ANNETTE BURGOS v. RAYMOND BURGOS

 

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-0937-06T20937-06T2

ANNETTE BURGOS,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

vs.

RAYMOND BURGOS,

Defendant-Appellant.

__________________________________

 

Submitted: September 5, 2007 - Decided September 11, 2007

Before Judges Cuff and Lintner.

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Chancery Division-Family Part, Camden County, Docket No. FM-04-629-06.

Paul R. Melletz, attorney for appellant.

Mullen & Reagan, attorneys for respondent (Mitchell L. Mullen, on the brief).

PER CURIAM

In this appeal, defendant seeks review of the Judgment of Divorce (JOD) entered on August 30, 2006, and the order dated October 6, 2006, denying his motion for reconsideration. The JOD was entered following a trial.

On appeal, defendant Raymond Burgos contends that the trial judge erred in his valuation and distribution of marital assets, principally his pension asset and the former marital home, and the calculation of certain credits to plaintiff Annette Burgos. Defendant also contends that Judge Solomon should have granted his motion for reconsideration and should not have awarded attorney's fees to plaintiff for costs incurred to respond to the motion for reconsideration and to prosecute her motion to enforce the JOD.

We have thoroughly reviewed the transcript of the August 30, 2006 trial, including the documentary evidence admitted in the course of that proceeding. We discern no basis to disturb the findings of fact entered by the judge. Those findings are well-supported by the record and the governing law was properly applied to the facts as found by the trial judge. Cesare v. Cesare, 154 N.J. 394 (1998); Rova Farms Resort, Inc. v. Investors Ins. Co. of Am., 65 N.J. 474, 484 (1974). We affirm, therefore, substantially for the reasons expressed by Judge Solomon in his August 30, 2006 oral decision.

Having concluded that the findings of fact and the conclusions of law were proper, there was no basis to disturb the October 6, 2006 order denying defendant's motion for reconsideration.

Finally, we affirm that part of the October 6, 2006 order that awarded counsel fees to plaintiff. The award of counsel fees is vested in the discretion of the trial judge. The award of counsel fees was limited solely to the post-trial motions. The amount of the award is modest and the decision to award fees in this limited fashion is well-supported by the record.

Affirmed.

 

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A-0937-06T2

September 11, 2007