MSG FINANCIAL GROUP, INC. v. MENDEL WHITE

 

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-4348-04T14348-04T1

MSG FINANCIAL GROUP, INC.,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

MENDEL WHITE,

Defendant-Appellant.

_________________________________

 

Submitted January 11, 2006 - Decided February 28, 2006

Before Judges Wefing and Fuentes.

On appeal from Superior Court of New

Jersey, Law Division - Special Civil Part,

Hudson County, No. SC-456-05.

Appellant submitted a pro se brief.

Soena Sahni and Gagan Sahni submitted a

pro se brief on behalf of respondent.

PER CURIAM

Following a trial in the Small Claims Division of the Special Civil Part, judgment was entered against defendant in the amount of $1,768.81. Defendant has appealed from that judgment. After reviewing the record in light of the contentions advanced on appeal, we affirm.

Defendant owned the premises located at 543 Georgia Tavern Road in Howell Township. On August 23, 2004, he signed a contract to sell the premises to MSG Financial Group, Inc. The contract provided for an estimated closing date of September 24, 2004. For reasons that are not apparent from the record before us, the closing did not take place until October 20, 2004. After the closing occurred, plaintiff received a bill from the municipality for additional real estate taxes due as a result of the change in use of the property from residential to office space. That change in use occurred in February 2004, approximately eight months before the closing. When defendant refused to reimburse plaintiff for a proportionate share of the increased taxes, this lawsuit resulted.

The closing appears to have been handled in a somewhat informal manner, as was the trial. Plaintiff obtained a title search through the date of the estimated closing, September 24 but never requested a run-down search through the actual date of closing. Because the increase in taxes that resulted from the earlier change in use of the property was not added to the municipal rolls until October 1, it was not reflected in plaintiff's title search. Thus, there was no adjustment at the closing for the increase in taxes.

We reject defendant's first contention, that the manner in which the trial was conducted was unconstitutional because he was deprived of his right of cross-examination. Several factors support our conclusion in this regard. We note, for instance, that although defendant is appearing pro se in this matter, he is in fact an attorney admitted to the practice of law in New Jersey. As such, he is deemed fully familiar with the concept of cross-examination. He indicated no desire, however, to pose any questions to MSG's principal, Gagan Sahni. Further, the transcript gives no indication that the trial court did not allow the parties the time needed to present their cases. Defendant does not explain, moreover, how a challenge to Mr. Sahni's credibility through cross-examination would affect defendant's responsibility to contribute toward the taxes that had accrued prior to closing. Although it might have been preferable for the trial court to ask defendant and Mr. Sahni whether either had questions for the other, we do not deem the omission fatal in the overall context of this case.

Similarly, we reject defendant's second contention that the trial court failed to follow the rules of evidence. Mr. Sahni presented to the trial court a copy of a letter dated December 6, 2004, from Howell's deputy tax assessor to the attorney who represented Sahni in connection with the closing. According to that letter, the conversion from residential to office space led to a tax increase of $2,307.14. This letter also noted that defendant had been notified in February of the added assessment. Defendant objected to the admission of this letter and denied receiving any notification of such an increase in taxes.

While the letter was indisputably hearsay, N.J.R.E. 101(a)(2) authorizes the relaxation of the rules of evidence in matters being heard in the Small Claims Section of the Special Civil Part. Triffin v. Quality Urban Hous. Partners, 352 N.J. Super. 538, 543 (App. Div. 2002). Further, in our judgment, defendant's argument on appeal is somewhat incongruous. Defendant in his brief refers to this letter as "impermissible hearsay" because it did not have attached to it the February 2004 notification to which it referred. Attaching that notification would not cure the hearsay nature of the document, it would only accentuate it.

Defendant points to plaintiff's title search as well as an earlier search he had conducted in March 2004 to prove that Howell did not make or record an added tax assessment prior to the closing. Both documents are ineffective for that purpose. Defendant's March 2004 search still refers to the premises as residential and does not reflect the change to office space. Additionally, both predate October 1, the date upon which the assessor is to file the added assessment list. N.J.S.A. 54:4-63.6.

Similarly, we reject defendant's argument that the trial court disregarded controlling decisions. The cases to which defendant refers are all distinguishable, none involving a seller's proportionate obligation for taxes accrued prior to closing.

Finally, plaintiff did satisfactorily prove its damages. It introduced proof of the total increase in taxes, and the trial court ultimately awarded a proportionate share.

The judgment under review is affirmed.

 

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A-4348-04T1

February 28, 2006