SHAFAQ AGHA v. NEW JERSEY MOTOR VEHICLE COMMISSION

 

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-1499-07T31499-07T3

SHAFAQ AGHA,

Appellant,

v.

NEW JERSEY MOTOR VEHICLE

COMMISSION,

Respondent.

__________________________

 

Submitted October 21, 2008 - Decided

Before Judges Yannotti and LeWinn.

On appeal from the New Jersey Motor Vehicle Commission.

Shafaq Agha, appellant pro se.

Anne Milgram, Attorney General, attorney for respondent (Lewis A. Scheindlin, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel; Mala Narayanan, Deputy Attorney General, on the brief).

PER CURIAM

Shafaq Agha appeals from the October 29, 2007 final decision by the Motor Vehicle Commission (MVC), which suspended her driving privileges for a period of sixty days.

Appellant's driving privileges were suspended in July 2006, pursuant to N.J.S.A. 39:5-30.8 and N.J.A.C. 13:19-10.2(a)(7), because she had accumulated twenty points as the result of seven speeding violations and three unsafe driving violations. Appellant paid a restoration fee on July 31, 2006, and her driving privileges were conditionally restored four days later. Appellant received specific notice that the restoration of her driving privileges was subject to her serving a one-year probationary period, effective August 3, 2006, and that if she committed any motor vehicle violations during this probationary period, she would be subject to suspension of her driving privileges.

On February 22, 2007, appellant was charged with unsafe driving. Because she had committed this violation during her one-year probationary period, the MVC sent her a notice of a sixty-day suspension on April 1, 2007.

On April 9, 2007, appellant was charged with careless driving. When this conviction was posted to her driving record, the MVC issued another suspension notice, dated September 23, 2007, imposing a 120-day suspension based upon appellant's second violation during her one-year probationary period.

On October 10, 2007, appellant wrote to the MVC asking for an explanation of her driving record. Appellant did not contest either the February or the April violation. Rather, she contended that a municipal prosecutor had allegedly informed her that she had "more points than [she] should have[,]" and, therefore, she sought clarification of her record.

On October 29, 2007, the MVC issued its final decision, noting that because appellant had raised no factual dispute or legal argument contesting the proposed suspension, there was "no need for a hearing." The MVC, however, reduced the suspension period to sixty days.

Appellant raises the following argument for our consideration:

THE DEPARTMENT OF MOTOR VEHICLES HAS ADDED UNNECESSARY POINTS TO MY DRIVER'S LICENSE WHICH IS RAISING MY INSURANCE ON MY CAR VERY HIGH, THEREFORE, I SHOULD GET THE UNNECESSARY POINTS OFF MY LICENSE TO BETTER CONVENIENCE MYSELF.

However, appellant does not provide us with any analysis of the points she has received and which, if any, she challenges as "unnecessary." Rather, she appears to claim that "an agreement was made in court to drop the points and pay a high fee . . . ," but she provides no documentary support for this contention.

The record clearly supports the MVC's actions. Appellant has a significant history of motor vehicle violations. N.J.S.A. 39:5-30(a) provides, in pertinent part: "Every . . . privilege to drive motor vehicles . . . may be suspended or revoked by the director for a violation of any of the provisions of this Title . . . , after due notice in writing of such proposed suspension . . . and the ground thereof."

Further support for the MVC's decision is found in N.J.S.A. 39:5-30.10, which provides:

Except for good cause, the [MVC] director shall suspend for a period as provided herein the license to operate a motor vehicle of any person who, having had his license suspended pursuant to . . . this act, . . . is convicted of a violation committed within 1 year of the date of restoration of the driving privilege . . . . For commission of one violation within 1 year, the period of suspension shall be no less than 45 days and no more than 90 days. For a second violation the period of suspension shall be no less than 90 days and no more than 180 days.

The authority conferred in this statute is mirrored in the implementing regulations. N.J.A.C. 13:19-10.6(a) and (b).

Appellant was clearly subject to a 120-day suspension upon her second violation within her probationary term. Nonetheless, the MVC modified her term to sixty days "[b]ased on the extenuating/mitigating circumstances stated in the hearing request . . . ."

As noted, appellant does not contest the two violations committed during her probationary term; nor does she dispute the law applicable to such violations committed while on probation. Therefore, we conclude that the MVC's final determination was neither arbitrary nor unreasonable as it fully comported with the governing law. McGowan v. N.J. State Parole Bd., 347 N.J. Super. 544, 563 (App. Div. 2002). In fact, appellant benefited from the MVC's decision to reduce her suspension term from the presumptive 120-day term to sixty days.

Where, as here, a final agency decision is based upon the proper application of controlling legal principles, we will afford substantial deference to the agency's interpretation of its authorizing statutes and regulations. In re Progressive Cas. Ins. Co., 307 N.J. Super. 93, 102 (App. Div. 1997). "[T]he breadth of an agency's authority encompasses all express and implied powers necessary to fulfill the legislative scheme that the agency has been entrusted to administer." In re Virtua-West Jersey Hosp. Voorhees, 194 N.J. 413, 422-23 (2008).

 
In sum, we find the MVC's decision to suspend appellant's driving privileges for sixty days, based upon her two motor vehicle violations while on probation, was supported by "substantial evidence" in the record. George Harms Constr. Co. v. N.J. Tpk. Auth., 137 N.J. 8, 27 (1994).

Affirmed.

On November 19, 2007, we entered an order staying the suspension pending appeal, with the consent of the MVC.

As noted, the record is devoid both of documentation and cogent argument regarding appellant's points charged against her driver's license. Therefore, we do not address whether she is entitled to a reduction in points beyond that which the DMV concedes she is entitled to.

(continued)

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A-1499-07T3

December 8, 2008