EDWARD GOLDSTEIN v. ROSENBERG & GOLDSTEIN, Appellant.

Annotate this Case

 

 
 
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-4550-04T24550-04T2

EDWARD GOLDSTEIN,

Respondent,

v.

ROSENBERG & GOLDSTEIN,

Appellant.

________________________________

 

Submitted: January 24, 2006 - Decided February 10, 2006

Before Judges Skillman and Axelrad.

On appeal from the New Jersey Department of Labor, Division of Workers' Compensation.

Bernadette S. Styliades argued the cause for appellant (Styliades, Jackson, and DiMeo, attorneys; Beverly A. McCurry, on the brief).

Neil Stackhouse argued the cause for respondent.

PER CURIAM

Petitioner Edward Goldstein is an attorney and officer in the respondent law firm of Rosenberg & Goldstein. Respondent leased 2,400 square feet of office space on the second floor of a commercial building located at l555 Zion Road in Northfield. The parking area of the building consisted of between eighty and ninety spaces in the front lot. There was no parking on Zion Road, a busy thoroughfare, which appears to be the only means of ingress and egress to the leased premises. Pursuant to the lease, respondent had the right to the use of ten undesignated spaces in the parking lot based on its square footage of office space. The spaces were utilized by all employees and clients of the firm. In addition to its rental obligation under the lease, respondent paid a proportionate share of maintenance costs of the common areas, which included the parking facilities and front entranceway of the building. Respondent also had input in determining what improvements and maintenance would be made to the common areas.

Around lunchtime on June 29, 2000, petitioner was dropped off by his partner at the edge of the parking lot, in front of the porte-cochere (entranceway) to the building. As petitioner hurriedly exited the vehicle, he fell on a concrete pad at the entranceway and injured his shoulder. Petitioner filed a claim petition for workers' compensation, which was denied on the basis that he had not as yet reached his employer's premises when he fell, thus his injuries did not arise in the course of his employment. At the request of the parties, the case was bifurcated for trial on the issue of whether petitioner's claim was barred by the "premises" rule. See Kristiansen v. Morgan, 153 N.J. 298, 316 (1998) (The rule, established by the l979 amendment to the Workers' Compensation Act, L. 1979, c. 283, 12, replaced the "going and coming rule" and limited recovery to injuries which occurred on the employer's premises.), modified on other grounds, 158 N.J. 681 (1999).

Following trial, the judge of compensation found the front entrance to the office building where petitioner fell was under the "control" of his employer. Accordingly, the judge concluded petitioner's injuries arose out of and in the course of his employment and were thus compensable. Judge Giovinazzi reasoned:

First, respondent was responsible under the terms of its lease agreement to pay, as additional rent, its share of operating, maintaining and repairing the common areas of the building and land, "including, but not limited to the exterior of the building, parking facilities and landscaping." While respondent itself did not perform the maintenance on the common areas and parking facilities, it paid for such maintenance along with other tenants of the property. Additionally, when respondent noticed defects, such as potholes in the parking area or other common areas of the property, it brought such defects to the attention of the landlord, which generally responded promptly. Furthermore, when the landlord considered the installation of common area improvements, these improvements were discussed with the tenants who had input into whether they should be installed. Thus, not only were maintenance and improvements to the parking facilities and common areas paid for by the respondent, but respondent also had input into what maintenance and improvements would actually be undertaken. Pursuant to Livingston[e], supra, parking facilities and common areas, owned, maintained or used by employers for employee parking, ingress and egress are part of the employer's premises for purposes of the Workers' Compensation Act.

Secondly, the parking facility and common entranceway to the building was clearly important to and used in the employer's business. Under the terms of the lease, respondent was entitled to at least four parking spaces for each l,0000 square feet which it leased from the landlord. Even though respondent's employees were not given designated parking spaces in the parking lot, their entitlement to use the lot was critical since no other parking is available in the area. A parking lot adjacent to the office building is privately owned and not available to employees of respondent. Additionally, Zion Road, the street providing access to the lot, is a busy thoroughfare, and on-street parking is prohibited. Given the terms of the lease, it cannot be questioned that the parking spaces available to the respondent, even though not specifically designated, are important to the business of the respondent and, therefore, constitute a part of the leased premises.

On appeal, respondent contends petitioner was not injured in an area under its control because it had no ownership interest in the building's common area, did not have the ability to direct employees to park in designated areas of the parking lot or use a portion of the lot, the landlord retained the sole right and obligation to maintain and repair the common areas under the lease, and the firm never undertook any maintenance on its own of the common areas. Respondent further argues the trial court's holding is violative of one of the public policy objectives of the l979 amendments, i.e., reducing costs by sharply curtailing compensation for off-premises accidents.

 
Based on our review of the facts, which are uncontroverted, and the applicable law, we reject petitioner's arguments and affirm for the reasons set forth in the cogent legal analysis and decision of Judge Giovinazzi.

Affirmed.

Livingstone v. Abraham & Strauss, Inc., 111 N.J. 89 (1988).

(continued)

(continued)

5

A-4550-04T2

February 10, 2006

 


Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.

This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.