STATE OF NEW JERSEY v. PHILIP HOLDEN

Annotate this Case

(NOTE: The status of this decision is Published.)

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court."
Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the
parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-0143-16T1

STATE OF NEW JERSEY,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

PHILIP HOLDEN,

Defendant-Appellant.

_____________________________

Submitted December 14, 2017 – Decided March 12, 2018

Before Judges Rothstadt and Gooden Brown.

On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey,
Law Division, Essex County, Indictment No. 10-
08-1918.

Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney
for appellant (William Welaj, Designated
Counsel, on the brief).

Robert D. Laurino, Acting Essex County
Prosecutor, attorney for respondent (Tiffany
M. Russo, Special Deputy Attorney General/
Acting Assistant Prosecutor, of counsel and
on the brief).

PER CURIAM
Defendant appeals from the March 28, 2016 Law Division order

denying his petition for post-conviction relief (PCR) without an

evidentiary hearing. We affirm.

Following a jury trial, on June 24, 2011, defendant was

convicted of third-degree aggravated assault,
N.J.S.A. 2C:12-

1(b)(2) (count two);1 first-degree attempted murder,
N.J.S.A.

2C:5-1, 11-3 (count three); first-degree murder,
N.J.S.A. 2C:11-

3(a)(1), (2) (count four); second-degree unlawful possession of a

handgun,
N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(b) (count five); and second-degree

unlawful use of a handgun,
N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4(a) (count six). After

appropriate mergers, he was sentenced on August 5, 2011, to two

consecutive terms of life imprisonment, subject to the No Early

Release Act (NERA),
N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2,2 on counts three and four,

and a concurrent ten-year term with a five-year parole disqualifier

on count five.

Defendant's convictions and sentence were affirmed on appeal,

and his petition for certification was denied. State v. Holden,

1
The jury convicted defendant of third-degree aggravated assault
as a lesser included offense of second-degree aggravated assault,

N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1(a).
2
A defendant convicted of a first-degree crime subject to NERA
must serve eighty-five percent of his sentence before he is
eligible for parole.
N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2(a). Furthermore, solely
for the purpose of calculating the minimum term of parole
ineligibility, a term of life imprisonment shall be deemed to be
seventy-five years.
N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2(b).

2 A-0143-16T1
No. A-2663-11 (App. Div. Apr. 10, 2014), certif. denied,
220 N.J.
40 (2014). We incorporate by reference the proofs adduced at the

trial detailed in our earlier opinion and will not repeat them

here at length. Suffice it to say for purposes of this opinion

that the convictions stemmed from defendant fatally shooting an

innocent bystander outside of a liquor store when he shot at, but

missed, a drug dealer with whom he had a dispute over their

respective drug dealing activities. The State's proofs included

eyewitness testimony from the drug dealer and a buyer at the scene,

who had had prior encounters with defendant, as well as

surveillance footage of the street. Although police subsequently

executed a search warrant at defendant's home which he shared with

his girlfriend, Daphne Stuckey, the gun used in the shooting was

not recovered. At trial, defendant presented an alibi defense

through Stuckey's testimony. In addition, through a stipulation,

defendant presented evidence of third-party guilt by virtue of the

fact that the same gun used in the shooting was used in two

subsequent shootings, which occurred months later while defendant

was incarcerated.

Defendant filed a timely pro se petition for PCR, alleging

that trial counsel was ineffective in several areas. Assigned PCR

counsel supplemented the petition with briefs, underscoring that

trial counsel was ineffective for failing to thoroughly

3 A-0143-16T1
investigate and effectively advance defendant's defenses.

Specifically, PCR counsel argued that trial counsel failed to

thwart the State's efforts to impeach his alibi witness by calling

two additional witnesses who could corroborate one aspect of her

testimony. PCR counsel also argued that trial counsel merely

relied on the stipulation without more in advancing defendant's

third-party guilt defense.

In a supplemental certification, defendant certified that he

told trial counsel that two witnesses, Monique and Carl Blanchard,

could verify that Stuckey was arrested the day after the shooting

and spent all day at the precinct because the Blanchards "picked

her up after she was released." However, according to defendant,

trial counsel did nothing with this information and allowed the

State's rebuttal witness to deny that Stuckey was taken to police

headquarters to "[make] her look like she had fabricated the story

and lied about what happened." Defendant submitted certifications

by Monique Blanchard, Stuckey's sister, and her husband, Carl

Blanchard, confirming his account. Defendant also averred that

although trial counsel entered into a stipulation with the State

that an individual named Juan Scott was found in possession of the

gun used in the homicide, trial counsel failed to conduct "any

further investigation" and failed to present "to the jury the

4 A-0143-16T1
similar physical characteristics" between Scott and defendant to

support defendant's claim of misidentification.

On March 24, 2016, during oral argument, PCR counsel

emphasized the "great importance" of Stuckey's credibility as a

witness. He argued that the importance of Stuckey's credibility

was evidenced by the fact that "the State actually called a

rebuttal witness" to discredit her by showing "that she wasn't

. . . stuck in the precinct all day, as she testified to when, in

fact, that's exactly what . . . happened" and "Monique and Carl

Blanchard were witnesses that would've supported that." According

to PCR counsel, Stuckey being removed from her home by police the

day after the shooting and taken to headquarters where she remained

the entire day was significant because it was her reference point

for vouching for defendant's whereabouts when he purportedly

committed the crimes. PCR counsel asserted that allowing the

State's rebuttal testimony to go unchallenged constituted

ineffective assistance of counsel. Turning to the third-party

guilt defense, PCR counsel argued trial counsel's performance was

deficient in relying solely on the stipulation rather than

emphasizing the "similar physical characteristics" between Scott

and defendant to point out that defendant could have been easily

misidentified.

5 A-0143-16T1
In an oral decision, the PCR judge, who was also the trial

judge, rejected all of defendant's arguments and denied

defendant's petition. The judge determined that defendant failed

to establish a prima facie case of ineffective assistance of

counsel under the two-pronged test formulated in Strickland v.

Washington,
466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984), and adopted by our Supreme

Court in State v. Fritz,
105 N.J. 42 (1987), to warrant an

evidentiary hearing. After noting that defendant's trial counsel

had "experience" and "trial abilities" that were "probably

unsurpassed in this County," the judge rejected defendant's

contentions regarding his alibi defense. The judge explained that

the two affidavits of the Blanchards "don't really go to the alibi

issue" but instead would "go to . . . bolstering the witness'

testimony . . . ." The judge also rejected defendant's argument

as to the third-party defense claim and concluded that the

challenged performance was all "a matter of strategy" and would

not have "changed anything" to meet "the second prong of Strickland

. . . ." The judge entered a memorializing order and this appeal

followed.

On appeal, defendant raises a single point for our

consideration:

6 A-0143-16T1
POINT I3

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING THE
DEFENDANT'S PETITION FOR POST CONVICTION
RELIEF WITHOUT AFFORDING HIM AN EVIDENTIARY
HEARING TO FULLY ADDRESS HIS CONTENTION THAT
HE FAILED TO RECEIVE ADEQUATE LEGAL
REPRESENTATION AT THE TRIAL LEVEL.

A. THE DEFENDANT DID NOT RECEIVE
ADEQUATE LEGAL REPRESENTATION FROM
TRIAL COUNSEL AS A RESULT OF
COUNSEL’S FAILURE TO ELICIT
RELEVANT TESTIMONY TENDING TO
ESTABLISH THIRD-PARTY GUILT.

B. THE DEFENDANT DID NOT RECEIVE
ADEQUATE LEGAL REPRESENTATION FROM
TRIAL COUNSEL AS A RESULT OF TRIAL
COUNSEL'S FAILURE TO UTILIZE THE
TESTIMONY OF TWO POTENTIAL
WITNESSES WHO WOULD HAVE SERVED TO
REHABILITATE THE CREDIBILITY OF THE
DEFENDANT'S ALIBI WITNESS, DAPHNE
STUCKEY, AFTER IT HAD BEEN IMPEACHED
BY THE STATE DURING REBUTTAL.

The mere raising of a claim for PCR does not entitle the

defendant to an evidentiary hearing. State v. Cummings,
321 N.J.

Super. 154, 170 (App. Div. 1999). Rather, trial courts should

grant evidentiary hearings and make a determination on the merits

only if the defendant has presented a prima facie claim of

ineffective assistance, material issues of disputed facts lie

outside the record, and resolution of the issues necessitates a

hearing. R. 3:22-10(b); State v. Porter,
216 N.J. 343, 355 (2013).

3
We condensed Point I for clarity.

7 A-0143-16T1
We review a judge's decision to deny a PCR petition without

an evidentiary hearing for abuse of discretion. State v. Preciose,

129 N.J. 451, 462 (1992). Where, as in this case, "no evidentiary

hearing has been held, we 'may exercise [de novo] review over the

factual inferences drawn from the documentary record by the [PCR

judge].'" State v. Reevey,
417 N.J. Super. 134, 146-47 (App. Div.

2010) (second alteration in original) (quoting State v. Harris,

181 N.J. 391, 421 (2004)).

To establish a prima facie claim of ineffective assistance

of counsel, the defendant

must satisfy two prongs. First, he must
demonstrate that counsel made errors "so
serious that counsel was not functioning as
the 'counsel' guaranteed the defendant by the
Sixth Amendment." An attorney's
representation is deficient when it "[falls]
below an objective standard of
reasonableness."

Second, a defendant "must show that the
deficient performance prejudiced the
defense." A defendant will be prejudiced when
counsel's errors are sufficiently serious to
deny him a "fair trial." The prejudice
standard is met if there is "a reasonable
probability that, but for counsel's
unprofessional errors, the result of the
proceeding would have been different." A
"reasonable probability" simply means a
"probability sufficient to undermine
confidence in the outcome" of the proceeding.

[State v. O'Neil,
219 N.J. 598, 611 (2014)
(alteration in original) (citations omitted)

8 A-0143-16T1
(quoting Strickland,
466 U.S. at 687-88,
694).]

"[I]n order to establish a [prima facie] claim, [the

defendant] must do more than make bald assertions that he was

denied the effective assistance of counsel. He must allege facts

sufficient to demonstrate counsel's alleged substandard

performance." Cummings,
321 N.J. Super. at 170. Indeed, the

defendant must establish, by a preponderance of the credible

evidence, that he is entitled to the requested relief. State v.

Nash,
212 N.J. 518, 541 (2013). In determining whether counsel's

performance fell "outside the wide range of professionally

competent assistance," Strickland,
466 U.S. at 690, "[n]o

particular set of detailed rules for counsel's conduct can

satisfactorily take account of the variety of circumstances faced

by defense counsel or the range of legitimate decisions regarding

how best to represent a criminal defendant." Id. at 688-89. Thus,

a "strong presumption" of competence applies. Id. at 689.

For that reason,

[A]n otherwise valid conviction will not be
overturned merely because the defendant is
dissatisfied with his or her counsel's
exercise of judgment during the trial. The
quality of counsel's performance cannot be
fairly assessed by focusing on a handful of
issues while ignoring the totality of
counsel's performance in the context of the
State's evidence of defendant's guilt. As a
general rule, strategic miscalculations or

9 A-0143-16T1
trial mistakes are insufficient to warrant
reversal except in those rare instances where
they are of such magnitude as to thwart the
fundamental guarantee of a fair trial.

[State v. Allegro,
193 N.J. 352, 367 (2008)
(quoting State v. Castagna,
187 N.J. 293, 314-
15 (2006)).]

Here, defendant renews his arguments that his trial counsel's

failure to elicit "critical testimony" that the person found in

possession of the gun matched defendant's physical description,

and failure to call the Blanchards "to rehabilitate Stuckey's

credibility" violated his right to effective assistance of

counsel. We disagree and are in accord with the PCR judge's

reasons for rejecting defendant's arguments. Moreover, even

assuming counsels' performance could in some way be characterized

as deficient, which we do not find, defendant has failed to meet

the heavy burden of proof that but for counsels' performance, the

result would have been any different given the damning evidence

of his guilt. Accordingly, we discern no abuse of discretion in

the denial of defendant's PCR petition without an evidentiary

hearing, as defendant failed to present a prima facie claim of

ineffective assistance of counsel warranting an evidentiary

hearing.

Affirmed.

10 A-0143-16T1

Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.

This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.