IN THE MATTER OF NICHOLAS MAZZA, DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES

 

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-3931-04T33931-04T3

IN THE MATTER OF

NICHOLAS MAZZA,

DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES

 

Argued November 9, 2006 - Decided November 22, 2006

Before Judges Cuff and Winkelstein.

On appeal from a final administrative action of the Commissioner of Personnel, 2002-3583.

James M. Cooney argued the cause for appellant, Nicholas Mazza (Weissman & Mintz, attorneys; Mr. Cooney, of counsel and on the brief).

Andrea R. Grundfest, Deputy Attorney General, argued the cause for respondent, Commissioner of Personnel (Stuart Rabner, Attorney General, attorney; Patrick DeAlmeida, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel; Ms. Grundfest, on the brief).

PER CURIAM

In this classification appeal, appellant Nicholas Mazza appeals from a February 25, 2005 final administrative action of the Commissioner of Personnel (the Commissioner), who concluded that appellant is properly classified as a Clinical Psychologist 3, rather than a Clinical Psychologist 1. We affirm.

From 1995 to the present, appellant has been employed by the New Jersey Department of Human Services, Division of Developmental Disabilities, as a Staff Clinical Psychologist 3. In July 2001, he submitted a letter to the Department of Personnel requesting reclassification. His application was denied, ultimately resulting in the Commissioner's February 25, 2005 final action.

In reviewing an administrative action such as that taken by the Commissioner here, our role is limited. We do not interfere with the agency action unless it was arbitrary or unreasonable. Mullin v. Ringle, 27 N.J. 250, 255-56 (1958). To make that determination, we examine:

(1) whether the agency's action violates express or implied legislative policies, that is, did the agency follow the law; (2) whether the record contains substantial evidence to support the findings on which the agency bases its action; and (3) whether, in applying the legislative policies to the facts, the agency clearly erred in reaching a conclusion that could not reasonably have been made on a showing of the relevant factors.

[In re Musick, 143 N.J. 206, 216 (1996).]

We may not substitute our judgment of the facts for that of an administrative agency. Campbell v. N.J. Racing Comm'n, 169 N.J. 579, 587 (2001) (citing Clowes v. Terminix Int'l, Inc., 109 N.J. 575, 587 (1988)). As long as we are satisfied "that the evidence and the inferences to be drawn therefrom support the agency head's decision, then [we] must affirm even if [we] . . . would have reached a different result . . . ." Ibid.

We have carefully reviewed the record in light of the applicable law, and conclude that the decision of the Commissioner does not violate any legislative polices and is supported by the substantial credible evidence in the record. The agency did not clearly err. Appellant's arguments to the contrary are without merit and do not warrant discussion in a written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(D), (E). Consequently, we affirm, substantially for the reasons set forth in the Commissioner's February 25, 2005 written opinion.

Affirmed.

 

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A-3931-04T3

November 22, 2006