NEW JERSEY DIVISION OF YOUTH AND FAMILY SERVICES v. J.B.

 

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-1825-05T41825-05T4

NEW JERSEY DIVISION OF YOUTH

AND FAMILY SERVICES,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

J.B.,

Defendant-Appellant,

IN THE MATTER OF

THE GUARDIANSHIP OF

A.F.B., A Minor.

________________________________

 

Submitted June 14, 2006 - Decided July 13, 2006

Before Judges Wefing and Coburn.

On appeal from Superior Court of New

Jersey, Chancery Division - Family Part,

Union County, No. FG 20-30-05F.

Yvonne Smith Segars, Public Defender,

attorney for appellant (Christine B. Mowry,

Designated Counsel, on the brief).

Zulima V. Farber, Attorney General, attorney

for respondent (Andrea M. Silkowitz, Assistant

Attorney General, of counsel; Christina G.

Ramirez, Deputy Attorney General, on the brief).

Yvonne Smith Segars, Public Defender, Law

Guardian, attorney for minor respondent

(Christopher A. Huling, Assistant Deputy

Public Defender, of counsel and on the brief).

PER CURIAM

J. B. appeals from a judgment entered by the trial court terminating her parental rights to A.F.B. After reviewing the record in light of the contentions advanced on appeal, we affirm.

We do not find it necessary to set forth at length in this opinion the limitations which afflict both J.B. and A.F.B. We note merely that J.B. has had five other children, none of whom are in her custody and care and that the trial court noted in its oral opinion that it considered J.B. morally blameless in light of the abuse to which she herself had been exposed over the years.

On appeal, J.B. does not contend that she has the ability to parent A.F.B. A.F.B. was born on June 4, 2003. She has never resided with J.B., who argues that the Division of Youth and Family Services ("DYFS") failed to prove the third element necessary under N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a) to terminate her parental rights.

The overarching standard governing the question whether a court should terminate parental rights is the best interests of the child. N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1 sets forth a four-prong test to measure whether termination of parental rights is in the best interest of the particular child. Termination is necessary when:

(1) The child's safety, health or development has been or will continue to be endangered by the parental relationship;

(2) The parent is unwilling or unable to eliminate the harm facing the child or is unable or unwilling to provide a safe and stable home for the child and the delay of permanent placement will add to the harm. Such harm may include evidence that separating the child from his resource family parents would cause serious and enduring emotional or psychological harm to the child;

(3) The Division has made reasonable efforts to provide services to help the parent correct the circumstances which led to the child's placement outside the home and the court has considered alternatives to termination of parental rights; and

(4) Termination of parental rights will not do more harm than good.

[N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a).]

These four elements are "not discrete and separate; they relate to and overlap with one another to provide a comprehensive standard that identifies a child's best interest." In re Guardianship of K.H.O., 161 N.J. 337, 348 (1999).

J.B. contends on appeal that DYFS did not adequately explore whether A.F.B. could be placed with a family member as an alternative to termination of her parental rights. We disagree.

J.B. had three brothers, two of whom, G.B. and Ga.B., have custody of her five other children. G.B. and Ga.B each advised DYFS on A.F.B.'s birth that they were unable to care for A.F.B. As to J.B.'s other brother, Ja.B, J.B. could provide no contact information to DYFS. J.B.'s case worker spoke to one of J.B.'s other brothers and asked him to have Ja.B. contact her if he would be interested in assuming the care of A.F.B. She heard nothing.

Within her brief, J.B. sets forth at length the various limitations of the original foster home in which A.F.B. had been placed. Whatever the deficiencies of that placement might have been do not bear upon the question of whether J.B. is capable of providing adequate parental nurture and care to A.F.B. The record clearly demonstrates that she is not able to do so.

The judgment terminating J.B.'s parental rights is affirmed, substantially for the reasons expressed in the comprehensive oral opinion of Judge Spatola of November 7, 2005.

 

(continued)

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4

A-1825-05T4

RECORD IMPOUNDED

July 13, 2006