JENNIFER ARONSON v. BOARD OF REVIEW, DEPARTMENT OF LABOR et al.

 

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-5050-05T15050-05T1

JENNIFER ARONSON,

Appellant,

v.

BOARD OF REVIEW, DEPARTMENT

OF LABOR and CITISTREET,

Respondents.

_______________________________

 

Submitted March 6, 2007 - Decided April 30, 2007

Before Judges Weissbard and Lihotz.

On appeal from Board of Review, Department of Labor, Docket No. 103,506.

Jennifer Aronson, appellant pro se.

Stuart Rabner, Attorney General of New Jersey, attorney for Board of Review, Department of Labor (Patrick DeAlmeida, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel; Andrea R. Grundfest, Deputy Attorney General, on the brief).

PER CURIAM

Petitioner Jennifer B. Aronson appeals from a final decision of the Board of Review finding her disqualified for the receipt of unemployment benefits because she left her employment voluntarily, without good cause attributable to the work, N.J.S.A. 43:21-5(a), and, further, required her to refund $6864 in benefits paid, N.J.S.A. 43:21-16(d)(1). Aronson's subsequent request to re-open the record was also denied. Our review of the record, in light of our standard of review, satisfies us that the final decision of the Board of Review was properly premised upon facts in the record and that its determination was consonant with relevant statutory provisions.

The facts are as follows: Aronson was employed by Citigroup Payco III, CitiStreets, as a human resources generalist. On November 18, 2004, she took medical leave and applied for benefits pursuant to a private disability insurance plan. Aronson returned to work on January 5, 2004, but again became ill and applied for disability on March 1, 2004. A letter from the insurance company stated Aronson's period of long-term disability benefits expired on July 19, 2004, and that she did not qualify for permanent disability. It was presumed that she would return to work. Aronson testified, however, that, she did not return to work based on her physician's advice. Aronson's was medically released by her doctor to return to work in November 2004. She did not contact her employer to determine whether work was available at that time because, after she received correspondence instructing her to rollover her Citigroup pension, "because [her] employment with Citigroup ended on July 18, 2004," she assumed her job was lost. During the hearing, a representative for the employer testified that work was available and would have been extended to petitioner had she called.

Aronson applied for unemployment benefits, which were originally awarded. After redetermination, Aronson was found disqualified to receive unemployment benefits because she had left her work voluntarily; and she was ordered to repay the equivalent of the benefits she received. The Board of Review affirmed. Aronson appeals the agency determination that she was disqualified to receive benefits, asserting her failure to return to work resulted because her employer terminated her before she was medically cleared by her physician.

An individual is disqualified to receive unemployment benefits "[f]or the week in which the individual has left work voluntarily without good cause attributable to such work . . . ." N.J.S.A. 43:21-5. We have observed that "[w]hile the statute does not define 'good cause,' our courts have construed the statute to mean 'cause sufficient to justify an employee's voluntarily leaving the ranks of the employed and joining the ranks of the unemployed.'" Domenico v. Bd. of Review, 192 N.J. Super. 284, 287 (App. Div. 1983) (quoting Condo v. Bd. of Review, 158 N.J. Super. 172, 174 (App. Div. 1978)). This test is fact-sensitive requiring the application of "ordinary common sense and prudence." Ibid.

In scrutinizing the circumstances presented as an employee's reason for leaving, we have stated "it is the employee's responsibility to do what is necessary and reasonable in order to remain employed." Ibid. The Department of Labor administrative regulations also provide guidance on this issue. N.J.A.C. 12:17-9.3(c) states:

(c) [A]n individual who has been absent because of a personal illness or physical and/or mental condition shall not be subject to disqualification for voluntarily leaving work if the individual has made a reasonable effort to preserve his or her employment, but has still been terminated by the employer. A reasonable effort is evidenced by the employee's notification to the employer, requesting a leave of absence or having taken other steps to protect his or her employment.

The limited nature of our review of administrative decisions is well established. Brady v. Bd. of Review, 152 N.J. 197, 210 (1997). "Unless the agency's action was arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable, the agency's ruling should not be disturbed." Ibid. "[I]f substantial credible evidence supports an agency's conclusion, a court may not substitute its own judgment for the agency's even though the court might have reached a different result." Greenwood v. State Police Training Ctr., 127 N.J. 500, 513 (1992).

In this case, Aronson did not maintain contact with the employer at the time her private disability benefits ended or when she was medically cleared to return to work by her physician. Accordingly, we are required to respect the Board's expertise and defer to its considered determination. Ibid; Karins v. City of Atlantic City, 152 N.J. 532, 540 (1998).

Affirmed.

 

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A-5050-05T1

April 30, 2007