'S FACTUAL FINDINGS ARE NOT OBJECTIVELY SUSTAINABLE ON THE RECORD BELOW AND THE TRIAL COURT MISAPPLIED THE STATUTORY CRITERIA IN CONCLUDING THE FOUR PRONGS OF N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15 AND [N.J.S.A.] 30:4C-15.1 WERE MET.

 

(1) The Trial Court's Finding that [Defendant] Has Harmed Sonia Within the Meaning of N.J.S.A 30:4C-15.1(a)(1) is Not Objectively Sustainable on the Record Below.

 

a) Creates and Continues to

Create Bad Relationships;

 

b) Continues to Use Drugs;

 

c) Bad Decisions and Behavior.

 

(2) The Trial Court's Finding That [Defendant] Was Unwilling or Unable to Eliminate Harm Facing Sonia Within the Meaning of the Statute is Not Objectively Sustainable and There Was No Evidence [That] Delay in Permanent Placement Had or Would Cause Harm to Sonia.

 

(3) The Trial Court's Finding That [the Division] Made Reasonable Efforts Toward Reunification in Compliance With the Statutory Criteria is Not Objectively Sustainable and the Court Did Not Fully Consider Alternatives to Termination of Parental Rights.

 

a) The Trial Court Did Not Fully Consider Alternatives to Termination of Parental Rights.

 

(4) There is Inadequate Basis in the Record to Support the Trial Court's Finding That Termination of [Defendant's] Parental Rights Would Not Do More Harm Than Good.

 

We find no merit in these contentions.

The New Jersey Supreme Court has established the standard of review in parental termination cases:

Our task as an appellate court is to determine whether the decision of the family court in terminating parental rights is supported by substantial and credible evidence on the record. We accord deference to factfindings of the family court because it has the superior ability to gauge the credibility of the witnesses who testify before it and because it possesses special expertise in matters related to the family. . . . We will not overturn a family court's factfindings unless they are so wide of the mark that our intervention is necessary to correct an injustice. It is not our place to second-guess or substitute our judgment for that of the family court, provided that the record contains substantial and credible evidence to support the decision to terminate parental rights.

 
[N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. F.M., 211 N.J. 420, 448-49 (2012) (citations omitted).]

 

The Supreme Court "ha[s] consistently imposed strict standards for the termination of parental rights." In re Guardianship of K.H.O., 161 N.J. 337, 347 (1999) (citations omitted). When seeking the termination of a parent's rights pursuant to N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a), the Division has the burden of establishing, by clear and convincing proof, the following factors:

(1) The child's safety, health or development has been or will continue to be endangered by the parental relationship;
 
(2) The parent is unwilling or unable to eliminate the harm facing the child or is unable or unwilling to provide a safe and stable home for the child and the delay of permanent placement will add to the harm. Such harm may include evidence that separating the child from his resource family parents would cause serious and enduring emotional or psychological harm to the child;

 
(3) The [D]ivision has made reasonable efforts to provide services to help the parent correct the circumstances which led to the child's placement outside the home and the court has considered alternatives to termination of parental rights; and
 
(4) Termination of parental rights will not do more harm than good.

 

These "four prongs are not discrete and separate, but relate to and overlap with one another to provide a comprehensive standard that identifies a child's best interests." F.M., supra, 211 N.J. at 448 (citations omitted).

"Parental rights, though fundamentally important, are not absolute. The constitutional protection surrounding family rights is tempered by the State's parens patriae responsibility to protect the welfare of children." K.H.O., supra, 161 N.J. at 347 (citing In re Guardianship of J.C., 129 N.J. 1, 10 (1992)). Applying these standards, we find that the contentions raised in the appeal have no merit. We affirm substantially for the reasons expressed by Judge Anklowitz in his comprehensive seventy-five page opinion. We add only the following comments.

Defendant argues that the trial court improperly admitted and relied on hearsay and other unreliable evidence. In particular, defendant challenges the reliance upon certain records of the Crossroads and NJM programs, reports prepared by Dr. Gordon and Dr. Baruch, and Division records pertaining to L.B., defendant, and her siblings. As to all of the evidentiary challenges, we disagree.

The Appellate Division reviews the trial court's evidentiary rulings for an abuse of discretion. Estate of Hanges v. Metro. Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 202 N.J. 369, 382-84 (2010); Hisenaj v. Kuehner, 194 N.J. 6, 12 (2008).

Rule 5:12-4(d) allows the Division to submit into evidence reports prepared by staff personnel or professional consultants "provided the documents satisfy the requirements of the business records exception, N.J.R.E. 803(c)(6) and 801(d)." N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. M.G., 427 N.J. Super. 154, 173 (App. Div. 2012); see also N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. B.M., 413 N.J. Super. 118, 129 (App. Div. 2010). N.J.R.E. 803(c)(6) provides the definition of a business record constituting an exception to the hearsay rule:

A statement contained in writing or other record of acts, events, conditions, . . . made at or near the time of observation by a person with actual knowledge or from information supplied by such a person, [is admissible] if the writing or other record was made in the regular course of business and it was the regular practice of that business to make it, unless the sources of information or the method, purpose or circumstances of preparation indicate that it is not trustworthy.

Further, N.J.R.E. 801(d) provides that a "business includes every kind of business, institution, association, profession, occupation and calling, whether or not conducted for profit, and also includes activities of governmental agencies."

Under these evidence rules, a party seeking to introduce a hearsay statement under the business record exception

must demonstrate that "the writing [was] made in the regular course of business," the writing was "prepared within a short time of the act, condition or event being described," and "the source of the information and the method and circumstances of the preparation of the writing must justify allowing it into evidence."
 
[N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. M.C. III, 201 N.J. 328, 347 (2010) (quoting State v. Matulewicz, 101 N.J. 27, 29 (1985)).]

 

Moreover, N.J.R.E. 803(c)(6) expressly subjects the admissibility of opinions and diagnoses contained in otherwise admissible business records to the added requirements of N.J.R.E. 808, which provides:

Expert opinion which is included in an admissible hearsay statement shall be excluded if the declarant has not been produced as a witness unless the trial judge finds that the circumstances involved in rendering the opinion, including the motive, duty, and interest of the declarant, whether litigation was contemplated by the declarant, the complexity of the subject matter, and the likelihood of accuracy of the opinion, tend to establish its trustworthiness.
 

Defendant asserts that the judge erred in allowing a package of documents into evidence from Crossroads, namely two letters dated November 17, 2009, and May 5, 2010, that were addressed "To Whom It May Concern," and a discharge report from Crossroads titled, "Group Home Discharge Plan & Summary."9 Defendant also objects to a package of documents from the NJM program that included handwritten notes by a foster mother. She complains that a foster mother does not qualify as an affiliated consultant of the Division under N.J.R.E. 801(d).

In his opinion, the judge found that of the fifty exhibits the State moved into evidence, many were admitted as business records that the Division prepared or reports from outside sources. The Division relied on those outside records in order to provide services to defendant. Additionally, the court explained that with regard to the Division records pertaining to L.B.,

this evidence is needed in order to show the dangerous environment that surrounded [L.B.] . . . [T]his evidence was admitted and used solely for the purpose of describing the relationship between [defendant] and [L.B.], providing procedural history and to determine the extend of reasonable efforts needed in this case.

 

The Appellate Division often has found Division records to be reliable and admissible evidence. In In re Guardianship of Cope, 106 N.J. Super. 336, 343-44 (App. Div. 1969), the court explained:

[T]he Bureau [of Children's Services, the predecessor agency of the Division10] should be permitted to submit into evidence . . . reports by Bureau staff personnel (or affiliated, medical, psychiatric, or psychological consultants), prepared from their own first-hand knowledge of the case, at a time reasonably contemporaneous with the facts they relate and in the usual course of their duties with the Bureau.

 

Reports of this type, prepared by the qualified personnel of a state agency charged with the responsibility for overseeing the welfare of children in the State, supply a reasonably high degree of reliability as to the accuracy of the facts contained therein. The parent remains free to offer evidence contradicting any statements present in such reports, and, of course, the trier of the facts may in his discretion call for live testimony on any point.

 

Such reports can be admissible pursuant to Rule 5:12-4(d), which permits the Division to admit into evidence the reports of its "professional consultants." See M.C. III, supra, 201 N.J. at 347. Other documents that are part of the agency's file could be admissible as business records. Id. at 346-48.

The record reflects that Crossroads and NJM were consultants to the Division and provided services by referral. As such, the records and reports they prepared are admissible under Rule 5:12-4(d).

Finally, defendant contends that the court erred in admitting the expert reports of Drs. Gordon and Baruch without the opportunity to cross-examine them. While defendant is correct that Judge Anklowitz allowed one report by Dr. Baruch and three by Dr. Gordon to be admitted into evidence, there is a sound basis for that ruling.

In M.G., supra, 427 N.J. Super. at 172-75, the court addressed the trial judge's decision, over the defendant's objection, to permit the Division to rely on written reports of psychologists without requiring the Division to produce the experts for cross-examination. The court stated that "Rule 5:12-4(d) permits the Division to introduce reports by staff personnel or professional consultants into evidence provided the documents satisfy the requirements of the business records exception, N.J.R.E. 803(c)(6) and 801(d)." Id. at 173 (citation omitted). Here, it is clear that Drs. Gordon and Baruch conducted a series of tests on defendant and met with her prior to writing their reports. As such, these reports constitute business records that Dr. Becker-Mattes could rely upon.

Upon review of the record, we are satisfied that the judge carefully considered Dr. Becker-Mattes' testimony, which was based in part on the reports Drs. Gordon and Baruch prepared. The judge concluded therefrom "that the reports were a textbook example of documents that experts in the field rely on in conducting an analysis." As a whole, we conclude that Judge Anklowitz did not abuse his discretion in rendering his evidentiary rulings and admitting these documents into the record.

A

ffirmed.

1 The Division of Youth and Family Services is now known as the Division of Child Protection and Permanency. L. 2012, c. 16, eff. June 29, 2012.

2 In light of the sensitive issues involved, we refer to all parties by fictitious names. R. 1:38-3(d).

3 On August 25, 2009, the Division filed an amended complaint.

4

On February 9, 2010, Judge Lawrence P. De Bello determined that the removal of defendant from her mother's home was necessary to avoid ongoing risk to her life, safety, or health because defendant "has a medical condition that requires surgery and [L.B.] failed to attend a necessary medical appointment and consent to anesthesia." Further, the order states that the Division is granted custody, care, and supervision of defendant, and that the Division is to continue care and supervision of Sonia, with legal custody remaining with defendant. The order also pertained to defendant's siblings.

5 Piercy documented questionable behavior involving a twenty-five-year-old male, poor behavior at school, including cursing at a teacher, stealing from a store, violence involving other girls at school, smoking marijuana, blacking out and physically attacking C.E., suicidal thoughts, grabbing a knife off the counter, and arguments with C.E. Piercy questioned whether defendant could take care of Sonia and concluded that defendant lacked patience and attentiveness, and was not ready for independent living.

6

H.H. waived his right to further notification of court proceedings, including those addressing his parental rights. On November 18, 2011, the judge orally terminated H.H.'s parental rights.

7 On September 28, 2010, the court ordered that defendant was not to leave the NJM program without the court's permission.

8 The Division relied on these evaluations to support its plan for the adoption of Sonia by her foster family.

9 Caseworker Burns testified about the Crossroads and NJM records and defendant substantiated the veracity of the records through her admissions when she testified.

10 See L. 1979, c. 208 (specific language formerly codified at N.J.S.A. 30:4C-2). L. 2012, c. 16 substituted "Division of Child Protection and Permanency" for "Division of Youth and Family Services" throughout the section and deleted "successor to the 'Bureau of Children's Services.'"