RICHARD E. DOMINICUS et al. v. BOARD OF REVIEW, DEPARTMENT OF LABOR
Annotate this CaseNOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-3352-04T23352-04T2
A-3353-04T3
RICHARD E. DOMINICUS and
WILLIAM DOMALEWSKI,
Petitioners-Appellants/
Cross-Respondents,
v.
BOARD OF REVIEW, DEPARTMENT
OF LABOR,
Respondent-Respondent,
and
AMERGEN ENERGY COMPANY,
Respondent-Respondent/
Cross-Appellant.
________________________________________________________________
Submitted December 6, 2006 - Decided January 2, 2007
Before Judges Lefelt, Parrillo and
Sapp-Peterson.
On appeal from Board of Review, New
Jersey Department of Labor, Docket
Numbers 04-B-00775-077-XO and 04-B-
00775-033-XO.
Richard E. Dominicus, appellant-cross-
respondent, submitted a pro se brief.
William Domalewski, appellant-cross-
respondent, submitted a pro se brief.
Ballard, Spahr, Andrews & Ingersoll,
attorneys for respondent-cross-appellant
Amergen Energy Company (Steven W. Suflas
and Richard S. Swartz, on the brief).
Stuart Rabner, Attorney General, attorney
for respondent Board of Review (Patrick
DeAlmeida, Assistant Attorney General, of
counsel; Ellen A. Reichart, Deputy
Attorney General, on the brief).
PER CURIAM
Generally, unemployment benefits are designed to "ameliorate the impact of involuntary unemployment. Sweeney v. Bd. of Review, 43 N.J. 535, 539 (1969). Ordinarily, an employee is disqualified for unemployment benefits when the employee has stopped work because of a labor dispute. N.J.S.A. 43:21-5(d); N.J.A.C. 12:17-12.1(a)1. To disqualify such an employee, however, the work stoppage, or strike, must substantially curtail production so that the employer is not able to produce "more than 80 percent of [its] normal . . . goods or services." N.J.A.C. 12:17-12.2(a)2.
In this consolidated appeal, two striking employees, Richard Dominicus and William Domalewski, who were employed by AmerGen, a nuclear generating facility, claim they were entitled to unemployment benefits because the facility continued to produce 100% of its electricity output during the entire labor dispute. Consequently, they appeal from the Board of Review's final decision denying unemployment benefits to all employees who participated in the strike. We agree with the Board and affirm.
In November 1999, AmerGen purchased Oyster Creek Generating Station from GPU Nuclear. At the time of sale, GPU Nuclear had a union contract with Local 1289 of the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers Union, whose members included 217 of the plants 439 employees. AmerGen assumed this contract, which was due to expire on January 31, 2003.
Two months prior to expiration, AmerGen and the Union began negotiations for a new contract. The parties' efforts proved largely unproductive, though they agreed to abide by the contract until the new one could be negotiated. The Union's primary grievances involved the broadening of individual responsibilities and plant safety. In the Spring of 2003, AmerGen provided a "last best and final offer," which was rejected by the Union. The company nevertheless began implementing parts of the new contract, and the Union responded with a strike.
Approximately half of the AmerGen workforce walked the picket line twenty-four hours a day, seven days a week, until August 7th, when a new contract was ratified. During the strike, AmerGen transferred employees from its other generating facilities and utilized a number of "non-bargaining unit personnel" to perform many of the functions that had been handled by the striking employees. The non-union personnel included approximately 240 managers, supervisors, and technical personnel. AmerGen did not hire any permanent replacement workers.
It is undisputed that the plant electric production remained at 100% during the strike. However, due to the re-routing of personnel, the responsibilities of the management sector were temporarily set aside. The plant manager estimated that approximately fifty to sixty percent of the overall work of the plant was being done during the strike. This calculation was based on the plant's internal financial monitoring of expenses caused by importing employees from other AmerGen plants, and redirecting Oyster Creek's remaining employees.
After the strike concluded, forty-five of the Union employees filed for unemployment benefits. The Board rejected these applications, concluding that focusing exclusively on the electricity output in applying N.J.A.C. 12:17-12.2(a)2 would mean "there could never exist any disqualifying work stoppage during a labor dispute involving a New Jersey public utility." The Board instead cast the issue as one concerning "whether the normal work processes of the employer were substantially curtailed by the work stoppage." This conclusion was based on the scale of the strike and the reduction, postponement, or non-completion of routine work processes at the plant.
On appeal to this court, Dominicus and Domalewski both contend that the Board's findings were not supported by substantial credible evidence in the record.
It has long been recognized that a work stoppage sufficient to disqualify a worker from unemployment benefits "need not be complete and that it will suffice if there has been a substantial curtailment of operations." Ablondi v. Bd. of Review, 8 N.J. Super. 71, 77 (App. Div. 1950). "An employer is considered to have a substantial curtailment of work if not more than 80 percent of the normal production of goods or services is met." N.J.A.C. 12:17-12.2(a)2. We interpret this regulation as including, within "goods or services," not only the goods and services that the plant normally supplies to customers, but also the goods and services that are provided within the plant to facilitate production and planning for future activities. This interpretation includes, for example, managerial and business services, training activities, monitoring or assessment services, and similar functions that are normally performed by the plant for safe, efficient production, and future operations.
Here, the Board recognized that "nearly half of the employer's workforce [, over 200 workers,] withdrew their services during the strike." Consequently, the Board found it "difficult to believe that the employer's normal procedures would not have been substantially affected." Although AmerGen agreed that safety was not sacrificed during the strike, the Board referenced the assessment team's report listing numerous instances where projects or work was delayed or not completed at all, giving "credence to the employer's assertion that routine processes were reduced, postponed or left undone."
These tasks included a number of internal assessment processes "designed to improve operations at the facility, make [it] more cost competitive, [and] improve radiological exposure to individuals," and internal processes that document "conditions adverse to quality" as mandated by regulatory requirements. It is apparent that numerous responsibilities were being set aside at the plant during the strike. Significantly, the plant manager testified that somewhere between fifty and sixty percent of the usual plant work was being done.
This evidence was sufficient to sustain the Board's decision excluding unemployment benefits. Henry v. Rahway State Prison, 81 N.J. 147, 153 (1980). In addition, the decision being far from "arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable," deserves to be affirmed. Brady v. Bd. of Review, 152 N.J. 197, 210 (1997).
Because we agree with the Board, it is not necessary to consider AmerGen's other arguments justifying denial of unemployment benefits to claimants.
Affirmed.
We consolidated forty-five Board of Review cases involving striking employees of AmerGen. Forty-three of these cases were dismissed for failure to file a timely brief, leaving only A-3352-04T3, involving Dominicus, and A-3353-04T3, involving Domalewski. As we have addressed these two appeals in our opinion, all cross-appeals are dismissed as moot. To simplify the matter, we have captioned the appeal in the names of the two claimants who perfected their appeals. The dismissed matters are listed herein:
Robert G. Mclaughlin v. Bd. of Review A-3044-04T3
Gary S. Hutton v. Bd. of Review A-3046-04T3
Joseph E. Wyjas v. Bd. of Review A-3074-04T2
Edward J. Brennan, Jr. v. Bd. of Review A-3075-04T2
Michelle M. Junay v. Bd. of Review A-3091-04T3
Kathleen F. Molyneux v. Bd. of Review A-3094-04T3
Diane A. Moser v. Bd. of Review A-3130-04T3
Karen Summers v. Bd. of Review A-3131-04T2
John C. Biruk v. Bd. of Review A-3156-04T3
Diane M. Marrone v. Bd. of Review A-3175-04T2
Eugene J. Roberts v. Bd. of Review A-3176-04T2
Daniel J. Smith v. Bd. of Review A-3208-04T3
Douglas K. Hartmann v. Bd. of Review A-3213-04T2
Anita Russell Spady v. Bd. of Review A-3222-04T2
Bernard R. Fleming v. Bd. of Review A-3249-04T2
Alfred R. Decker v. Bd. of Review A-3257-04T3
Fiona M. Roberts v. Bd. of Review A-3261-04T3
Robert F. Swift v. Bd. of Review A-3262-04T3
Gary C. Shunk v. Bd. of Review A-3287-04T3
Lawrence S. Pallino v. Bd. of Review A-3295-04T2
Mark E. Hartmann v. Bd. of Review A-3296-04T2
Edward G. Morris v. Bd. of Review A-3302-04T2
Robert C. McNamee v. Bd. of Review A-3323-04T3
Lisa Hawtin v. Bd. of Review A-3401-04T2
Earl Lautenschlager v. Bd. of Review A-3402-04T2
Robert K. Hemmann v. Bd. of Review A-3403-04T3
Mark G. Croushore v. Bd. of Review A-3405-04T3
Marie L. Tarantino v. Bd. of Review A-3545-04T2
Michael Bahrle v. Bd. of Review A-3546-04T2
Russell L. Smith v. Bd. of Review A-3548-04T3
Anna M. Verde v. Bd. of Review A-3566-04T3
Thomas Rizzo v. Bd. of Review A-3578-04T2
Joseph J. Cicalo v. Bd. of Review A-3618-04T3
Linda J. Rikeman v. Bd. of Review A-3627-04T3
Maureen D. Selvage v. Bd. of Review A-3666-04T3
Kim M. Manno v. Bd. of Review A-3669-04T3
Sharon R. Gray v. Bd. of Review A-3798-04T2
Richard M. Brown v. Bd. of Review A-3818-04T2
Kevin T. Commons v. Bd. of Review A-3889-04T3
Linda L. Hahn v. Bd. of Review A-4047-04T3
Jon Osenko v. Bd. of Review A-4426-04T3
Eugene Risinski, Jr. v. Bd. of Review A-4427-04T2
Deborah O. Prusik v. Bd. of Review A-5722-04T3
(continued)
(continued)
8
A-3352-04T2
January 2, 2007
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