STATE OF NEW JERSEY v. Carl Reinhardt

 

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-3026-03T43026-03T4

STATE OF NEW JERSEY,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

vs.

CARL REINHARDT,

Defendant-Appellant.

__________________________________

 

Submitted: November 14, 2005 - Decided:

Before Judges Cuff, Lintner and Holston, Jr.

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Mercer County, Indictment No. 01-091200.

Yvonne Smith Segars, Public Defender, attorney for appellant (William Welaj, Designated Counsel, of counsel and on the brief).

Peter C. Harvey, Attorney General, attorney for respondent (H. John Witman III, Deputy Attorney General, of counsel and on the brief).

PER CURIAM

On April 22, 2001, defendant, Carl Reinhardt, bludgeoned and stabbed his wife to death in the garage of their home in the presence of one of the couple's children. A jury found defendant guilty of knowing or purposeful murder, contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3a(1) (Count One); third degree possession of weapons (a knife and a blunt object) for an unlawful purpose, contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4d (Count Two); and fourth degree possession of weapons under circumstances not manifestly appropriate for the lawful use the objects may have, contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5d (Count Three). Following merger of Count Three with Count Two, Judge Bielamowicz imposed a sentence of life imprisonment with a minimum mandatory term of thirty years on Count One and a concurrent five-year term of imprisonment on Count Two. The appropriate fines, penalties and assessments were also imposed.

Defendant and his wife, Katherine, were having marital problems. At the request of his wife and eldest daughter, Jessica, defendant moved out of the marital home in March 2001 and moved into his brother's residence. Defendant subsequently moved into his parents' home following an overdose of medication and hospitalization at Hamilton Hospital and an inpatient stay at Princeton House.

On April 20, 2001, defendant returned to the marital home to watch his three daughters while Katherine went out for the evening. That evening, defendant repeatedly called his wife to profess his love for her and ask for a reconciliation. While he was in the house, defendant searched Katherine's e-mail and found a message from her to a male friend informing him of her separation. The e-mail contained the line, "My daughter told me that I think daddy needs to take a break from us." Defendant confronted his daughter and said, "You helped get me out of the house, now you have to help me get back in."

The next morning, as defendant was taking Jessica to soccer practice, he began telling his daughter that she did not love him and tried to blame her for his present situation. She asked defendant to turn around and bring her home. Defendant and Katherine argued until defendant's sister picked him up and brought him to his parents' house.

The next day, Katherine and her daughters spent the day at a family barbeque. While they were away, a neighbor saw defendant sunning himself in the backyard of the home. He left before his wife and children returned.

That night, defendant returned to the home to speak with his wife. The two went into the garage to talk privately. Soon thereafter, their daughter, Samantha, heard the family dog barking and heard screams. She ran to the garage door and saw defendant hitting her mother in the head with a wooden board. Samantha ran into the house and tried to wake her sisters and to call 911, but the phone was not working. She took a BB gun from a cabinet above the refrigerator and ran back to the garage, but the door was closed and locked. Samantha started to scream that her father was hurting her mother. Hearing the girl's screams, neighbor Wayne Giovanazzo ran to the Reinhardt home, forced his way into the garage, and restrained defendant. In the meantime, Jessica had awakened, found her mother's cell phone, and called 911. Upon seeing her sister on the cell phone, Samantha ran to another neighbor's house to get more help. That neighbor went to the Reinhardt residence and brought the girls outside just as the police arrived.

Katherine was dead when the police arrived. Defendant told the police that he wanted to die. A bat, wooden rail, and kitchen knife, all bloody, were found in the garage. Defendant's wife had suffered various injuries, including a deep slash wound in the neck inflicted by a knife, as well as lacerations and abrasions to the head, face, legs and arms caused by blunt force trauma, as would be caused by a baseball bat or wooden post. The cause of death was exsanguination from the deep neck laceration that cut the jugular blood vessels. Defendant presented evidence at trial that his mental state was so impaired that he was incapable of acting in a knowing or purposeful manner. He contended that he tried to kill himself when it became clear to him that a reconciliation was hopeless. He also contended that his wife intervened and suffered cuts and bruises when she tried to disarm him and prevent his suicide. At trial, defendant produced Dr. Gerald Cooke, a clinical forensic psychologist, and Dr. Daniel Paul Greenfield, a forensic psychiatrist in support of his defense.

On appeal, defendant raises the following issues:

POINT I: THE PROSECUTOR'S SUMMATION EXCEEDED THE BOUNDS OF PROPRIETY. (NOT RAISED BELOW).

POINT II: THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN PERMITTING THE PROSECUTOR TO ELICIT TESTIMONY INDICATING THAT THE DEFENDANT WAS INCARCERATED AT THE TIME HE WAS INTERVIEWED BY THE STATE'S EXPERT WITNESS.

POINT III: THE TRIAL COURT'S LIMITING INSTRUCTION TO THE JURY REGARDING THE DEFENDANT'S INCARCERATED STATUS WAS UNTIMELY, INACCURATE AND INADEQUATE IN NATURE. (NOT RAISED BELOW).

POINT IV: THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY FAILING TO MERGE COUNT II CHARGING POSSESSION OF A WEAPON FOR AN UNLAWFUL PURPOSE INTO COUNT I CHARGING PURPOSEFUL/KNOWING MURDER. (NOT RAISED BELOW).

POINT V: THE LIFE IMPRISONMENT TERM IMPOSED BY THE TRIAL COURT ON COUNT I IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL SINCE IT EXCEEDS THE MAXIMUM SENTENCE AUTHORIZED BY THE JURY'S VERDICT.

POINT VI: THE SENTENCE IMPOSED WAS MANIFESTLY EXCESSIVE.

Defendant argues that the prosecutor's summation deprived him of a fair trial because he discredited the defense experts and their testimony. Raised as plain error, we must be satisfied that any error had the clear capacity to produce an unjust result. R. 2:10-1; State v. Macon, 57 N.J. 325, 336 (1971).

In his summation, the prosecutor argued that jealousy drove defendant to kill his wife and that his history of depression did not prevent him from forming a knowing or purposeful state of mind. The prosecutor reminded the jury that Dr. Cooke, the defense psychologist, had never seen the e-mail message sent by the victim to a male friend that was intercepted by defendant. The prosecutor also reminded the jury that Dr. Greenfield, the defense psychiatrist, never mentioned the e-mail message in his report, although his notes revealed that he had knowledge of it. The prosecutor then questioned why the psychiatrist never mentioned it. Responding to his own question, the prosecutor suggested that "[the e-mail message] didn't fit into their defense of an emotional outburst that lasted a minute or two where he's not able to form the cognitive ability to have a knowing and purposeful intent." The prosecutor also noted other inaccuracies in the psychiatrist's report, including the type of knife used by defendant, and questioned the integrity of the opinion offered by the psychiatrist. Finally, the prosecutor stated:

Ladies and gentlemen, cutting through all of the psycho babble that you heard in this case, one of the most telling things that the State heard from Dr. Michals [the State's psychiatrist] was, you don't kill someone that you love. (emphasis added.)

Defendant argues that these comments demeaned the defense experts, suggested that their opinions were fabricated, and discredited the motivation of the defense experts.

It is the prosecutor's job to ensure that justice is done, whether that means a conviction or an acquittal. State v. Spano, 64 N.J. 566, 568 (1974). When presenting the summation, the prosecutor is bound to confine his comments to the facts revealed during trial and any reasonable inferences that may be drawn therefrom. State v. Zola, 112 N.J. 384, 426 (1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1022, 109 S. Ct. 1146, 103 L. Ed. 2d 205 (1989). Prosecutors are allowed significant freedom as long as the commentary is reasonably related to the evidence before the jury. State v. Harris, 141 N.J. 525, 559 (1995). In fact, in a criminal case, a prosecutor is entitled and expected to make his closing arguments vigorously and forcefully. State v. Frost, 158 N.J. 76, 82 (1999); Harris, supra, 141 N.J. at 559.

Nevertheless, because the prosecutor is the representative of the State, it is not unreasonable for the jury to have confidence in his words; they are spoken with the authority of the State. Spano, supra, 64 N.J. at 568. When determining whether a prosecutor's remarks during summation were improper and require reversal, an appellate court must first decide whether the prosecutor's conduct deprived a defendant of a fair trial. Frost, supra, 158 N.J. at 83. To warrant reversal, the prosecutor's conduct must have "'substantially prejudiced defendant's fundamental right to have a jury fairly evaluate the merits of his defense.'" State v. Smith, 167 N.J. 158, 182 (2001) (quoting State v. Timmendequas, 161 N.J. 515, 575 (1999), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 858, 122 S. Ct. 136, 151 L. Ed. 2d 89 (2001)). In making this determination, the court should consider factors such as whether defense counsel made a timely objection, whether the trial judge ordered the remarks stricken, and whether the jury was instructed to disregard the comments. State v. Ramseur, 106 N.J. 123, 322-23 (1987).

At no time during the above-mentioned statements did defendant's counsel object. When no objection is made, an appellate tribunal often will find no prejudice because the absence of a timely objection indicates that the defense did not find the remarks prejudicial when made. Frost, supra, 158 N.J. at 83-84. The failure to interpose a timely objection also deprives the court of a chance to remedy the problem. Id. at 84. In her instructions to the jury, Judge Bielamowicz reminded them that they are the sole judges of the evidence, including witness credibility, and that summations are not evidence and should not be treated as such.

The prosecutor's commentary was limited to the facts in evidence. It is not improper for a prosecutor to question the reliability or credibility of witnesses. See, e.g., Smith, supra, 167 N.J. at 176 (questioning witness credibility because of payment received). It is proper in summation for counsel to draw inferences from the evidence and point out weaknesses in the opponent's arguments. Herring v. New York, 422 U.S. 853, 862, 95 S. Ct. 2550, 2554, 45 L. Ed. 2d 593, 600 (1975). Nothing about the prosecutor's remarks compromised the ability of the jury to discharge its factfinding function, especially considering the instructions they received.

To find defendant guilty of murder, the State had to prove that he acted knowingly and purposely. The evidence of the e-mail from Katherine to her friend, Kevin Kitner, was extremely relevant to these proofs. Certainly if defendant's experts were unaware of this message, their conclusions that defendant did not act knowingly and purposely were questionable. The same is true with regard to the evidence of the knife. The type of knife, kitchen knife or fishing knife, and the place it was ordinarily kept, were certainly relevant to proving whether defendant acted knowingly or purposely or whether his actions were the result of an outburst. Therefore, we conclude that the prosecutor's comments and criticisms of the opinions offered by the defense experts did not exceed established norms.

Defendant also argues that the trial judge erred when she allowed the prosecutor to elicit testimony from the defense experts revealing that defendant was incarcerated when interviewed. We disagree.

In preparation for trial, defendant was examined by the psychologist and psychiatrist retained by defendant and the psychiatrist retained by the State. Defendant was incarcerated at the time of the examinations. The State sought to question the defense psychologist about the role of imprisonment as a psychological stressor and a contributing factor to the mental state found at the time of examination. Defendant responded that his expert would offer an opinion regarding defendant's state of mind on the day of the victim's death; therefore, his status as a prisoner was irrelevant. Judge Bielamowicz found that the incarcerated status of defendant at the time of examination was relevant and observed that a juror would probably expect that a person charged with murder would spend some time in jail prior to trial. The trial judge also determined that any prejudice could be minimized by an appropriate instruction.

During his cross-examination of the defense psychologist, the prosecutor asked the expert once if imprisonment was a significant stressor that may influence a test administered to an inmate of a correctional institution. When the State presented the testimony of its expert, he testified that he interviewed defendant at the county jail.

The jury instructions contained the following limiting instruction:

Certain evidence may be admissible during a trial for a limited purpose. It may be considered by you for that purpose, but for no other. Specifically, during the trial, the expert witnesses referred to the fact that interviews and/or psychological testing of Mr. Reinhardt were conducted in a correctional facility. The setting and circumstances of the interviews and testing may be considered by you, along with all other relevant evidence, only for the purpose of evaluating and considering the testimony of the witness who conducted the evaluation, and in determining the weight to be accorded to their testimony, and the evaluation and testing procedures which supported their testimony. It may not be considered for any other purpose. The fact that Mr. Reinhardt was in a correctional facility at the time is not relevant to his guilt or innocence of the offenses with which he has been charged. The circumstances under which the evaluations took place must not in any way influence your thinking about his guilt or innocence, nor should you draw any negative inferences from this fact.

The defendant is entitled to the presumption of innocence, and as I have instructed you, that presumption continues throughout the entire trial, unless and until you, the jurors, as judges of the facts, are satisfied that the State has proven each of the elements charged beyond a reasonable doubt.

Here, the evidence of the circumstances at the time of clinical interviews was relevant. The critical issue was defendant's state of mind at the time he killed his wife. All of the clinical interviews, however, occurred months after the incident. Therefore, it was imperative to determine if circumstances at the time of interview may have influenced the professional judgment of the interviewers.

Courts, however, have long-recognized that knowledge of a defendant's incarcerated status at the time of trial may undermine the presumption of innocence accorded to each defendant. State v. Martini, 131 N.J. 176, 235 (1993), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 875, 116 S. Ct. 203, 133 L. Ed. 2d 137 (1995). In Martini, the heavy security measures in the courtroom prompted the trial judge to advise the jury that defendant was incarcerated. Id. at 233-34. The trial judge also provided a limiting instruction. Id. at 234. Notably, the Court held that the trial judge's actions were an appropriate exercise of judgment to assure a fair trial. Id. at 237.

A trial court's discretionary decision concerning whether to admit or exclude evidence is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard. Ramseur, supra, 106 N.J. at 266. "To demonstrate abuse of such discretion, the danger of undue prejudice must outweigh probative value so as to divert jurors 'from a reasonable and fair evaluation of the basic issue of guilt or innocence.'" State v. Moore, 122 N.J. 420, 467 (1991) (quoting State v. Sanchez, 224 N.J. Super. 231, 249-50 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 111 N.J. 653 (1988)).

We discern no error in the admission of evidence of defendant's incarcerated status. The reference was fleeting and it was relevant to the central issue in the case, defendant's state of mind on the day he killed his wife. Furthermore, the trial judge delivered a well-crafted limiting instruction. We must assume that the jury followed this instruction. State v. Muhammad, 145 N.J. 23, 52 (1996). Any prejudice flowing from the reference to defendant's incarcerated status was minimized by this limiting instruction. We are also unpersuaded that the omission of a limiting instruction at the time the subject was broached during Dr. Cooke's cross-examination and Dr. Michal's direct examination accentuated the prejudice to defendant. Therefore, we reject the contention that reference to defendant's incarcerated status impaired his right to a fair trial.

Defendant was sentenced to a term of life in prison with a thirty-year minimum mandatory term for the knowing or purposeful murder of his wife and a concurrent five-year term of imprisonment. On appeal, defendant argues that the life term is unconstitutional, that the sentence is manifestly excessive, and that the conviction for possession of weapons for an unlawful purpose (Count Two) should have merged with the murder conviction (Count One). The State agrees that Count Two should have merged with Count One; therefore, we remand for entry of an amended Judgment of Conviction to reflect the merger.

Defendant's contention that his sentence for murder is unconstitutional is without merit. In State v. Abdullah, 184 N.J. 497, 507-08 (2005), the Court held that there is no presumptive term for murder. Therefore, any sentence within the authorized statutory range for murder does not transgress a defendant's Sixth Amendment right to a trial by jury.

We also reject defendant's argument that his sentence is manifestly excessive. When reviewing a trial court's sentencing decision, an appellate court must consider three questions: first, whether the sentencing guidelines were followed; next, whether there is adequate evidence to support the findings of aggravating and mitigating factors; and finally, whether the trial court came to an unreasonable conclusion. State v. Roth, 95 N.J. 334, 364-66 (1984). A sentence will not be modified unless there was a "clear error of judgment" that "shocks the judicial conscience." Id. at 364.

The trial judge identified four aggravating factors: the nature and circumstances of the offense (aggravating factor one) (N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1a(1)); the vulnerability of the victim (aggravating factor two) (N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1a(2)); the risk that defendant would commit another offense (aggravating factor three) (N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1a(3)); and the need to deter (aggravating factor nine) (N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1a(9)). She identified a single mitigating factor: the lack of prior criminal history (mitigating factor seven) (N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1b(7)). The judge cited the brutality of the attack that utilized multiple weapons and was witnessed by one of the children. She found that defendant was able to lure his wife to the garage due to their intimate relationship. She also found that the attack was ferocious and that defendant had expressed his need for vengeance in a letter written after his arrest. All of these facts were well-supported by the trial record.

So, too, is the judge's evaluation of the aggravating and mitigating factors. Finally, the term selected is authorized by statute and cannot be considered an inappropriate exercise of the discretion reposed in the sentencing judge. When his plea for reconciliation was rebuffed, defendant retaliated in a physical attack marked by its extreme ferocity and insensitivity to the child who sought to intervene. Using three implements, a knife, a baseball bat and a wooden post, he cut and bludgeoned his wife until, as found by the sentencing judge, "you had squeezed the last ounce of life out of her body." The sentence does not shock our conscience.

The conviction and sentence are affirmed but for the need to merge Count Two with Count One. We remand for entry of an amended Judgment of Conviction.

 

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A-3026-03T4

December 16, 2005