YVONNE C. WILLIAMSON, et al. v. BLOCK AND SOBEL, et al.

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NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-2948-05T52948-05T5

YVONNE C. WILLIAMSON,

Individually and ARMON HARRIS

and NIKITA WILLIAMSON,

By their Guardian Ad Litem,

YVONNE C. WILLIAMSON,

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

v.

BLOCK AND SOBEL, a Partnership,

BLOCK AND SOBEL, a Limited Liability Company,

BLOCK AND SOBEL, P.C., a Professional Corporation,

BRUCE SOBEL, Individually, and

CHASE MANHATTAN MORTGAGE CORPORATION,

a Foreign Corporation,

Defendants,

and

MICHAEL L. BLOCK, Individually,

Defendant-Respondent.

______________________________________________________________

 

Submitted March 6, 2007 - Decided April 20, 2007

Before Judges Holston, Jr. and Grall.

On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Burlington County, Docket No. L-0470-03.

Walter T. Wolf, attorney for appellant.

Respondent Michael L. Block did not file a brief.

PER CURIAM

Plaintiff, Yvonne C. Williamson, individually and as guardian ad litem for her children, Armon Harris and Nikita Williamson, appeals the Law Division's August 10, 2005 order denying her motion for confirmation of a May 29, 2005 award of arbitration. Plaintiffs also appeals the February 14, 2006 order denying reconsideration.

On February 13, 2003, plaintiff filed a fourteen count complaint and jury trial demand against defendant, Michael L. Block, and co-defendants, Block and Sobel, LLC (B&S) and Bruce Sobel. Plaintiff sued the defendants for legal malpractice. She contends that Block's failure to timely file a Chapter 13 petition for her with the Bankruptcy Court caused her and her children the loss of their home. Additionally, plaintiff asserts other tort causes of action against defendants for which she seeks compensatory and punitive damages and injunctive relief. After the complaint was filed, Block and Sobel, individually, and B&S were initially defended by counsel selected by their professional liability insurance carrier, GAI. The GAI selected counsel were relieved from representing defendants because the insurance carrier denied insurance coverage for defendants on the basis of a fraudulent application. The trial judge, thereafter, recommended that the parties submit their dispute to voluntary arbitration pursuant to Rule 4:21A-1(b).

On May 20, 2005, the parties appeared before arbitrator, Richard M. Orr. Block appeared pro se. A Report and Award of Arbitration was entered by Orr on May 20, 2005 and was signed by Block for himself and B&S, Joseph Pinto, Esq. for Sobel, and Walter T. Wolf, Esq. for plaintiff. The award imposes 100% liability upon Block and B&S, and zero liability upon Sobel and plaintiff. The award recites that plaintiff dismisses the complaint against Sobel with prejudice. The award further states that Block, consents to $385,881 in compensatory damages payable to plaintiff, $25,000 in compensatory damages payable to plaintiff's children and punitive damages in the amount of $1,250,000. The total damages purportedly consented to by Block are in the amount of $1,660,881.

On June 10, 2005, plaintiff filed a motion to confirm the arbitration award and to have judgment entered on the award. On June 14, 2005, defendant filed a notice for request for trial de novo pursuant to Rule 4:21A-6(b)(1) and (c).

By order dated August 10, 2005, the motion judge entered an order denying confirmation of the award. The order memorialized the court's letter opinion of the same date. The court determined, inter alia, that defendant had an absolute right under Rule 4:21A-6 to reject the arbitration award and file for a trial de novo "for good reason or no reason at all," if dissatisfied with the arbitration award.

On October 16, 2005, Block filed for Bankruptcy, individually. On October 24, 2005, the court entered an order of dismissal as to Block only, without prejudice, and subject to reinstatement if the bankruptcy proceedings do not fully dispose of the issues between the parties.

Plaintiff filed for reconsideration of the August 10, 2005 order. On October 25, 2005, the court denied plaintiff's motion for reconsideration on the basis that Block filed a petition for bankruptcy relief and "the automatic stay precludes any further action being taken against Mr. Block." On December 21, 2005, a stipulation of dismissal without prejudice, pursuant to Rule 4:37-1(b) between plaintiff and Sobel was filed purporting to dismiss the action in its entirety.

By order dated February 6, 2006, the Bankruptcy Court modified the automatic stay to permit plaintiff to appeal from the order of August 10, 2005. This appeal followed.

Rule 4:21A-6(b) provides that "[a]n order shall be entered dismissing the action following the filing of the arbitrator's award unless: (1) within 30 days after filing of the arbitration award, a party files . . . and serves . . . a notice of rejection of the award and demand for trial de novo and pays a trial de novo fee." Rule 4:21A-6(c), provides that "[a]n action in which a timely trial de novo has been demanded by any party shall be returned, as to all parties, to the trial calendar for disposition."

We are convinced, therefore, that the effect of Block's rejection of the award and demand for trial de novo was to restore the parties to the status quo ante, which prior to Block's filing of a petition in bankruptcy permitted plaintiff to prosecute her complaint against Block. We note that the August 10, 2005 order denying confirmation of the arbitration award does not dismiss plaintiff's complaint against defendants.

Rule 2:2-3(a)(1) permits appeals to the Appellate Division as of right from final judgments of the Superior Court trial divisions. We are convinced that the order appealed from is not a final appealable order but an interlocutory order. No final judgment was ever entered.

Interlocutory adjudications are appealable only on leave granted pursuant to Rule 2:5-6. Granting leave is within our exclusive authority as an exercise of our discretion "in the interest of justice. . . ." R. 2:2-4. It is the exclusive province of this court to determine whether extraordinary circumstances are present warranting a piecemeal appeal. See e.g., Fu v. Fu, 309 N.J. Super. 435, 440 (App. Div. 1998), appeal granted, 155 N.J. 585 (1998), reversed on other ground, 160 N.J. 108 (1999); Hallowell v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 297 N.J. Super. 314, 318 (App. Div. 1997). No such circumstances exist in this case.

We thus conclude that plaintiff's notice of appeal is improvidently filed. Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal without prejudice to plaintiff seeking to reinstate the complaint if, as indicated in the trial court's October 24, 2005 order of dismissal, the bankruptcy proceeding does not fully dispose of the issues between the parties.

Dismissed.

 

11 U.S.C. 362(a).

The stipulation of dismissal was filed after Block's bankruptcy petition was filed. Thus, as to Block, individually, the stipulation would be subject to the automatic stay.

(continued)

(continued)

6

A-2948-05T5

April 20, 2007

 


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