STATE OF NEW JERSEY v. IGOR SAMARIN

 

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-1140-06T51140-06T5

STATE OF NEW JERSEY,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

IGOR SAMARIN,

Defendant-Appellant.

_______________________________________________________________

 

Submitted April 24, 2007 - Decided

Before Judges Coburn and R. B. Coleman.

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Chancery Division, Family Part, Somerset County, FO-18-363-06.

Igor Samarin, appellant pro se.

Wayne J. Forrest, Somerset County Prosecutor, attorney for respondent (James L. McConnell, Assistant Prosecutor, of counsel and on the brief).

PER CURIAM

Defendant Igor Samarin appeals, pro se, from an order of the Chancery Division, Family Part, Somerset County, entered on July 20, 2006, that memorialized defendant's plea of guilty to a charge of contempt of a domestic violence restraining order, N.J.S.A. 2C:29-9b. Defendant was sentenced to probation for one year with a condition that he have no contact with his ex-wife and appropriate mandatory assessments were imposed. We affirm.

At the hearing that resulted in the plea of guilty, defendant was represented by counsel and assisted by an interpreter. In his Notice of Appeal, defendant asserts that "my attorney . . . forced me to plea [sic] guilty." In his brief, defendant argues that he had to say he was guilty in order to avoid prison for another two months and that his attorney put enormous pressure on him to plead guilty. Based upon our independent review of the transcript of the plea hearing, we find that defendant's suggestion that his plea was invalid is so lacking in merit that it does not warrant discussion in a written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(2); R. 3:9-2. Nevertheless, we make the following brief observations.

The record discloses that Judge Ann R. Bartlett patiently inquired of defendant whether he understood the ramifications of pleading guilty, and she even took a fifteen minute recess to allow defendant to discuss with his attorney whether he really wanted to plead guilty. There is no indication that defendant was not acting knowingly and voluntarily by entering the plea. For example, after defendant stated "I admit that I was guilty of breaking the agreement with my wife because I wanted to clarify the situation . . .", the judge herself sought clarification. She asked, "All right. But you are willing to plead guilty because you now understand that whether you agree with the law or not the law forbade you to speak to your wife and to be at the house against her will, right?" Defendant answered, "Yes."

Moreover, defendant's brief on appeal offers no basis for anyone to conclude reasonably that he did not violate the restraining order by returning to the marital home and remaining there in the presence of his wife and against her wishes. See, e.g., State v. Simon, 161 N.J. 416, 444 (1999) (noting that representations made by a defendant at the plea hearing concerning the voluntariness of the decision to plead, as well as any findings made by the trial court when accepting the plea, constitute a "formidable barrier" which defendant must overcome before he will be allowed to withdraw his plea).

Defendant does not actually argue that he did not violate the restraining order. As he stated at the hearing: "[E]ven if I was guilty, but still we are human beings and we can at least talk and straighten things out. She's the mother of my children. She's the closest person to me." It is, thus, obvious that defendant refuses to accept the limitations imposed by the restraining order. However, to the extent Samarin contends the underlying restraining order was improperly issued, that is not properly a subject of this appeal. That order was entered on December 2, 2004, and no direct appeal was taken at that time. There is no indication the protected party wishes to vacate the restraining order and the validity of the order is not properly before us.

We are satisfied that Judge Bartlett, who presided over that proceeding, was sensitive to defendant's frustration over the restrictions imposed upon defendant's right to visit freely with his children and over the terms of the final restraining order prohibiting defendant from communication with his ex-wife. Indeed, the judge recognized, as a mitigating factor, that the couple had agreed - contrary to the terms of the restraining order - that defendant could enter the marital home to visit with the children during which time the ex-wife would absent herself, but defendant did not even abide by those relaxed limits. On the occasion in question, defendant refused to leave upon the ex-wife's return because he wanted to speak with her, and she called the police. Judge Bartlett properly concluded that defendant was in contempt of the restraining order, and she exercised sound discretion when she accepted the plea of guilty and sentenced defendant to a period of probation.

 
Affirmed.

(continued)

(continued)

4

A-1140-06T5

May 11, 2007