CHARLTON KENNETH BOYCE v. ANDREW PANTELIDES, et al.

 

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-0392-05T50392-05T5

CHARLTON KENNETH BOYCE,

Appellant,

v.

ANDREW PANTELIDES, ACTING

GOVERNOR RICHARD J. CODEY,

TREASURER JOHN E. McCORMAC,

and NEW JERSEY DEPARTMENT OF

TREASURY, DIVISION OF REVENUE,

Respondents.

_______________________________________

 

Submitted June 7, 2006 - Decided

Before Judges Parker and Grall.

On appeal from a Final Determination of the Department of the Treasury, Division of Revenue.

Charlton Kenneth Boyce, appellant pro se.

Zulima V. Farber, Attorney General, attorney for respondents (Patrick DeAlmeida, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel; Michael J. Duffy, Deputy Attorney General, on the brief).

PER CURIAM

Charlton Kenneth Boyce appeals from a final determination of the Business Support Services Bureau of the Division of Revenue in the Department of the Treasury (Division), which affirmed the rejection of Boyce's "UCC Financing Statement (Form UCC-1)" and his "UCC Statements of Continuation, Partial Release, Assignment, Etc. (Form UCC-3)." Our review is limited, and because the agency's decision is supported by the record and consistent with the law and regulations we affirm. George Harms Constr. Co. v. N.J. Tpk. Auth., 137 N.J. 8, 27 (1994).

The Division is charged with the duty of accepting and filing statements submitted pursuant to the Uniform Commercial Code. N.J.S.A. 12A:9-501; N.J.S.A. 52:16-8.1; L. 1998, Reorganization Plan 004-1998 (transferring the Division of Commercial Recording from the Office of the Secretary of State to the Department of Treasury's Division of Revenue, Office of Commercial Recording). A financing statement must provide: "the name of the debtor; . . . the name of the secured party or a representative of the secured party; and . . . the collateral covered by the financing statement." N.J.S.A. 12A:9-502(a).

If the debtor "has a name, [a statement is sufficient] only if it provides the individual or organizational name of the debtor." N.J.S.A. 12A:9-503(a)(4)(A). "[I]f the debtor does not have a name, [a statement is sufficient] only if it provides the names of the partners, members, associates, or other persons comprising the debtor." N.J.S.A. 12A:9-503(a)(4)(B).

The Division must refuse to accept a record for filing if it does not include specified information. N.J.S.A. 12A:9-520(a). Deficiencies that require rejection pursuant to N.J.S.A. 12A:9-520 are set forth in N.J.S.A. 12A:9-516(b). They include failure to: provide a name or mailing address for the debtor; indicate whether the debtor is an individual or an organization; and, where the debtor is an organization, provide the jurisdiction of organization, the type of organization and the organization number if there is one. N.J.S.A. 12A:9-516(b). Pursuant to subsection (c)(1) of N.J.S.A. 12A:9-516, a "record does not provide information if the filing office is unable to read or decipher the information." Regulations, authorized by N.J.S.A. 12A:9-526, explain:

For purposes of N.J.S.A. 12A:9-516(c), the filing office shall be considered to be unable to read or decipher information in a record if[:]

. . . .

iii. The record contains confusing, conflicting or contradictory matter that gives rise to uncertainty, ambiguity, or lack of clarity as to information in the record. Examples of such uncertainty, ambiguity, or lack of clarity include, but are not limited to, the following:

(1) If it appears to the filing office that a debtor named in a record is the same person as a secured party, the filing office shall be considered to be unable to decipher, and the record shall be considered not to provide, the name of the debtor or the name of the secured party.

(2) If it appears to the filing office that one portion of a record contains matter that indicates that a debtor is an organization and another portion of the record contains matter that indicates that the same debtor name is an individual, the filing office shall be considered to be unable to decipher, and the record shall be considered not to provide, the name of such debtor or an indication whether the debtor is an individual or an organization.

. . . .

(3) If all or any part of an address in a record is qualified by words or phrases such as "near," "about," "approximately," "on or about," or the like, or if all or any part of an address in a record is contained in parenthesis, brackets, quotation marks, or the like, in a context that gives rise to uncertainty, ambiguity, or lack of clarity with respect to such address, the filing office shall be considered to be unable to decipher, and the record shall be considered not to provide, such address.

. . . .

(5) If the record contains language which describes the collateral which is the subject of the filing in a confusing, unclear, or ambiguous manner.

(6) If debtor is listed as an individual or an organization and classifies as a "transmitting utility," but the record does not contain any information indicating the debtor's name meets the definition of transmitting utility in N.J.S.A. 12A:9-102(80).

[N.J.A.C. 17:33-5.2(a)(8)(iii) (1), (2), (3), (5), (6).]

The record amply supports the agency's finding of defects under the regulatory provisions set forth above and explained in the agency's final determinations dated August 31, 2005. Moreover, appellant's legal arguments are without sufficient merit to warrant discussion in a written opinion. Accordingly, we affirm without extended discussion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(D).

We add a brief explanation. Boyce cannot establish error in the agency's decision by relying on an Employer Identification Number obtained on September 1, 2005, or a Certificate of Trade Name dated October 27, 2005. Those documents, which post-date the agency's August 31, 2005 final determinations, are not part of the record below.

The agency's determination that Boyce's forms appear to identify the same party as both the secured party and the debtor are compelled by the record. That alone is sufficient grounds for rejection of both filings. In requesting review of the initial decision to reject his Form UCC-1 and Form UCC-3, Boyce explained:

CHARLTON KENNETH BOYCE in all caps (as is all legal U.S. citizens) is a corporation formed by the state at birth! CHARLTON KENNETH BOYCE is a separate legal entity, and a strawman, fictitious corporation that the Internal Revenue Services (IRS) keeps an account on from birth and issuance of a birth certificate, until death!

Our review of the record also convinces us that Boyce was afforded all process due and that the agency did not misapply the law. His argument to the contrary overlooks relevant provisions of the statutes and regulations.

Although we have decided this case on the merits, we note that Boyce's brief does not conform with the requirements of R. 2:6-2(a) or (b). The submission does not include a procedural history, concise statement of facts supported by reference to the record or legal arguments divided under appropriate point headings and supported by relevant authority.

Affirmed.

 

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A-0392-05T5

June 28, 20006