BENJAMIN O. WILKIE v. BOARD OF REVIEW, DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, et al.

 

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-4321-05T24321-05T2

BENJAMIN O. WILKIE,

Appellant,

v.

BOARD OF REVIEW, DEPARTMENT

OF LABOR, and VANGUARD CAR

RENTAL USA, INC.

Respondents.

_________________________________________

 

Argued January 24, 2007 - Decided February 23, 2007

Before Judges Lefelt and Sapp-Peterson.

On appeal from the Board of Review, Department of Labor, Docket No. 94,777.

Benjamin O. Wilkie, appellant, argued the cause pro se.

Julie D. Barnes, Deputy Attorney General, argued the cause for respondent Board of Review (Stuart Rabner, Attorney General, attorney; Michael J. Haas, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel; Ms. Barnes, on the brief).

PER CURIAM

Benjamin O. Wilkie appeals from a decision dated February 16, 2006, by the Board of Review (Board) finding him ineligible for unemployment benefits for the benefit year October 2005 through October 2006. We affirm.

Wilkie filed a claim for unemployment benefits on October 24, 2004, following his termination from employment with Vanguard Car Rental USA, Inc. He was deemed eligible for benefits and collected unemployment compensation for twenty-six weeks through April 2005, at which time his benefits were exhausted. Wilkie again filed for benefits on October 25, 2005. A deputy claims examiner determined that Wilkie was ineligible to receive benefits. Wilkie appealed this determination to the Appeal Tribunal, which affirmed the deputy claims examiner's decision. In its decision, the Appeal Tribunal determined that because Wilkie had not worked since October 2004, he had not fulfilled the statutory requirements for further benefits, which required that Wilkie have worked at least four weeks in the previous benefit year, which in this case was the period between October 2004 and October 2005. There was no dispute that Wilkie had not worked since October 2004. The Appeal Tribunal therefore found that the deputy claims examiner properly concluded that Wilkie was ineligible to collect unemployment benefits. Wilkie appealed the decision to the Board. The Board sustained the Appeal Tribunal's finding that Wilkie was ineligible to collect benefits because he had failed to work the requisite weeks during the relevant time period.

On appeal, Wilkie argues that an unidentified attendant at the Unemployment Office advised him that if he enrolled in school, his unemployment benefits would continue until he completed school. Wilkie maintains he was never told that he was required to work for a certain number of weeks in order to qualify for further benefits. In addition, Wilkie claims he earned commissions which he did not receive from his former employer. Had the commissions been paid, Wilkie contends he would have earned the required base earnings of $5,200 necessary to collect unemployment compensation for the benefit year October 23, 2005 through October 21, 2006. As to this latter contention, Wilkie told the appeals examiner he took no action to recover the claimed commissions because Vanguard's human resources representative told him payment of the commissions was discretionary.

Our scope of review of administrative decisions is narrowly circumscribed. In re Taylor, 158 N.J. 644, 656 (1999). Our role is to determine "'whether the findings made could reasonably have been reached on sufficient credible evidence present in the record' considering 'the proofs as a whole,' with due regard to the opportunity of the one who heard the witnesses to judge their credibility." Ibid. (quoting Close v. Kordulak Bros., 44 N.J. 589, 599 (1965)). We may not engage in an independent assessment of the evidence, id., and we will accord a strong presumption of reasonableness to the decision of an administrative agency. Smith v. Ricci, 89 N.J. 514, 525 (1982). We give deference to administrative decisions, State v. Johnson, 42 N.J. 146, 159 (1964), but we do not act simply as a rubber stamp of the agency's decision. Taylor, supra, 158 N.J. at 657. An administrative decision will be reversed when it is found to be "arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable or it is not supported by substantial credible evidence in the record as a whole." Henry v. Rahway State Prison, 81 N.J. 571, 579-80 (1980).

The Unemployment Compensation Law, N.J.S.A. 43:21-4(e)(6), proscribes the conditions for requalifications for unemployment benefits in the year immediately following the receipt of initial benefits:

The individual applying for benefits in any successive benefit year has earned at least six times his previous weekly benefit amount and has had four weeks of employment since the beginning of the immediately preceding benefit year. This provision shall be in addition to the earnings requirements specified [in the above paragraphs] of this subsection, as applicable.

It is undisputed that Wilkie has not worked since filing his initial claim in October 2004. Therefore, he does not meet the statutory requirements to receive benefits in a successive benefit year. Further, Wilkie's decision to enroll in school based upon erroneous information conveyed by an unidentified attendant at the Unemployment Office that he would continue to receive unemployment benefits while enrolled in school does not exempt Wilkie from the requirements of the statute. Bannan v. Bd. of Review, 299 N.J. Super. 671 (App. Div. 1997) (holding that reliance upon erroneous information from unemployment compensation office employee does not exempt claimant from the requirement that he reimburse the Division of Unemployment and Temporary Disability Insurance for benefits improperly received).

We are satisfied the Board's decision was neither arbitrary, capricious nor unreasonable. The Board's decision is supported by substantial credible evidence in the record. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(D).

Affirmed.

 

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A-4321-05T2

February 23, 2007