CECILY CATHERINE MARANGOS v. VASSOS S. MARANGOS

 

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-3225-05T33225-05T3

CECILY CATHERINE MARANGOS,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

VASSOS S. MARANGOS,

Defendant-Appellant.

_______________________________________

 

Argued November 1, 2006 - Decided December 6, 2006

Before Judges Wefing and Yannotti.

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Chancery Division, Monmouth County, Docket No. FM-13-1202-04.

Vassos Marangos, appellant, argued the cause pro se.

Cecily Catherine Marangos, respondent pro se.

PER CURIAM

Defendant Vassos S. Marangos appeals from an amended final judgment of a divorce filed in this action on January 17, 2006. We affirm.

The facts relevant to our decision may be briefly summarized. Plaintiff Cecily Catherine Marangos married defendant on August 11, 1985. Four children were born of the marriage. Plaintiff filed a complaint for divorce on February 6, 2004, and on July 6, 2005, the parties placed their settlement on the record. The parties agreed that they would have joint legal custody of the children and plaintiff would have primary residential custody. The parties agreed upon a visitation arrangement. They agreed upon the equitable distribution of marital assets, alimony, child support, the payment of pendente lite arrearages, college expenses, and the allocation of certain marital debts.

The parties further agreed to have the judge resolve certain outstanding issues, including the responsibility for certain debts, and the applications by the parties for attorneys' fees. In addition, plaintiff's attorney placed on the record certain additional terms that plaintiff was insisting upon, one of which included a provision that defendant's vacation in California in August 2006 was contingent upon his "prompt cooperation" with Lillian Haber-Gordon (Gordon), so that she could review his "prescription regime." Gordon was the court-appointed evaluator who made recommendations on custody and parenting time.

Defendant's attorney questioned defendant under oath regarding the settlement. Defendant agreed that the terms placed on the record reflected what had been discussed by the parties earlier that day. He stated that he understood the terms and accepted them. Defendant also agreed that the settlement was a "fair and equitable" way to resolve the case subject to the judge's decision on the outstanding issues.

The judge informed defendant that he was not required to enter into the settlement and could have the judge decide all issues in the case. Defendant expressed some reservation about having Gordon make recommendations. The judge said that, if defendant finds that Gordon "has done something in her recommendation that you feel is unfair or unwarranted," he could ask for a hearing and the judge would make a "fair decision" on the issue.

Defendant stated that he had not been coerced into settling the case. He said that he understood that he was waiving his right to a trial on all issues except for the issues that parties had reserved for decision by the court. Defendant stated that he was satisfied with the services provided by his attorney. In addition, defendant said that he was not under the influence of any drugs, medication, or alcohol that might affect his ability to understand what was taking place.

Although we have not been provided with a copy of the transcript, it appears that the judge heard the matter on July 7, 2005, and resolved the remaining issues in dispute between the parties.

A final judgment of divorce was filed on August 29, 2005. On or about November 10, 2005, plaintiff filed a motion to set aside the judgment. In a supporting certification, plaintiff's attorney Donna L. Maul (Maul) maintained that the judge had not considered her objections to the proposed judgment that was submitted by defendant's attorney, John DeBartolo (DeBartolo). It appears that, on or about July 14, 2005, Maul submitted a proposed form of judgment to DeBartolo. In a letter dated July 25, 2005, DeBartolo acknowledged receipt of the proposed judgment and said that he would respond in detail "this week." Because DeBartolo had not responded by August 2, 2005, Maul submitted her proposed judgment to the judge.

Subsequently, DeBartolo submitted to the judge his own alternative proposed form of judgment. DeBartolo asked the judge to enter the order if no objections were received from Maul. It appears that Maul wrote to the judge on or about August 26, 2005, and advised that she had certain objections to the proposed order. However, on August 29, 2005, the judge entered the order that DeBartolo had submitted. Maul wrote to the judge on or about September 20, 2005, and informed the judge that she had concerns regarding with the executed judgment. She asked that the judge schedule a conference to consider her concerns. The judge conducted a conference on November 7, 2005, and determined that a formal motion should be filed.

Defendant filed a pro se cross-motion seeking a trial based on what he called certain "irregularities." Alternatively, defendant asked the judge to grant certain "enforcements and amendments" to the August 29, 2005, judgment. In his supporting certification, defendant stated that plaintiff and her attorney had "ulterior motives" for seeking to set aside the judgment. According to defendant, plaintiff's motive was to acquire both of the houses owned by the parties and all assets. Defendant said that plaintiff and her attorney had denied him access to the children, fabricated baseless accusations and child support arrearages, had him arrested one week after filing for divorce, drove him out of the State, and caused his start-up company "to go up in smoke." He stated that plaintiff and her attorney had turned the matter "into a calamity" and "destroyed" his life.

Defendant further asserted that plaintiff's motion to set aside the final judgment was intended to cover up the irregularities caused by plaintiff's attorney in the judgment and was intended to create evidence calling into question his state of mind so that it could be used in future litigation. Defendant asked the judge to: 1) order plaintiff to sign documents for the transfer of title to property in Red Bank; 2) place plaintiff on "probation" if she continues to "actively" take away the children's Greek heritage, lie to the children, use the children as "accessories for ulterior motives," and prevent defendant from seeing them; 3) order a credit of $5,000 for defendant's child support account; 4) grant defendant the entire Fidelity IRA; 5) grant defendant the children's foreign passports so that the children could visit family members outside of the United States; 6) remove the obligation to pay $9,239 in past due tuition because the children's grandmother had taken care of it; 7) eliminate the need for a joint tax return in 2004; 8) remove the provision for dissolution of defendant's start-up company; 9) take the marital home from plaintiff and place the property in defendant's name or the names of the children; 10) eliminate alimony or place the money in a trust account for the children and allow its use for defendant's travel expenses; 11) permit defendant to assume responsibility for all of the children's uncovered medial expenses and the children's after-school daycare expenses, provided alimony is eliminated; and 12) order equalization of the values of the two homes owned by the parties.

The judge heard the motions on January 6, 2006. The judge resolved the disagreements concerning the proposed amended judgment. The judge entered an order dated January 6, 2006, directing plaintiff to execute documents for the transfer of title to the Red Bank property, and denying the other relief sought by defendant. An amended judgment of divorce, nunc pro tunc to July 7, 2005, was signed by counsel for both parties and submitted to the judge. The judge signed the judgment and filed it on January 17, 2006. Defendant filed a notice of appeal on February 27, 2006.

In his brief, defendant raises the following points:

I. JUDGMENT OF DIVORCE SHOULD BE SET ASIDE AND A TRIAL OR MODIFICATION GRANTED ON THE BASIS OF FRAUD.

A. Misrepresenting the period of separation.

B. Judgment set aside on misrepresentation.

c. Bribery to Parenting Time Evaluator.

II. ORDER OF MARCH 31, 2006 SHOULD BE VACATED ON THE BASIS OF FRIVOLOUS LITIGATION AND ABUSE OF PROCESS.

A. Ulterior motive of plaintiff's motion.

B. Deceptive tactic with arrears.

III. UNCONSCIONABILITY IN ENFORCING JUDGMENT.

A. Children's tuition using IRA funds.

B. Plaintiff's imputed income.

C. Plaintiff causing $104,000 in damages.

D. Traveling expenses to visit the children.

E. Turning joint custody into sole.

F. Preventing contact with Greek relatives.

IV. MODIFICATION OF JUDGMENT IS WARRANTED ON THE BASIS OF CHANGED CIRCUMSTANCES.

As the statement of contentions indicates, defendant is seeking in this appeal to challenge provisions of two orders dated March 31, 2006, which granted in part and denied in part a motion by plaintiff to enforce litigant's rights, and denied defendant's motion for sanctions under the frivolous litigation rule and other relief. However, defendant has never filed a notice of appeal from the orders entered on March 31, 2006. Consequently, we do not have jurisdiction to consider defendant's contentions respecting these orders.

We have considered defendant's contentions with respect to the amended judgment entered on January 17, 2006. As we stated previously, the amended judgment was entered because the judgment filed on August 29, 2005, did not accurately reflect the agreement of the parties that was placed on the record on July 6, 2005, and the judge's disposition of the remaining issues on July 7, 2005. At the hearing on January 6, 2006, the judge resolved all further objections to the form of the judgment. The judgment was signed by counsel for both parties. The judge signed and filed the amended judgment on January 17, 2006. In our view, the judge correctly determined that the amended judgment reflected the parties' agreement and his rulings on the disputed issues.

We reject defendant's contention that the judgment should be set aside and a trial granted in the matter based on his allegations of fraud and misrepresentation. Defendant contends that plaintiff misrepresented to the court that the parties had been separated longer than eighteen months. However, neither defendant nor his attorney objected to that representation when the matter was before the court on July 6, 2005. Defendant further contends that he was coerced to settle but his statements under oath on July 6, 2005, were to the contrary. Defendant additionally asserts that at the hearing on January 6, 2006, plaintiff's attorney suggested that he had improperly submitted the initial judgment to the court but defendant's attorney made clear that he submitted the judgment to the court, not defendant. In short, the record does not support defendant's contention that he was coerced into agreeing to the settlement, or his claim that his agreement was the result of fraud or misrepresentations by plaintiff or her attorney.

We have considered defendant's other contentions and find those contentions to be of insufficient merit to warrant discussion in a written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E).

 
Affirmed.

(continued)

(continued)

10

A-3225-05T3

December 6, 2006