ESTATE OF CURTIS KNIGHT v. STATE OF NEW JERSEY, DEPARTMENT OF TREASURY

 

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-2900-05T32900-05T3

ESTATE OF CURTIS KNIGHT,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

STATE OF NEW JERSEY,

DEPARTMENT OF TREASURY,

Defendant-Respondent.

________________________________________________________________

 

Submitted March 6, 2007 - Decided March 21, 2007

Before Judges Lisa and Grall.

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Essex County, L-8458-03.

Curtis Knight, appellant pro se.

Stuart Rabner, Attorney General, attorney for respondent (Michael J. Haas, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel; Randall B. Weaver, Deputy Attorney General, on the brief).

PER CURIAM

Plaintiff, Curtis Knight, appeals from an order dismissing his complaint pursuant to N.J.S.A. 52:4C-1 to -6, for damages because he was allegedly mistakenly convicted and imprisoned. The complaint was dismissed as untimely because it was filed more than two years after plaintiff's release from imprisonment. See N.J.S.A. 52:4C-4. Defendant argues: (1) that his claim did not accrue until dismissal of the indictment for which he had been imprisoned, and he filed his suit within two years of that date; (2) if his claim accrued on the date he was released from imprisonment, the limitation period should be tolled under the doctrines of substantial compliance, the discovery rule, or equitable tolling; and (3) the statutory provisions are unconstitutionally vague. We reject these arguments and affirm.

Plaintiff was tried and convicted of first-degree murder and related weapons offenses in 1990 and sentenced to life imprisonment with a thirty-year parole disqualifier. His conviction was reversed on appeal, see State v. Knight, 283 N.J. Super. 98 (App. Div. 1995), aff'd 145 N.J. 233 (1996), and a new trial was ordered. Plaintiff was retried in 1997 and convicted of aggravated manslaughter and related weapons offenses, and sentenced to twenty-four years imprisonment with an eleven-year parole disqualifier. We again reversed the convictions and remanded for a new trial. See State v. Knight, No. A-1370-97 (App. Div. Apr. 2, 2001), certif. denied, 170 N.J. 205 (2001).

On April 30, 2001, plaintiff was released from the New Jersey Department of Corrections. On October 17, 2001, on the motion of the Essex County Prosecutor, the indictment was dismissed. In support of its dismissal motion, the prosecutor stated that a key witness had died and, based upon rulings in the appellate proceedings, the previously-recorded testimony of that witness would not be admissible. Thus, the State's decision to forgo a further retrial was occasioned by proof problems, and the State has never conceded that plaintiff did not commit the crimes.

On January 15, 2002, plaintiff filed two lawsuits, one in New Jersey Superior Court and the other in the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey. As far as we can tell from the record, the claims in both actions were identical, consisting of numerous federal civil rights violations, state tort law violations, malicious prosecution, and violations under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization Act (RICO), 18 U.S.C.A. 1962-1968. Plaintiff named the same thirty-three defendants in each of these actions. He did not name the State of New Jersey or the Department of Treasury. See N.J.S.A. 52:4C-2 (authorizing suit against the Department of the Treasury for persons mistakenly convicted or imprisoned). On May 29, 2002, plaintiff voluntarily dismissed his state court action, apparently to allow his claim in federal court to proceed. The record is unclear as to the status of the federal court action.

On October 15, 2003, plaintiff filed this action. Judge Koprowski granted the State's summary judgment motion for dismissal because plaintiff did not file the claim "within a period of two years after his release from imprisonment" as required by N.J.S.A. 52:4C-4. The judge found no basis for equitable tolling or a finding of substantial compliance based upon the filing of the earlier state and federal actions.

In this appeal, plaintiff again raises the equitable tolling and substantial compliance arguments. He raises additional arguments that were not presented in the trial court, namely that the accrual of the cause of action should be tolled under the discovery rule, that the statutory provisions are unconstitutionally vague, and that his action did not accrue until the indictment was dismissed. Although these new arguments are not properly before us and are not properly cognizable on appeal, see Neider v. Royal Indem. Ins. Co., 62 N.J. 229, 234 (1973), we will address them on the merits.

We reject plaintiff's vagueness argument. There is no lack of clarity in the statutory limitation provision, which requires the filing of a claim within two years from a claimant's "release from imprisonment." If the Legislature intended to begin the running of the limitations period with the dismissal of an indictment, or, for example, release from imprisonment or dismissal of an indictment, whichever is later, it would have said so. Plaintiff has provided no basis for interpreting the statute other than by its plain terms, and we have no occasion to do so.

We further reject plaintiff's contention that he was not truly "free from imprisonment" on these charges until the indictment was dismissed. Plaintiff argues that after release from imprisonment, when a new trial is ordered, it may take a long time, perhaps even more than the two-year limitation period, before the case is retried. Thus, he argues, if the action accrues at the time of release from imprisonment, a claimant would be precluded, or at least hindered, in proving an essential element of the claim, namely that he did not commit the crime for which he was convicted. See N.J.S.A. 52:4C-3. We find this argument unpersuasive. In such circumstances, the civil action could be stayed or placed on the inactive list pending the outcome of the retrial of the criminal case. In that manner, the statute's limitations provision would assure the State timely notice of a potential civil claim while at the same time preserving the rights of the plaintiff in the civil action while not infringing upon his rights in the criminal action.

We therefore conclude that the limitation period began to run upon plaintiff's release from imprisonment on April 30, 2001. The complaint was not filed until about thirty months later, on October 15, 2003. Our remaining inquiry, then, is whether the time was subject to tolling under any asserted equitable doctrines.

The doctrine of substantial compliance requires the defaulting party to show:

(1) the lack of prejudice to the defending party; (2) a series of steps taken to comply with the statute involved; (3) a general compliance with the purpose of the statute; (4) a reasonable notice of petitioner's claim[;] and (5) a reasonable explanation why there was not a strict compliance with the statute.

[Bernstein v. Board of Trustees of Teachers' Pension & Annuity Fund, 151 N.J. Super. 71, 76-77 (App. Div. 1977).]

Plaintiff has met none of the criteria. Although the State has not asserted any particular prejudice, plaintiff has the burden of demonstrating a lack of prejudice. Indeed, the passage of time during which a key witness died so prejudiced the State that it determined it could not further proceed criminally. Plaintiff took no steps to comply with the statute and did not generally comply with its purpose. His filing of the earlier state and federal actions did not name the State of New Jersey or its Treasurer as a defendant and did not contain a claim for damages under N.J.S.A. 52:4C-1 to -6. The State was therefore not reasonably on notice of the potential for such a claim. And, plaintiff's only explanation for non-compliance with the two-year limitation period was nothing more than his lack of knowledge of the statutory cause of action.

The doctrine of equitable tolling typically requires a showing that the claimant has been induced or lulled by his or her adversary's conduct into allowing the filing deadline to pass. See Villalobos v. Fava, 342 N.J. Super. 38, 46 (App. Div. 2001) ("Equitable tolling assumes the accrual of the action but intercepts and delays the bar of the statute of limitations because the plaintiff lacked vital information which was withheld by a defendant.") The State did nothing here to induce plaintiff to delay in filing. Nor are we persuaded by plaintiff's reliance on White v. Violent Crimes Compensation Board, 76 N.J. 368 (1978). There, the victim of a brutal assault and rape was temporarily incapacitated, and filed her claim within the one-year limitation applicable under the Criminal Injuries Compensation Act of 1971 within one year of regaining mental capacity. Id. at 387-88. The Court held that "[i]t would be anomalous indeed if the incapacity resulting from the infliction of those injuries could operate to deprive an otherwise eligible victim of the opportunity to benefit from the legislative enactment designed to mitigate the often devastating economic consequences of such injuries" and therefore the limitation period "may be tolled for the period of the victim-applicant's crime-induced incapacity . . . ." Id. at 386. Of course, plaintiff suffered no incapacity here, and the White principles simply do not apply.

Finally, we find no basis for invoking the discovery rule. Plaintiff argues that he filed his claim immediately after he "discovered that he had a course of redress [under N.J.S.A. 52:4C-1 to -6] in State Court." However, "[t]he discovery rule is essentially a rule of equity," which "provides that in an appropriate case a cause of action will be held not to accrue until the injured party discovers, or by an exercise of reasonable diligence and intelligence should have discovered that he [or she] may have a basis for an actionable claim." Lopez v. Swyer, 62 N.J. 267, 272-73 (1973); see also Villalobos, supra, 342 N.J. Super. at 45-46 ("The discovery rule avoids the mechanical application of a statute of limitations by postponing the accrual of a cause of action so long as a party is unaware either that he has been injured or that the injury was due to the fault or neglect of an identifiable person.")

Plaintiff was, of course, fully aware that he had been imprisoned for the conviction of a crime and subsequently released. He was also fully aware that he asserted his innocence. He was thus aware at all times of the basis for his claim under N.J.S.A. 52:4C-1 to -6. The only thing he did not discover until it was too late was that the law allowed such a claim. Ignorance of the law does not support invocation of the discovery rule.

Affirmed.

 

Appellant died during this pendency of this appeal, and by order dated February 9, 2007 we granted the motion to substitute his estate as appellant. See R. 4:34-1(b).

In the trial court proceedings, it was conclusively established that plaintiff's release from imprisonment arising out of these charges occurred on April 30, 2001, and he was not imprisoned on these charges thereafter. Plaintiff did not contend otherwise. On appeal, plaintiff contends he was held for a time in the county jail after his release from State Prison and that he made bail at an unspecified time about "five months before his case was finally dismissed" on October 17, 2001. Although the trial record controls, even if we accept plaintiff's assertion, it would not change our analysis or conclusion, because, at best, his filing of this complaint would have been about twenty-nine months after his release from custody, rather than thirty months.

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A-2900-05T3

March 21, 2007