NEW JERSEY DIVISION OF YOUTH AND FAMILY SERVICES V. P.H.

RECORD IMPOUNDED

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-1935-11T1

NEW JERSEY DIVISION OF YOUTH

AND FAMILY SERVICES,1

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

P.H.,

Defendant-Appellant.
_______________________________________________

IN THE MATTER OF M.H. AND X.H., Minors.

_______________________________________________

May 17, 2013

Argued January 9, 2013 - Decided

Before Judges Ashrafi, Hayden and Lisa.

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Chancery Division, Family Part, Passaic County, Docket No. FN-16-44-10.

Sarah L. Monaghan, Designated Counsel, argued the cause for appellant (Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney; Ms. Monaghan, on the brief).

Shona L. Mack, Deputy Attorney General, argued the cause for respondent (Jeffrey S. Chiesa, Attorney General, attorney; Andrea M. Silkowitz, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel; Ms. Mack, on the brief).

Caitlin McLaughlin, Designated Counsel, argued the cause for minors M.H. and X.H. (Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, Law Guardian, attorney; Ms. McLaughlin, on the brief).

PER CURIAM

This is an appeal from a Title Nine2 protective services proceeding. Following the September 28, 2011 order dismissing the Title Nine complaint, defendant P.H. (Pam),3 appeals from (1) a July 7, 2011 Family Part order finding that she had abused and neglected her children, M.H. (Michael) and X.H. (Xia), (2) the August 17, 2011 permanency order, and (3) the voluntary dismissal order. For the reasons that follow, we reverse the finding of abuse and neglect and dismiss the remaining issues as moot.

We discern the following facts from the record. The Division first became involved with Pam in August 2009 when the police brought Pam, three-month-old Michael, and D.H. (Daniel), the child s father, to Chilton Hospital because of the parents erratic behavior. Pam, who had a history of psychiatric treatment for bipolar disorder and schizophrenia, was admitted to the hospital with a diagnosis of paranoid schizophrenia. Daniel, who had a history of schizophrenia and substance abuse, was not admitted and returned home with Michael. However, the hospital contacted the Division due to safety concerns about the baby.

Initially, the Division determined that Michael appeared to be doing well, but, because of Daniel's past drug abuse, sent him for a substance abuse evaluation. At the evaluation, he reportedly told the evaluator that he regularly heard voices. The evaluator conveyed this information to the Division, which became concerned for the child's safety and, immediately removed the child from the home and the custody of the parents. The Division administratively substantiated both parents for abuse and neglect against Michael.

Pam remained hospitalized for almost three months. Thereafter, she began taking her medication again and her mental health improved. At the January 14, 2010 fact-finding hearing, where only the Division caseworker testified, the trial judge found that the Division had not presented competent evidence that Daniel had made statements that he was hearing voices or had engaged in any behavior that put the child at a substantial risk of harm. He concluded that the Division had not proven abuse and neglect by either parent under N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.21(c)(4). The judge returned the child to his mother's custody but ordered the Division's case to remain open for "care and supervision" and to provide "wrap-around" services to Pam and the child in their home. Because Daniel had recently tested positive for marijuana and cocaine, he was not allowed to live with the child or have unsupervised visitation until he had addressed his substance abuse.

For the next several months Pam appeared to be doing well. In August 2010, the Division suspected that Pam was pregnant, although she denied it. Without telling the Division, when she realized she was pregnant Pam had ceased taking Risperdal and Seroquel, medications prescribed by her psychiatrist for her mental illness. Xia was born in late August 2010 and was soon released from the hospital to live with Pam.

On September 7, 2010, Pam sent a series of text messages to her case manager at Resources for Human Development (RHD), an agency providing Pam with social services. The messages contained assertions that her apartment was bugged, that she could hear someone speaking the words that she was typing, and that a nearby lawn mower was creating an intolerable odor. The RHD case manager went to Pam's residence and tried unsuccessfully to convince her to go to the hospital.

Alerted by the case manager, two Division caseworkers visited the home on September 9, 2010. Pam's mother was also present. Pam informed the caseworkers that, based upon medical advice, she was not taking her medication. The Division and the family came to an agreement that Pam and the children would temporarily live with the maternal grandmother. The next day, Pam was involuntarily committed after a violent episode at the maternal grandmother's home in the presence of the children.

A few days later, Pam's sister came to the Division's office saying the family was unable to care for Pam's children. The Division performed an emergency removal of both children later that day. On September 15, 2010, the Division filed an order to show cause and amended verified complaint for custody of the children. Pam's counsel waived his client's right to have a full hearing on the order to show cause, advising the court that "there is no doubt that she was in a mental health situation at the time of the removal of the children. And there was nobody else available to take care of them at that point." At the time, Daniel was living in New York City and participating in substance abuse treatment.

The fact-finding hearing scheduled for December 22, 2010 was rescheduled because Pam was receiving inpatient psychiatric treatment and was not stable enough to appear, even by phone. Instead, the judge held a compliance hearing, during which Daniel made a voluntary general surrender of his parental rights to both children and was dismissed from the litigation.

Also at the compliance hearing, Pam's attorney questioned her ability to participate in the proceedings and requested that the judge appoint a guardian ad litem on her behalf. Three weeks later, after the defense attorney again questioned his client's competency, the judge appointed one. At the fact-finding hearing on June 16, 2011, the guardian ad litem reported that she had met with Pam and reviewed the records. She concluded that Pam understood the nature of the proceedings, was able to cooperate with her attorney, and, as long as she continued to take her medication, was competent to participate.

During the fact-finding hearing, the Division provided testimony of its caseworker and admitted into evidence the Division screening summary and Pam's psychiatric hospitalization records from three hospitals. The caseworker testified that in August 2010 she learned that Pam had stopped taking her prescribed medication on advice of her doctor. The caseworker did not recall speaking to Pam s obstetrician but spoke to her midwife, who reported that Pam had participated fully in her prenatal care.

Pam testified that when she learned that she was pregnant with Xia, she stopped taking the prescribed medication on the advice of her obstetrician, Dr. Andrew Garber. She stated that he informed her that her medications were harmful to her child as they could cause birth defects. According to Pam, she made the decision after talking to Dr. Garber because "as a mother, I did not feel as if it would be good to take those strong medications for my baby." Pam reported that she had brought a letter from the doctor to the caseworker in September 2010 explaining her cessation of medication. Pam attempted to introduce into evidence a copy of Dr. Garber s letter but, because it was not signed, the judge did not permit her to do so.

In his summation, defense counsel argued that because Pam stopped taking the medication for a good reason and never harmed her children, she should not be found to have abused and neglected them. The Division s attorney argued, while not attributing fault to Pam, that "she stopped taking medication, whether it was motivated for good reasons or not is beside the point. The point is, when she stopped taking the medication she put her children at risk of harm because she is unable to control her illness without it." The Law Guardian articulated a similar argument.

The trial judge scheduled a hearing to deliver his decision on July 7, 2011. Before he began giving his decision, defense counsel offered a signed copy of a letter from Dr. Garber, dated June 27, 2011, stating that it was his medical opinion that "[Pam] not take any psychiatric medication for the safety of her unborn fetus and remain drug free throughout this pregnancy." The judge read part of the letter into the record.

In finding that the Division satisfied its burden of demonstrating that Michael and Xia were abused or neglected children pursuant to N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.21(c), the trial judge relied upon hospital records from Pam's 2009 and 2010 psychiatric admissions, which reported that Pam suffered from serious mental illness. The judge found a "continuing theme" in Pam's records of discontinuing her medication "without medical advice." He found further evidence of this "continuing theme" in Dr. Garber's unsigned letter, in which Dr. Garber indicated that Pam was already "off all psychiatric medication" at the time of her first appointment with him on March 8, 2010. The judge found "no evidence that any other medical professional . . . took her off the medication." Rather, he found that Pam used pregnancy as an excuse to stop her medication "without the evidence of medical advice to that effect." He also noted that there was no evidence that Dr. Garber consulted with Pam s treating psychologists to determine the seriousness of her mental illness or her need for the medication. Based upon these fact-findings, the trial judge determined that by stopping her medication, Pam voluntarily repeated the downward spiral of her mental illness, thereby placing her children at a substantial risk of harm.

The judge held the permanency hearing on August 17, 2011 to determine whether to approve or disapprove the Division's permanency plan of termination of parental rights followed by adoption. At this point, Michael had been out of his parents' care for fifteen of the last twenty-two months and Xia had been in placement for eleven months. In arguing in favor of its plan, the Division's attorney relied on the report of its consultant, Dr. Donna LoBiondo, concerning Pam's May 24, 2011 psychological evaluation, which was provided to the judge and all counsel in advance of the hearing. She also highlighted the history of defendant's non-compliance with services and lack of cooperation as discussed in previous compliance hearings. The Law Guardian supported the Division's plan. Defense counsel argued that Pam had been compliant with medication and had recently started therapy. The judge approved the plan of termination of parental rights for both children and ordered the Division to file a guardianship complaint.

On September 28, 2011, the Division initiated the guardianship proceeding,4 and at the request of the Division the judge dismissed the Title Nine proceeding. This appeal followed.

On appeal, defendant raises the following contentions for our consideration:

I. THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDING OF ABUSE/NEGLECT MUST BE REVERSED BECAUSE IT IS NOT BASED ON SUBSTANTIAL CREDIBLE EVIDENCE.

II. THE COURT'S CONCLUSION THAT DYFS MET THE HIGHER BURDEN OF CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE IS NOT SUPPORTED BY THE WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE AND MUST BE REVERSED.

III. THE COURT'S FINDING THAT DYFS HAD PROVED ABUSE/NEGLECT BY CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE DOES NOT MEET THE REQUIREMENTS OF [N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. R.D., 207 N.J. 88 (2011)] AND IS NOT ENTITLED TO PRECLUSIVE EFFECT IN ANY SUBSEQUENT GUARDIANSHIP ACTION.

IV. INNUMERABLE PROCEDURAL ERRORS DEPRIVED DEFENDANT OF HER CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, DUE PROCESS AND A FAIR TRIAL.

A. Trial Court's Rulings at the Permanency Hearing and Subsequent Hearing to Dismiss the FN Litigation Not Entitled to Any Deference from Appellate Court Because No Evidence Was Introduced and No Sworn Testimony Was Taken at That Stage of the Proceedings.

B. Parent's Right to Raise Her Children is a Fundamental Constitutional Right That Cannot Be Interfered With Without Strict Adherence to Due Process.

C. At the Permanency Hearing and at the Hearing at Which It Terminated the FN Litigation, the Court Improperly Relied on the DAG's Representations Rather Than Testimony of Sworn Witnesses, Expert Opinion, Documentary Evidence, or Any Other Reliable Forms of Evidence.

The court's power "to remove children from the custody of their parents must be exercised with scrupulous adherence to procedural safeguards." N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. J.Y., 352 N.J. Super. 245, 261 (App. Div. 2002). These safeguards are designed to serve two functions: to protect innocent parents against government interference with their fundamental right to parent and to spare children unnecessary emotional trauma. Ibid. Yet, the Division and the courts need not wait until a child is actually harmed by parental inattention or neglect before it acts in the welfare of the child. N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. V.M., 408 N.J. Super. 222, 236 (App. Div. 2099) (citing In re Guardianship of D.M.H., 161 N.J. 365, 383 (1999)).

The Division brought this case under Title Nine, N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.21 to -8.73, the statute covering non-criminal abuse and neglect of children. Title Nine requires that, after a child has been temporarily removed from his or her parent's custody, a fact-finding hearing must be held to determine whether the Division has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that the child was abused or neglected. N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.44. The evidence presented at a fact-finding hearing must be competent, material and relevant. N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.46(b)(2).

An "abused or neglected" child is defined as one who is less than eighteen years of age and

whose physical, mental, or emotional condition has been impaired or is in imminent danger of becoming impaired as the result of the failure of his parent or guardian . . . to exercise a minimum degree of care (a) in supplying the child with adequate food, clothing, shelter, education, medical or surgical care though financially able to do so or though offered financial or other reasonable means to do so, or (b) in providing the child with proper supervision or guardianship, by unreasonably inflicting or allowing to be inflicted harm, or substantial risk thereof . . . .

[N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.21(c)(4).]

In determining whether action or inaction constitutes abuse or neglect, the court must base its decision on the totality of the circumstances. N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. V.T., 423 N.J. Super. 320, 329 (App. Div. 2011). An inquiry under N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.21 should focus on the harm to the child, rather than on the intent of the caregiver, in order to allow the Division to properly "protect children from a wide range of conduct that clearly qualifies as neglect." G.S. v. Dep't of Human Servs., 157 N.J. 161, 180-81 (1999). In G.S., the Court explained that "[t]he phrase 'minimum degree of care' denotes . . . . something more than ordinary negligence" and "refers to conduct that is grossly or wantonly negligent, but not necessarily intentional." Id. at 178. The essence of gross or wanton negligence is that it "implies that a person has acted with reckless disregard for the safety of others." Id. at 179 (citations omitted). Thus, a guardian fails to exercise a minimum degree of care when he or she is aware of the dangers inherent in a situation and fails adequately to supervise the child or recklessly creates a risk of serious injury to the child. Id. at 181.

The scope of our review of a trial court's factual findings is limited. N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. M.M., 189 N.J. 261, 278 (2007). These findings may not be disturbed unless "they are so manifestly unsupported by or inconsistent with the competent, relevant and reasonably credible evidence as to offend the interests of justice." Rova Farms Resort, Inc. v. Investors Ins. Co. of Am., 65 N.J. 474, 484 (1974). Moreover, "[b]ecause of the family courts' special jurisdiction and expertise in family matters, appellate courts should accord deference to family court factfinding." N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs v. M.C. III, 201 N.J. 328, 343 (2010) (quoting Cesare v. Cesare, 154 N.J. 394, 413 (1998)). "Where the issue to be decided is an 'alleged error in the trial judge s evaluation of the underlying facts and the implications to be drawn therefrom,' we expand the scope of our review." N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. G.L., 191 N.J. 596, 605 (2007) (quoting In re Guardianship of J.T., 269 N.J. Super. 172, 188-89 (App. Div. 1993)). The trial judge's legal conclusions and the application of those conclusions to the facts are subject to plenary review. Manalapan Realty, L.P. v. Twp. Comm. of Manalapan, 140 N.J. 366, 378 (1995).

The narrow issue now before us regarding the trial judge's finding of abuse and neglect is whether Pam acted "with reckless disregard for the safety of others" when she stopped taking her psychotropic medication on the advice of her obstetrician. Put differently, was Pam grossly and wantonly negligent in deciding to risk deterioration of her own mental health to prevent harm to the fetus she was carrying? We think not.

There is no question that untreated mental illness, resulting, as in Pam s case, in loss of touch with reality or even in paranoid hallucinations, can pose a substantial risk of harm to a child. See N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. F.M., 211 N.J. 420, 450-51 (2012) (noting that while mental illness alone does not disqualify a parent from raising a child, refusal to treat the illness can pose a real threat to a child); N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. A.G., 344 N.J. Super. 418, 440 (2001) (finding that mental illness may render parents unable to care for their child safely, without fault on the parents' part), certif. denied, 171 N.J. 44 (2002). However, here, Pam's treating obstetrician advised her that taking her medication posed a risk of harm to her unborn child. The trial judge accepted that Dr. Garber gave Pam that advice but disregarded its significance because she had ceased taking the medication when she learned she was pregnant and because the doctor did not consult with Pam s treating psychiatrist. We do not find these facts to override the importance of Pam s decision to heed her doctor s warning, even if made shortly after she had ceased the medication.

The Division argues that it does not matter what Pam s motivation was, as the actor s intention is not an issue when determining gross and wanton negligence. The Division did not contact Dr. Garber to confirm his reported warning or to ascertain his reasons for giving such advice to his patient. Moreover, the Division did not provide any expert testimony challenging the doctor s basic premise that Pam s medications, Risperdal and Seroquel, may be harmful to an unborn child or providing an informed analysis of the risks versus the benefits of each medication to a pregnant woman. Nor does the record contain any evidence that Dr. Garber was not a licensed obstetrician or was otherwise unqualified to render medical advice to his pregnant patient.

Based upon the sparse record before us, we are unable to find sufficient competent evidence in the record that Pam engaged in willful and wanton misconduct by following her physician s advice in order to prevent harm to the fetus. We agree with the Division that, depending on the circumstances, a person s cessation of prescribed medication which resulted in increased symptoms of mental illness putting a child at harm may be abuse and neglect under N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.21. Here, the circumstances were that Pam stopped taking her medications when she became pregnant, and she continued not to take them while breastfeeding her newborn infant.

The Division bore the burden of proving that Pam's decision, whether with or without medical advice, was reckless or unreasonable. It did not offer any evidence that the medications in fact presented no risk of harm to the fetus or the breastfeeding infant. The trial judge referred to a notation in the hospital records that Pam's perception of harm was "an erroneous statement," but that notation was inadmissible hearsay from an unknown source, and also too vague to support such an important medical conclusion in the circumstances of this case.

We recognize, as the trial judge noted, that Pam has a history of failure to take her medication, resulting in several psychiatric hospitalizations. However, in this discrete instance, Pam faced a Hobson s choice of taking the medication and possibly harming the fetus versus not taking the medication and possibly posing a risk of harm to both children. We cannot find that the Division has provided competent evidence, expert or otherwise, that Pam's choice was so reckless as to constitute abuse and neglect under Title Nine. Consequently, we reverse the finding of abuse and neglect and order that Pam s name be removed from the Division's Central Registry kept pursuant to N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.11.5

A finding that a parent has not abused or neglected a child, which requires a dismissal of the Title Nine action, N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.50(c), does not prevent the Division from protecting a child in need of services to ensure his or her safety and welfare. N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. A.L., 213 N.J. 1, 30-34 (2013). Recognizing that "the safety of children must always be paramount," the Legislature required the child welfare system "to provide services to at-risk children and families in order to prevent harm." N.J.S.A. 30:4C-1.1. Under N.J.S.A. 30:4C-12, "if 'it appears that the child requires care and supervision by the division or other action to ensure the health and safety of the child, the division may apply' for a court order 'placing the child under [its] care and supervision or custody . . . .'" N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. T.S., 426 N.J. Super. 54, 64-65 (App. Div. 2012).

Generally, when a judge does not find abuse and neglect under Title Nine, the judge dismisses the Title Nine litigation and, if warranted, holds a summary hearing to determine if it is in the child s best interest for the Division to remain involved with the child pursuant to N.J.S.A. 30:4C-12. Id. at 65. We note that at the initial hearing on the order to show cause, Pam s attorney acknowledged that grounds existed for the Division s intervention because she was hospitalized and Pam s family was unable to care for the children, which could well justify the Division's involvement under N.J.S.A. 30:4C-12. A.L., supra, 213 N.J. at 34 (noting that Section 12 "is triggered by the appearance that a child s welfare is endangered" despite lack of parental abuse and neglect). However, since the Title Nine complaint has been dismissed, we will not remand for a hearing under N.J.S.A. 30:4C-12 as it serves no useful purpose. T.S., supra, 426 N.J. Super. at 67.

Pam also contends that the permanency order and the voluntary dismissal order were entered after numerous procedural errors, which deprived her of a fair trial and violated her constitutional rights. Under Title Nine, all final orders are appealable. N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.70. Although a finding of abuse and neglect is an interim order, it may be appealed pursuant to N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.70, due to its lasting effects, such as inclusion in the Division's Central Registry. N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. A.P., 408 N.J. Super. 254, 263 (App. Div. 2009), certif. denied, 201 N.J. 153 (2010). By its very nature, an order entered after a permanency hearing is interlocutory as the case is still pending. An aggrieved party may challenge a trial court s interim order by moving for leave to appeal, R. 2:5-6, but Pam did not seek leave to appeal here.

Now that the Title Nine proceeding has been dismissed, we consider if interim orders entered in that proceeding are moot. Since the Division may bring a Title Thirty guardianship action without first filing a Title Nine action, see N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. K.M., 136 N.J. 546, 556 (1994), the Division had the authority to dismiss a pending Title Nine action when it brings the guardianship action. A.P., supra, 408 N.J. Super. at 261. Courts normally will not decide issues when a controversy no longer exists and the disputed matters have become moot, at least concerning the parties who initiated the litigation. Devesa v. Dorsey, 134 N.J. 420, 428 (1993). "An issue is 'moot' when the decision sought in a matter, when rendered, can have no practical effect on the existing controversy." A.P., supra, 408 N.J. Super. at 261 (quoting Greenfield v. N.J. Dep t of Corrs., 382 N.J. Super. 254, 257-58 (App. Div. 2006), certif. denied, 201 N.J. 153 (2010)). On the other hand, "if a party 'still suffers from the adverse consequences to her caused by [a] proceeding,' an appeal from an order in that proceeding is not moot." Id. at 261-62 (quoting Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. G.M., 398 N.J. Super. 21, 51 (App. Div. 2008), aff d as modified on other grounds, 198 N.J. 382, 387 (2009)).

The statutory provisions adopted to ensure the timely and permanent placement of children were "enacted to enable New Jersey to qualify for the continued federal funding of its child protection system" provided in the federal Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997 (ASFA), Pub. L. No. 105-89, 111 Stat. 2115 (1997) (codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.A.). See N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. A.R.G., 179 N.J. 264, 283 (2004). At the permanency hearing, the court s review and approval of the Division s plan for the permanent care of a child effectuates the "strong policy considerations that underscore the need to secure permanency and stability for the child without undue delay." D.M.H., supra, 161 N.J. at 385. The hearing is not an adjudication of parental rights or the Division s responsibilities. The order does not relieve the Division of its obligation to extend services to the parents or follow the mandates of Title Nine while the litigation is ongoing. However, once the Title Nine action is dismissed, an interim permanency order, which merely approves a plan, cannot be challenged as there is no longer a basis for relief.

The Division s voluntary dismissal of its Title Nine action "leaves the situation as far as procedures therein are concerned the same as though the suit had never been brought, thus vitiating and annulling all prior proceedings and orders in the case." A.P., supra, 408 N.J. Super. at 263 (citations omitted). Such a disposition, like the dismissal of any other action by a plaintiff under Rule 4:37-1, does not provide a final adjudication on the merits. Malhame v. Borough of Demarest, 174 N.J. Super. 28, 30 (App. Div. 1980) (citations omitted). Consequently, Pam s assertion of flawed procedural compliance is moot. The Division has filed an action for guardianship, which is subject to different burdens and standards of proof. See N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a) (stating a four-pronged test for termination of parental rights by clear and convincing evidence). The Division s filing of a Title Thirty order "supersedes any order entered in the Title [Nine] actions," A.P., supra, 408 N.J. Super. at 255, and moots the parent s appeal from all Title Nine orders, save findings of abuse and neglect, in the withdrawn Title Nine action.

Accordingly, we reverse as to the finding of abuse and neglect against Pam under N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.21(c)(4), order the Division to remove her name from the Division s Central Registry, and dismiss the remainder of the appeal as moot.

1 On June 29, 2012, the Governor signed into law A-3101, which reorganized the Department of Children and Families, which included the renaming of the Division as the Division of Child Protection and Permanency. L. 2012, c. 16, eff. June 29, 2012.

2 N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.21 to -8.73.

3 We use pseudonyms for the parents and children to protect their privacy.

4 The Division informed us by letter that the guardianship proceedings had been completed and the judge entered an order on January 9, 2013, terminating Pam's parental rights to both children and granting guardianship to the Division. That matter is not before us on appeal and we make no determination regarding the court's judgment in the guardianship case.

5 Because we reverse the finding of abuse and neglect, we do not address defendant s arguments in Points II and III.