STATE OF NEW JERSEY IN THE INTEREST OF C.B.

 

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-2839-05T22839-05T2

STATE OF NEW JERSEY

IN THE INTEREST OF C.B.

________________________________________________________________

 

Argued January 18, 2007 - Decided April 13, 2007

Before Judges Wefing and Parker.

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Chancery Division, Family Part, Somerset County, Docket No. FJ-18-351-06.

John P. Robertson, II, argued the cause for appellant (Hanlon, Dunn & Robertson, attorneys; Mr. Robertson, on the brief).

Daryl A. Williams, Assistant Prosecutor, argued the cause for respondent (Wayne J. Forrest, Somerset County Prosecutor, attorney; James L. McConnell, Assistant Prosecutor, of counsel and on the brief).

PER CURIAM

In this juvenile matter, C.B. appeals from an order of disposition entered on December 20, 2005 after he was adjudicated guilty of an offense that if committed by an adult would constitute third degree eluding, N.J.S.A. 2C:29-2b. He was sentenced to a one-year term of probation, fifty hours community service, and a suspension of his driving privileges for six months after he became eligible to obtain a driver's license. He was also required to send a letter of apology to the Hillsboro Police Department. We affirm.

The charges against this juvenile arose out of an incident characterized by the juvenile as "joyriding." It was, in fact, a far more serious event than mere "joyriding" and placed the juvenile, his companions, the police officers involved and the general public at serious risk.

On August 22, 2005, at about 2:30 a.m., C.B., then thirteen years old and heading into the eighth grade, took a male friend and two girls on a drive through the public streets of Hillsboro in his family's car to the back of the Woodfern School. When two Hillsboro police officers on routine patrol spotted them and shined a light on the car, C.B. sped away. The officers activated their lights and attempted to stop C.B.'s vehicle. Instead of stopping, however, C.B. led the police on a wild chase with sirens blaring and lights flashing. At times, C.B. reached speeds of seventy-five miles an hour. Only when C.B.'s vehicle was blocked by several police cars did he finally stop.

In this appeal, C.B. argues:

POINT ONE

JUVENILE-APPELLANT'S REQUEST FOR A DEFERRED DISPOSITION WAS IMPROPERLY DENIED

C.B. maintains that he should have been granted a deferred disposition pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2A:4A-43(b)(1) rather than be sentenced to a probationary term. In a deferred disposition pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2A:4A-43(b)(1), the matter is adjourned for up to twelve months "for the purpose of determining whether the juvenile makes a satisfactory adjustment," and if he does, the complaint is dismissed.

C.B. contends that a deferred or adjourned disposition is akin to Pretrial Intervention (PTI) for adults, but he acknowledges that the granting of a deferred disposition is left solely to the discretion of the family court judge. Indeed, we have previously held that the family court's determination to deny deferred disposition should not be reversed absent an abuse of discretion. State in the Interest of S.B., 333 N.J. Super. 236, 246 (App. Div. 2000) (citing State v. Gardner, 113 N.J. 510, 516 (1989)). Nevertheless, C.B. argues that Judge Thomas Dilts erred in interpreting and applying the deferred disposition statute because the judge "was apparently operating under the assumption that if he granted C.B.'s request for a [d]eferred [d]isposition the [c]ourt would not be able to impose the other, necessary conditions, such as probationary supervision and suspension of C.B.'s driving privileges."

As Judge Dilts explained in his August 14, 2006 supplemental decision, the January 2002 "Protocol for Monitoring Juvenile Deferred Disposition Cases" issued by the Administrative Director of the Courts, states in Schedule A that "[w]henever a deferred disposition is entered, the general conditions of probation do not and should not apply." Moreover, in a clarifying memo from the Administrative Director, dated June 13, 2002, subpart II states "please note the Standard Conditions of Probation do not apply in deferred cases."

When the Administrative Director acts in his designated capacity to "promulgate a compilation of administrative rules and directives relating to case processing," in accordance with R. 1:33-3, the directives have "the full force and effect of law" when they involve procedures, rather than substantive law, and "embody[] guidelines promulgated by the Supreme Court." State v. McNamara, 212 N.J. Super. 102, 108-9 (App. Div. 1986), certif. denied, 108 N.J. 210 (1987). Here, the Director's memoranda concerned procedure, rather than substantive law, and bound the trial judge to adhere to the directives contained therein.

Moreover, it is clear from the record that Judge Dilts intended to deny C.B.'s application for a deferred disposition, not solely because of the directives, but because of the seriousness of the offense. He stated on the record of December 20, 2005 that he was "unwilling" to grant the deferred disposition. In his supplemental decision dated February 16, 2006, he stated: "If the court did not deny the motion to defer disposition, C.B. would not learn the lessons needed to be learned from such egregious conduct and would fail to receive the supervision from the probation department that is needed for his acts of delinquency."

Judge Dilts further commented in the February 16, 2006 supplemental decision:

As to my decision to deny a deferral for a third degree offense under these circumstances, I rely on my statements made at the time of disposition. I would, however, add one additional factor that was not cited by me. That is, C.B. needs more intensive supervision. His parents' supervision was not adequate to insure that he did not drive his father's vehicle and violate the law in such egregious ways. My decision was that C.B. needs probation supervision to insure that he not only understands the consequences of his actions, but that he gets all of the help that he needs during the coming year to insure that he does not violate the law and endanger the public safety again.

I would also wish to reiterate what I said to C.B. in court: that to do anything less than to impose the probation and the terms of the disposition would send him the wrong signal and would in my judgment be contrary to his best interest. The best interest of C.B. calls for him to know that there are serious consequences for violating the law, and that he is no different from any other young person who violates the law. There is no right to a deferred disposition and although C.B. had many impressive letters of support written on his behalf[,] the court concluded that it could not grant the motion for deferral in view of the four aggravating factors that the court found to exist when coupled with the serious third degree charge for which he pled guilty.

We agree and affirm substantially for the reasons set forth by Judge Dilts on the record on December 20, 2005 and the supplemental letter opinions dated February 16 and August 14, 2006.

 
Affirmed.

(continued)

(continued)

6

A-2839-05T2

RECORD IMPOUNDED

 

April 13, 2007