KYLE JOHNSON v. DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS

 

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-1558-05T51558-05T5

KYLE JOHNSON,

Appellant,

v.

DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS,

Respondent.

________________________________________________________________

 

Submitted February 7, 2007 - Decided February 26, 2007

Before Judges Yannotti and Messano.

On appeal from a Final Agency Decision of the Department of Corrections.

Kyle Johnson, appellant, pro se.

Stuart Rabner, Attorney General, attorney for respondent Department of Corrections (Patrick DeAlmeida, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel; Lisa A. Puglisi, Deputy Attorney General, on the brief).

PER CURIAM

Kyle Johnson appeals from the final administrative decision of the Department of Corrections (DOC) finding him guilty of disciplinary infraction *.202, possession or introduction of a weapon, such as, but not limited to, a sharpened instrument, knife or unauthorized tool. N.J.A.C. 10A:4-4.1. After careful consideration of the record, we affirm.

On October 17, 2005, appellant was an inmate at Bayside State Prison serving a twenty-five year sentence for manslaughter and possession of a weapon. On that date, during a routine search of his cell, corrections officers found a metal rod, approximately six inches long with a sharpened end, inside a pillowcase on appellant's cellmate's bed. The area was accessible to both, but neither appellant nor his cellmate claimed ownership of the weapon. Both were charged with disciplinary infraction *.202.

At the administrative hearing, appellant denied any knowledge of the weapon. Relying upon the reports filed by the various officers who conducted the search, the hearing officer found defendant guilty of the charge, and imposed sanctions of fifteen days detention, the loss of 180 days of commutation credit, and 180 days of administrative segregation. Her decision and sentence were upheld upon administrative appeal and this appeal then ensued.

Appellant does not raise any issues with respect to the procedural aspects of the hearing. Avant v. Clifford, 67 N.J. 496 (1975). Our independent review of the record satisfies us that he was accorded all of the procedural due process requirements articulated by the Supreme Court in McDonald v. Pinchak, 139 N.J. 188 (1995) and Jacobs v. Stephens, 139 N.J. 212 (1995). Rather, he challenges the sufficiency of the evidence marshaled against him, claiming it was insufficient to establish his violation of disciplinary rule *202. We disagree.

Our review of agency action is limited. "An appellate court ordinarily will reverse the decision of an administrative agency only when the agency's decision is 'arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable or [] is not supported by substantial credible evidence in the record as a whole.'" Ramirez v. Dep't of Corr., 382 N.J. Super. 18, 23 (App. Div. 2005) (quoting Henry v. Rahway State Prison, 81 N.J. 571, 579-80 (1980)). DOC's regulations codify the requirement that any guilty finding be supported by substantial credible evidence. N.J.A.C. 10A:4-9.15(a). Substantial evidence means "such evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." In Re Hackensack Water Co. 41 N.J. Super. 408, 418 (App. Div. 1956).

In this case, the weapon was found in a pillowcase on the lower bunk of the cell. While this bed was routinely occupied by appellant's cellmate, both men had equal access to the bed, the pillowcase, and, hence, the weapon. The hearing officer was justified in concluding the weapon was in a common area of the cell. These facts were not disputed by the appellant at the hearing, nor are they disputed here.

Although appellant disclaimed any knowledge that the weapon was in the cell, the hearing officer was entitled to assess his credibility and independently determine that critical issue based solely on his testimony. In Blackwell v. Dep't. of Corr., 348 N.J. Super. 117, 124 (App. Div. 2002), we noted that when the critical issue was one of credibility, a detailed examination and determination of the officer's and inmate's competing versions of events was required.

Here, however, appellant's version of the incident did not conflict with that offered by DOC. Thus, this case centered solely on the credibility of the appellant. In that regard, the hearing officer was free to determine that issue by considering extrinsic factors routinely used to assess credibility, such as appellant's obvious self-interest in the outcome of the hearing, which provided ample motive to deny knowledge of the weapon's presence.

In short, we conclude that DOC's decision that appellant committed a *202 infraction was supported by sufficient credible evidence. We therefore affirm.

 

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A-1558-05T5

February 26, 2007