ABCBAIL BONDS v. CHARLES LAWRENCE, SR.

 

(NOTE: The status of this decision is Published.)

                     NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
                   APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
  This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court."
   Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the
     parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.




                                    SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
                                    APPELLATE DIVISION
                                    DOCKET NO. A-3993-16T3

ABC BAIL BONDS,

           Plaintiff-Respondent,

     v.

CHARLES LAWRENCE, SR. and
CHRISTINE CASANOVA LAWRENCE,

          Defendants-Appellants.
___________________________________

           Argued May 15, 2018 – Decided May 29, 2018

           Before Judges Fisher and Natali.

           On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey,
           Law Division, Special Civil Part, Burlington
           County, Docket No. SC-0359-17.

           Mark J. Molz argued the cause for appellants
           (Law Offices of Mark J. Molz, attorneys; Mark
           J. Molz, on the brief).

           Ethan P. Henshell          argued    the    cause    for
           respondent.

PER CURIAM
     Defendant Charles D. Lawrence, Sr. 1, appeals from a judgment

entered in the Small Claims Section of the Special Civil Part in

favor of plaintiff ABC Bail Bonds, Inc. in the amount of $2,050

plus costs.    We affirm.

     On June 14, 2016, defendant's son was arrested and detained

overnight for two drug-related offenses.         Bail was set at $25,000.

The next day, defendant contacted plaintiff to secure a bond for

his son's release. The premium for the bond was $2,500. Defendant

made an initial $500 payment and signed a promissory note that

obligated him to satisfy the remaining amount in $200 monthly

installments due the fifteenth of each month.             Defendant agreed

to make all payments within ten days of the due date or he would

be in default.    He also agreed that the promissory note was the

entire   agreement   between   the   parties     and   plaintiff   "made    no

promises to [defendant] other than those in the [promissory note]."

     After    defendant   failed     to   make   the   required    payments,

plaintiff filed this breach of contract action.            Defendant filed

a counterclaim and sought the return of the $500 deposit plus $37

in costs alleging he orally rescinded the promissory note prior

to plaintiff posting the bond.



1
  We have been advised that Christine Casanova Lawrence passed
away during the pendency of this appeal. Accordingly, we refer
to defendant in the singular.

                                      2                              A-3993-16T3
      During    a    two-day    trial,     plaintiff    called    two    employee

witnesses, Thomas Key and Beth Zimmerman, who was also plaintiff's

corporate officer.        Defendant and his wife Christine Casanova

Lawrence    appeared    pro     se   and   testified.     Both    parties     also

introduced documentary evidence.

      Zimmerman testified as to the contents of the promissory note

and the existence of a hold harmless agreement executed by the

parties.2     In sum, she confirmed that defendant's son was released

from jail after plaintiff posted the bond and that defendant failed

to make the required payments pursuant to the promissory note.

      Defendant testified that prior to signing the promissory note

he was falsely assured by plaintiff that his son would be released

within hours on June 15; instead, he was detained overnight.                   The

next morning, upset that his son spent another night in jail and

believing that he would likely be released that day at a scheduled

court proceeding, defendant stated that he directed Key to cancel

the   bond.     He    further    testified     that,    despite   this    express




2
    As stated by the trial judge, the hold harmless agreement
provided that defendant agreed to "forego all rights for any
refunds or reimbursement of any premiums paid after the bail bond
has been posted. . . ." Although neither party included the hold
harmless agreement in the appendix on appeal, it was introduced
into evidence at trial. Neither party disputes its terms.


                                           3                              A-3993-16T3
instruction, Key posted the bond.        Shortly thereafter, the court

released defendant's son from detention.

     Key   testified   that   it   was   contrary   to   his   practice    to

guarantee a release date before issuing a bond.            He also stated

that he did not recall defendant ever directing him not to post

the bond on July 16 and that in his twenty-two years of employment

in the bail bonds industry, he has "never posted a bond for an

individual where they told [him] not to."

     At the end of the trial's second day, the judge issued her

oral decision.    In ruling in plaintiff's favor and rejecting

defendant's counterclaim, the trial judge held:

           [T]he      plaintiff     fulfilled      their
           responsibility and bailed [defendant's son]
           out on the 16th. He was released on the 16th.

           The defendant signed the promissory note and
           made no inquiry after that day.        So the
           plaintiff fulfilled their responsibility. Mr.
           Key testified that if somebody withdrew their
           request for a bail bond, he would not have
           presented it, he would not have pursued it.

           It's   almost   a   year   later   from   this
           circumstance.    There are many gaps in the
           information. The defendant has done the best
           he could to fill the gaps, but the end result
           was his son was released . . . . [And] the
           court has to rely on the contract law, and the
           contract law is that the promissory note was
           signed, that they fulfilled their end of the
           contract, they did post the bond, they
           signed[,] they paid the premium to Lexington
           and they fulfilled their responsibility.


                                    4                               A-3993-16T3
              . . . .

         I allowed the defendant to tell the court . .
         . what he believed was orally said and what
         orally happened, but I cannot utilize the
         information because the plaintiff fulfilled
         their end of the bargain.

Defendant raises the following points on appeal:

         POINT I
         PLAINTIFF HAD NO PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE AS
         REQUIRED BY NEW JERSEY RULE OF EVIDENCE 403.

         POINT II
         PLAINTIFF FAILED TO PROVE IT'S [sic] CASE.

         POINT III
         THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY IGNORING THE RULES
         OF COURT AND RULES OF EVIDENCE.

         POINT IIIa.
         DEFENDANT WAS NOT GRANTED THE RIGHT TO CROSS
         EXAMINE WITNESSES (Issue not raised).

         POINT IIIb.
         [THERE WAS] OBJECTIONABLE USE OF LEADING
         QUESTIONS BY [THE] TRIAL COURT (Issue not
         raised).

         POINT IIIc.
         THE [TRIAL] COURT FAILED TO REQUIRE PLAINTIFF
         TO REST (Issue not raised).

         POINT IV
         THE DEFENDANT PROVED BY A PREPONDERANCE OF THE
         EVIDENCE THAT HE RESCINDED THE CONTRACT AFTER
         THE PLAINTIFF FAILED TO FILE FOR BAIL IN A
         TIMELY FASHION.

    After carefully reviewing the record in the light of the

written and oral arguments advanced by the parties, we conclude

that the issues presented by defendant are without sufficient

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merit to warrant extensive discussion in this opinion, Rule 2:11-

3(e)(1)(A) and (E), and we affirm substantially for the reasons

expressed by the trial judge in her oral opinion.      The findings

and conclusions of the judge are supported by substantial, credible

evidence in the record.      See Rova Farms Resort, Inc. v. Inv'rs

Ins. Co., 
65 N.J. 474, 484 (1974).    We add the following.

     As best we can glean from the appellate submissions, defendant

avers that the trial judge failed to conduct the trial fairly and

in a manner consistent with fundamental notions of due process.

We disagree.   As to defendant's first point on appeal, Zimmerman

was an authorized officer permitted to prosecute the action on

behalf of plaintiff pursuant to Rule 6:11.     Her testimony merely

recited the undisputed terms of the promissory note and hold

harmless agreement and confirmed that defendant executed those

documents.     In addition, plaintiff called Key who personally

interacted with defendant.    Both witnesses had sufficient personal

knowledge to support their testimony at trial.    N.J.R.E. 602.

     With respect to any claim that the judge failed to conduct

the trial in an impartial manner, we similarly disagree. Our review

of the record reveals that the judge was unfailingly patient

despite numerous and repeated interruptions by the parties.        See

Serratore v. Nardi, 
237 N.J. Super. 566, 568 (App. Div. 1990)

(finding no merit in defendant's contention that the trial judge

                                  6                           A-3993-16T3
acted unfairly towards him when the judge "was patient, courteous

and impartial throughout the proceeding").              Although the trial

judge elicited the majority of the testimony from the pro se

parties, she did so fairly and appropriately and to ensure relevant

and admissible evidence was presented in an efficient and effective

manner.       See   N.J.R.E.   611(a)(1)-(2).      At    no   point    in    the

proceedings did the trial judge prevent any party from introducing

documentary evidence or calling witnesses.          Further, defendant's

arguments fail to appreciate the ability of trial judges in the

Small Claims Section of the Special Civil Part to relax the

evidentiary rules.      See, e.g., N.J.R.E. 101(a)(2)(A); Penbara v.

Straczynski, 
347 N.J. Super. 155, 162 (App. Div. 2002).

      The trial record similarly belies defendant's claim that the

judge somehow prevented him from cross-examining witnesses.               While

it is true that defendant did not cross-examine Zimmerman, that

appears to have been by choice and not because of any ruling by

the   trial   judge.     Indeed,   defendant    cross-examined        Key,   the

critical witness who interacted with him regarding the bond and

its alleged rescission. In these circumstances, we cannot conclude

that this alleged error, not raised at trial, was "clearly capable

of producing an unjust result. . . ."          R. 2:10-2.




                                     7                                  A-3993-16T3
     Finally, the trial court's ruling enforcing the terms of the

promissory note and rejecting defendant's rescission claim was

supported by substantial, credible evidence in the record.

     "A contract arises from offer and acceptance, and must be

sufficiently definite 'that the performance to be rendered by each

party can be ascertained with reasonable certainty.'"            Weichert

Co. Realtors v. Ryan, 
128 N.J. 427, 435 (1992) (quoting West

Caldwell v. Caldwell, 
26 N.J. 9, 24-25 (1958)).            A court "must

enforce the contract as written and not make a better contract for

either party[]" if its terms are clear.            Graziano v. Grant, 
326 N.J. Super. 328, 342 (App. Div. 1999).             A court may rescind a

contract "where there is original invalidity, fraud, failure of

consideration, or material breach or default."            Center 48 Ltd.

P'ship v. May Dep't Stores Co., 
355 N.J. Super. 390, 411-12 (App.

Div. 2002).

     Based on the documentary and testimonial evidence, the trial

judge concluded that plaintiff had fulfilled its obligations to

post a bond and that defendant had breached his obligation under

the promissory note and hold harmless agreement. The trial judge's

decision was in accordance with the terms of the promissory note,

including its integration clause that confirmed that the writing

memorialized the parties' entire agreement.            As to defendant's

rescission    claim,   the   trial   judge   was    likewise   within   her

                                     8                             A-3993-16T3
discretion to credit Key's testimony that he neither recalled

defendant directing him to withdraw the bond nor had he ever posted

a bond when instructed not to do so.

     Affirmed.




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