STEEPLECHASE VILLAGE, INC. v. TOWNSHIP OF EGG HARBOR et al.

 

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-0831-05T50831-05T5

STEEPLECHASE VILLAGE, INC.,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

TOWNSHIP OF EGG HARBOR and TOWNSHIP

COMMITTEE OF EGG HARBOR TOWNSHIP,

Defendants-Respondents.

________________________________________________________________

 

Submit May 23, 2006 - Decided July 19, 2006

Before Judges Coburn, Lisa and S.L. Reisner.

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Atlantic County, L-3101-05.

Lori C. Greenberg, attorney for appellant.

Marc Friedman, attorney for respondents (Mr. Friedman and Tara M. Garry, of counsel and on the brief).

PER CURIAM

Steeplechase Village, Inc. (Steeplechase) is the owner of a manufactured home community, sometimes referred to as a mobile home park, in Egg Harbor Township. The Township does not collect solid waste from Steeplechase Village or any of the other mobile home parks within its borders. Steeplechase requested that the Township commence collection, and the Township refused. Steeplechase brought this action, alleging that the Township was treating mobile home parks differently than other residences in the community for no valid reason, thus violating Steeplechase's due process and equal protection rights. It sought declaratory relief determining that the Township is required to collect its trash. It also sought injunctive relief to compel trash collection, damages for failure to collect trash, and damages pursuant to 42 U.S.C.A. 1983 based upon the alleged due process and equal protection violations.

Immediately after the Township filed its answer, Steeplechase moved for summary judgment. The Township cross-moved for summary judgment, seeking dismissal of the complaint. Both parties filed briefs, but they were accompanied by a very scant factual record. The court heard oral argument on September 13, 2005. Both parties and the trial judge agreed that no material facts were in dispute, the issue presented was one purely of law, and the matter was ripe for summary judgment. On October 3, 2005, the judge issued a comprehensive written opinion and accompanying order denying Steeplechase's motion and granting the Township's motion, thus dismissing the complaint.

The judge concluded that because manufactured homes located in mobile home parks are not subject to taxation as real property and because in setting the municipal service fee imposed upon the owners of the manufactured homes Egg Harbor Township does not include the cost of solid waste collection, the Township's disparate treatment of mobile home parks, as opposed to other residential users in the community, was a reasonable and rational classification and did not violate Steeplechase's due process or equal protection rights. The judge's legal analysis was very thorough and thoughtful. However, we are of the view that development of a more comprehensive factual record would better guide the determination of this important issue. Accordingly, we vacate the orders granting the Township's and denying Steeplechase's summary judgment motions and remand for a plenary hearing to develop a factual record, and, of course, for redetermination in light of that record.

Steeplechase Village contains 164 lots. The entire tract of land is owned by Steeplechase. Individual mobile home owners pay ground rent for their lot, but they continue to own the mobile home. The park contains a network of internal streets. There appears to be no dispute that the streets are paved. Steeplechase has been contracting with a private waste disposal company since at least the early 1980s for the collection and disposal of solid waste. That contractor enters and drives through the internal streets, picking up the trash placed along the internal streets next to each mobile home. Without dispute, Steeplechase factors in the cost of trash collection in determining the amount of rent. And, the Township has a rent control ordinance that regulates the rents.

Under the rent control ordinance, landlords are entitled to an annual Consumer Price Index (CPI) increase. Landlords have the right to apply for additional increases if they can demonstrate the need "when the present rents are insufficient to cover the cost of mortgage payments; maintenance; local taxes; current operating expenses which are reasonable, necessary, recurrent and ordinary; or for other special hardships." In 1982, Steeplechase applied for such an added increase and obtained it, but has not applied since. Steeplechase contends that the cost of solid waste collection has escalated substantially and that the annual CPI increase is inadequate to cover the cost. However, rather than apply to the Rent Review Board for an additional rent increase, a process which it claims is cumbersome, it has sought to compel the Township to collect its trash. It concedes that if it is successful, the Township would have the right to increase the municipal service fee payable by its tenants to cover the cost of collection, and the Rent Review Board might order a reduction in rents.

The Township acknowledges that it collects trash from all other residential users in the community, including those consisting of single family homes as well as apartments. It gives no reason for refusing to collect from mobile home parks except that the service is already being provided by the mobile home park owners, as it has been for decades, the individual mobile homes are not taxed as real property, and it is therefore not being paid for providing the service.

During oral argument, one attorney represented that the Township contains about eighteen mobile home parks. We do not know the accuracy of the comment, nor do we know whether some or all of the other parks share characteristics similar to those of Steeplechase Village. We do not know the scope of the issue presented, because we do not know the total number of residential units in mobile home parks throughout the Township.

Steeplechase contends it pays slightly more than $1,600 per month for trash collection, which translates to about $10 per unit per month. We do not know how that compares to the other mobile home parks in the Township and we do not know how it compares to the cost experienced by the Township for its much larger operation. Steeplechase argues that because of the economies of scale, the Township could provide the service at a much lower rate, and its refusal to do so unfairly singles out the occupants of mobile homes in mobile home parks for paying a higher cost than other residents.

Steeplechase further directs our attention to the Township's trash collection ordinance, which, by its terms, appears to apply generally to all residential units in the community. In particular, Section 118-2 of the Township Code provides that the Township or its contractor "shall be responsible for collecting and disposing of solid wastes within the Township. This responsibility shall not include collection and disposal of demolition material and nonresidential user solid wastes." The Township "interprets" this provision to exclude mobile home parks. The reason is not clear. It attempts to treat these residences as "commercial" because the mobile home sites are rented for profit. Our courts have clearly determined that such a purported classification is untenable because it is the nature of the use that controls. 399 Lincoln Assocs. v. City of Orange Twp., 244 N.J. Super. 238, 243-45 (App. Div. 1990); Boulevard Apartments, Inc. v. Mayor of Lodi, 110 N.J. Super. 406, 411 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 57 N.J. 124 (1970). Undoubtedly many other residences in the Township, single family and multi-family alike, are rented by their owners to occupants for profit. Yet, they receive Township trash collection.

Along similar lines, the Township admits that it collects trash from all of the apartment complexes in the community and has done so since the decision of this court in WHS Realty Co. v. Town of Morristown, 323 N.J. Super. 553 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 162 N.J. 489 (1999). In that case, we held that a local trash collection ordinance providing for collection by the municipality of residential dwellings consisting of three or fewer units, as well as condominium developments in which no more than fifty percent of the units were owned by one person or entity, violated the Equal Protection Clause. Id. at 560-61.

In the aftermath of WHS Realty, the Legislature enacted N.J.S.A. 40:66-1.3, which requires municipalities that provide residential trash collection to either collect the trash from multi-family dwellings or reimburse the owners for the cost of collection. This legislation paralleled existing legislation applicable to "qualified private communities," N.J.S.A. 40:67-23.3, including condominiums, N.J.S.A. 40:67-23.2e. The record in this case is silent as to whether any condominium developments exist in the Township and, if so, whether the Township collects their trash.

With apartments and condominiums, a municipality has the option to provide the service or make reimbursement. The reimbursement is required to avoid the Equal Protection Clause violation that would result from the payment of taxes, which includes a component for trash collection, when that service is not provided. But a mobile home installed in a mobile home park is not subject to taxation as real property. N.J.S.A. 54:4-1.5b. Thus, there is no "double taxation" as would exist for residents of apartments and condominiums.

The Township argues that the net effect of its decision to refuse to collect trash from mobile home parks is no different than a decision it has the right to make, but has declined, by virtue of the statutory provisions pertaining to apartments and condominiums. If it chose, it could refuse to collect trash from those facilities and give back the share of taxes paid that were earmarked for that service. With the mobile home parks, it has never collected as part of the municipal service fee any money for the trash collection service in the first instance. And, if it chose to collect trash from the mobile home parks, it would increase their municipal service fee and collect an appropriate amount to provide the service. The choices are the same and the result if either choice is made would be the same as with respect to apartments and condominiums.

Thus, the Township argues that its classification determinations were made within the statutory framework devised by our Legislature, and that those determinations are based on reason and rationality. Further, the Township argues that the classification it has designated is presumptively valid and Steeplechase has presented no basis to invalidate it. The Township's argument, accepted by the trial judge, has some merit.

Opposing the argument is the rationale expressed by Judge Serpentelli in a case factually similar to this one:

The distinction might have some validity if, in fact, the Borough could demonstrate that Barker's would be receiving services which it was not paying for through taxes. However, in this case, the Borough is given the luxury to remedy the disparity in taxes paid for the same municipal services being provided, a tool which the township in WHS Realty did not have.

Lakehurst has within its power the right to balance its tax collection to the extent it is providing equal services through the imposition of the municipal service fee. Therefore, it could include in its calculation of the fee the additional cost of providing garbage collection under the same terms and conditions that the town provides services to other residents who are similarly situated. Of course, if collection of the dumpsters on-site is not feasible, the Borough would have the right to insist that the tenants within the park bring their garbage to a public street for collection just as any other resident receiving that service. Pleasure Bay Apts. [v. City of Long Branch, 66 N.J. 79, 85 (1974).] The net result would be that between the real estate taxes on the park property and improvements and the enhanced municipal service fee, the sole justification for the disparate treatment of mobile homes completely disappears.

[Barker's Trailer Court, Inc. v. Borough of Lakehurst, 371 N.J. Super. 432, 446-47 (Law Div. 2004).]

Judge Serpentelli deemed his rationale essential to avoid "the second class treatment of mobile home parks, with regard to garbage collection." Id. at 447. He recognized that the municipality would not be required to enter into internal private streets of the mobile home park and empty dumpsters. The municipality had the right to insist upon curbside collection in individual containers placed along public streets.

In the case before us, dumpsters are not utilized, at least not at Steeplechase Village. We do not know if they are utilized in the other mobile home parks or in any apartment complexes in the Township. We also cannot tell from this record whether placement along a public street is feasible at Steeplechase Village or any other mobile home park in the Township. Presumably, such placement would entail inconvenience and perhaps even significant hardship to residents, who now place their trash in close proximity to their home.

We note that the Township's mobile home park ordinance provides, at Section 207-7C, that all "spaces shall abut upon a driveway of not less than 20 feet in width which shall have unobstructed access to a public street, alley or highway." The ordinance further provides, at Section 207-13, that trash shall be placed for disposal "not farther than 200 feet from any trailer coach space." These sections imply that the internal streets are, in some sense, deemed by the Township "public" streets.

We do not know the quality of construction, width, configuration, and other characteristics of the internal streets in Steeplechase Village and the other mobile home parks in the Township. We do not know if the Township contends that its equipment would have difficulty negotiating these streets or whether the quality of construction and nature of the streets would render such operation difficult, perhaps in bad weather, compared to other "public" streets in the Township. See N.J.S.A. 40:67-23.1 (authorizing municipalities, by ordinance, to authorize curbside collection of solid waste which have not been taken over by the municipality or dedicated and accepted as public highways).

The Township Code, at Section 118-13, defines "Street, Curb, Sidewalk and Alley" as "Any accepted public street, curb, sidewalk and alley." (emphasis added). Yet, we do not know from this record whether the Township collects trash other than at curbside along public streets for any other residential users in the Township, including apartments and condominiums.

Nowhere in this litigation are the sentiments of the occupants of the mobile homes in Steeplechase Village or other mobile home parks mentioned. They are not parties. We do not know the contractual arrangement between Steeplechase and its tenants with respect to trash collection. We know from the mobile home park ordinance that trash collection in close proximity to the individual pad sites is contemplated and, indeed, required. Steeplechase might further be contractually obligated to provide such service. If it is within the Township's authority to demand that if it provides the service, the trash must be placed along public streets, this might be violative of its own ordinance and the leases between Steeplechase and its tenants.

And, although Steeplechase asserted deprivation of its due process and equal protection rights, the analysis in the judge's decision dealt with the equal protection rights of the mobile home occupants. The court in Barker's did the same. See Stubaus v. Whitman, 339 N.J. Super. 38 (App. Div. 2001) (holding that school districts lack standing to assert rights on behalf of resident taxpayers), certif. denied, 171 N.J. 442 (2002). If Steeplechase is truly asserting its own rights, its task will be a difficult one because of the uniqueness of mobile home parks and their real property tax status. It is similarly situated in that regard only with respect to landlords of the other mobile home parks, and they are all being treated the same by the Township. Steeplechase will be hard pressed to argue that it is being discriminated against invidiously because other landlords do not have to factor trash collection into their rents. If Steeplechase is, in effect, asserting the rights of its residents, its standing must be addressed. Even more important is the effect the requested relief would have on the residents. We have no way of knowing whether they would be better off under the current arrangements or those sought by Steeplechase. Consideration should also be given as to whether the tenants or a tenant association, if any, should be joined as parties. See R. 4:28-1.

It is clear that municipalities are not required to provide trash collection service, and if they do, they are not required to collect all waste generated within their boundaries. Pleasure Bay Apartments, supra, 66 N.J. at 90. However, a municipality that chooses to provide trash collection service cannot engage in invidious discrimination in choosing the classifications within the community to whom the service is offered. Boulevard Apartments, Inc., supra, 110 N.J. Super. at 411. The classification will constitute a violation of the Equal Protection Clause "unless the service is available to all persons in like circumstances upon the same terms and conditions. Persons situated alike shall be treated alike." Ibid. (citing Reid Dev. Corp. v. Twp. of Parsippany-Troy Hills, 10 N.J. 229, 233 (1952)).

The sole basis upon which the Township supports its classification of mobile home parks, a classification which does not appear to be established by ordinance, is the unique real property tax treatment of mobile home parks. The classification is presumptively valid. The burden is on the assailant, Steeplechase, to demonstrate that the classification lacks a rational basis, that is, that it cannot be justified on any reasonably conceivable state of facts. Taxpayers Ass'n of Weymouth Twp., Inc. v. Weymouth Twp., 80 N.J. 6, 39-40 (1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 977, 97 S. Ct. 1672, 52 L. Ed. 2d 373 (1977).

The analysis in this case, as in Barker's, has focused on legal principles, somewhat in a vacuum, with a real dearth of factual perspective. The decision in this case may have far-reaching consequences. In our view, the ultimate legal determination should be tethered to a clearer factual picture. We expect that a plenary hearing will give the parties an opportunity to more fully expose relevant information that will enable a more informed determination of whether the Township's classification of mobile home parks as entities not entitled to trash collection should be sustained.

Remanded for further proceedings. We do not retain jurisdiction.

 

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A-0831-05T5

July 19, 2006