STATE OF NEW JERSEY v. TAMEKA L. NELSON
Annotate this CaseNOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-0545-08T4
STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
TAMEKA L. NELSON,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________________________________________________
Submitted October 1, 2009 - Decided August 26, 2010
Before Judges Stern, Graves and Sabatino.
On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey,
Law Division, Hudson County, Indictment No.
06-08-1379.
Yvonne Smith Segars, Public Defender, attorney
for appellant (Andrew P. Slowinski, Designated
Counsel, of counsel and on the brief).
Edward J. De Fazio, Hudson County Prosecutor,
attorney for respondent (John R. Cascarano,
Assistant Prosecutor, on the brief).
PER CURIAM
A jury acquitted defendant Tameka Nelson of first-degree
aggravated manslaughter in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:11-4(a)(1)
(count two) for causing the death of Idatte Hamilton (Ida or
Hamilton) under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference
to human life; but defendant was found guilty of second-degree
vehicular homicide in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:11-5(a) (count
one) for causing Hamilton's death by driving a vehicle
recklessly; and third-degree leaving the scene of an accident
resulting in death in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:11-5.1 (count
three). On April 28, 2008, the trial court sentenced defendant
to an eight-year prison term on count one with an eighty-five
percent period of parole ineligibility under the No Early
Release Act, N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2, and a consecutive four-year
term on count three. Appropriate monetary fees, assessments,
and penalties were also imposed. Defendant appeals and we
affirm.
On May 4, 2005, at approximately 8:15 p.m., Wendy Wallace
(Wallace), Hamilton's cousin, was driving to Hamilton's house to
pick her up and take her for pizza. The headlights on Wallace's
car were on when she arrived at Hamilton's house, and Wallace
parked on the street because she saw Hamilton "coming down the
stairs." As Hamilton was walking towards the car, Wallace
noticed that a young African-American girl, later identified as
defendant, "glanced back" in Wallace's direction before entering
her vehicle, an Acura Integra. Defendant's Acura was facing in
the same direction as Wallace's Mitsubishi, and the Acura was
parked about two car lengths in front of the Mitsubishi.
A-0545-08T4
2
According to Wallace, who was the only eyewitness to
testify, defendant's vehicle then "accelerated" in reverse
hitting the front passenger side of Wallace's car and Hamilton,
who was about to enter the car. Defendant's vehicle then
sideswiped "almost the entire length" of Wallace's car. As this
was taking place, Wallace heard loud banging noises and she
heard her cousin screaming.
Defendant's vehicle did not stop after sideswiping the
Mitsubishi and hitting Hamilton. Wallace testified that
defendant's car "continued accelerating" in reverse and struck
another car that was parked behind Wallace's car before finally
hitting a third vehicle parked on the other side of the street.
At that point, defendant's vehicle stopped, and Wallace "saw the
girl jump out of her car and run." Wallace testified that
defendant's car was "about 20 feet away," and she heard her
cousin, who was pinned under defendant's car, calling for help.
Wallace dialed 9-1-1 as she exited her car and ran to
defendant's car. Hamilton was still conscious and was
screaming. Wallace sat in the street and held Hamilton's hand
until help arrived. Hamilton was then removed from underneath
defendant's vehicle and taken to the Jersey City Medical Center,
where she died at 10:55 p.m. on the same day.
A-0545-08T4
3
On May 5, 2005, at approximately 12:20 a.m., defendant
turned herself in. According to Sergeant Joseph Olszewski,
defendant told him, "I think you're looking for me." When asked
to be more specific, defendant said, "I was involved in the
accident." Defendant then asked about Hamilton's condition, and
when she learned that Hamilton had died, defendant began to cry.
Olszewski then read defendant her rights and placed her under
arrest.
Because the crimes of aggravated manslaughter and vehicular
homicide both require a showing that defendant acted recklessly
in causing the death of another, the central dispute at trial
was whether defendant operated her vehicle recklessly. In his
opening statement, the prosecutor told the jury: "If you drive
recklessly and someone gets killed, it's not an accident. It's
a crime." On the other hand, defendant's attorney told the jury
that what happened on May 4, 2005, "was an accident, a tragic,
unfortunate accident," because defendant did not know that
Hamilton was "behind her car at that time."
During the trial, Police Officer James Canfield (Canfield)
testified that when he arrived on the scene, "Hamilton was being
removed from underneath the vehicle by rescue personnel." After
Hamilton was removed, Canfield examined defendant's car. During
A-0545-08T4
4
his inspection of the Acura, he noticed a purse and a cell phone1
in the front seat. While looking through the purse, he found
some "miscellaneous items" and a motor vehicle identification
card with defendant's name on it.
Canfield ran defendant's identification number through the
Department of Motor Vehicles database and her license came up as
suspended. However, Canfield testified that defendant's driving
privileges were not to be suspended until May 14, 2005, ten days
after the accident, and conceded that he may have used "the
wrong date on the license or something" when he entered the
information into the computer. In light of this testimony, the
trial court instructed the jury that any evidence pertaining to
the status of defendant's driver's license could not "be
considered as evidence of recklessness":
The State has submitted evidence [of]
defendant's lack of [a] valid driver's
license -- and there is some issue of
whether it was suspended. I have told you
they have not proven that it was. This
evidence cannot be considered as evidence of
recklessness; rather, if you consider it at
all, it's only in the context of whether it
contributed to the defendant's state of mind
when and if you find that she did leave the
accident. In other words, you're not
deciding whether her license is suspended or
1
According to Canfield, when the cell phone rang, he answered
it and the caller "asked for Tameka." Canfield testified he
told the caller, "if you know where she is, tell her to come
because she's in a little bit of trouble."
A-0545-08T4
5
that she didn't have a driver's license.
That doesn't determine if she's guilty of
this offense or any offense. You may not
consider lack of a valid driver's license as
being an act of recklessness in the prior
count or as to contributing to her in and of
itself leaving the scene.
The State also presented the testimony of Dr. Eddy
Lilavois, a forensic pathologist for the Regional Medical
Examiner's Office, who performed the autopsy on Hamilton. Dr.
Lilavois testified that the victim's point of impact injury was
on her right leg, about nine inches above her heel. The bone
did not fracture, however, and according to Dr. Lilavois if
defendant's vehicle had stopped, "the victim would have walked
away." Dr. Lilavois testified that the cause of death was
several "blunt impact injuries to the torso with subsequent
fractures of bones and lacerations of vital organs, including
the lungs and the liver," and the victim subsequently "bled
out."
Defendant elected not to testify, but Dr. Wayne F. Nolte,
an accident reconstruction expert, testified for the defense.
Based on his investigation, Dr. Nolte described the events that
occurred on May 4, 2005, as follows:
Tameka Nelson got in her car, a 1995 Acura,
in front of the property known as 187
Claremont Avenue. She at some point backed
up that vehicle, and when she did, her
vehicle came in contact with a . . . grey
2003 Mitsubishi Gallant that was parked in
A-0545-08T4
6
front of property 189, which is located west
of where she was parked. But the Gallant
was in the street, parallel to the parking
space. It was not stopped in the parking
space adjacent to the curb, but out in the
street.
Ida Hamilton came out of the residence
and went to the passenger side door of the
Mitsubishi Gallant, and while she was there,
the Nelson vehicle came back, struck the
right side of the Mitsubishi. Basically a
sideswipe that started from near the front
of that car on the passenger side. Moved
back and ultimately struck Ida Hamilton, and
then continued back.
As it continued back, it did continue
back at an angle, and the angle was more
toward the north or going across the
roadway.
The right rear of Tameka Nelson's car
came in contact with the left front corner
of a Pontiac that was parked in front of
property 190 -- 191. That car was parked
near the driveway. It was contacted on the
right front corner, and the Nelson vehicle
then continued across the street to where it
struck the side of a Ford van, a Windstar
van that was parked adjacent to the curb on
the north side of the street, across -- or
in front of property 190.
. . . The accident was the Nelson vehicle
moved in a westerly direction, and then
moved in a northerly direction across the
street. And there was a sideswipe, there
was a contact with the left front corner of
the Pontiac, and then ultimately contact
with the van across the street, and it
pushed the van into the curb line. That's
the accident.
A-0545-08T4
7
According to Dr. Nolte, defendant's car backed up about
seventeen feet before striking the front of the Mitsubishi, then
traveled another five feet before striking Hamilton. Dr. Nolte
testified that defendant's Acura traveled a total distance of
"about 47 feet" and was not going "more than ten miles per
hour." He estimated the entire incident took place in about
"four or five seconds."
At sentencing on April 28, 2008, defendant apologized "for
all the agony" she caused, and her attorney noted she "candidly
admitted in the presentence investigation that she was under the
influence. I suppose that may explain some of the otherwise
unexplainable aspects of the case."
On appeal, defendant presents the following arguments for
our consideration:
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT SHOULD HAVE GRANTED A
DIRECTED VERDICT AT THE CLOSE OF THE STATE'S
CASE ON THE CHARGE OF VEHICULAR HOMICIDE DUE
TO INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE THAT DEFENDANT
ACTED RECKLESSLY BY CONSCIOUSLY DISREGARDING
A SUBSTANTIAL RISK. (PARTIALLY RAISED
BELOW).
POINT II
THE VERDICT OF THE JURY SHOULD HAVE BEEN SET
ASIDE BY THE TRIAL COURT AS AGAINST THE
WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE AS THERE WAS
INSUFFICIENT FACTUAL BASIS FOR FINDING THAT
DEFENDANT ACTED RECKLESSLY BY CONSCIOUSLY
DISREGARDING A KNOWN RISK.
A-0545-08T4
8
POINT III
DEFENDANT'S RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS OF LAW AS
GUARANTEED BY THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT TO
THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION AND ART.
1 PAR. 1 OF THE NEW JERSEY CONSTITUTION WAS
VIOLATED BY CONFUSING AND PREJUDICIAL JURY
INSTRUCTIONS WHICH REPEATEDLY INFORMED THE
JURY THAT THE CASE DID NOT INVOLVE AN
ACCIDENT. (NOT RAISED BELOW).
POINT IV
DEFENDANT'S RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS OF LAW AS
GUARANTEED BY THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT TO
THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION AND ART.
1 PAR. 1 OF THE NEW JERSEY CONSTITUTION WAS
VIOLATED BY THE TRIAL COURT'S FAILURE TO
GIVE A TAILORED INSTRUCTION ON RECKLESSNESS.
(NOT RAISED BELOW).
POINT V
DEFENDANT'S RIGHT TO A FAIR TRIAL WAS
VIOLATED AS THE TRIAL COURT ERRONEOUSLY
ALLOWED THE STATE TO ADMIT IRRELEVANT AND
PREJUDICIAL HEARSAY EVIDENCE REGARDING THE
STATUS OF DEFENDANT'S DRIVER'S LICENSE.
(NOT RAISED BELOW).
POINT VI
DEFENDANT'S RIGHT TO A FAIR TRIAL WAS
VIOLATED BY IMPROPER AND INFLAMMATORY
COMMENTS OF THE PROSECUTOR IN HIS CLOSING
STATEMENT. (NOT RAISED BELOW).
POINT VII
DEFENDANT'S RIGHT TO A FAIR TRIAL WAS
VIOLATED AS A RESULT OF THE CUMULATIVE
EFFECT OF ERRORS COMMITTED BY THE TRIAL
COURT. (NOT RAISED BELOW).
A-0545-08T4
9
POINT VIII
THE SENTENCE IMPOSED BY THE TRIAL COURT WAS
EXCESSIVE.
A. DEFENDANT'S SENTENCE WAS
SIGNIFICANTLY MORE SEVERE THAN
SENTENCES IMPOSED IN SIMILAR
CASES.
B. THE SENTENCING COURT
FAILED TO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT
APPROPRIATE MITIGATING FACTORS.
Based on our review of the record and the controlling legal
principles, we conclude that defendant's arguments are without
sufficient merit to warrant extended discussion in a written
opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(2). We add only the following comments.
In her third point, defendant argues the jury instructions
were "confusing and prejudicial" because the jury was told "that
the case did not involve an accident." Defendant asserts that
even though the issue was not raised below, "the plain error
rule is wholly appropriate." On the other hand, the State
maintains the jury instructions were clear, thorough, and
necessary to clarify the difference between negligent and
reckless conduct.
We conclude from our review of the jury charge as a whole,
that the jury was properly instructed and that the court's
instructions regarding the difference between negligent conduct
A-0545-08T4
10
and reckless conduct were neither confusing nor prejudicial.
For example, the judge stated:
So I'd like to make it clear in the
case at hand that this is a criminal case.
It's not an automobile accident case. It
may arise from an automobile accident, but
this is not a civil matter where the accused
is alleged to have been negligent. All
right?
A defendant in a criminal matter in
contrast to a civil matter requires that the
State and the Prosecutor . . . prove that
the defendant acted recklessly, criminally.
It's a higher standard of culpability than
civil negligence or even criminal negligence
or carelessness.
Bear in mind that when I . . . give you
the first two charges here, which is the
vehicular homicide and then the greater
offense of aggravated manslaughter, the
State must prove the requisite -- that the
defendant possessed the requisite state of
mind, namely, reckless and . . . what the
degree of recklessness is. It's not enough
that the defendant acted negligently or
accidentally.
On the other hand, the last charge
deals with the knowing state of mind,
knowingly leaving the scene of an accident,
all right, where death occurred. I'll get
into that.
We recognize, of course, that proper jury instructions "are
State v. Green,
86 N.J. 281, 287
essential for a fair trial."
(1981). See also State v. Martin,
119 N.J. 2, 15 (1990) ("A
charge is a road map to guide the jury, and without an
appropriate charge a jury can take a wrong turn in its
A-0545-08T4
11
deliberations."). In the present matter, we are satisfied that
the court gave "a comprehensible explanation of the questions
that the jury must determine, including the law of the case
applicable to the facts." Green, supra,
86 N.J. at 287.
Accordingly, we find no error in the jury instructions, much
less plain error.
In point four, defendant asserts that the testimony about
the status of her driver's license was irrelevant and
prejudicial, and the trial court's limiting instruction was
insufficient to cure the prejudice. We do not agree. As the
trial court properly noted, the status of defendant's driver's
license had no bearing on whether she was reckless. State v.
Bakka,
176 N.J. 533, 538 (2003) ("[E]vidence that defendant's
license has been revoked by itself cannot be probative of
recklessness."). Therefore, the trial court correctly
instructed the jury that the testimony could only be considered
for the limited purpose of determining defendant's state of mind
See Biunno, Current N.J. Rules
when she ran from her vehicle.
of Evidence, comment 1 on N.J.R.E. 401 (2010) ("[A]ny evidence
which logically tends to show a motive, or which fairly tends to
explain the conduct of the accused, should be permitted.").
In point six, defendant argues that improper comments
during the prosecutor's summation deprived her of a fair trial.
A-0545-08T4
12
Defendant contends that the following statements by the
prosecutor warrant a new trial:
In [defense counsel's] world, where
does an accident become a crime? It's just
an accident. She gets in her car, whether
she looks in the mirror or not, it's an
accident. Whether she sees the double
parked car back there -- and by the way,
when you look back and you see a double
parked car, is someone getting in or is
someone getting out?
She backs it up. She hits the car.
When does that stop being an accident? She
hits somebody, she drags her. She's
screaming. When does that stop being an
accident?
At one point, it becomes a crime, and
somebody has to be responsible. And you
know what, it wasn't Ida Hamilton.
Improper comments by a prosecutor require reversal when the
prosecutor's misconduct is "so egregious that it deprived the
defendant of a fair trial." State v. Frost,
158 N.J. 76, 83
(1999). Nevertheless, a prosecutor is not precluded from making
"a vigorous and forceful presentation of the State's case."
State v. Bucanis,
26 N.J. 45, 56, cert. denied,
357 U.S. 910,
78 S. Ct. 1157,
2 L. Ed. 2d 1160 (1958). Moreover, "[p]rosecutors
are afforded considerable leeway in closing arguments" (and they
may respond to arguments raised by defense counsel), "as long as
their comments are reasonably related to the scope of the
Frost, supra,
158 N.J. at 82.
evidence presented."
A-0545-08T4
13
In the present matter, the State contends the prosecutor's
comments were an appropriate response to defense counsel's
summation, which included the following:
At the outset of this case, [the
prosecutor] got up during his opening
statement, and he . . . referred to this
incident as being a senseless accident, if
you recall those words.
And to that I say, amen. That's
exactly what it was, this is an accident.
An inexplicable accident, certainly a tragic
accident. And, unfortunately, Ida Hamilton
lost her life as a result of the accident.
But as I point out back then, I'll reiterate
again, accidents, unfortunately are part of
the human condition. They happen.
Frequently they're tragic, and they'll
happen again.
....
Accidents, as the judge has already
told you, are normally litigated as civil
suits. In that sense, we're in the wrong
courthouse, you're in the wrong courthouse.
Civil suits, next door in the Brennan
Justice Complex.
But, however, [by] virtue of indicting
this case, the State has taken this accident
to a new level, a higher level, a different
level. Different to the extent that
criminal guilt or not guilt is the issue.
Is this a crime? As opposed to what they
might have done next door, litigate
liability, who was responsible. And
ultimately, at least, the currency over
there is monetary damages. If there's a
victim, how much money does -- should she
receive by virtue of the negligence of the
defendant.
A-0545-08T4
14
If that were the case, I wouldn't be
sitting here or over there. You'd have
insurance company lawyers sitting [as] a
defense attorney. You'd have plaintiff's
attorney sitting in [the prosecutor's]
place.
But this case is not being treated as
your ordinary accident. I don't know what
the basis for doing that is, because when
you analyze it all, I submit to you, this is
still an accident.
Because defense counsel did not object to the prosecutor's
summation, we must determine whether there was plain error
requiring reversal. R. 2:10-2. We find no such error. In our
view, when the summations are viewed in their entirety, the
prosecutor's comments were a fair response to defense counsel's
argument that defendant was not guilty because "Ida Hamilton
lost her life as a result of the accident."
Defendant also challenges her sentence. But we conclude
from our examination of the record that the trial court
correctly applied the sentencing guidelines, defendant's
aggregate sentence is not excessive or unreasonable, and it
certainly does not "shock the judicial conscience." State v.
Roth,
95 N.J. 334, 365 (1984).
Affirmed.
A-0545-08T4
15
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.
