TED M. ROSENBERG v. STATE OF NEW JERSEY DEPARTMENT OF LAW AND PUBLIC SAFETY, DIVISION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE
Annotate this CaseNOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-6440-08T3
TED M. ROSENBERG,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
and
GEORGE E. NORCROSS, III; MARK
NEISSER; HENRY CHUDZINSKI; R.
LOUIS GALLAGHER, II; JCA
ASSOCIATES, INC.; PHILADELPHIA
NEWSPAPERS, INC.; NEWARK MORNING
LEDGER COMPANY, publisher of
The Star Ledger; NEW YORK TIMES
COMPANY; RECORD OF BERGEN COUNTY;
BURLINGTON COUNTY TIMES and
COURIER-POST,
Plaintiffs-Intervenors-Respondents,
v.
STATE OF NEW JERSEY DEPARTMENT
OF LAW AND PUBLIC SAFETY, DIVISION
OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE and STATE OF
NEW JERSEY,
Defendant-Respondent.
_______________________________________________________________
Argued May 3, 2010 - Decided May 26, 2010
Before Judges Lisa, Baxter and Coburn.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New
Jersey, Law Division, Burlington County,
Docket No. L-147-05.
Ted M. Rosenberg, appellant, argued the
cause pro se.
Lisa Sarnoff Gochman, Deputy Attorney
General, argued the cause for respondent
State of New Jersey (Paula T. Dow, Attorney
General, attorney; Ms. Gochman, of counsel
and on the brief).
PER CURIAM
In Rosenberg v. New Jersey Department of Law and Public
Safety, Division of Criminal Justice,
396 N.J. Super. 565, 581
(App. Div. 2007) (Rosenberg I), we remanded to the Law Division
with instructions that the court should review anew the
documents plaintiff Ted M. Rosenberg had sought from defendant,
New Jersey Department of Law and Public Safety, Division of
Criminal Justice (DCJ). We concluded that the judge's August
28, 2006 letter opinion upholding DCJ's refusal to provide the
documents lacked specific factual findings and was so conclusory
as to frustrate appellate review. Ibid. Consequently, we
directed the judge upon remand to make detailed findings of fact
concerning the contents of the documents, to apply the Loigman
v. Kimmelman,
102 N.J. 98, 113 (1986), factors, and to provide
specific reasons, on a document-by-document basis, explaining
why each document was protected, or not protected, from
disclosure. Rosenberg I, supra,
396 N.J. Super. at 581.
We agree with plaintiff's contention that the remand
opinion issued on February 25, 2009, and adopted by order of
A-6440-08T3
2 August 11, 2009, falls short of satisfying the instructions we
issued in Rosenberg I. Consequently, we remand again and direct
the Law Division to issue an opinion that satisfies those
instructions.
I.
In our opinion in Rosenberg I, we set forth in considerable
detail the events leading up to plaintiff's document request,
made under the common law right to know doctrine, as well as
Supra,
396 N.J. Super. at 570-
DCJ's response to that request.
75. We incorporate that discussion by reference here. For
present purposes, it is sufficient to note that in 2000,
plaintiff ran unsuccessfully for the position of Chair of the
Burlington County Democratic Party. Id. at 570. At the time of
the election, plaintiff was Solicitor of the Borough of Palmyra.
Ibid. After the election, John J. Gural, Jr., a Palmyra
councilman, notified plaintiff that he was being subjected to
considerable pressure from two colleagues at the Moorestown
engineering firm at which he worked to refuse to reappoint
plaintiff as Palmyra Borough Solicitor when plaintiff's term
expired. Ibid. Gural reported these events to DCJ and provided
DCJ attorneys with secretly made tape recordings that supported
DCJ's investigation, which spanned
his allegations. Ibid.
several years, ultimately resulted in the two initial targets of
A-6440-08T3
3
the investigation pleading guilty, but only to tax evasion. Id.
at 571. The wider criminal investigation into whether highly
placed political operatives in the Burlington County Democratic
Party had engaged in a conspiracy to deny plaintiff
reappointment as Solicitor was ultimately closed in February
2005, id. at 573, amid claims by the United States Attorney that
DCJ had severely bungled the investigation, id. at 575.
On December 22, 2004, plaintiff served a written request
upon DCJ's Records Custodian under the Open Public Records Act
(OPRA), N.J.S.A. 47:1A-1 to -13, for "'[a]ny and all recordings
and transcripts of such recordings made by [DCJ] . . . of
conversations between . . . Gural . . . and'" various
individuals. Id. at 572 (second alteration added). Relying on
N.J.S.A. 47:1A-1.1, DCJ denied the request on January 4, 2005.
Ibid.
On January 11, 2005, plaintiff modified his request for the
Gural tapes, seeking access under the common law "right to know"
DCJ denied this request on January 18, 2005,
doctrine. Ibid.
as plaintiff had "failed to show an interest in the records
requested" and because state and federal litigation was pending
regarding the records. Ibid.
On January 12, 2005, plaintiff filed, in state court, a
verified complaint in lieu of prerogative writs and order to
A-6440-08T3
4
show cause for production of the documents he had requested from
DCJ. Ibid. Plaintiff requested both the Gural tapes and "[a]ny
and all investigative records, documents, or other information
made or kept by DCJ relating to any criminal investigations
involving the appointment of the Solicitor in Palmyra for the
year 2001."
On March 4, 2005, the Law Division ordered DCJ to turn over
the Gural tapes to plaintiff. The judge found that the tapes
were common law public documents; that plaintiff possessed the
requisite interest in the tapes as he was the primary focus of
and reason for making the tapes; and that plaintiff's interest
in the disclosure of the tapes outweighed the State's interest
in non-disclosure because there was no ongoing investigation.
Id. at 573.
On March 18, 2005, DCJ moved for reconsideration of the
March 4, 2005 order. DCJ supported its motion by providing the
judge with a Vaughn index1 that listed the participants in each
of the transcripts made from the Gural tapes. DCJ also provided
the judge with a transcript of each of the taped conversations
for in camera review. Ibid.
1
Vaughn v. Rosen,
484 F.2d 820, 826-28 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert.
denied,
415 U.S. 977,
94 S. Ct. 1564,
39 L. Ed. 2d 873 (1974).
A-6440-08T3
5
In a March 31, 2005 order, the judge granted intervenor
status as plaintiffs to George Norcross III, Mark Neisser, Henry
Chudzinski, R. Louis Gallagher II, and JCA Associates, Inc. for
the purpose of obtaining the Gural tapes and transcripts should
the court ultimately order them to be turned over to plaintiff.
Ibid. The March 31, 2005 order also denied DCJ's motion for
reconsideration and ordered DCJ to "produce all of the
recordings and transcripts to the [p]laintiff . . . and to all
interven[o]rs by 4:00 p.m. on March 31, 2005."
On May 12, 2005, by leave granted, we reversed the portions
of the March 31, 2005 order that had required release of the
tapes. We stated:
The State's claims of need to protect
innocent third parties and criminal
investigative methods and techniques . . .
are remanded to the trial judge for an in
camera proceeding limited to those claims.
The proceeding shall consist of a review of
the Vaughn indices and transcripts which
have been provided by the State.
On September 9, 2005, plaintiff filed the motion that is
the subject of this appeal, seeking to compel DCJ to provide him
with its entire investigatory file concerning the Palmyra
Solicitor matter. In response to that motion, DCJ produced an
expanded Vaughn index on December 2, 2005, which listed all
documents alleged to be privileged and confidential. Id. at
575. The judge ordered DCJ to provide copies of the expanded
A-6440-08T3
6
Vaughn index to plaintiff and to intervenors. Ibid. DCJ
simultaneously released to plaintiff copies of files it did not
deem privileged, including correspondence between DCJ and
plaintiff; plea agreements for Neisser, Chudzinski, and William
Vukoder; legal research; and newspapers and internet articles.
Ibid.
In response to our May 12, 2005 order, on August 28, 2006,
the judge issued a preliminary letter opinion in which he listed
the types of documents that were included in the box of
camera review.
materials DCJ had provided to him for in
Included were emails, evidence vouchers, newspaper articles,
notes of interviews and telephone calls, Gural recordings, legal
memoranda, reports from DCJ detectives, reports of interviews
and personal impressions, transcripts of previously released
tape recordings made while Gural was wearing a body wire,
correspondence between counsel, and numerous pages downloaded
Id. at 576. On September 29, 2006, the
from NJPolitics.com.
judge issued a letter opinion in which he concluded that each of
the items was protected from disclosure by one or more specific
privileges. The judge reasoned:
Every document reviewed contained, in
whole or in part, personal impressions,
opinions, or observations of the authors
and/or police investigative protocols or
techniques, all of which were so intertwined
with other factual material as to render
A-6440-08T3
7
redaction of the former an impossible task
if some semblance of meaning were to remain
for the unredacted portion of the document
or set of documents.
....
Based upon my in camera review of the
documents, I am convinced that a clear
showing of advancement of the public
interest has not been made such as to
warrant disclosure. That conclusion results
from consideration of the factors enumerated
in [Loigman, supra,
102 N.J. at 113]: (1)
that disclosure of the written material in
this case could easily impede the primary
functions of the DCJ by discouraging
witnesses from reporting actual or potential
criminal activities; (2) that such witnesses
could be subject to ridicule and unwarranted
legal actions by those whose names and
activities were reported; (3) that many of
the documents contained self-critical
analyses and recommendations for improved
investigative procedures which, if released,
will be subjected to a chilling effect; (4)
that, as noted, the factual data contained
in the material sought is so intertwined
with personal observations, impressions and
strategies that meaningful redaction is made
virtually impossible; and (5) that the
investigation by the Attorney General's
office was the subject of a report from the
Office of Governmental Integrity that this
court also declined to disclose for
basically the same reasons that disclosure
is deemed improper here.
To release the documents sought by
plaintiff would, in this court's opinion, be
the functional equivalent of allowing the
plaintiff to participate with employees of
the Attorney General's office in the actual
investigation. Separation of facts from
opinions cannot be accomplished in any
meaningful way.
A-6440-08T3
8
In our opinion in Rosenberg I, we held that the judge's
September 29, 2006 letter opinion was insufficient and we
remanded for "a more detailed articulation of reasons, focusing
on either individual documents or groups of documents designated
by Bates number in the privilege log (Vaughn Index) filed under
seal by the State." Supra,
396 N.J. Super. at 569. We held:
[T]he judge restated, in a conclusory
fashion, the five Loigman factors he found
applied, without referencing particular
2
to which a
documents by Bates numbers
particular factor applied, or making
specific factual findings why the factor
applied to the contents of particular
documents. We, therefore, remand the matter
to the trial court with the directions to
review anew the documents contained in the
Vaughn index and render a decision making
specific reference to particular documents
or group of documents and provide his
factual findings, if necessary, in the form
of a separate sealed decision.
[Id. at 581.]
We essentially held that without these factual findings, we were
unable to determine whether the judge had abused his discretion
We
in not releasing the documents plaintiff requested. Ibid.
therefore remanded for the preparation of a detailed statement
of reasons. Ibid.
2
The term "Bates numbers" refers to a numbering system commonly
used for voluminous medical, commercial and legal documents, in
which a sequential number is stamped on each page for ease of
reference.
A-6440-08T3
9
In the interim, the judge who issued the September 29, 2006
opinion had retired. Consequently, the task of preparing the
remand opinion was assigned to a second judge, who filed a
written opinion on February 25, 2009. The February 25, 2009
opinion began with a list, in the most general of terms,
describing each of the documents he reviewed.3
3
The list of documents included:
1. Hand written and typed versions of the
notes of the Deputy Attorney General Susan
Kase.
2. Hand written and typed versions of the
notes of Deputy Attorney General Tony
Piccone.
3. Hand written notes from an unidentified
Deputy Attorney General or Division of
Criminal Justice Investigator.
4. Hand written notes of Former Chief
Investigator [Redacted].
5. Internal memoranda from investigators and
deputy attorneys general to Andrea Rossner,
Deputy Director of Criminal Justice.
6. Internal memoranda from investigators and
deputy attorneys general to Melanie
Campbell, Deputy Attorney General/Government
Integrity Bureau.
7. Internal investigative reports from
Senior Investigator [Redacted], Investigator
[Redacted], Senior Investigator [Redacted]
and Senior Investigator [Redacted].
(continued)
A-6440-08T3
10
(continued)
8. Internal memoranda from investigators and
deputy attorneys general to Louise Lester,
Chief of the Special Prosecutions Unit.
9. Correspondence:
A. Letter dated May 8, 2001 to Mike
Pinsky, Esq[.] from John Musarra, Deputy
Attorney General.
B. Letter dated June 12, 2001 to Mike
Pinsky, Esq. from John Musarra, Deputy
Attorney General.
C. Two unsigned letters dated April 2,
2004 . . . to Kevin Marino, Esq. from Louise
Lester, Chief of the Special Prosecutions
Unit.
D. Letter dated April 8, 2004 to Kevin
Marino, Esq. from Louise Lester, Chief of
the Special Prosecutions Unit.
E. Letter dated June 24, 2004 to Robert
Agre, Esq. from Susan Kase, Deputy Attorney
General. Attached to this correspondence is
an investigative report from Investigator
[Redacted].
F. Facsimile dated October 18[,] 2001 to
Tony Zar[r]illo from Michael Critchley, Esq.
Attached to this correspondence are
references to various taped conversations.
G. Letter dated November 18, 2003 to
Thomas Goan Jr. Deputy Attorney General from
Mike Pinsky, Esq. Attached to this
correspondence is a letter dated June 12,
2001 from Mike Pinsky Esq. to John Musarra,
Deputy Attorney General.
H. Facsimile dated November 18, 2003 to
John Goan, Deputy Attorney General from Mike
(continued)
A-6440-08T3
11
After listing the eleven items, the judge made the
following findings of fact and conclusions of law about the
documents in groups one through eight and ten and eleven. We
quote his findings in their entirety:
It is this court's opinion that after a
review of the above mentioned documents, the
plaintiff has not established that his
interests in public disclosure outweigh the
state's interest in maintaining
confidentiality. Loigman, supra, 102 N.J.
(continued)
Pinsky, Esq. Attached is a letter dated
November 18, 2003 to John Goan, Deputy
Attorney General from Mike Pinsky, Esq.
I. Facsimile dated April 21, 2004 from
Kevin Mari[no], Esq. to Anthony Picione,
Esq. Deputy Attorney General. Attached is a
letter dated April 21, 2004 to Louise
Lester, Esq. Chief, Special Prosecutions
Unit from Kevin Marino.
J. Facsimile dated April 13, 2004 to
Louise Lester, Chief Special Prosecutions
Bureau from Kevin Marino, Esq. Attached is a
letter dated April 13, 2004 to Louise
Lester, Esq., Chief Special Prosecutions
Bureau from Kevin Marino, Esq.
10. An unsigned and undated Affidavit of
Application of Investigator [Redacted] for a
Communications Data Warrant (CDW).
11. The remaining documents consist of notes
taken during a review of various taped
conversations. Also included is legal
research conducted by the individuals who
were reviewing the taped conversations.
A-6440-08T3
12
at 112. The documents or groups of
documents contained in 1-8 and 10 and 11
above consist of internal memorand[a] of
various members of the Division of Criminal
Justice. Disclosure of these documents
would discourage witnesses from reporting
actual or potential criminal activities,
reveal self-critical analyses and
recommendations which would result in a
chilling effect on future agency activities,
and most importantly as far as this court is
concerned, the information sought could not
be separated from personal observations,
impressions, and strategies because this
information is so intertwined so as to make
redaction virtually impossible. The court
therefore finds that disclosure of this
internal information should not be ordered.
As to the documents in group nine, which consisted of
correspondence, the judge made a separate finding, which we set
forth in its entirety:
The court also finds that the
correspondence should not be disclosed
because it pertains to individuals other
than the plaintiff, and it is privileged,
absent a waiver of the privilege. The
information should not be disclosed.
N.J.R.E. 504.
On August 11, 2009, because the second judge had also
retired, a third judge issued an order adopting the second
judge's February 25, 2009 opinion. It is from that opinion and
order that plaintiff now appeals, raising a single argument. He
contends that on remand, the trial judge failed to comply with
this court's directive to review anew the documents contained
within the Vaughn index and to make specific factual findings as
A-6440-08T3
13
to the applicability of the Loigman factors. In particular,
plaintiff argues that the February 25, 2009 opinion fails to
comply with this Court's directive in Rosenberg I because, in
his written opinion, the judge made only "general, conclusory
observations" and failed to "refer to specific documents by
Bates numbers[,] . . . failed to render an opinion making the
necessary findings of fact[,] . . . [and] failed to explain the
rationale for each document he deemed privileged."
DCJ argues that the February 2009 opinion satisfied this
Court's instructions in Rosenberg I because it provides far more
detail than the earlier 2006 opinion. In particular, according
to DCJ, the 2009 opinion lists the documents reviewed and then
applies the Loigman factors to each document or category listed.
II.
A citizen requesting disclosure of documents pursuant to
the common law right to know doctrine must satisfy three
requirements: "(1) the records must be common-law public
documents; (2) the person seeking access must establish an
interest in the subject matter of the material; and (3) the
citizen's right to access must be balanced against the State's
interest in preventing disclosure." Keddie v. Rutgers,
148 N.J.
36, 50 (1997) (internal quotations and citations omitted). When
evaluating prong three, the trial court should consider the six
A-6440-08T3
14
factors set forth in Loigman, supra,
102 N.J. at 113. These
factors are:
(1) the extent to which disclosure will
impede agency functions by discouraging
citizens from providing information to the
government; (2) the effect disclosure may
have upon persons who have given such
information, and whether they did so in
reliance that their identities would not be
disclosed; (3) the extent to which agency
self-evaluation, program improvement, or
other decisionmaking will be chilled by
disclosure; (4) the degree to which the
information sought includes factual data as
opposed to evaluative reports of
policymakers; (5) whether any findings of
public misconduct have been insufficiently
corrected by remedial measures instituted by
the investigative agency; and (6) whether
any agency disciplinary or investigatory
proceedings have arisen that may
circumscribe the individual's asserted need
for the materials.
[Ibid.]
The Loigman factors, however, are not exhaustive and other
criteria may be examined. Educ. Law Ctr. ex rel. Burke v. N.J.
Dep't of Educ.,
396 N.J. Super. 634, 644 (App. Div. 2007), rev'd
on other grounds,
198 N.J. 274 (2009).
In making a decision whether to disclose the documents, the
"trial court must examine each document individually and make
factual findings with regard to why [a plaintiff's] interest in
disclosure is or is not outweighed by [the State's] interest in
non-disclosure." Keddie, supra,
148 N.J. at 54. Further, the
A-6440-08T3
15
trial court should "make specific determinations regarding
plaintiff's access to [the records], including an expression of
reasons for the court's rulings. The trial court must examine
each document individually, and explain as to each document
deemed privileged why it has so ruled." Seacoast Builders Corp.
v. Rutgers,
358 N.J. Super. 524, 542 (App. Div. 2003) (internal
quotations and citations omitted).
With these principles in mind, we turn to an analysis of
the judge's February 25, 2009 opinion. As we have noted, DCJ
urges us to affirm the order because, in keeping with our
the judge made reference to the
decision in Rosenberg I,
specific documents he received. We reject DCJ's argument for
several reasons.
First, as is evident from the judge's opinion, although the
judge divided the documents into eleven groups, he made no
effort to analyze the documents individually. Instead, he
merely discussed them in the aggregate, commenting that "[t]he
documents or groups of documents contained in 1 [through] 8 and
10 and 11 above consist of internal memorand[a] of various
members of [DCJ]." Without an individualized discussion of each
document, the February 2009 decision falls far short of the
"document-by-document" analysis we required in Rosenberg I,
supra,
396 N.J. Super. at 569. DCJ relies on the portion of our
A-6440-08T3
16
opinion that permitted the judge on remand to render a decision
"making specific reference to particular documents or group of
documents." Id. at 581 (emphasis added). However, DCJ's
approach is not only unduly mechanical, but also takes the
language of our opinion out of context.
As is evident from our opinion in Rosenberg I, we
criticized the first judge for issuing an opinion that "referred
generally to all the documents rather than a particular document
by Bates number," id. at 580, and for restating the Loigman
factors "in a conclusory fashion . . . without referencing
particular documents by Bates numbers to which a particular
factor applied," id. at 581 (emphasis added). Thus, DCJ's
argument that the judge discussed the documents in the groups
that we authorized in Rosenberg I elevates form over substance.
We authorized the judge to refer to documents by "groups," but
only if the documents shared common characteristics.
Aggregating dozens of documents into one group, as the judge did
in his February 2009 opinion, does not satisfy our instruction
in Rosenberg I, ibid., that an individualized assessment be made
of each document.
Second, by referring to documents as "1 [to] 8 and 10 and
11," the judge lumped together an enormous multitude of
documents. The judge's approach caused DCJ, in its appellate
A-6440-08T3
17
brief, to devote nearly two single-spaced pages in a footnote to
cross-referencing all of these documents to the Vaughn index,
which is something the judge himself should have done. As but
one example, DCJ's brief explains that group seven consists of
"58 separate investigative reports by various criminal
investigators," which "are found at page 37, row 2, through page
Group seven of the Vaughn index alone consumes
38, row 3."
pages 221-232 of plaintiff's appendix.
The Vaughn index itself is sixty-two pages long. It
contains a total of 312 separate entries. It is highly unlikely
that the same Loigman factors ("[d]isclosure . . . would
discourage witnesses from reporting . . . criminal activities,
reveal self-critical analyses and . . . [cause] a chilling
effect on future agency activities") could possibly apply with
equal force to 312 documents. For these reasons, we reject
DCJ's contention that because the judge listed the documents he
had reviewed, he complied with our instruction to conduct an
individualized assessment of each document.
Another problem with the judge's February 2009 opinion is
the absence of any description of the contents of the 312
documents the judge reviewed. Although the judge identified the
author and the recipient of each letter or facsimile, he has
told us nothing about their content. DCJ urges us to read the
A-6440-08T3
18
judge's list of documents in conjunction with the Vaughn index,
because the Vaughn index provides more information about the
documents. However, the only additional, substantive
information provided by the Vaughn index is the identity of
third parties who were mentioned in the document and which
privilege DCJ was asserting as to the document; the Vaughn index
provides no further insight into the content of the documents
themselves. Without knowing more about the content, this court
is unable to conduct any review, much less a thorough review, of
plaintiff's claims.
In particular, and as an example, without knowing the
content of the "internal investigative reports" referenced in
group seven or of the "internal memoranda" from DCJ
investigators to deputy attorneys general referenced in group
six, our review of the judge's conclusions is impossible. How
can we affirm or reverse the judge's conclusions that disclosure
would "reveal self-critical analyses," thereby causing a
"chilling" effect on future agency activities, or that
disclosure would "discourage witnesses from reporting . . .
criminal activities" if we are left completely in the dark about
the content of the actual documents?4
4
The documents themselves are not part of the record on appeal,
and we therefore have no way to evaluate the soundness of the
(continued)
A-6440-08T3
19
It was for this very reason, relying on Seacoast, supra,
358 N.J. Super. at 542, that we rejected the first judge's
Supra, 396 N.J. Super. at
conclusory opinion in Rosenberg I.
581. The February 2009 opinion suffers from identical
shortcomings. It provides us with no description of the
contents of the documents that were reviewed in camera on a
document-by-document basis; it fails to explain which Loigman
factors apply to which documents; and it fails to balance
plaintiff's right of access against the State's purported
interest in avoiding disclosure.
We note that DCJ has spent a substantial portion of its
brief arguing that the judge's decision not to release the
documents was not an abuse of discretion because plaintiff's
interests in disclosure did not outweigh the State's interest in
maintaining confidentiality. This issue is not before us given
the posture of the present appeal. Plaintiff has appealed only
as to the form of the judge's opinion and has argued that the
judge failed to follow the directive of Rosenberg I. No
argument has been made by plaintiff as to whether the
(continued)
judge's legal determinations or his application of the Loigman
factors. Should there be any further appeal, the party filing
the appeal should arrange for the delivery to us of a
copy of each of the documents the Law Division reviewed in
camera. R. 2:5-4(a) and (d).
A-6440-08T3
20
substantive holding, that the documents should not be released,
constitutes an abuse of discretion. Moreover, this issue is not
currently ripe for this court's review in light of the
deficiencies in the judge's February 2009 opinion that we have
already discussed, and the absence of the documents from the
record on appeal. Without the factual findings and rationales
required by Rosenberg I, this court cannot proceed to the next
stage of determining whether an abuse of discretion has
occurred. See Shuttleworth v. City of Camden,
258 N.J. Super.
573, 588 (App. Div.) (observing that a judge's decision on
release of documents is reviewed for an abuse of discretion),
certif. denied,
133 N.J. 429 (1992).
We reverse the August 11, 2009 order that adopted the
February 25, 2009 opinion. We remand for the issuance of the
opinion we required in Rosenberg I.
Reversed and remanded.
A-6440-08T3
21
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