NEFERTIRIA POOLE v. CAMDEN COUNTY HEALTH SERVICES CENTER

 

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-1573-05T11573-05T1

NEFERTIRIA POOLE,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

CAMDEN COUNTY HEALTH SERVICES

CENTER,

Defendant-Respondent,

and

WILLIAM KEATON,

Defendant.

_________________________________

 

Submitted August 15, 2006 - Decided August 24, 2006

Before Judges Parrillo and Sabatino.

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey,

Law Division, Camden County, Docket No.

L-3993-03.

Paul R. Melletz, attorney for appellant/cross-respondent.

Thomas Dempster, III, attorney for respondent/cross-

appellant.

PER CURIAM

Plaintiff, Nefertiria Poole, sued defendant, Camden County Health Services Center (defendant or Center), and William Keaton in connection with injuries she suffered while a patient involuntarily committed to the care and custody of the Center. The complaint alleged that she was sexually assaulted by another patient, Keaton, due to the negligent failure of the Center to properly supervise its staff and patients and to maintain a safe environment for plaintiff's medical care and treatment. The Center was ultimately granted summary judgment on its motion based on the absolute immunity provision of N.J.S.A. 59:6-7 of the Tort Claims Act, N.J.S.A. 59:1-1 to -12-3. Plaintiff appeals, and we affirm.

In enacting the Tort Claims Act, the Legislature set forth the public policy of this State, N.J.S.A. 59:2-1:

a. Except as other provided by this act, a public entity is not liable for an injury, whether such injury arises out of any act or omission of the public entity or a public employee or any other person.

b. Any liability of a public entity established by this act is subject to any immunity of the public entity and is subject to any defenses that would be available to the public entity if it were a private person.

The clear intent of the statute is "to insure that any immunity provisions provided in the act or by common law will prevail over the liability provisions." Comment on N.J.S.A. 59:2-1(b). See also Rochinsky v. State, Dep't of Transp., 110 N.J. 399 (1988).

N.J.S.A. 59:6-7b, the pertinent immunity provision of the Tort Claims Act, provides:

Neither a public entity nor a public employee is liable for:

. . . .

b. an injury by any person who has been confined for mental illness or drug dependence upon any other person so confined.

The comment to N.J.S.A. 59:6-7 states simply: "'This provision is prompted by reasoning similar to that contained in the comment to section 59:5-2 of this act.'" Gianni v. County of Bergen, 251 N.J. Super. 486, 490 (App. Div. 1991) (quoting Comment on N.J.S.A. 59:6-7), certif. denied, 127 N.J. 565 (1992). N.J.S.A. 59:5-2(b)(4) provides immunity to public entities for "any injury caused by

. . . a prisoner to any other prisoner." The comment to that section states:

"Subsection b(4) also recognizes the practical problems inherent in supervising prisoners and particularly in preventing injuries caused by one prisoner upon another. While it is necessary to provide supervision, the decision to do so for the purpose of preventing inter-prisoner injuries should not be threatened with tort liability nor should the actions of prison guards in reacting to situations which may give rise to such injuries. Thus, this provision (as it relates to injuries to another prisoner) specifically rejects the reasoning of the Appellate Division in Harris v. State, 118 N.J. Super. 385 [(App. Div.] . . . [, rev'd, 61 N.J. 585 (1972)]."

[Popek v. State, Dep't of Human Servs., 240 N.J. Super. 128, 132 (App. Div. 1990) (quoting Comment on N.J.S.A. 59:5-2b(4) (first alteration in original)).]

Thus, the clear legislative intent is to provide absolute immunity for public entities and their employees when their negligence - simple or gross - enables one prisoner to injure another. See White v. Lewis, 156 N.J. Super. 198, 202 (App. Div. 1978).

The legislative intent is equally clear in the enactment of N.J.S.A. 59:6-7 with respect to patients at public psychiatric institutions. In Popek, we held that the Tort Claims Act provides immunity from liability for injuries caused by any person who has been involuntarily confined for mental illness or drug dependence upon any other person so confined. Popek, supra, 240 N.J. Super. at 132-34. And in Gianni, we held that for purposes of public immunity, there is no distinction between voluntary and involuntary patients:

In our view the purpose of N.J.S.A. 59:6-7(b) was to confer immunity upon governmental entities and employees for injuries to all patients physically confined which were inflicted by other patients so confined, regardless of whether they were voluntarily or involuntarily committed to the institution.

[Gianni, supra, 251 N.J. Super. at 492.].

Despite the clarity of the statutory language, defendant nevertheless argues that the Tort Claims Act does not afford a public entity immunity for its own negligence in failing to follow its own rules and regulations, relying exclusively on Harris v. State, 61 N.J. 585 (1972). That case, however, affords defendant no support. The State's immunity was not in issue in Harris, id. at 590, just that of the individual state prison employees whom the plaintiff prisoner claimed owed him a duty of due care which they negligently failed to discharge and should, arguably, be individually liable for the injuries he sustained from a fellow inmate's assault. Ibid. Moreover, in Harris, the individual defendant's immunity was determined under the common law, and not the Tort Claims Act, which was determined to be prospective in application only. Nevertheless, the Court explained the breadth of the statutory grant of immunity:

We are not now confronted with any claim by the plaintiff that he is entitled to damages from the State of New Jersey because of its alleged failure to provide suitable prison facilities for his care and safety while in custody. At the time of the attack the State was clearly immune from any ensuing tort claim by him. The recently enacted New Jersey Tort Claims Act continues this immunity in its pertinent aspects. It contains a sweeping provision that neither a public entity nor a public employee shall be liable for injury caused by "a prisoner to any other prisoner;" since this provision is effective only prospectively it has no application to the case at hand and we need not deal with it.

[Id. at 589 (citations omitted).].

As noted, N.J.S.A. 59:6-7(b)'s grant of immunity is equally broad with respect to patients at public psychiatric institutions, such as defendant's. Popek, supra, 240 N.J. Super. at 132. The language of this provision is clear, unambiguous and unqualified, affording absolute immunity to a public entity and its employees for "an injury caused by any person who has been confined for mental illness or drug dependence . . . ." N.J.S.A. 59:6-7(b). As such, the grant of summary judgment dismissing plaintiff's complaint against defendant was proper.

Affirmed.

 

Plaintiff settled with defendant Keaton.

(continued)

(continued)

6

A-1573-05T1

 

August 24, 2006