JOHN BURKE v. TEACHERS' PENSION AND ANNUITY FUND

 

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-3638-05T33638-05T3

JOHN BURKE,

Petitioner-Appellant,

v.

teachers' pension AND annuity

fund,

Respondent-Respondent.

_________________________________

 

Argued April 18, 2007 - Decided May 14, 2007

Before Judges Lefelt and Parrillo.

On appeal from a final decision of the Board of Trustees, Teachers' Pension and Annuity Fund, Docket No. TPAF-1-10-80135.

Dina R. Khajezadeh argued the cause for appellant (Starkey, Kelly, Bauer, Kenneally, & Cunningham, attorneys; Ms. Khajezadeh, of counsel and on the brief).

Dawn M. Harris, Deputy Attorney General, argued the cause for respondent (Stuart Rabner, Attorney General of New Jersey, attorney; Patrick DeAlmeida, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel; Susanne Culliton, Deputy Attorney General, on the brief).

PER CURIAM

Petitioner John Burke appeals from the February 3, 2006 final decision of the Board of Trustees of the Teachers' Pension and Annuity Fund (TPAF Board), adopting the December 5, 2005 findings of fact and conclusions of law of an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) that denied petitioner's application to waive any portion of his receipt of pension benefits overpayment. We affirm.

Since September 1983, petitioner was employed by the Point Pleasant Board of Education as an English and Theater teacher. He was injured while teaching in October 1990 and was out of work for two-and-one-half years receiving disability benefits at that time. He eventually filed for an ordinary disability retirement benefit on June 26, 1996, when he was fifty-one years of age, and the TPAF Board granted his application effective July 1, 1996, based on the fact that petitioner was totally and permanently disabled from performing his duties as a teacher. Apparently, at the time his application for disability retirement was approved, petitioner never received from the Division of Pension and Benefits (Division) the standard determination letter advising retirees of the earnings limitation rules set forth in N.J.S.A. 18A:66-40a.

In any event, upon his retirement from public employment, petitioner took a job with Monmouth University, a private employer, as Chair of its Music and Theater Department, where his average annual salary ranged from $71,000 to $90,000. Indisputably, this post-retirement income placed petitioner over the statutory earnings limitation. Consequently, on March 10, 2004, the Division sent petitioner a letter of assessment notifying him that during the calendar years 1999 through 2003, he exceeded the earnings limitation for disability retirees in violation of N.J.S.A. 18A:66-40a and N.J.A.C. 17:3-6.14. The letter further advised that petitioner had been overpaid $70,478.57 in pension benefits during this time and demanded return of the overpayment.

Petitioner appealed from the Division's assessment and by letter of August 6, 2004, the TPAF Board denied the request to waive any portion of the assessment, noting that N.J.S.A. 18A:66-40a was in effect prior to the approval of petitioner's retirement benefit and because he was in violation of this statute from 1999 to 2003, the overpayment must be returned. Thereafter, the TPAF Board granted petitioner's request for a hearing and transferred the matter to the Office of Administrative Law (OAL) as a contested case.

At the hearing, the Division's Director of Finance, Michael Czyzyk, explained the earnings test:

Initially, what we do is take the final salary of the individual when they retired. Th[eir] last salary at the time of retirement and we apply an actual real growth rate of 5.95% per year to that. Now if the individual disputes that in terms -- saying well my salary would have been higher had I remained in the position. We'll go to the former employer and get verification on that and if it is the case we'll make an adjustment. If it's to the benefit -- if it's to the benefit of the member.

Czyzyk further explained how the earnings limitation is enforced. By regulation, the Division is permitted to request tax returns each year, N.J.A.C. 17:3-6.14, however, historically the Division only randomly inquired into retiree's earnings. It was not until recently, December 2003, at the instigation of both the State Auditor and State Commission of Investigation, that the Division contracted with the United States Department of Labor to obtain wage and hour records for all employees reporting to that agency, and developed a computer program comparing these records to a list of those individuals receiving benefits to identify recipients exceeding the earnings limitation. In addition to pursuing earnings testing on a more vigorous basis, the Division also determined to limit application of the Labor records to a five-year period and not try to recoup any monies earned but not adjusted prior to that time. On this point, Czyzyk testified that:

[I]t was the Division's [d]etermination to . . . balance fairness to the member and

. . . we do have a fiduciary responsibility to the fund to recover these amounts. So we felt that period of time would be fair.

As to the Division's effort to inform retirees of the earnings limitation, it was established that the TPAF member handbook, distributed by the Division to all certifying officers for distribution to new members, contains a notice of the guidelines for disability retirees. The Division also generates a newsletter specifically for retirees called "Pension News," distributed every few months, which often includes information relevant to them. For instance, in the July 2002 publication, retirees were notified of the earnings test:

PERS and TPAF disability retirees should be aware that by law, if they accept any employment after retiring, they must face a yearly earnings test. The sum of their disability pension and their earnings from employment after retirement cannot exceed the amount of salary they would currently earn in the position from which they had retired. If it does, their pension will be reduced so that their total income equals the current salary paid for the position they had retired from.

A fact sheet issued by the Division also advised:

All PERS and TPAF disability retirees who are under the age of 60, and those who are age 60 or older who retired on or after November 1, 1992, are subject to an annual earnings test. If your pension, when added to the earnings from employment, exceeds what your former position currently pays, your pension will be reduced dollar for dollar by the excess earnings over the current salary of your former position. Each year the Division of Pensions and Benefits may request copies of your previous year's federal tax return and W-2s.

More pointedly, the form of application for disability retirement in effect in 1996 when petitioner filed his application contains a section entitled "Employment after Retirement" which reads:

If you are gainfully employed after retirement, your disability retirement benefit may be reduced, even if total disability continues.

If you are considering returning to public employment, contact the Division of Pensions and Benefits to determine how this may affect your retirement.

Petitioner denied any knowledge of the statutory earnings limitation prior to receiving the Division's March 10, 2004 assessment letter. Before that, he thought that he could continue to work after having been determined to be disabled, but that he could not be employed in the same pension system which covered his previous employment. Petitioner neither remembers receiving a TPAF member handbook from his employer nor reading about the earnings tests in either the Division's pension newsletter or fact sheet. Neither does he recall reading the section of his completed application form dealing with the possible effect of post-retirement earnings on disability retirement benefits. Yet despite his claimed lack of knowledge of the earnings test at the time, the October 2, 2002 property settlement agreement incorporated into petitioner's final judgment of divorce, as it pertained to equitable distribution of petitioner's pension, specifically addressed post-retirement earnings:

Wife's percentage entitlement shall be applied to all payments Husband is entitled to receive from his TPAF benefits whether they are classified as pension benefits or disability benefits. If Husband's TPAF benefits are reduced or terminated because Husband violates a rule or regulation respecting other employment or other income, Husband shall personally make said payments to Wife in the amount of $475.97 per month throughout any and all periods of interruption.

[(emphasis added).]

At the conclusion of the hearing, the ALJ upheld the Division's assessment of $70,478.57 for the years 1999 through 2003 and $8,680.10 for the year 2004, finding that petitioner's lack of actual knowledge of the statutory earnings test did not equitably estop the Division from enforcing the express legislative mandate to which petitioner was clearly subject. Following exceptions and reply, the TPAF Board adopted the ALJ's recommendation, which affirmed the Board's original determination.

On appeal, petitioner raises the following issues:

I. BASED UPON THE STANDARD OF REVIEW APPLICABLE TO DECISIONS OF ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES, THE DECISION OF THE BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF THE TEACHERS' PENSION AND ANNUITY FUND MUST BE REVERSED.

II. JUDGE MARTONE ERRED IN HIS FINDINGS THAT (1) N.J.A.C. 17:3-6.14 EXISTS TO ASSIST THE DIVISION IN ADMINISTERING THE ENABLING LEGISLATION BY REQUESTING TAX RETURNS EACH YEAR, AND NOT TO LIMIT THE DIVISION IN THE MANNER IN WHICH IT MAY DO SO, AND THAT (2) ACTUAL NOTICE OF THE EARNINGS TEST SOUGHT TO BE ENFORCED BY THE DIVISION IS NOT REQUIRED AS A CONDITION OF ITS ENFORCEMENT. THESE FINDINGS ARE INCONSISTENT WITH A CLEAR READING OF THE STATUTE AND REGULATION AND WITH THE CASE LAW REQUIRING THAT THE STATUTES GOVERNING PENSIONS FOR PUBLIC EMPLOYEES ARE TO BE CONSTRUED AND ADMINISTERED IN FAVOR OF THE RETIRANTS.

III. THE DOCTRINE OF EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL SHOULD BE APPLIED TO PRECLUDE THE DIVISION OF PENSIONS AND BENEFITS FROM DEMANDING BURKE'S REPAYMENT OF THE PENSION BENEFITS AT ISSUE HEREIN.

IV. THE FINAL DECISION REQUIRING BURKE'S REPAYMENT OF PENSION MONIES MUST BE REVERSED AS IT ALLOWS THE DIVISION TO APPLY N.J.S.A. 18A:66-40a AND N.J.A.C. 17:3-6.14(a) RETROACTIVELY, IN CONTRAVENTION OF THE CLEAR TERMS OF THE STATUTE AND REGULATION AND IN CONTRAVENTION OF THE LEGISLATIVE INTENT IN ENACTING THE STATUTE.

V. IN THE EVENT THAT THIS COURT DETERMINES THAT THE DOCTRINE OF EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL DOES NOT APPLY TO THE FACTS OF THE INSTANT CASE, BURKE MAINTAINS THAT, BASED UPON THE DECISION OF THIS COURT IN INDURSKY V. BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF THE PUBLIC EMPLOYEES' RETIREMENT SYSTEM, 137 N.J. SUPER. 335 (APP. DIV. 1975), THE BOARD'S DECISION MUST BE REVERSED.

In his reply brief, petitioner further contends:

I. RESPONDENT'S ARGUMENT THAT PETITIONER SHOULD HAVE BEEN AWARE OF THE EARNINGS TEST IN LIGHT OF THE DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE IS INCONSISTENT WITH THE TESTIMONY AND DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE PRESENTED AT THE HEARING AND WITH JUDGE MARTONE'S FINDING THAT PETITIONER WAS UNAWARE OF THE EARNINGS TEST UNTIL HE RECEIVED THE LETTER OF MARCH 10, 2004 FROM MR. MEGARIOTIS INDICATING THAT HIS POST-RETIREMENT EARNINGS EXCEEDED THE EARNINGS LIMITATIONS FOR DISABILITY RETIRANTS IN VIOLATION OF N.J.S.A. 18A:66-40a.

II. THE CASE LAW RELIED UPON BY RESPONDENT TO SUPPORT ITS POSITION THAT THE DIVISION IS NOT REQUIRED TO NOTIFY ITS MEMBERS OF AMENDATORY LEGISLATION THAT MAY AFFECT THEIR PENSIONS IS INAPPOSITE TO THE INSTANT CASE, WHERE THE DIVISION HAS ESTABLISHED A POLICY OF PROVIDING DISABILITY RETIREES WITH INFORMATION RELATIVE TO THE EARNINGS LIMITATION RULES BY WAY OF A STANDARD DETERMINATION LETTER WHICH, ADMITTEDLY, WAS NOT PROVIDED TO PETITIONER IN THE INSTANT CASE.

III. RESPONDENT'S CONTENTION THAT THE DOCTRINE OF EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL DOES NOT APPLY TO THE INSTANT CASE IS UNSUPPORTABLE. RESPONDENT FAILS TO CONSIDER THE UNIQUE FACTUAL CIRCUMSTANCES PRESENTED HEREIN, MANDATING THE APPLICATION OF THE DOCTRINE.

IV. N.J.S.A. 18A:66-40a AND N.J.A.C. 17:3-6.14(a) CLEARLY DO NOT PROVIDE THE DIVISION WITH AUTHORITY TO ASSESS A DISABILITY RETIREE FOR OVERPAYMENTS FOR THE PREVIOUS FIVE YEARS, AND RESPONDENT IS ABSOLUTELY BARRED FROM DEMANDIND PETITIONER'S REPAYMENT OF OVERPAYMENTS OF PENSION BENEFITS FOR THE YEARS 1 999 THROUGH 2002.

V. BASED UPON THIS COURT'S DECISION IN THE CASE OF BATTERSBY V. BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF THE POLICE AND FIREMEN'S RETIREMENT SYSTEM, DOCKET NO. A-3452-95T5 (APP. DIV., JUNE 1, 2000 (UNPUBLISJED)), AS APPLIED TO THE FACTS PRESENTED HEREIN, RESPONDENT MAY NOT RETROACTIVELY APPLY N.J.S.A. 18A:66-40a OR N.J.A.C. 17:3-6.14 WITH REGARD TO ITS ASSESSMENTS AGAINST PETITIONER.

VI. RESPONDENT'S ATTEMPTS TO DISTINGUISH THE CASE OF INDURSKY V. BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF THE PUBLIC EMPLOYEES' RETIREMENT SYSTEM, 137 N.J. SUPER. 335 (APP. DIV. 1975), ARE LIKEWISE UNAVAILING AS THE EQUITIES PREDOMINATE IN FAVOR OF PETITIONER. FURTHER, RESPONDENT FAILS TO RECOGNIZE ITS OBLIGATION TO TURN SQUARE CORNERS IN THE EXERCISE OF STATUTORY RESPONSIBILITIES.

We have considered each of these issues in light of the record, the applicable law, and the arguments of counsel, and we are satisfied that none of them warrants disturbance of the final agency decision. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(D). We, therefore, affirm substantially for the reasons expressed by ALJ Martone in his comprehensive and well-reasoned Initial Decision of December 5, 2005. We add only the following comments.

Membership in TPAF is extended by N.J.S.A. 18A:66-4 to persons employed as teachers, as defined in N.J.S.A. 18A:66-2(p). Upon retirement for reason of disability, the statute prescribes an earnings limitation in the case of post-retirement income. Thus, N.J.S.A. 18A:66-40(a) provides in pertinent part:

If the disability beneficiary is engaged in an occupation, then the amount of his pension shall be reduced to an amount which, when added to the amount then earned by him, shall not exceed the amount of the salary now attributable to his former position.

If his earnings have changed since the date of his last adjustment, then the amount of his pension may be further altered; but the new pension shall not exceed the amount of pension originally granted.

[N.J.S.A. 18A:66-40(a).]

Notably, nowhere in the statute do we find, expressed or implicit, any obligation on the Board to notify its members of the so-called earnings limitation. Id. Cf. Kramer v. Bd. of Trs. of PERS, 291 N.J. Super. 46, 56 (App. Div. 1996), certif. denied, 148 N.J. 458 (1997); Koschker v. Bd. of Trs., PFRS, 233 N.J. Super. 209, 218-19 (App. Div. 1989); In re Krah, 130 N.J. Super. 366, 368 (App. Div. 1974).

Pursuant thereto, the Board promulgated a regulation, N.J.A.C. 17:3-6.14, permitting the Division to enforce the statute's earnings test by requesting tax returns each year. Thus, at all relevant times, N.J.A.C. 17:3-6.14 read:

Upon written request from the Division, all disability retirants shall be required to file a report with the Fund [including proofs] indicating the type of employment they are engaged in, if any, and the gross income realized therefrom . . . .

[ 36 N.J.R. 4220(a).]

Contrary to petitioner's contention, the Board maintains that the implementing regulation exists to facilitate the Division in administering and enforcing the enabling legislation, not to limit the agency in the manner in which it may do so. And, of course, where an agency is interpreting its own regulation, internally promulgated, its interpretation "is owed considerable deference because the agency that drafted and promulgated the rule should know the meaning of that rule." In re Freshwater Wetlands Gen. Permit No. 16, 379 N.J. Super. 331, 341-42 (App. Div. 2005). Thus, it seems self-evident that far from creating a notice requirement as suggested by petitioner, N.J.A.C. 17:3-6.14 places squarely on the retiree the obligation to produce income documentation when requested.

Essentially acknowledging his violation of the earnings test, petitioner nevertheless argues that the TPAF Board should be equitably estopped from enforcing the clear legislative mandate in this instance because it failed to provide actual notification of the statutory limitation and failed to demand repayment for six years. We disagree.

The doctrine of equitable estoppel prevents a party from repudiating prior "conduct if such repudiation would not be responsive to the demands of justice and good conscience."

Carlson v. Masters, Mates & Pilots Pension Plan Trust, 80 N.J. 334, 339 (1979) (internal quotation marks omitted); Davin, L.L.C. v. Daham, 329 N.J. Super. 54, 67 (App. Div. 2000). "[O]ne may, [therefore,] by voluntary conduct, be precluded from taking a course of action that would work [an] injustice and wrong to [another] who with good reason and in good faith has relied upon such conduct." Summer Cottagers' Ass'n. v. City of Cape May, 19 N.J. 493, 503-04 (1955). However, "[t]he doctrine of equitable estoppel is [to be] applied only in very compelling circumstances." Palatine I v. Planning Bd., 133 N.J. 546, 560 (1993) (internal quotation marks omitted), overruled on o.g., 176 N.J. 126 (2003); Davin, supra, 329 N.J. Super. at 67. In addition, the burden of proof of a claim based upon principles of equitable estoppel is on the party asserting the estoppel. Palatine I, supra, 133 N.J. at 562; Davin, supra, 329 N.J. Super. at 67.

Moreover, "[e]quitable estoppel is rarely invoked against a governmental entity, particularly when estoppel would 'interfere with essential governmental functions.'" O'Malley v. Dep't of Energy, 109 N.J. 309, 316 (1987) (citation omitted) (quoting Vogt v. Borough of Belmar, 14 N.J. 195, 205 (1954)). The doctrine should be "most strictly limited" in matters against a governmental entity. Buonviaggio v. Hillsborough Tp. Comm., 122 N.J. 5, 17 (1991). It may be applied in appropriate circumstances "where [the] interests of justice, morality and common fairness clearly dictate that course." Middletown Tp. Policemen's Benevolent Ass'n Local No. 124 v. Tp. of Middletown, 162 N.J. 361, 367 (2000) (quoting Gruber v. Mayor and Tp. Comm., 39 N.J. 1, 13 (1962)). In determining whether to apply the doctrine, petitioner's reliance on governmental conduct must be weighed against the public's interest. Tubridy v. Consol. Police and Firemen's Pension Fund Comm'n., 84 N.J. Super. 257, 264 (App. Div. 1964). Of course, in the context of a pension fund, the public has an interest in preserving the integrity of the fund against depletion. See id. at 263-64. Indeed, pension statutes are "carefully drawn to protect the integrity of the public and contributed funds from which pensions are paid." Id. at 263. Therefore, claimants such as petitioner "cannot on the theory of estoppel be permitted to aggrandize the specific statutory rights of qualified pensioners into illegal depletions of such funds for their private benefit." Ibid.

Balanced against this weighty interest is petitioner's conduct, which adds little if anything to his side of the equation. Despite the provision in his 2002 property settlement agreement specifically contemplating such an eventuality, petitioner never inquired of the Division as to the effect of post-retirement income on his disability retirement benefit, content instead to rely on the unverified advice of unidentified individuals. Moreover, petitioner failed to apprise himself of the law, which he is charged with knowing. Widmer v. Tp. of Mahwah, 151 N.J. Super. 79, 83 (App. Div. 1977).

On the other hand, the Division never provided false, misleading or even incorrect information, nor does petitioner contend he ever relied on such. On the contrary, the Division made reasonable efforts to put all retirees on notice, even though it was under no statutory obligation to do so. For instance, the employee handbook, periodicals, and instructions on the application form, all available to petitioner, clearly advised of an earnings test applicable to recipients of a disability pension. Thus, petitioner's failure to read or comprehend this information bespeaks more a lapse on his part than the government's, and simply falls far short of grounds for equitable estoppel. In short, petitioner sought no information from the Division and failed to review any of the information that was, in fact, provided by the Division regarding the applicability of the earnings test. Indeed, petitioner managed to avoid any information at all. In sum, in assessing the conduct of both petitioner and government in this case, as well as the public interest, we find no reason in either "justice, morality or common fairness" to invoke the doctrine of equitable estoppel against the Board.

We reject as without merit petitioner's other contention, raised for the first time on appeal, that the Board erred in retroactively applying N.J.S.A. 18A:66-40(a). R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(D) and (E). We do not deal here with the construction of a newly adopted statute and its application to facts developed prior to enactment. N.J.S.A. 18A:66-40(a) was enacted in 1967 and has not been amended since 1971, well before petitioner filed for disability retirement. Therefore, no legitimate question of retroactivity is implicated here. Rather, petitioner confuses retroactivity of a statute with the fact that the "excess earnings recovery" feature of the statute in issue is, by its very nature, "retroactive" in that the Board must look at facts which occurred in the past when making its determination. However, delay in enforcement is a far different question than applying new law to old behavior.

Equally unsound is petitioner's reliance on Indursky v. Bd. of Trs. of PERS, 137 N.J. Super. 335 (App. Div. 1975), in support of his argument that the Division is precluded from collecting the overpayment because of the six-year delay in enforcement. Indursky is distinguishable. There, the beneficiary was deemed permanently disabled and began receiving full benefits under N.J.S.A. 43:15A-44, while working part-time as an attorney. Id. at 338-39. Later, the law was amended to allow a reduction in benefits if the beneficiary was employed, even if permanently disabled. Id. at 339-40. Indursky subsequently asked for clarification of his pension status but received no definite answer. Id. at 340-41. Six years after enactment, the PERS Board notified Indursky of its decision to reduce benefits and its demand for the return of overpayment. Id. at 341-42. On appeal, we reversed, finding that while reduction of Indursky's benefits was proper, the requirement of reimbursement was "unduly punitive, unfair, and unjust" given respondent's lack of diligence, and "nothing meaningful in the pensioner's conduct dilut[ed] the equities reflected in his favor." Id. at 343-44. We noted, in so deciding, that "[h]e did essentially everything the Board asked of him, and indeed questioned whether" his benefits would continue. Id. at 343-44.

In contrast, there was no change of law here. Moreover, at the time, the TPAF Board did not have access to any retiree's labor records and was required to rely upon the honesty of individual members to report payments over the statutory limit. Further, the Division immediately notified petitioner upon its discovery that he violated the statutory earnings test. While petitioner attempts to equate this six-year enforcement lag with the six-year time lapse in Indursky, he ignores an important distinction: here the Division was unaware of petitioner's post-retirement income during the elapsed time and the resources available to it made earlier discovery unlikely. And lastly, as noted earlier, the equities do not weigh on petitioner's side. See, e.g., Skulski v. Nolan, 68 N.J. 179, 195-96 (1975); Vliet v. Bd. of Trs. of PERS, 156 N.J. Super. 83, 89-90 (App. Div. 1978). He relied on the advice of undisclosed individuals who told him that earnings limitation rules did not apply to work outside the TPAF system, rather than seek more specific and accurate information from the Division, or reasonably avail himself of the information already in petitioner's domain. We, therefore, conclude that the Division's delay in enforcement presents no bar, legal or equitable, to enforcement of the statutory mandate.

Petitioner's remaining arguments are without merit. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E). We are satisfied, from our review of the record, that the TPAF Board reasonably determined, based on substantial credible evidence, that petitioner exceeded the earnings permitted by law and must return that portion of his income in excess of the salary attributable to the position from which he retired on ordinary disability. Henry v. Rahway State Prison, 81 N.J. 571, 579-80 (1980).

Affirmed.

 

By letter of March 23, 2005, the Division notified petitioner that his 2004 wages exceeded the amount he was eligible to earn while continuing to receive full benefits, and therefore demanded that petitioner refund the Teachers' Pension and Annuity Fund (TPAF) an additional $8,680.10 in benefits receiving during 2004. Petitioner appealed this determination as well and the ALJ consolidated the separate appeals before the OAL.

In 2004, when the Division adopted a new system for enforcing N.J.S.A. 18A:66-40(a), this regulation was replaced by one which clarified the earnings test and provides in pertinent part:

if a disability retirant is engaged in gainful employment that does not require reenrollment in the Teachers' Pension and Annuity Fund, then the amount of the retirant's pension benefit and cost-of-living increases based on the pension benefit, but not the annuity benefit, shall be reduced to an amount, when added to the amount then earned, shall not exceed the amount of salary now attributable to the position from which the member retired.

[N.J.A.C. 17:3-6.14.]

(continued)

(continued)

19

A-3638-05T3

May 14, 2007