BARBARA MANNING v. JOHN MANNING

 

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-4388-05T54388-05T5

BARBARA MANNING, now known as

BARBARA CARROLL,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

JOHN MANNING,

Defendant-Appellant.

_____________________________________________________________

 
Argued telephonically March 27, 2007 -

Decided April 11, 2007

Before Judges Graves and Lihotz.

On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey,

Chancery Division, Family Part, Bergen County,

Docket No. FM-02-6706-93.

Jennifer S. DeSimone argued the cause for

appellant (Smith & Doran, attorneys, Ms.

DeSimone, on the brief).

George B. Wolfe argued the cause for

respondent.

PER CURIAM

The parties were divorced in 1994. They have three daughters: Melissa is twenty-three years old, Amy is twenty-one, and Samantha is nineteen. Defendant John Manning appeals from companion orders entered on March 17, 2006, denying his motion for discovery and a plenary hearing, and granting plaintiff's motion requiring him to pay one-half of the children's college expenses, including the sum of $39,615.82 for monies "already expended," and (2) the sum of $12,034.53 representing one-half of unreimbursed medical expenses allegedly incurred on behalf of parties' children during an eleven-year period from 1994 through 2004. We reverse and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

The trial court did not state its reasons for denying defendant's request for discovery and a hearing to consider the factors set forth in Newburgh v. Arrigo, 88 N.J. 529, 545 (1982). And the court's statement of reasons for granting plaintiff's motion was limited to the following:

RIDER TO ORDER (FINDINGS OF FACT)

Pursuant to the Judgment of Divorce, defendant is to pay 1/2 of all medical bills. The $12,034.53 represents defendant's share of past medical bills.

Defendant was directed to pay $205 per week beginning June 6, 1994. Defendant unilaterally reduced the support payments commencing June 2005 to $592.22 per month. Because there was no consent to same or Court Order modifying the child support, the $205 per week remains unchanged, and arrearages have accumulated amounting to $7,091.64.

Pursuant to the Judgment of Divorce, defendant is to contribute to the medical insurance for plaintiff and the children. The $2,404.35 represents reimbursement owed to the plaintiff as contribution to the payment of medical insurance.

Defendant has a responsibility to contribute to his children's college education. "In appropriate circumstances, parental responsibility includes the duty to assure children of a college and even of a postgraduate education such as law school." Newburgh v. Arrigo, 88 N.J. 529 (1982). The court has considered the Newburgh factors and concludes the defendant has an obligation to contribute, both retroactively and prospectively, to the education of his three children.

Because the parties' divorce judgment is silent regarding defendant's obligation to contribute to the children's college expenses, the court properly considered the non-exhaustive list of factors enumerated in Newburgh. Unfortunately, the court failed to set forth how it evaluated, weighed, and balanced those twelve factors in arriving at its ultimate determination. See Gac v. Gac, 186 N.J. 535, 543 (2006) ("[A] trial court should balance the statutory criteria of N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23(a) and the Newburgh factors, as well as any other circumstances, to reach a fair and just decision . . . ."). The trial court's conclusory statement that it "considered the Newburgh factors" fails to satisfy the requirements of R. 1:7-4. See Curtis v. Finneran, 83 N.J. 563, 570 (1980) ("Naked conclusions do not satisfy the purpose of R. 1:7-4. Rather, the trial court must state clearly its factual findings and correlate them with the relevant legal conclusions.").

Defendant does not dispute he owes the sum of $2,404.35 for the children's medical insurance and the sum of $7,091.64 for child support arrears. But defendant contends that the order requiring him to pay for one-half of the alleged college expenses and unreimbursed medical expenses should not have been entered without discovery and a plenary hearing. We agree. Our review of the record confirms that the parties did not submit current case information statements to the motion judge, and plaintiff failed to substantiate the children's unreimbursed medical expenses. Defendant claimed that he should not be compelled to contribute to the children's college expenses because (1) he was never consulted regarding the children's education, (2) through no fault of his own, he does not have a relationship with any of his three children, and (3) he lacks sufficient financial resources to contribute to his children's college education. Under these circumstances, we are satisfied defendant is entitled to discovery and a plenary hearing. See Tretola v. Tretola, 389 N.J. Super. 15, 20-21 (App. Div. 2006) ("The need for discovery and analysis of the evidence in a further proceeding is underscored in a case such as this where the parties' PSA does not specifically address [the father's] monetary obligation under the circumstances . . . .").

Because a remand is required, there is no need for us to consider whether plaintiff's request for unreimbursed medical expenses is barred by the doctrine of laches. If the parties are unable to resolve this issue following discovery, then the dispute must be presented to the trial court for a fair resolution in light of the relevant evidence.

Reversed and remanded to the Family Part for further proceedings in conformity with this opinion. We do not retain jurisdiction.

 

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A-4388-05T5

April 11, 2007