DIVISION OF YOUTH AND FAMILY SERVICES v. J.T.

 

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-1819-05T41819-05T4

DIVISION OF YOUTH AND

FAMILY SERVICES,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

J.T.,

Defendant-Appellant,

IN THE MATTER OF THE GUARDIANSHIP

OF A.T.,

Minor.

____________________________________________________________

 

Submitted January 18, 2007 - Decided March 13, 2007

Before Judges Wefing, Parker and Yannotti.

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Chancery Division, Family Part, Atlantic County, Docket No. FG-01-2-05.

Yvonne Smith Segars, Public Defender, attorney for appellant (Michele C. Buckley, on the brief).

Stuart Rabner, Attorney General of New Jersey, attorney for respondent (Michael J. Haas, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel; James P. Gentile, Deputy Attorney General, on the brief).

Yvonne Smith Segars, Public Defender, Law Guardian, attorney for minor A.T. (Sonia G. Wagner, of counsel and on the brief).

PER CURIAM

Defendant J.T., the biological mother of A.T., appeals from a judgment of guardianship entered on October 6, 2005 terminating her parental rights to A.T. We affirm.

The facts relevant to this appeal are as follows. J.T. was diagnosed with schizophrenia and mental retardation in 1964 when she was six years old. She was committed to Ancora Psychiatric Hospital for two years and was placed at the Johnstone Program for Mental Health Services. In 1993 and again in 1996, the Division of Youth and Family Services (DYFS) received referrals regarding J.T.'s now-adult children. With respect to those referrals, DYFS noted that the Division of Developmental Disabilities (DDD) was already providing services to the family and serving as J.T.'s legal guardian.

On March 18, 2002, J.T. was involuntarily committed to Atlantic City Medical Psychiatric Unit (ACMC) until March 28, 2002, because she "was reportedly agitated, belligerent and assaultive at the doctor's office." At the time of her admission, it was noted that J.T. had been "decompensating" for several weeks and had recently thrown a cup of bleach at her daughter. J.T.'s discharge diagnosis was "schizophrenia, chronic paranoid type, acute exacerbation" and "mild mental retardation."

On July 11, 2002, J.T. was again involuntarily committed to ACMC. During this commitment, J.T. was found to be six to seven weeks pregnant. Her diagnosis was, again, paranoid type schizophrenia, chronic with acute exacerbation, and mild mental retardation. She was also diagnosed with certain physiological ailments associated with the pregnancy. She was discharged on July 19, 2002 with an indication that her schizophrenia had "returned to baseline levels."

In September 2002, DDD placed J.T. at Pacific Avenue Supervised Apartments. On October 10, 2002, she was evaluated by Dr. David London to determine whether she was in continuing need of guardianship by DDD. In his report, Dr. London found:

1. [J.T.] has significantly subaverage intellectual functioning, based on measured abilities at the mild level of mental retardation. She was involved with local child study teams, enrolled in special education classes, and was at a developmental disabilities facility during school years.

2. She also has significant mental health issues, including multiple psychiatric hospitalizations and treatment with psychotropic medications. She has some vision impairment; however, her sensory-motor and communication abilities are functional.

3. [J.T.] indicates preferences and choices, and has adequate capacity to make meaningful, informed decisions regarding critical life areas such as personal care, health care and medical treatment, independent living, economic self-sufficiency, self-direction, and safety.

4. When her mental health issues are acute, though, [J.T.'s] decision making capacity is lessened. However, with proper mental health treatment, she manages and maintains her life or elicits help where she lacks proficiency (e.g., transportation, money management, etc.).

5. Evidently, then, [J.T.] can make decisions but needs supports to execute some of these decisions efficiently. [J.T.] is, therefore, determined to have the mental capacity to function as her own legal guardian.

6. Psychotherapy/counseling for emotional support, psychotropic medication treatment for psychiatric symptoms, economic support from Social Service agencies, involvement with ARC, and family contacts are thus essential for maintenance of adequate and stable functioning. [J.T.'s] prognosis is guarded.

7. DSM-IV diagnoses include the following[:] Axis I: 295.90 Schizophrenia, Undifferentiated Type[;] Axis II: 317.0 Mild Mental Retardation[;] 301.9 Personality Disorder Not Otherwise Specified[;] Axis III: Four months pregnant; Axis IV: Problems with primary support group. Problems related to the social environment[;] Axis V: GAF=57 (ongoing).

DDD assigned caseworker Linda DiToto to find J.T. an alternate living arrangement for her and her child after he was born because children were not permitted in the supervised apartments. DiToto undertook an exhaustive search for residential placement but was unable to find one before the child was born. When A.T. was born on March 5, 2003, the hospital referred the matter to DYFS. On March 11, 2003, DYFS placed A.T. in foster care because DDD had already undertaken an exhaustive search and was unable to locate a residential placement for the mother and child. The child remained in that foster home until August 14, 2006.

Meanwhile, S.H., an acquaintance of J.T., inquired about becoming a skilled home provider (SHP) for J.T. and the child. S.H. was not a licensed provider at the time and had to undergo the licensing procedure with DDD, as did her husband who would serve as a backup provider when S.H. was not available.

DiToto testified that she believed reunification of J.T. with A.T. was possible as long as J.T. received proper support. In July 2004, however, DYFS transferred the matter to the Adoption Resource Center and commenced the guardianship action against J.T. Once J.T. began living with S.H. full time, however, her visitation with A.T. increased to eight hours a week and she was ultimately granted overnight supervised visits. DYFS caseworker, Mai Tang, noted that during the supervised visits, J.T. was appropriate and affectionate. During the visits, J.T. made progress in parenting skills such as changing diapers, retrieving meals without being prompted and initiating interactive games. Nevertheless, there were times when J.T. left the child unsupervised.

In December 2004, Dr. Linda Jeffrey conducted a psychological evaluation of J.T. on behalf of DYFS. Dr. Jeffrey indicated that J.T. had serious intellectual deficits and "a severe clinical syndrome, delusional disorder . . . and a severe personality pathology, paranoid . . . consistent with a diagnosis of paranoid schizophrenia." She also displayed a narcissistic personality disorder with paranoid and avoidant personality features, and mild mental retardation "that impede her from being able to care for a child safely." Dr. Jeffrey concluded that the child would be at "high risk physically and emotionally in the care of [J.T.]." A bonding evaluation conducted at the same time indicated that A.T. "resisted contact with [J.T.], and refused to go to her." Dr. Jeffrey concluded that J.T. "did not serve as a secure base for [A.T.], and he appeared unhappy and frightened in her presence." In April 2005, a follow-up bonding evaluation concluded that "[s]ince [A.T.] does not have a secure attachment to [J.T.], it is highly unlikely to cause him serious and enduring harm if her parental rights are terminated." Thus, in December 2004, and again in April 2005, evaluations indicated that J.T. "does not have the capacity to parent her [one] year old son" and that if J.T. were to regain custody of the child, she "would require nearly continuous supervision."

A bonding evaluation conducted in November 2004 indicated that A.T. was securely attached to his foster parents. A second evaluation in April 2005 confirmed the earlier determination. Evidence was presented at trial that there had been several allegations of abuse against the foster parents with whom A.T. had been placed. None of those allegations were substantiated after investigation, but on August 14, 2006, A.T. was removed from the foster home and placed in a new "resource family home." The child was not placed in J.T.'s care because she had decided to leave the supervised home in which she had been living.

In this appeal, J.T. argues that DYFS did not prove by clear and convincing evidence the second and third prongs of the best interests test articulated in N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. A.W., 103 N.J. 591 (1986) and codified in N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1.

The trial judge rendered a lengthy and detailed decision setting forth his findings of fact and analysis of each of the four statutory factors. N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a). With respect to the second factor, N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a)(2), the evidence more than adequately supports the trial judge's finding that J.T. is unwilling or unable to eliminate the harm to the child.

J.T. argues that the evidence demonstrated that A.T. had bonded with her. Although the evidence demonstrated a degree of bonding between J.T. and A.T., it also demonstrated that the child had bonded with the foster parents and that A.T. would be at risk if his attachment to his foster parents were severed. The trial judge relied on Dr. Jeffrey's opinion that J.T. would not be able to ameliorate the harm and that no benefit would be derived from reuniting the child with J.T. Moreover, J.T.'s expert, Dr. David Bogacki, testified that J.T. does not have the capacity to parent A.T. and would require constant supervision if the child were returned to her. The trial judge found Dr. Jeffrey's testimony persuasive and properly concluded that J.T. is unwilling or unable to eliminate harm to the child.

With respect to the third factor, N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a)(3), the record similarly supports the judge's determination that DYFS made reasonable efforts to provide services to assist J.T. in maintaining or regaining custody of the child and considered alternatives to termination of parental rights. The judge properly found that DDD "is the exclusive agency for finding suitable homes for [its] clients." The judge relied on the testimony of DDD caseworker DiToto that she had made substantial efforts to find skilled home providers for J.T. and the child until September 2004. The trial court noted that "[t]he delay in finding a homecare provider was a result of the extent of the illness of [J.T.]." DYFS need not duplicate DDD's exhaustive search for an appropriate placement. The evidence further supported the trial judge's finding that J.T. - even with the support of the special homecare provider - would be unable to deal appropriately with the child and his emotional issues if his attachment with the foster parents was severed.

We have carefully considered defendant's arguments in light of the applicable law and we are satisfied that they lack sufficient merit to warrant further discussion in a written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E). We affirm substantially for the reasons set forth by Judge Max A. Baker in his comprehensive, well-reasoned decision rendered on October 6, 2005. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(A).

 
Affirmed.

ARC stands for Association of Retarded Citizens, which is the agency that facilitates supervised living environments, such as the Pacific Avenue Supervised Apartments.

(continued)

(continued)

9

A-1819-05T4

RECORD IMPOUNDED

March 13, 2007