NEW JERSEY DIVISION OF YOUTH AND FAMILY SERVICES v. W.G.

 

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-4721-04T44721-04T4

NEW JERSEY DIVISION OF

YOUTH AND FAMILY

SERVICES,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

W.G.,

Defendant-Appellant.

__________________________________

IN THE MATTER OF THE

GUARDIANSHIP OF D.N.G.

and D.T.C.,

Minors.

_______________________________________________________

 

Submitted November 16, 2005 - Decided

Before Judges Wefing and Graves.

On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey,

Chancery Division, Family Part, Camden County,

FG-04-62-05.

Yvonne Smith Segars, Public Defender, attorney

for appellant W.G. (Mark Tabakman, Designated

Counsel, of counsel and on the brief).

Peter C. Harvey, Attorney General, attorney

for respondent (Michael J. Haas, Assistant

Attorney General, of counsel; Serena C.

Robinson, Deputy Attorney General, on the

brief).

Yvonne Smith Segars, Public Defender, Law

Guardian for minors D.N.G. and D.T.C.

(Noel Christian Devlin, Assistant

Deputy Public Defender, on the brief).

PER CURIAM

W.G., the biological father of two young boys, D.N.G. and D.T.C., appeals from a Family Part judgment terminating his parental rights to the children and awarding guardianship to the Division of Youth and Family Services (DYFS) for purposes of consenting to adoption. W.G. contends that the evidence presented did not clearly and convincingly prove that the best interests of the children require severance of his parental rights. After carefully reviewing the entire record, the briefs filed, and the applicable law, we conclude that the trial court's findings of fact and conclusions of law are firmly supported by substantial, credible evidence. Therefore, we affirm.

DYFS's first involvement with J.C., the biological mother of the children, began on December 11, 1998, when J.C. was a minor (J.C. was born on September 27, 1984). J.C. was sixteen years old when D.N.G. was born on November 22, 2000, and she was seventeen when D.T.C. was born on September 6, 2002. W.G., the father of the children, was born on May 25, 1981. The parents of the children were never married, and they never lived together with any of their children.

Prior to the birth of her first child, J.C. was placed with T.W., her maternal aunt, who obtained legal custody of her. T.W. subsequently requested that J.C. be removed from the home and placed into foster care because J.C. was not obeying the rules of the home. J.C. ran away from several DYFS arranged placements, and she was incarcerated at Valentine Juvenile Correction Facility when D.T.C. was born. During this period, T.W. was the primary caretaker of the children.

On September 5, 2003, DYFS received a referral that J.C. gave birth to a daughter, T.M.G. W.G. is also the father of this child. On September 14, 2003, J.C. and W.G. agreed to T.M.G.'s placement in long-term foster care with a paternal aunt. On January 30, 2004, DYFS placed D.N.G. and D.T.C. in their current placement with D.F. D.F. has expressed his desire to adopt the two boys should they become available for adoption.

This matter was tried on February 23 and 24, 2005, and April 6, 8, and 11, 2005. On April 6, 2005, the mother of the children finalized an identified surrender. When she was asked why she was voluntarily surrendering her parental rights, she replied: "Because I believe it's in the best interest of my children to remain where they're at."

On April 8, 2005, the trial court made the following general findings before addressing the four-part statutory test of N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a):

[D.N.G.] was born November 22nd, 2000. [D.N.G.] is about four and a half right now. [D.T.C.] was born September 6th, 2002. And that child is about two and seven months.

Their parents are [J.C.] who voluntarily surrendered her parental rights and identified a person [D.F.] to adopt her children. And [W.G.], who is the natural father of the children, and who is contesting this matter.

On the basis of the evidence presented, I find and determine by more than clear and convincing evidence, and frankly, beyond all reasonable doubt, the best interest of these children require that their father's parental rights be terminated involuntarily and that they be placed in the custody of the State Division of Youth & Family Services for all purposes, including the placement for adoption.

The standards to be applied are set out, as I've indicated, in the statute, Title 30:4(c)-15.1, commonly referred to as the four prong test which was originally established by our Supreme Court [New Jersey Division of Youth & Family Services v. A.W., 103 N.J. 591 (1986)].

I specifically find and determine that all of the specific four prong test have been met. And in addition, there are certain general findings in this case which carry on throughout all the findings.

Most specifically, I find and determine that the first overall finding is that [the] father failed to plan for these children, is unable to provide a safe and stable environment for them and allow them to be raised by others and still is unable to provide for their safe and stable home, to the point where it would be damaging to these children to remove them from their present situation which he created.

The second determination is that psychologically, as pointed out by the experts, whose testimony and reports have been submitted, uncontroverted, [the] father cannot effectively parent these children, and frankly, is not fit to parent these children at this time by reason of some significant mental problems and psychiatric problems which, that together with his inability to provide for himself in a safe and stable environment, renders him unfit at this time to parent the children.

In that respect, it is similar to that which was determined to be unfitness [In re Guardianship of K.H.O., 161 N.J. 337 (1999)], when Justice Handler concluded, "That parental unfitness may also be demonstrated if a parent has failed to provide a safe and stable home for a child and the delay in permanent placement will further harm the child." And that's from page 352 of his learned opinion.

Those are the two primary general findings of the Court.

W.G. challenges Judge Page's findings contending that DYFS failed to establish the requirements of N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a). The Supreme Court set forth criteria for the termination of parental rights, which included the best interest test, in New Jersey Division of Youth and Family Services v. A.W., supra, 103 N.J. 591. The Legislature thereafter codified the elements of the test in N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a). To terminate parental rights, DYFS has the burden of proving the following by clear and convincing evidence:

(1) The child's safety, health or development has been or will continue to be endangered by the parental relationship;

(2) The parent is unwilling or unable to eliminate the harm facing the child or is unable or unwilling to provide a safe and stable home for the child and the delay of permanent placement will add to the harm. Such harm may include evidence that separating the child from his resource family parents would cause serious and enduring emotional or psychological harm to the child;

(3) The division has made reasonable efforts to provide services to help the parent correct the circumstances which led to the child's placement outside the home and the court has considered alternatives to termination of parental rights; and

(4) Termination of parental rights will not do more harm than good.

In every termination of parental rights case, a trial court must evaluate and balance competing considerations. The balance implicates fundamental rights and interests of the parents and the children, as well as critical governmental concerns. The balance between fundamental parental rights and the State's parens patriae responsibility is achieved through the best interests of the child standard. In re Guardianship of K.H.O., supra, 161 N.J. at 347. The four parts of the statutory test are interrelated and overlapping to provide a comprehensive standard that identifies a child's best interests. Id. at 348. "[T]he focus is on the effect of harms arising from the parent-child relationship over time on the child's health and development." Ibid.

"The general rule is that findings by the trial court are binding on appeal when supported by adequate, substantial, credible evidence." Cesare v. Cesare, 154 N.J. 394, 411-12 (1998). We do not disturb the factual findings and legal conclusions of a trial judge unless "they are so manifestly unsupported by or inconsistent with the competent, relevant and reasonably credible evidence as to offend the interests of justice." Id. at 412 (quoting Rova Farms Resort, Inc. v. Investors Ins. Co. of Am., 65 N.J. 474, 484 (1974)).

The trial court carefully considered all of the evidence adduced at trial, including the uncontroverted testimony of the expert witness called by DYFS, Dr. Chester Sigafoos. Our review of the record discloses no flaw in the court's findings and conclusions, or its ultimate determination. Judge Page's findings of fact are fully supported by the credible evidence in the record, and his conclusions predicated on those findings are legally sound. Accordingly, we affirm substantially for the reasons expressed by Judge Page in his comprehensive oral decision rendered on April 8 and 11, 2005.

 
Affirmed.

(continued)

(continued)

8

A-4721-04T4

RECORD IMPOUNDED

December 21, 2005