STATE OF NEW JERSEY v. RONALD TYRONE COOPER

 

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-1981-03T41981-03T4

STATE OF NEW JERSEY,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

RONALD TYRONE COOPER,

Defendant-Appellant.

_______________________________

 

Submitted November 16, 2005 - Decided February 22, 2006

Before Judges Wefing and Fuentes.

On appeal from Superior Court of New

Jersey, Law Division, Union County,

Indictment No. 02-12-1429-I.

Yvonne Smith Segars, Public Defender,

attorney for appellant (Cecelia Urban,

Assistant Deputy Public Defender,

of counsel and on the brief).

Theodore J. Romankow, Union County

Prosecutor, attorney for respondent

(Steven J. Kaflowitz, Assistant Prosecutor,

of counsel and on the brief).

PER CURIAM

Defendant Ronald Tyrone Cooper was charged with third-degree possession of cocaine, in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:35-10(a)(1); third-degree possession of cocaine with intent to distribute, in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5(a)(1) and (b)(3); third-degree possession of cocaine with intent to distribute within 1,000 feet of school property, in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:35-7 and fourth-degree hindering apprehension or prosecution, in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:29-3(b)(4). Pursuant to a negotiated plea agreement, defendant pled guilty to one count of third-degree possession of cocaine with intent to distribute within 1,000 feet of school property.

The plea agreement provided for defendant to enter a long-term, in-patient drug rehabilitation program, or serve a maximum sentence of eight years, with three years of parole ineligibility. The trial judge addressed defendant directly in the course of the plea hearing, and emphasized the legal significance of defendant completing the in-patient program:

THE COURT: If I give you the in-patient facility and they would accept you, for example, but you don't do what you're supposed to in that facility, you are asked to leave, you run away, anything of that type, well you get 8 with 3. You understand?

DEFENDANT: Oh, yes.

The Court sentenced defendant to a five-year term of probation, subject to his acceptance in and completion of a long-term, in-patient drug rehabilitation program. Defendant was thereafter admitted into the Salvation Army Adult Rehabilitation Center located in the City of Newark (the "Program"). Less than one month after his admission, defendant was terminated from the Program, prompting the probation department to issue a formal notice of violation of the conditions of his probation.

At the probation violation hearing, the court heard the testimony of Phillip Dougherty, a substance abuse counselor at the Salvation Army's Newark Program. He gave the following explanation for defendant's termination from the Program:

A. He was terminated for lack of motivation, for poor program participation, and basically telling the staff the only reason he was there was because he didn't want to go to jail.

Q. When he first -- when you first check in your facility, all the patients, including Mr. Cooper, explained the rules of the facility?

A. Absolutely. They're given a copy of the rules.

Q. And could you briefly tell us what some of those rules say about their attitude in general.

A. Basically the rules say they have to participate in the spiritual aspect of the program, work therapy aspect of the program, and they have to show growth in the recovery process.

Q. And Mr. Cooper didn't comply with those rules?

A. In my first session with Mr. Cooper he basically told me that he was upset because he thought he was getting into a halfway house. He needed to get to work, he needed to make money for his family, and he was upset. He did not want to be there.

Q. Is there anything else, specific examples you could cite to the court as to his lack of cooperation?

A. Well, there's several aspects of the program as I said. There's work therapy where men are given a job assignment during the day. He showed very little participation, motivation in the work therapy. He had been told many times to keep working.

Basically in sessions I had with him, all he wanted to talk about was how he could get out of the program without being violated. He requested to see the in-house doctor to find if the doctor would medically discharge him from the program. And he asked me would he get violated if the doctor discharged him medically. And I told him Newark Homeless Health Care had never discharged anyone medically from our program, and that would be up to the court whether or not he would be violated.

Defendant testified in his own defense. He denied being uncooperative or unwilling to abide by the Program's rules. He indicated that he was discharged from the Program for medical reasons. He also indicated that he had been accepted at two other in-patient programs operated by the Salvation Army, one located in Jersey City, and the other in Paterson. He thus requested the opportunity to resume his treatment at one of these facilities.

The trial court rejected defendant's testimony, and accepted, as a matter of credibility, Dougherty's explanation as to the grounds for defendant's termination from the Program. Pursuant to the terms of the original plea agreement, the court revoked defendant's prior sentence, and imposed a five-year term of imprisonment, with three years of parole ineligibility. In so doing, the court acknowledged that defendant could have been sentenced to an eight-year extended term.

Defendant now appeals raising the following arguments.

POINT ONE

THE EVIDENCE DID NOT SUPPORT THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDING THAT MR. COOPER WILLFULLY VIOLATED THE TERMS OF HID SPECIAL PROBATION.

POINT TWO

THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY PERMANENTLY REVOKING MR. COOPER'S TERM OF SPECIAL PROBATION UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THIS CASE.

We reject these arguments and affirm. We are satisfied that the court's findings are well supported by competent evidence. State v. Reyes, 207 N.J. Super. 126, 137 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 103 N.J. 499 (1986). We note, that in making its determination whether to revoke a special term of probation, the trial court is specifically required to:

give added weight to the treatment provider's recommendation that the person's special probation be permanently revoked, or to the treatment provider's opinion that the person is not amenable to treatment or is not likely to complete the treatment program successfully.

[N.J.S.A. 2C:35-14f(3)].

 
Dougherty's testimony indisputably provided the court with sufficient evidence to revoke defendant's special probation. The trial court's findings will not be reversed if supported by substantial credible evidence. State v. Johnson, 116 N.J. 99, 102 (1989). As an appellate court, we are not at liberty to engage in an independent assessment of that evidence. State v. Locurto, 157 N.J. 463, 471 (1999). The sentence imposed was well within the scope of the original plea agreement and supported by defendant's criminal history and the particular details of this offense.

Affirmed.

Based on his prior convictions, defendant was eligible to be sentenced under the extended term provisions in N.J.S.A. 2C:44-3b.

Defendant testified that the day before his termination from the Program he reported to University Hospital's emergency room complaining of chest pains. He was examined and discharged from the emergency room that same day.

(continued)

(continued)

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A-1981-03T4

February 22, 2006