NEW JERSEY DIVISION OF YOUTH AND FAMILY SERVICES v. D.L.

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NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-6409-05T46409-05T4

NEW JERSEY DIVISION OF YOUTH

AND FAMILY SERVICES,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

D.L.,

Defendant-Appellant,

IN THE MATTER OF THE GUARDIANSHIP

OF G.L.S., Jr.,

Minor.

__________________________________________________

 

Submitted March 7, 2007 - Decided March 19, 2007

Before Judges Parker, C.S. Fisher and Messano.

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Camden County, Docket No. FG-04-84-06.

Yvonne Smith Segars, Public Defender, attorney for appellant (Mary Potter, Designated Counsel, on the brief).

Stuart Rabner, Attorney General, attorney for respondent (Patrick DeAlmeida, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel; Angela N. Domen, Deputy Attorney General, on the brief).

Yvonne Smith Segars, Public Defender, Law Guardian, attorney for minor child, G.L.S., Jr. (Noel C. Devlin, Assistant Deputy Public Defender, on the brief).

PER CURIAM

Following a non-jury trial, Judge Robert W. Page rendered an oral decision and entered a judgment, which terminated the parental rights of defendant D.L. to her sixth child, G.L.S., Jr., who was born on October 18, 2002. On appeal, defendant argues that there was insufficient evidence to support the judge's determination. We disagree and affirm.

The evidence adduced at trial reveals that defendant is the biological parent of five other children: J.S. (born May 14, 1990); N.L. (born September 13, 1991); L.L. (born June 8, 1993); J.L. (born March 10, 1994); and D.U. (born May 17, 1997). None of these children remains in defendant's care.

The Division of Youth and Family Services (Division) became involved with defendant and her family on September 13, 2003, when it received a referral from the Camden City Police Department indicating that L.L. and G.L.S., Jr. were home alone and that the home was in a deplorable state. L.L., who was then ten years old, told the police that defendant was asleep in the home; this was not true. While defendant remained missing, the police searched among the numerous soiled diapers scattered about the home for a clean diaper for G.L.S., Jr. Defendant later acknowledged that she left L.L. and G.L.S., Jr. in the care of J.S., who was then thirteen years old, and that J.S. must have left the home without permission.

The police later arrested defendant on outstanding traffic warrants, and the children were placed in the care of a relative for a fifteen-day period with defendant's consent. A few days later, defendant went to the relative's home and took the children back to her home without the Division's approval.

When a Division worker visited defendant's home soon thereafter, the home was found to be neat and clean, and the children appeared healthy. Defendant consented to a plan, which included her agreement to participate in a psychological evaluation, individual and family counseling, and parenting classes. She also agreed to submit urine screens. Based on this agreement, the Division agreed to allow the children to remain with defendant.

Defendant failed to attend three scheduled appointments for the psychological evaluation and, on March 26, 2004, the Division received another referral, which indicated that N.L. was sent to school dirty and that defendant was using drugs. A responding Division worker observed that the home was clean and defendant denied drug usage. The Division worker reminded defendant of her need to cooperate with the Division.

In October 2004, defendant tested positive for opiates, cocaine, marijuana, and benzodiazepine. Defendant acknowledged that she had been using seven bags of heroin daily for the past year; defendant also admitted using cocaine and having spent $2,100 on drugs during the prior thirty days. In addition, defendant admitted she was unemployed and not looking for work. Given the severity of her drug addiction, defendant was referred to an intensive outpatient program for five days of treatment per week. She missed three appointments in October and November 2004. In late November 2004, and twice during December 2004, defendant tested positive for opiates. Defendant was later discharged from another program for non-compliance and positive urine screens.

In January 2005, defendant was arrested on outstanding warrants. G.L.S., Sr., the natural father of G.L.S., Jr., was also arrested at that time for possession of controlled dangerous substances. The Division received a referral because, as a result of these arrests, G.L.S., Jr. was at the police station and there were no available relatives to care for him. G.L.S., Jr. was then placed in foster care, where he remains at present.

The record also contains additional evidence of defendant's non-compliance with drug treatment programs since the placement of G.L.S., Jr. with his foster parents. Indeed, as Judge Page observed in his oral decision of June 23, 2006, defendant had tested positive for drug use in May 2006 and again, on June 20, 2006, the day of trial. Based on his findings, only some of which we have summarized, Judge Page concluded that the Division had demonstrated, through clear and convincing evidence, that termination was required. Judgment was entered on June 26, 2006.

Defendant appealed, asserting the following arguments for our consideration:

DYFS FAILED TO ESTABLISH BY CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE THAT IT IS NECESSARY TO TERMIANTE D.L.'S PARENTAL RIGHTS IN ORDER TO PROTECT HER SON'S BEST INTEREST.

A. The Child's Safety, Health and Welfare Have Not Been Endangered by His Relationship With His Mother, Nor Will the Continuation of The Relation-ship Endanger Him.

B. D.L. Is Willing and Able to Eliminate The Harm Facing Her Son and Is Able And Willing to Provide a Safe and Stable Home for Him.

C. DYFS Failed to Make Reasonable Efforts To Provide Services to Help D.L. Correct the Circumstances Which Led to Her Son's Placement Outside the Home and the Trial Court Failed to Adequately Consider Alternatives to Termination of Parental Rights.

D. Termination Will Do More Harm Than Good.

We find no merit in these contentions.

In reaching his decision, Judge Page correctly applied N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1, which mandates that, in order to terminate parental rights, the Division is required to prove, by clear and convincing evidence, that:

(1) The child's health and development have been or will continue to be endangered by the parental relationship;

(2) The parent is unwilling or unable to eliminate the harm facing the child or is unable or unwilling to provide a safe and stable home for the child and the delay of permanent placement will add to the harm . . .;

(3) The division has made reasonable efforts to provide services to help the parent correct the circumstances which led to the child's placement outside the home and the court has considered alternatives to termination of parental rights; and

(4) Termination of parental rights will not do more harm than good.

See also N.J. Div. of Youth & Fam. Serv. v. A.W., 103 N.J. 591, 604-05 (1986).

Judge Page considered the evidence submitted by the Division. Defendant did not testify nor did she call any witnesses. In his thorough and thoughtful oral decision, Judge Page weighed and considered the evidence, which we have only briefly synopsized, of defendant's drug usage and her inability to parent this child or to provide a safe and stable home. He ultimately found the Division's proofs regarding each of the statutory factors to be clear and convincing.

The applicable standard of appellate review requires that we defer to a trial judge's factual findings when they are based on credible evidence in the record and unless we are convinced those findings are "so wholly unsupportable as to result in a denial of justice." In re Guardianship of J.N.H., 172 N.J. 440, 472 (2002); Cesare v. Cesare, 154 N.J. 394, 411-12 (1998). After careful review, we conclude that the record contains clear and convincing evidence to support Judge Page's findings. We also conclude that Judge Page carefully and thoughtfully applied the correct legal standards to the facts he found in ultimately concluding that termination was required. We discern from the record no sound reason for disturbing Judge Page's findings.

Affirmed.

 

(continued)

(continued)

7

A-6409-05T4

RECORD IMPOUNDED

March 19, 2007

 


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