DIVISION OF YOUTH AND FAMILY SERVICES v. J.C.

 

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-A-1304-06T4
A-1306-06T41304-06T4

A-1306-06T4

DIVISION OF YOUTH AND

FAMILY SERVICES,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

J.C. and J.L.L.

Defendants-Appellants,

 
 

IN THE MATTER OF THE

GUARDIANSHIP OF B.L.C. and

T.C.,

Minors.

____________________________________________

 

Submitted: April 18, 2007 - Decided:

Before Judges Stern, A. A. Rodr guez and Lyons.

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Chancery Division, Family Part, Ocean County, FG-15-10-06.

Yvonne Smith Segars, Public Defender, attorney for appellant J.C. (A-1304-06T4) (Alan I. Smith, Designated Counsel, on the brief).

Yvonne Smith Segars, Public Defender, attorney for appellant J.L.L. (A-1306-06T4) (William J. Sweeney, Designated Counsel, on the brief).

Stuart Rabner, Attorney General, attorney for respondent (Patrick DeAlmeida, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel; Lisa B. Landsman, Deputy Attorney General, on the brief).

Yvonne Smith Segars, Public Defender, Law Guardian for minors B.L.C. and T.C. (Keri N. Popkin, Assistant Deputy Public Defender, on the brief).

PER CURIAM

J.C. (birth father) and J.L.L. (birth mother), appeal from the September 7, 2006 Judgment of Guardianship, terminating their parental rights to their daughters B.L.C., now age three-and-one-half, and T.C., now age two. The judgment awarded guardianship to the Division of Youth and Family Services (DYFS). We affirm.

Both birth parents have a history of substance abuse (drugs and alcohol), unstable histories of housing and unemployment, and a history of recurring domestic violence. Both birth parents have failed to show stability, even with the numerous services provided by DYFS. The birth mother has failed to abide by court orders that forbid contact with the birth father.

DYFS caseworkers Letizia Zindell, Brianne Cuff, Stephanie Noss and Leticia Nicole Green testified at trial regarding the agency's involvement with the family since 2003. Their testimony can be summarized as follows. In 2003, after B.L.C., the oldest daughter, was born, DYFS provided services to the parents through Family Preservation. However, two months later, the birth mother informed DYFS that she was residing with her mother, because the birth father was drinking too much and had become violent with her. The following month, DYFS received a referral involving a family altercation wherein B.L.C. was present. The birth mother was placed at the Providence House with B.L.C. She signed a case plan providing that she would not return to her mother's home. The following month, DYFS was informed that the birth mother was no longer living at the Providence House and was living in a motel with B.L.C. DYFS continued to provide services to the family.

In July 2004, the birth mother informed DYFS that she had given birth to another daughter, who was born two months premature with a very low birth weight and other medical issues. That child, who is not the subject of this litigation, was diagnosed with cerebral palsy, suffered from feeding difficulties and was developmentally delayed. In August 2004, the birth parents signed a six-month Informed Consent form for placement of this daughter into care by DYFS because she was deemed medically fragile. Eventually, DYFS was granted guardianship of this child.

In July 2004, DYFS received another referral indicating that the birth parents were involved in a domestic violence incident. Subsequently, the birth parents entered into a case plan stipulating that the birth father would leave the family home. However, two months later, DYFS received another referral alleging that the birth parents were residing together in violation of the case plan that had been signed approximately one month prior. There was a subsequent referral indicating that the family was living with the maternal grandmother, despite the earlier case plan. As a result of the birth father residing with the birth mother without any notice to the Board of Social Services (Board), and in contravention of the terms of the housing allowance, the Board took away the birth mother's housing allowance.

DYFS then filed an order to show cause seeking custody of B.L.C. The court awarded DYFS custody of B.L.C. Then, in April 2005, T.C. was born. T.C. was placed in foster care because of her parents lack of stable housing or stable employment. In addition, the birth parents had not completed the services that DYFS had offered. DYFS ruled out all relatives as foster parents.

DYFS then sought guardianship of B.L.C. and T.C. At the trial, DYFS presented the testimony of Alan J. Lee, Psy.D., a licensed psychologist. Lee conducted psychological evaluations of the children and their birth and foster parents. He diagnosed the birth father as suffering from: impulse control disorder; alcohol abuse; and personality disorder with narcissistic and antisocial traits. Lee testified that he had concerns about the birth father being an independent caretaker to any minor child. Lee also conducted a psychological evaluation of the birth mother and diagnosed her as suffering from depressive disorder, attention deficit hyperactivity disorder and impulse control disorder. Lee recommended against the birth mother being an independent caretaker to any minor child.

Lee conducted bonding evaluations between B.L.C. and her foster parents. He concluded that B.L.C. had formed a positive attachment and psychological bond with both foster parents. However, Lee opined that B.L.C. had not formed a significant psychological bond or attachment with either birth parent. Similarly, Lee concluded that T.C. had the underpinnings of a significant psychological attachment or bond with the foster parents. Lee also opined that T.C. had not formed any kind of significant attachment to either birth parent.

At the conclusion of trial, Judge June Strelecki rendered an oral decision. She found that DYFS had proven all four prongs pursuant to N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1 and ordered that judgment be entered terminating the birth parents' parental rights of B.L.C. and T.C. Judge Strelecki said that the parents "just failed to do what they were supposed to do," taking many missteps along the way and selectively complying with DYFS.

The birth father appeals contending that, "the judgment for guardianship should be reversed because [DYFS] failed to prove the four prongs of the best interests test by clear and convincing evidence." Specifically, he argues that, (a) the harms to B.L.C. and T.C. that were identified by DYFS were a result of [the birth father's] poverty, which is not a harm under the first prong; (b) DYFS produced only equivocal proof of parental unfitness; (c) DYFS failed to make reasonable efforts to accommodate [the birth father]; and (d) the judge applied an improper better interests analysis that failed to consider the sibling rights of B.L.C. and T.C.

We reject these contentions because they are not supported by the record. The birth father's allegation that the harms to the children identified by DYFS are due to his poverty fly in the face of the proofs. Although unstable employment and housing may be a function of a economic condition, substance abuse, domestic violence and failure to cooperate with DYFS, are individual failings of the birth father. We note that the Law Guardian for B.L.C. and T.C. urges affirmance.

The birth mother contends on appeal that "substantial credible evidence did not exist supporting the court's finding that the 'best interests' test was proven by clear and convincing evidence." Specifically, she argues that there did not exist clear and convincing evidence: (a) to support the finding that the health and development of the children were and would continue to be endangered by the parental relationship; (b) to support a finding that the appellant was unwilling or was unable to eliminate the harm facing the children; (c) that DYFS made reasonable efforts to provide services to J.L.L.; and (d) to support the court's finding that termination of parental rights will not do more harm than good. We are not persuaded by these contentions.

The legal standard is well-set. N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1 codified the standards the Supreme Court established in N.J. Div. of Youth and Family Servs. v. A.W., 103 N.J. 591 (1986). DYFS must establish by clear and convincing evidence that:

(1) The child's safety, health or development has been or will continue to be endangered by the parental relationship;

(2) The parent is unwilling or unable to eliminate the harm facing the child or is unable or unwilling to provide a safe and stable home for the child and the delay of permanent placement will add to the harm. Such harm may include evidence that separating the child from his resource family parents would cause serious and enduring emotional or psychological harm to the child;

(3) The division has made reasonable efforts to provide services to help the parent correct the circumstances which led to the child's placement outside the home and the court has considered alternatives to termination of parental rights; and

(4) Termination of parental rights will not do more harm than good.

[N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a); see also A.W., supra, 103 N.J. at 604-11.]

Moreover, although the rights to bear and nurture a child are profound individual rights, the rights are not inviolate. These rights are not paramount to the right of the child to be free from physical or emotional abuse or neglect. N.J. Div. of Youth and Family Servs. v. B.G.S., 291 N.J. Super. 582, 591 (App. Div. 1996).

Applying that standard here, it is clear that DYFS met its burden by the requisite standard. We have carefully reviewed the record in light of the arguments presented on appeal and determine that the judgment of the trial court is based on findings of fact which are adequately supported by the evidence in the record. We find that the arguments made are without sufficient merit to warrant discussion in detail in a written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(A)(E). Therefore, we affirm the September 7, 2006 judgment terminating the birth parents' parental rights of B.L.C. and T.C., substantially for the reasons expressed by Judge Strelecki in her September 7, 2006 oral opinion.

Affirmed.

 

The birth parents have another daughter, now age two-years and ten-months, who was voluntarily surrendered to DYFS and has since been adopted. The birth father also has a daughter, who is in the custody of her birth mother. The birth mother also has a son, who is in the custody of his maternal grandmother. These children are not the subject of this litigation.

(continued)

(continued)

9

A-1304-06T4

RECORD IMPOUNDED

May 18, 2007