DAWN C. DEGREGORIO v. BOARD OF REVIEW DEPARTMENT OF LABOR and BELL-MARK SALES CO., INC

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NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
                   APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

                                        SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
                                        APPELLATE DIVISION
                                        DOCKET NO. A-2759-08T1

DAWN C. DEGREGORIO,

     Appellant,

v.

BOARD OF REVIEW,
DEPARTMENT OF LABOR and
BELL-MARK SALES CO., INC.,

     Respondents.
______________________________

           Submitted May 18, 2010 - Decided August 26, 2010

           Before Judges Carchman and Lihotz.

           On   appeal  from   the   Board  of   Review,
           Department of Labor, Docket No. 202,015.

           Dawn C. DeGregorio, appellant pro se.

           Paula T. Dow, Attorney General, attorney for
           respondent   Board   of  Review  (Lewis   A.
           Scheindlin, Assistant Attorney General, of
           counsel; Ellen A. Reichart, Deputy Attorney
           General, on the brief).

           Respondent Bell-Mark Sales has not filed a
           brief.

PER CURIAM

     Claimant Dawn C. DeGregorio appeals from a final decision

of   the   Board    of   Review    (Board)   requiring    her    to   refund

unemployment   compensation       benefits   previously   paid    during   a

period when she was found ineligible to receive benefits.                           The

Board affirmed the determination of an appeals tribunal, which

found claimant liable to repay the benefits previously paid.

N.J.S.A. 43:21-16(d)(1).              Following our review, we conclude the

final decision of the Board was properly premised upon facts in

the record and its determinations were consonant with relevant

statutory provisions.           Accordingly, we affirm.

      Claimant was employed by Bell-Mark Sales Co., Inc. (Bell-

Mark)   as    an    accounts     receivable      clerk   from    October     2006   to

October 4, 2007.          While employed, claimant often told her co-

worker Lorraine Ciuta of her plans to relocate to Florida.                          She

even showed Ciuta pictures of a house claimant and her husband

intended to purchase when they moved.                  Claimant was scheduled to

undergo      surgery    on   October     5,    2007,    and   return    to   work    on

October 8, 2007.          Although claimant's surgery was re-scheduled,

on   October       5,   2007,   she    neither    notified      her    employer     nor

attended work.           During the appeal tribunal hearing, claimant

testified she later called Bell-Mark on October 8, 2007, to

advise she was sick and requested the day off.                        On October 9,

2007, claimant again called her supervisor, James Pontrella Jr.,

finally disclosing that she was in Florida.                      She also called

Ciuta, explaining her husband had secured employment in Florida;

they had purchased a home, and intended to relocate.                         Finally,




                                                                             A-2759-08T1
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in an October 10, 2007 telephone conversation with Pontrella,

claimant         confirmed     her   intention        to    relocate          to    Florida.

Pontrella stated Bell-Mark would replace her.

       Claimant filed for unemployment compensation benefits.                             Her

application was denied by a deputy claims examiner, who found

she had "left work voluntarily without good cause attributable

                                           43:21-5(a).            Claimant         appealed.
to    such       work[.]"      N.J.S.A.

During       a    telephonic     hearing        before     the        appeals      examiner,

claimant testified she was terminated.                     No representative from

the    employer       appeared.       Consequently,         the        appeals      tribunal

(tribunal) found claimant was discharged by her employer and she

did not intend to leave her job.                 Claimant was awarded $8,788.00

in benefits.         Bell-Mark appealed, challenging the determination.

The    Board       remanded    the   matter      to   an    appeals          tribunal     for

additional          evidence     regarding        claimant's           separation       from

employment.         Upon remand, the same appeals examiner conducted a

telephonic hearing during which claimant, her husband, Ciuta and

Pontrella testified.             The tribunal concluded claimant had not

been   discharged       but    instead    voluntarily        left       her     employment,

making her ineligible to receive benefits.                       Claimant appealed to

the Board, which affirmed the tribunal's decision.

       In    a    separate     matter,    the    Director        of    the    Division     of

Unemployment Insurance issued a Request for Refund of the monies




                                                                                    A-2759-08T1
                                           3

previously       paid    to    claimant.         Claimant    also    appealed      that

determination.          A tribunal concluded claimant was liable for

refunding all benefits erroneously paid.                    Following its review,

the Board affirmed that determination.

       In disputing the Board's findings, claimant argued Bell-

Mark dismissed her despite the fact that she was ready, willing

and    able   to    return     to   work   and    continued    to    reside   in    New

Jersey.       Additionally, because she maintains she is eligible to

receive benefits, claimant asserts she should not be required to

repay the monies she had received.

       The scope of our review of administrative agency decisions

is limited.         Brady v. Bd. Of Review, 
152 N.J. 197, 210 (1997);

Campbell v. Dep't of Civil Serv., 
39 N.J. 556, 562 (1963).                          The

agency's determination carries a presumption of correctness, and

a     claimant      carries     a    substantial       burden       of   persuasion.

Gloucester Cty. Welfare Bd. v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 
93 N.J. 384,

390-91 (1983).          "We are obliged to defer to the Board when its

factual findings are based on sufficient credible evidence in

the record," Lourdes Med. Ctr. v. Bd. of Review, 
197 N.J. 339,

367    (2009)      (internal    quotations       and   citations     omitted),      and

overturn an agency determination only if "'it is found to be

arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable or it is not supported by

substantial credible evidence in the record as a whole.'" Barry




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                                           4

v.   Arrow    Pontiac,     Inc.,      100       N.J.   57,   71   (1985)      (quoting

Gloucester Cty., supra, 
93 N.J. at 391).                      Finally, we accord

substantial      deference      to    an    agency's     interpretation        of    the

statute it is charged with enforcing.                  Board of Educ. v. Neptune

Tp. Educ. Ass'n, 
144 N.J. 16, 31 (1996).

     The purpose of New Jersey's Unemployment Compensation Act

(Act), N.J.S.A. 43:21-1 to -71, "is to provide some income for

the worker earning nothing, because he is out of work through no

fault or act of his own[.]"                  Yardville Supply Co. v. Bd. of

Review, 
114 N.J. 371, 375 (1989) (quotation omitted).                               "The

basic policy of the [Act] is advanced . . . when benefits are

denied in improper cases as when they are allowed in proper

cases."    Id. at 374.

     The     governing     statute,        N.J.S.A.    43:21-5(a),      provides     an

individual is disqualified for unemployment benefits where the

"individual      has     left    work      voluntarily       without    good     cause

                                        Self v. Bd. of Review, 
91 N.J. 453,
attributable to such work."

456-57 (1982).      "Good cause means cause sufficient to justify an

employee's voluntarily leaving the ranks of the employed and

joining    the   ranks    of    the   unemployed[.]"          Heulitt    v.    Bd.   of

Review, 
300 N.J. Super. 407, 414 (App. Div. 1997) (internal

citation omitted).




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                                            5

       Our review of the record discerns the Board's determination

denying claimant benefits was properly supported by substantial

credible     evidence.        The   Board       rejected      claimant's     contention

that   Bell-Mark      fired    her.     She       departed      for    Florida     after

postponement of a medical procedure on October 5, 2007, and she

did not report for work on October 5, and October 8 through 10.

Additionally, the evidence included Ciuta's testimony relating

claimant's disclosures of her move and the purchase of a home,

along with Pontrella's statement that claimant resigned, which

he confirmed in an October 11, 2007 letter to claimant stating,

"Congratulations on your relocation plans to Florida.                            I wish

you and your husband the best in your move and his new job."                            We

have    no    basis     to    interfere         with    the     Board's      reasonable

conclusion to deny claimant's request for benefits because she

voluntarily     resigned      her   employment         in   order     to    relocate    to

              See Lourdes Med. Ctr., supra, 
197 N.J. at 367-68;
Florida.

Campbell, supra, 
39 N.J. at 562.

       Finally, because claimant had been paid benefits that she

was    not   entitled    to    receive,         she    is   liable    to    refund     the

benefits paid pursuant to N.J.S.A. 43:21-16(d).                            See Kugel v.

Bd. of Review, 
66 N.J. Super. 547, 550 (App. Div. 1961).

       In Bannan v. Bd. of Review, 
299 N.J. Super. 671, 674 (App.

Div. 1997), we held that full repayment of benefits is required




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                                            6

from anyone "who, for any reason, regardless of good faith, was

not actually entitled to those benefits."                            Indeed, recovery of

such     benefits     "furthers      the       purpose          of     the     unemployment

compensation       laws"   and    preserves         the   Unemployment          Trust       Fund

"for the payment of benefits to those individuals entitled to

receive them."       Ibid.       (citations omitted).                 Moreover, "federal

law requires that a state recover improperly paid unemployment

compensation       benefits[,]"      id.       at     675;       see     42     U.S.C.A.         ยง

503(a)(9), as do our own regulations.                        N.J.A.C. 12:17-14.1 to

-14.3.      In fact, the only restriction the Legislature has placed

on recoupment is that the Division must seek a refund "before

four years have elapsed from the time the benefits in question

were paid."        N.J.S.A. 43:21-16(d)(1).               Here, the request for a

refund was timely.

       In   sum,    the    Board's   dual        decisions,           rendered       after       a

hearing     that    comported     with     due      process,          Malady    v.      Bd.    of

Review, 
166 N.J. Super. 523, 528 (App. Div. 1979), are supported

by   substantial     credible      evidence         in    the    record        as   a    whole.

Barry, supra, 
100 N.J. at 71.                  Accordingly, no basis has been

presented to intervene in its considered determinations.

       Affirmed.




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