WELLS FARGO BANK, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION v. TODD MARRAZZO
Annotate this CaseNOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court."
Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the
parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-0998-16T1
WELLS FARGO BANK, NATIONAL
ASSOCIATION, as Trustee for
MASTR Asset Backed Securities
Trust 2005-OPT1, Mortgage
Pass-Through Certificates,
Series 2005-OPT1,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
TODD MARRAZZO,
Defendant-Appellant,
and
MRS. MARRAZZO, UNKNOWN SPOUSE
OF TODD MARRAZZO, SUMMA CAPITAL CORP.,
A NEW YORK CORPORATION, GEORGE MALIK,
a/k/a GEORGE MALEK, PAWNEE LEASING
CORPORATION, ALVIN DAVIS, STATE OF
NEW JERSEY, GREG & ARTIN SERVICE, INC.,
and MARINA DISTRICT DEVELOPMENT CO., INC.,
Defendants.
__________________________________________
Argued March 12, 2018 – Decided April 19, 2018
Before Judges Accurso and Vernoia.
On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey,
Chancery Division, Bergen County, Docket No.
F-000985-16.
Nicholas A. Stratton argued the cause for
appellant (Stratton Stepp, LLP, attorneys;
Nicholas A. Stratton and Louis J. Johnson,
Jr., on the briefs).
Stuart I. Seiden argued the cause for
respondent (Duane Morris, LLP, attorneys;
Stuart I. Seiden, Brett L. Messinger and Kelly
K. Huff, of counsel and on the brief).
PER CURIAM
In this mortgage foreclosure action, defendant Todd Marrazzo
appeals from a June 24, 2016 Chancery Division order granting
plaintiff Wells Fargo's1 motion for summary judgment, striking
defendant's answer and entering default against him, and an October
13, 2016 final judgment of foreclosure. Defendant argues the
court erred by rejecting his contention the complaint was filed
beyond the six-year limitations period set forth in
N.J.S.A. 2A:50-
56.1(a), and by finding plaintiff had standing to bring the
foreclosure action. We disagree and affirm.
I.
On December 10, 2004, defendant signed a $319,500 promissory
note in favor of Option One Mortgage Corporation. The note
1
Plaintiff's full name is Wells Fargo Bank, National Association,
as Trustee for Mastr Asset Backed Securities Trust 2005-OPT1,
Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2005-OPT1.
2 A-0998-16T1
included an expressly defined "Maturity Date" of January 1, 2035.
Defendant executed a mortgage to Option One granting a security
interest in residential property located in Hackensack. The
mortgage included an acceleration clause granting plaintiff "the
option" of declaring all sums and interest secured by the mortgage
immediately due in the event of a default under the note or
mortgage. The mortgage was recorded in the Bergen County Clerk's
Office on January 13, 2005.
Defendant defaulted on September 1, 2008, and thereafter has
failed to make any payments under the note. On December 10, 2008,
plaintiff filed a foreclosure complaint, which included a
declaration accelerating the total amount due under the note. On
February 25, 2014, the complaint was dismissed by stipulation of
the parties.
On January 8, 2016, plaintiff filed a second foreclosure
complaint. Defendant's contesting answer included the affirmative
defense that the action was time-barred, claiming it was filed
beyond the six-year limitations period under
N.J.S.A. 2A:50-
56.1(a). Defendant also averred that plaintiff lacked standing
because it was "neither a possessor of the note, a holder in due
course, or a non-holder with a right to enforce."
On May 4, 2016, plaintiff filed a motion for summary judgment,
which the court granted following oral argument. The court
3 A-0998-16T1
rejected defendant's claims that plaintiff lacked standing and the
complaint was filed beyond the limitations period in
N.J.S.A.
2A:50-56.1(a). The court reasoned that
N.J.S.A. 2A:50-56.1(a)
required the filing of a foreclosure complaint within six years
of the maturity date set forth in the mortgage and note, and found
plaintiff's 2016 complaint was timely because the note's maturity
date is January 1, 2035. The court further determined plaintiff
had standing because plaintiff possessed the note and had a valid
assignment of the mortgage prior to the filing of the complaint.
Plaintiff moved for final judgment of foreclosure, which was
entered on October 13, 2016. This appeal followed.
Defendant presents the following arguments for our
consideration:
POINT I
THE COURT ERRED WHEN IT DETERMINED THAT THE
MATURITY DATE OF THE MORTGAGE WAS NOT
ACCELERATED AND
N.J.S.A. 2A:50-56.1(a) DID NOT
APPLY.
POINT II
THE COURT ERRED WHEN IT RELIED ON A VOID
ASSIGNMENT OF MORTGAGE AND THE UNSUPPORTED
ASSERTIONS OF A NON-PARTY TO AWARD PLAINTIFF
STANDING TO FORECLOSE.
II.
We review a summary judgment order de novo, applying the same
standard as the trial court. State v. Perini Corp.,
221 N.J. 412,
4 A-0998-16T1
425 (2015) (citing Town of Kearny v. Brandt,
214 N.J. 76, 91
(2013); Liberty Surplus Ins. Corp. v. Nowell Amoroso, PA,
189 N.J.
436, 445-46 (2007)). When considering a motion for summary
judgment, "both trial and appellate courts must view the facts in
the light most favorable to the non-moving party, which in this
case is" defendant. Bauer v. Nesbitt,
198 N.J. 601, 604-05 n.1
(2009); see also R. 4:46-2(c); Brill v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of
Am.,
142 N.J. 520, 540 (1995).
Summary judgment is appropriate where the record demonstrates
"no genuine issue as to any material fact challenged and that the
moving party is entitled to a judgment . . . as a matter of law."
Burnett v. Gloucester Cty. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders,
409 N.J.
Super. 219, 228 (App. Div. 2009). The interpretation of a statute,
such as a statute of limitations, is a question of law requiring
de novo review. See Royster v. N.J. State Police,
227 N.J. 482,
493 (2017); see also Brandt,
214 N.J. at 91.
Defendant argues the court erred in finding the complaint was
timely filed. He contends plaintiff's acceleration declaration
in the December 10, 2008 complaint modified the maturity date of
the note to the date of the complaint's filing. Defendant reasons
that the acceleration date became the new maturity date under the
note, and the 2016 foreclosure complaint was time-barred under
5 A-0998-16T
1 N.J.S.A. 2A:50-56.1(a) because it was filed more than six years
later. We are not persuaded.
In interpreting
N.J.S.A. 2A:50-56.1, our "overriding goal
must be to determine the Legislature's intent." Cast Art Indus.,
LLC v. KMPG LLP,
209 N.J. 208, 221 (2012) (citation omitted). Our
interpretation begins, as it must, with the plain language of the
statute because that is the best indicator of legislative intent.
DiProspero v. Penn,
183 N.J. 477, 492 (2005); accord State v.
Gandhi,
201 N.J. 161, 176-77 (2010). We "ascribe to the statutory
words their ordinary meaning and significance, and read them in
context with related provisions so as to give sense to the
legislation as a whole." Perrelli v. Pastorelle,
206 N.J. 193,
200 (2011) (quoting Hardy v. Abdul-Matin,
198 N.J. 95, 101 (2009)).
N.J.S.A. 2A:50-56.1 defines the limitations period for a
residential mortgage foreclosure, and provides that a foreclosure
action shall not be commenced beyond the earliest of three defined
deadlines.
N.J.S.A. 2A:50-56.1 provides:
An action to foreclose a residential mortgage
shall not be commenced following the earliest
of:
a. Six years from the date fixed for the
making of the last payment or the maturity
date set forth in the mortgage or the note,
bond, or other obligation secured by the
mortgage, whether the date is itself set forth
or may be calculated from information
contained in the mortgage or note, bond, or
6 A-0998-16T1
other obligation, except that if the date
fixed for the making of the last payment or
the maturity date has been extended by a
written instrument, the action to foreclose
shall not be commenced after six years from
the extended date under the terms of the
written instrument;
b. Thirty-six years from the date of
recording of the mortgage, or, if the mortgage
is not recorded, 36 years from the date of
execution, so long as the mortgage itself does
not provide for a period of repayment in
excess of 30 years; or
c. Twenty years from the date on which the
debtor defaulted, which default has not been
cured, as to any of the obligations or
covenants contained in the mortgage or in the
note, bond, or other obligation secured by the
mortgage, except that if the date to perform
any of the obligations or covenants has been
extended by a written instrument or payment
on account has been made, the action to
foreclose shall not be commenced after 20
years from the date on which the default or
payment on account thereof occurred under the
terms of the written instrument.
[
N.J.S.A. 2A:50-56.1 (Emphasis added).]
Here, defendant does not claim the complaint is barred under
the limitation periods in subsections (b) or (c). Instead, he
relies solely on the subsection (a) limitations period, arguing
the complaint was not filed within six years of the filing of the
December 10, 2008 complaint that included the acceleration
declaration.
7 A-0998-16T1
The plain language of subsection (a) does not support
defendant's argument. Subsection (a) requires commencement of the
foreclosure action within six years of "the date fixed for the
making of the last payment or the maturity date set forth in the
mortgage or the note, . . . whether the date is itself set forth
or may be calculated from information contained in the mortgage
or note."
N.J.S.A. 2A:50-56.1(a). The maturity date expressly
"set forth" in the note is January 1, 2035. Defendant does not
contend otherwise. Thus, the 2016 complaint was filed well before
the six-year period following the maturity date "set forth" in the
note.
Defendant argues that although the maturity date set forth
in the note is January 1, 2035, subsection (a) also provides for
application of a maturity date that "may be calculated from
information contained in the mortgage or note."
N.J.S.A. 2A:50-
56.1(a). Defendant reasons that the mortgage allows for
acceleration of the sums due under the note, plaintiff's
declaration of acceleration in the December 10, 2008 complaint
modified the maturity date, and plaintiff failed to commence the
foreclosure action until more than six years later, when it filed
its 2016 complaint. Defendant contends that December 10, 2008 is
the maturity date "that may be calculated from information
contained in the mortgage or note" under
N.J.S.A. 2A:50-56.1(a),
8 A-0998-16T1
and plaintiff's complaint therefore was filed beyond the six-year
limitations period.
Defendant's argument ignores N.J.S.A. 2A:50-56.1(a)'s plain
language, which provides that the applicable maturity date is
derived from the mortgage or note and not the lender's actions.
The statute permits the calculation of the pertinent maturity date
"from information contained in the mortgage or note."
N.J.S.A.
2A:50-56.1(a). This language provides no refuge for plaintiff,
however, because the December 10, 2008 accelerated maturity date
upon which defendant relies is based on facts and circumstances
existing outside of any "information contained in the mortgage or
note." More particularly, defendant's contention that December
10, 2008 is the applicable maturity date under
N.J.S.A. 2A:50-
56.1(a) is wholly dependent on the filing of the 2008 complaint
and the complaint's acceleration declaration. Neither the filing
of the complaint nor the acceleration of the note is information
"contained in the mortgage or note." See
N.J.S.A. 2A:50-56.1(a).
Defendant's reliance on the 2008 complaint's acceleration
declaration as the trigger for the running of the
N.J.S.A. 2A:50-
56.1(a) six-year limitations period is also not supported by the
record. Even accepting defendant's erroneous contention that
acceleration could define the maturity date applicable under
9 A-0998-16T
1 N.J.S.A. 2A:50-56.1(a), the acceleration was rescinded in 20142
when plaintiff dismissed the complaint. The mortgage provided
that acceleration was at plaintiff's option, and plaintiff opted
to rescind the acceleration in 2014. As a result, the accelerated
maturity date on which defendant relies to define the applicable
limitations period under
N.J.S.A. 2A:50-56.1(a) did not exist
following the dismissal of the 2008 complaint and could not, as a
matter of fact, thereafter define the maturity date of the note
even under defendant's interpretation of the statute.
In sum, we are convinced that neither
N.J.S.A. 2A:50-
56.1(a)'s plain language nor the facts support defendant's claim
that the acceleration declaration contained in the 2008 complaint
defined the maturity date for calculating the six-year limitations
period. The January 1, 2035 maturity date set forth in the note
constituted the sole maturity date pertinent to the determination
of the limitations period under N.J.S.A 2A:50:56.1(a)'s plain
language. The court correctly determined plaintiff's 2016
foreclosure complaint was timely filed.
Defendant also claims that the court erred by finding
plaintiff had standing to bring the foreclosure action.
2
For the reasons we explained supra, we reject defendant's
contention that the acceleration declaration contained in the 2008
complaint modified the maturity date of the note for purposes of
determining the limitations period under
N.J.S.A. 2A:50-56.1(a).
10 A-0998-16T1
Defendant's arguments are without merit sufficient to warrant
discussion in a written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E). We add only
that the competent evidence presented to the court shows an
assignment of the mortgage to plaintiff and plaintiff's possession
of the note prior to the filing of the complaint. The court
therefore correctly determined plaintiff had standing. See
Deutsche Bank Trust Co. Ams. v. Angeles,
428 N.J. Super. 315, 318
(App. Div. 2012) (citing Deutsche Bank Nat'l Trust Co. v. Mitchell,
422 N.J. Super. 214, 216 (App. Div. 2011)) ("[E]ither possession
of the note or an assignment of the mortgage that predated the
original complaint confer[s] standing" to bring a foreclosure
action).
Affirmed.
11 A-0998-16T1
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.
