STATE OF NEW JERSEY v. JASMINE HAMPTON

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NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-1650-08T4

STATE OF NEW JERSEY,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

JASMINE HAMPTON, a/k/a
JAZIRAH LAWRENCE,

Defendant-Appellant.

_______________________________________

March 25, 2010
Submitted March 1, 2010 Decided

Before Judges Rodríguez and Yannotti.

On appeal from the Superior Court of New
Jersey, Law Division, Middlesex County,
Indictment No. 03-02-00098-A.

Jasmine Hampton, appellant pro se.

Bruce J. Kaplan, Middlesex County Prosecutor,
attorney for respondent (Simon Louis
Rosenbach, Assistant Prosecutor, of counsel
and on the brief).

PER CURIAM

Defendant Jasmine Hampton appeals from an order entered by

the Law Division on October 31, 2008, denying her petition for

post-conviction relief (PCR). We affirm.

Defendant, Shariff Ingram (Ingram), Christopher Moore

(Moore) and Lynn Smith (Smith) were charged under Middlesex

County Indictment No. 00-06-764, with second degree conspiracy

to commit robbery, N.J.S.A. 2C:5-2 (count one); second degree

robbery, N.J.S.A. 2C:15-1 (counts two, three and four); third

degree burglary, N.J.S.A. 2C:18-2 (count five); first degree

murder, N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3(a)(3) (count six); third degree theft,

N.J.S.A. 2C:20-3 (count seven); and third degree possession of a

weapon for an unlawful purpose, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4(a) (count

eight). On February 19, 2003, defendant pled guilty to first

degree robbery, contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:15-1, as charged in

Accusation 98-02-03. As part of the plea bargain, the charges in

Indictment No. 00-06-764 were dismissed.

The court sentenced defendant to thirteen years of

incarceration, with a period of parole ineligibility as

prescribed by the No Early Release Act (NERA), N.J.S.A. 2C:43-

7.2. The court ordered the sentence to be served consecutively

to a sentence defendant was then serving. Defendant appealed her

sentence. We affirmed. State v. Hampton, No. A-4838-02 (App.

Div. Sept. 24, 2003).

Defendant thereafter filed a motion in the trial court to

amend her sentence so that it would run concurrently with the

previously imposed sentence. The trial court entered an order on

A-1650-08T4

2 February 10, 2004, denying the motion. Defendant filed another

motion seeking the same relief. The trial court denied that

motion on April 7, 2004.

Defendant filed a petition for certification seeking review

by the Supreme Court of our judgment in defendant's appeal

challenging her sentence. The Court denied the petition. State

v. Hampton,
179 N.J. 372 (2004).

Thereafter, defendant filed her first petition for PCR.

Defendant alleged, among other things, that she had been denied

the effective assistance of trial, appellate and PCR counsel.

The trial court entered an order on September 13, 2005, denying

PCR. We affirmed the trial court's order. State v. Hampton, No.

A-882-05T4 (App. Div. May 23, 2007) (slip op. at 2). Defendant

then filed a petition for certification seeking review of that

judgment by the Supreme Court. The Court denied the petition.

State v. Hampton,
192 N.J. 596 (2007).

On February 25, 2008, defendant filed her second petition

for PCR. The trial court entered an order dated May 1, 2008,

denying the petition without prejudice. On May 30, 2008,

defendant filed her third PCR application. The trial court

entered an order dated October 31, 2008, denying PCR. This

appeal followed.

A-1650-08T4
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Defendant raises the following issues for our

consideration:

POINT I
THE DEFENDANT'S CONVICTION AND SENTENCE MUST
BE VACATED BECAUSE THERE WAS [INSUFFICIENT]
FACTUAL BASIS ELICITED FROM DEFENDANT TO
SUPPORT HER GUILTY PLEA, BECAUSE THE PLEA
WAS NOT ENTERED INTO KNOWINGLY AND
VOLUNTARILY. [U.S. CONST.] AMENDS. VI, XIV,
N.J. CONST. ART I, PAR. 10.

POINT II
THE SENTENCE IMPOSED UNDER THE 85% RULE MUST
BE VACATED BECAUSE THE COURT APPLIED AN
INCORRECT STANDARD OF PROOF AND THE
DEFENDANT DID NOT PLEAD GUILTY TO A CRIME
INVOLVING A WEAPON OR FORCE R. 3:9-2.
DEFENDANT DID NOT MEET THE CRITERIA OF
2C:15-1, NOT KNOWINGLY OR
N.J.S.A.
VOLUNTARILY, THUS ILLEGAL.

POINT III
DEFENDANT WAS DENIED CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS
TO EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL[,] U.S.
CONST. AMEND. VI, XIV, N.J. CONST. (1947),
ART. I, PAR. 10 AND BECAUSE SHE WAS
PREJUDICED [THEREBY] THE COURT SHOULD GRANT
HER POST-CONVICTION RELIEF.

POINT IV
INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL FOR
FAILURE TO RAISE THE DISPARITY BETWEEN THE
SENTENCES IMPOSED ON CO-DEFENDANTS, RENDERED
DEFENDANT'S SENTENCE MANIFESTLY UNJUST AND
UNDULY PUNITIVE, THUS REQUIRING REVERSAL AND
A REMAND [FOR] RESENTENCING.

POINT V
ASSUMING THE COURT DOES NOT CONCLUDE THAT
THE DEFENDANT'S SENTENCE WAS MANIFESTLY
EXCESSIVE AND BASED UPON A REVIEW OF THE
APPLICABLE AGGRAVATING AND MITIGATING
FACTORS SUPPORTED BY THE RECORD, THE
DEFENDANT IS ENTITLED TO A REMAND PURSUANT

A-1650-08T4
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TO STATE V. NATALE. COUNSEL WAS []
CONSTITUTIONALLY [IN]EFFECTIVE FOR FAILING
TO SEEK PIPELINE RETROACTIVITY.

POINT VI
[THE] TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION
DURING THE FIRST AND SECOND POST CONVICTION
HEARING[S]; DEFENDANT'S CLAIMS SHOULD NOT BE
BARRED ON PROCEDURAL GROUNDS.

POINT VII
THE CUMULATIVE ERRORS OF COUNSEL CAUSED
PREJUDICE TO THE DEFENDANT DENYING HER THE
EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL, AND A
MEANINGFUL AND VIABLE DEFENSE DURING HER
FIRST AND THIRD PETITION FOR POST-CONVICTION
RELIEF.

Defendant argues that she was denied the effective

assistance of counsel when she entered her guilty plea to first

degree robbery. In our view, the contention is without merit.

A defendant's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel in

violation of the Sixth Amendment of the United States

Constitution is considered under the two-part test established

in Strickland v. Washington,
466 U.S. 668,
104 S. Ct. 2052,
80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984), and adopted by our Supreme Court in State

v. Fritz,
105 N.J. 42, 58 (1987), for consideration of similar

claims raised under our State Constitution. In order to prevail

on such a claim, a defendant first must show that his attorney's

handling of the matter "fell below an objective standard of

reasonableness." Strickland, supra,
466 U.S. at 688,
104 S. Ct.
at 2064,
80 L. Ed. 2d at 693. A defendant also must show that

A-1650-08T4
5

there exists a "reasonable probability that, but for counsel's

unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have

been different." Id. at 694,
104 S. Ct. at 2068,
80 L. Ed. 2d at

698.

Defendant maintains that her trial attorney was deficient

because he allowed her to plead guilty even though there was not

an adequate factual basis for her plea to first degree robbery.

We disagree.

At the plea hearing held on February 19, 2003, defendant

admitted that on February 15, 2000, she and Fatima Harris

(Harris) drove with Salaam Brown (Brown) to the apartment of

Corey Maddox (Maddox) in Woodbridge. Defendant stated that she

and Harris entered the apartment and spoke with Maddox.

Defendant said that, at some point, she went outside to smoke a

cigarette and saw Moore.

According to defendant, Moore told her not to lock the door

to Maddox's apartment. Defendant testified that she understood

that there was going to be a robbery. Defendant said that she

unlocked the door to Maddox's apartment. She stated that she

understood that, by unlocking the door, she was "helping" the

person who was going to commit the robbery. Moore, Brown, Ingram

and Smith entered the apartment. Brown had a weapon. Defendant

A-1650-08T4
6

and Harris were told to get on the floor. Defendant said she

observed Brown put a gun to Maddox's head.

Defendant and Harris were told to leave the apartment.

They went to Brown's car.1 Thereafter, Brown, Ingram, Moore and

Smith returned to the car. Defendant testified that she knew

that a robbery had been committed. Defendant said that they

drove to Smith's apartment in Newark. There, Brown showed them

the money that was taken in the robbery. Defendant was given

$3,500. She understood that it was money that had been taken in

the robbery.

In response to questioning by the court, defendant

acknowledged that she was aware that the other participants in

the robbery were going to, and did in fact, bring weapons with

them to the robbery. Defendant said that she knew the

perpetrators were going to commit an armed robbery. Defendant

additionally acknowledged that she agreed to help the

perpetrators commit the robbery by letting them into the

apartment.

In our judgment, defendant's statements provided an

adequate factual basis for her plea to first-degree armed

robbery. A person is guilty of robbery if

1
The facts of the incident are further detailed in State v.
Ingram,
196 N.J. 23, 29-31 (2008). Maddox was shot and killed
during the robbery. Id. at 30-31.

A-1650-08T4
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in the course of committing a theft, he [or
she]:

(1) Inflicts bodily injury or uses force
upon another; or

(2) Threatens another with or purposely puts
him in fear of immediate bodily injury; or

(3) Commits or threatens immediately to
commit any crime of the first or second
degree.

[N.J.S.A. 2C:15-1(a).]

Robbery "is a crime of the first degree if in the course of

committing the theft the actor attempts to kill anyone, or

purposely inflicts or attempts to inflict serious bodily injury,

or is armed with, or uses or threatens the immediate use of a

deadly weapon." N.J.S.A. 2C:15-1(b).

Furthermore, "[a] person is guilty of an offense if it is

committed by his [or her] own conduct or by the conduct of

another person for which he is legally accountable, or both."

N.J.S.A. 2C:2-6(a). A person may be "legally accountable" for

the conduct of another person if he or she "is an accomplice of

such other person in the commission of an offense[.]" N.J.S.A.

2C:2-6(b)(3). An individual "is an accomplice of another person

in the commission of an offense if:

(1) With the purpose of promoting or
facilitating the commission of the offense;
he [or she]

(a) Solicits such other person to commit it;

A-1650-08T4
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(b) Aids or agrees or attempts to aid such
other person in planning or committing it;
or

(2) His [or her] conduct is expressly
declared by law to establish his [or her]
complicity.

[N.J.S.A. 2C:2-6(c).]

At the plea hearing, defendant stated that, during the

course of the theft, Brown was armed. She also stated that Brown

put a gun to Maddox's head, thereby putting him in fear of

immediate bodily injury. Moreover, defendant acknowledged that

she opened the door to Maddox's apartment to facilitate the

robbery.

Defendant additionally argues that her trial attorney

failed to advise her as to the difference between a robbery and

an armed robbery. She contends that her attorney did not

investigate the matter properly. However, defendant has not

established that her attorney's advice or his investigation was

materially deficient. Moreover, defendant failed to show that

the result would have been different if her attorney had

provided other advice or investigated the matter further.

A-1650-08T4
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We have considered all of the other arguments raised by

defendant and conclude that they are without sufficient merit to

warrant discussion in a written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(2).

Affirmed.

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