CHARLES SONNTAG v. NEW JERSEY STATE PAROLE BOARD

 

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-5042-05T55042-05T5

CHARLES SONNTAG,

Appellant,

v.

NEW JERSEY STATE

PAROLE BOARD,

Respondent.

__________________________________________

 

Submitted March 20, 2007 - Decided May 7, 2007-

Before Judges Kestin and Weissbard.

On appeal from a Final Decision of the

New Jersey State Parole Board.

Charles Sonntag, appellant pro se.

Stuart Rabner, Attorney General, attorney for respondent (Patrick DeAlmeida, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel; Lisa A. Puglisi, Deputy Attorney General, on the brief).

PER CURIAM

Charles Sonntag, a state prison inmate, appeals from a final decision of the New Jersey State Parole Board (the Board), dated February 8, 2006, upholding the October 12, 2005 determination of a three-member panel, denying parole and establishing a sixteen-year future eligibility term (FET). The initial denial of parole resulted from a May 31, 2004 hearing by a two-member panel which then referred Sonntag's case to the three-member panel for fixing an extended FET. See N.J.A.C. 10A:71-3.21(d).

Sonntag is presently serving a 112-year sentence, imposed on September 8, 1988, for kidnapping, three counts of aggravated assault with a weapon, four counts of aggravated sexual assault, and threatening to kill. A fifteen-year period of parole ineligibility was imposed on the kidnapping charge. Defendant's convictions followed a jury trial which concluded on June 6, 1980. Sonntag first became eligible for parole on September 29, 1994. Parole was denied at that time and an eighteen-year FET was established. He became parole eligible again on April 13, 2005, leading to the matter under review.

In denying parole, the three-member panel noted the following factors: prior criminal record; nature of criminal record increasingly more serious; presently incarcerated for multi-crime conviction; prior opportunity on probation has failed to deter criminal behavior; prior incarceration did not deter criminal behavior; institutional infractions involved loss of commutation time; insufficient problem resolution, including lack of insight into criminal behavior and minimization of conduct as demonstrated by the panel interview, documentation in the case file, and confidential professional reports; and risk assessment. The panel noted that the "crime was extremely violent and little or nothing appears to have been done to deal with the issues involved. No progress is seen." The panel noted as mitigating factors that Sonntag had participated in programs specific to behavior, participated in institutional programs, and had average to above average institutional reports.

On appeal, in his pro se brief, Sonntag presents the following arguments:

POINT 4: THE NEW JERSEY STATE PAROLE BOARD IS IN VIOLATION OF ARTICLE III OF THE NEW JERSEY STATE CONSTITUTION

POINT 5: PAROLE BOARD IS NOT CONSISTENT IN DETERMINING CRITERIA FOR DENIAL OF PAROLE AND IMPOSITION OF FUTURE ELIGIBILITY TERM; PAROLE BOARD IS IN VIOLATION OF THE EQUAL TREATMENT UNDER THE LAW PROVISIONS OF THE 14TH AMENDMENT OF THE U.S. CONSTITUTION

POINT 6: CHARLES SONNTAG'S PRISON RECORD MEETS CRITERIA FOR "EXCEPTIONAL PROGRESS"

POINT 7: THE NOTICE OF DECISION OF A DENIAL OF PAROLE AND IMPOSITION OF AN 16 YEAR FET DOES NOT PROVIDE EVIDENCE THAT INMATE WILL COMMIT A CRIME IF RELEASED AND PORTIONS ARE NOT SUPPORTED BY THE RECORD

POINT 8: MANDATORY MINIMUM TERM IS ONLY STATUTORY REQUIREMENT FOR PAROLE

POINT 9:

CALCULATION OF 16 YEAR FUTURE ELIGIBILITY TERM

Point 1 of defendant's brief simply asserts our jurisdiction to review this matter, an issue not in dispute. Points 2 and 3 challenge the calculation of defendant's initial parole eligibility and his initial FET of eighteen years, matters which are now moot.

Our scope of review is limited. Parole Board determinations are not to be reversed unless they are arbitrary or an abuse of discretion. Trantino v. N.J. State Parole Bd., 154 N.J. 19, 25 (1998). When reviewing the decision of a state agency, such as the Parole Board, we must determine whether the agency's findings could reasonably have been reached on sufficient credible evidence in the record. Close v. Kordulak Bros., 44 N.J. 589, 599 (1965). We must affirm unless the determination by the Board "'went so far wide of the mark that a mistake must have been made.'" N.J. State Parole Bd. v. Cestari, 224 N.J. Super. 534, 547 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 111 N.J. 649 (1988) (quoting 613 Corp v. State of N.J., Div. of State Lottery, 210 N.J. Super. 485, 495 (App. Div. 1986)).

The decision of a parole board involves "'highly individualized discretionary appraisals.'" Trantino v. N.J. State Parole Bd., 166 N.J. 113, 173 (2001) (quoting Beckworth v. N.J. State Parole Bd., 62 N.J. 348, 359 (1973)). Such decisions represent a "'discretionary assessment of a multiplicity of imponderables, entailing primarily what a man is and what he may become rather than simply what he has done.'" Greenholtz v. Inmates of Nebraska Penal & Corr. Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 10, 99 S. Ct. 2100, 2105, 60 L. Ed. 2d 668, 677 (1979) (quoting Kadish, The Advocate and the Expert -- Counsel in the Peno-Correctional Process, 45 Minn. L. Rev. 803, 813 (1961)). Consequently, it is understood that the Board "has broad but not unlimited discretionary powers" in reviewing an inmate's application. Monks v. N.J. State Parole Bd., 58 N.J. 238, 242 (1971).

We have considered Sonntag's arguments in light of the record and applicable law and we find that they do not warrant extended discussion in a written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E). We agree with the State that Sonntag's initial and subsequent parole eligibility dates were calculated correctly, as was his first FET and future FET.

The Board denied parole based on a substantial likelihood that Sonntag would commit a crime if released on parole. See N.J.S.A. 30:4-123.53(a). It reached that determination after a consideration of all pertinent factors, including the non-exhaustive list found in N.J.A.C. 10A:71-3.11(b). The record fully supports the Board's determination. Further, the extended FET was based on the Board's rational conclusion that Sonntag had demonstrated a lack of progress while incarcerated, stating the following:

[You have] been unable to identify and articulate the underlying reasons for your extremely violent criminal behavior involved in the assaults you committed on September 29, 1979 and September 30, 1979, thereby demonstrating insufficient insight. In addition to beating the victim, you also sexually assaulted her with various objects such as bottles and sticks. Your steadfast refusal to discuss your actions during your incarceration demonstrates that you do not understand why you erupted into such a rage and assaulted your victim in such a depraved manner.

Been unable to demonstrate genuine remorse and empathy for your victim. Your statements: blaming the victim for stealing your wife's watch; insinuating that the charges you were convicted of were retaliatory in nature; and emphasizing that your rights were violated when you were sentenced demonstrate an apathetic and indifferent attitude towards your victim.

Been unable to accept genuine responsibility for your criminal behavior. The statements you made during your parole hearing reflect that you do not understand the concept of responsibility.

Demonstrated a minimal interest in participating in institutional programs/counseling, which might have provided satisfactory evidence of rehabilitative progress.

We affirm substantially for the reasons set forth by the three-member panel in its written decision of October 12, 2005, and by the full Board in its written decision of February 10, 2006. It is true that defendant has served an extraordinarily long time (over twenty-six years), but his offenses were horrific and, as the decisions fully explained, he has yet to meet the criteria for release on parole.

Affirmed.

 

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A-5042-05T5

May 7, 2007