SONIA VENTURA v. LOURDES QUEZADA

 

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-2414-04T22414-04T2

SONIA VENTURA,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

LOURDES QUEZADA,

Defendant-Appellant.

_______________________________________________________

 

Submitted October 25, 2005 - Decided

Before Judges Coburn and S.L. Reisner

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey,

Law Division, Essex County, Docket No. L-3129-02.

Ginarte, O'Dwyer & Winograd, attorneys for

appellant (Erik C. Acosta, on the brief).

Thomas J. Wall, attorney for respondent.

PER CURIAM

Sonia Ventura and Lourdes Quezada formed a partnership to purchase, rehabilitate, and sell a multi-family building in Belleville. Disputes arose and they both brought actions for dissolution of the partnership, accounting, and sale of the building. While those actions were pending in the Chancery Division, and apparently consolidated, their attorneys submitted a consent order to the court, which, in critical part, ordered that Quezada sell the property to Ventura "for a gross purchase [price] of $150,000 . . . subject to an accounting and offsets and charges against each partner's respective account . . . ." The order, which is dated March 1, 2002, specifically states that each attorney is consenting "to entry" of the order.

The case was transferred to the Law Division, where subsequent proceedings led to the entry of interim orders and a final judgment in favor of Ventura.

Quezada appeals, offering the following arguments:

POINT I

APPEALS FROM FINAL JUDGMENTS OF THE SUPERIOR COURT, TRIAL DIVISION, MAY BE TAKEN TO THE APPELLATE DIVISION AS OF RIGHT, PURSUANT TO N.J.CT.R. 2:2-3(a)(1)

POINT II

THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION AND COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN ENTERING THE ORDER, DATED MARCH 1, 2002, GIVEN DEFENDANT'S REJECTION OF THE ORDER, AND WITHOUT RATIFICATION OF SAME

POINT III

THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION AND COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN CONDUCTING AN EX PARTE CONFERENCE RESULTING IN THE ORDER ENTERED ON MARCH 1, 2002

POINT IV

UPON REVERSAL OF THE MARCH 1, 2002 ORDER, SUBSTANTIVE ORDERS MUST ALSO BE REVERSED TO RESTORE THE PARTIES

After carefully considering the record and briefs, we are satisfied that all of Quezada's substantive arguments are without sufficient merit to warrant discussion in a written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E). However, we add the following comments.

Quezada's argument under POINT IV depends on the reversal of the March 1, 2002, consent order, and the other substantive points are solely addressed to the consent order. Although Quezada argues that she did not authorize her attorney to consent to the order, she never brought that claim before the trial court on a formal motion. Without the certifications that would have had to accompany such a motion, or sworn testimony, we have no record to review. Nor, of course, do we have the findings of fact and conclusions of law that the trial court would have had to make if there had been a formal request for relief.

 
An application to vacate an order must be made in the trial court under Rule 4:50-1. No such application was made here. Furthermore, a party may not appeal from a consent order for the purpose of challenging its substantive provisions. Infante v. Gottesman, 233 N.J. Super. 310, 318-19 (App. Div. 1989).

Therefore, this appeal is dismissed.

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A-2414-04T2

November 4, 2005