STATE OF NEW JERSEY v. SUSAN HYLAND

Annotate this Case

(NOTE: The status of this decision is Published.)

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-2530-16T2

STATE OF NEW JERSEY,

Plaintiff-Appellant, APPROVED FOR PUBLICATION

v. November 21, 2017

SUSAN HYLAND, APPELLATE DIVISION

Defendant-Respondent.
_____________________________

Argued October 2, 2017 – Decided November 21, 2017

Before Judges Messano, O'Connor and Vernoia.

On appeal from the Superior Court of New
Jersey, Law Division, Camden County,
Indictment No. 16-06-1879.

Linda A. Shashoua, Assistant Prosecutor,
argued the cause for appellant (Mary Eva
Colalillo, Camden County Prosecutor,
attorney; Ms. Shashoua, of counsel and on
the brief).

Tamar Y. Lerer, Assistant Deputy Public
Defender, argued the cause for respondent
(Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender,
attorney; Ms. Lerer, of counsel and on the
brief).

The opinion of the court was delivered by

VERNOIA, J.A.D.

The State appeals from a judgment of conviction sentencing

defendant Susan Hyland to special Drug Court probation,
N.J.S.A.
2C:35-14. Because we conclude that we lack jurisdiction to

consider the State's appeal, we dismiss the appeal.

In March 2016, an automobile driven by defendant struck

sixteen-year-old Q.T. as he walked across a roadway. Q.T.

suffered spinal injuries that later caused his death.

Defendant, who did not have a valid driver's license, did not

stop or call the police. She took no action to get assistance

for Q.T. Instead, she fled the scene and went to a friend's

house, where they discussed burning her badly damaged automobile

and reporting that it was stolen.

Defendant's niece, who was in the car when Q.T. was struck,

called the police, reported the incident and identified

defendant as the driver. The police determined defendant's

location, found the automobile and arrested her.

Defendant was charged in an indictment with second-degree

knowingly leaving the scene of a fatal motor vehicle accident,

N.J.S.A. 2C:11-5.1, third-degree causing death while driving

with a suspended or revoked license,
N.J.S.A. 2C:40-22(a), and

third-degree endangering an injured victim, N.J.S.A. 2C:12-

1.2(a).

The Camden County Prosecutor's Office recommended against

defendant's admission into Drug Court. The State determined

defendant was legally ineligible for a special probation Drug

2 A-2530-16T2
Court sentence because it could not find that defendant "would

not be a danger to the community if placed" in Drug Court. See

N.J.S.A. 2C:35-14(a)(9). The State claimed "it is impossible to

find that . . . defendant is the type of non-violent offender

for which [D]rug [C]ourt was intended." Defendant appealed the

State's determination.

The court ordered that defendant undergo a substance abuse

evaluation, which revealed defendant suffered from five

substance abuse disorders. The evaluator recommended that

defendant undergo intensive treatment and concluded defendant

was clinically eligible for admission into Drug Court.

Over the State's objection, the court determined defendant

was legally eligible for special probation.1 The court observed

that defendant was not charged with causing Q.T.'s death, but

instead for her actions after Q.T. was struck. The court found

that although defendant was not charged with driving while

intoxicated, there was a connection between defendant's

1
Special probation is one of two tracks for admission to Drug
Court. State v. Bishop,
429 N.J. Super. 533, 540 (App. Div.
2013), aff'd o.b.,
223 N.J. 290 (2015). Special probation is
available to "prison-bound offenders, who would not [otherwise]
be eligible for regular probation." Ibid. An offender may also
be admitted to Drug Court under a separate track for those
eligible for regular probation. Ibid. Here, defendant's
admittance to Drug Court was through the court's imposition of a
sentence of special probation. See
N.J.S.A. 2C:35-14 (defining
standards for a special probation Drug Court sentence).

3 A-2530-16T2
substance abuse and the commission of the offenses. The court

considered defendant's prior record, noting her last criminal

conviction was sixteen years earlier in 2000 for criminal

trespass, and her "slew of arrests and convictions" for motor

vehicle and disorderly persons offenses. The court found that

defendant's prior record and "terrible choices" after Q.T. was

accidentally struck did not establish that she would be a danger

to the community if she was admitted to Drug Court. The court

entered an order finding defendant was legally eligible for a

special probation Drug Court sentence under
N.J.S.A. 2C:35-14.

Defendant pleaded guilty to the charges in the indictment

without the benefit of a negotiated plea agreement. The State

reserved its right to object to defendant's admission into Drug

Court at sentencing.

At sentencing, the court merged defendant's conviction for

third-degree endangering an injured victim with her conviction

for second-degree knowingly leaving the scene of a fatal motor

vehicle accident. The court sentenced defendant to concurrent

five-year special probation Drug Court terms on her convictions.

The court denied the State's motion for a stay of sentence

pending the State's appeal of defendant's Drug Court sentence.

Three weeks later, the court granted defendant's motion for

post-conviction bail pending appeal and released defendant on

4 A-2530-16T2
her own recognizance with the condition that she remain in an

inpatient substance abuse treatment facility until further court

order. We granted the State's request for a stay of execution

of defendant's sentence pending the State's appeal.

On appeal, the State makes the following argument:

POINT I

THIS COURT SHOULD REVERSE THE LAW DIVISION'S
SPECIAL PROBATION SENTENCING OF DEFENDANT AS
A TRACK ONE DRUG COURT OFFENDER AS, AFTER
KILLING THE VICTIM, DEFENDANT'S
PARTICIPATION IN DRUG COURT PRESENTS A RISK
TO PUBLIC SAFETY AND OFFENDS THE PRINCIPLES
OF THE DRUG COURT PROGRAM.

The State argues that a proper assessment of defendant's

danger to the community is required under
N.J.S.A. 2C:35-

14(a)(9), and the court's error in its assessment of the danger

requires reversal of defendant's Drug Court sentence. Defendant

argues we cannot address the merits of the State's contention

because we do not have jurisdiction to hear the State's appeal

of the court's sentence.

Rule 2:3-1(b) governs the right of the State to appeal in a

criminal proceeding. In pertinent part, it permits the State to

"appeal or where appropriate, seek leave to appeal" from:

(1) a judgment of the trial court dismissing
an indictment, accusation or complaint,
where not precluded by the constitution of
the United States or of New Jersey; (2) an
order of the trial court entered before
trial in accordance with [Rule] 3:5 (search

5 A-2530-16T2
warrants); (3) a judgment of acquittal
entered in accordance with [Rule 3:18-2]
(judgment n.o.v.) following a jury verdict
of guilty; (4) a judgment in a post-
conviction proceeding collaterally attacking
a conviction or sentence; (5) an
interlocutory order entered before, during
or after trial, or, (6) as otherwise
provided by law.

[R. 2:3-1(b).]

"Sentencing appeals by the State implicate the prohibitions

against multiple punishments incorporated in the double jeopardy

provisions of the Federal and State Constitutions." State v.

Johnson,
376 N.J. Super. 163, 171 (App. Div.), certif. denied,

183 N.J. 592 (2005). Rule 2:3-(b)(6) permits the State to

appeal as "provided by law." Thus, the State has authority to

appeal a sentence where there is "explicit statutory authority"

granting the State the right to appeal. State v. Veney,
327 N.J. Super. 458, 460 (App. Div. 2000); accord State v. Cannon,

128 N.J. 546, 573 n.13 (1992); State v. Roth,
95 N.J. 334, 343

(1984).

Rule 2:3-1(b)(6) also authorizes the State's appeal of an

illegal sentence. State v. Lefkowitz,
335 N.J. Super. 352, 356

(App. Div. 2000), certif. denied,
167 N.J. 637 (2001). The

State "ha[s] the authority, if not the duty, to appeal" an

illegal sentence. State v. Leslie,
269 N.J. Super. 78, 86 (App.

Div. 1993), certif. denied,
136 N.J. 29 (1994); see also State

6 A-2530-16T2
v. Ciancaglini,
204 N.J. 597, 605 (2011) (finding "the State can

appeal from imposition of an illegal sentence"). That is

because a court may correct an illegal sentence at any time

"even if it means increasing the term of a custodial sentence

that [a] defendant has begun to serve." State v. Eigenmann,
280 N.J. Super. 331, 337 (App. Div. 1995), aff'd o.b.,
138 N.J. 89

(1994).

Here, the State claims authority to appeal on both bases.

The State asserts it may appeal because defendant's Drug Court

sentence is illegal. It also asserts
N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(f)(2)

expressly authorizes its appeal of defendant's non-custodial

Drug Court sentence. We address and reject the State's

arguments in turn.

The State argues defendant's sentence is illegal because

the court did not correctly assess and determine defendant's

danger to the community if she were sentenced to Drug Court as

required by
N.J.S.A. 2C:35-14(a)(9). The State reasons that

because the court failed to correctly assess defendant's danger

to the community in accordance with the statute, the court erred

in finding defendant was eligible for Drug Court under
N.J.S.A.

2C:35-14 and, as a result, the Drug Court sentence was illegal.

7 A-2530-16T2
Our "Code of Criminal Justice,
N.J.S.A. 2C:1-1 to 2C:104-9

[] does not define the term 'illegal sentence,'" but "does

specify the sentence or penalty for each offense and the

authorized dispositions. N.J.S.A. 2C:43-2." State v. Murray,

162 N.J. 240, 246 (2000). Our Supreme Court has defined "an

illegal sentence [as] one that 'exceeds the maximum penalty

provided in the Code for a particular offense' or a sentence

'not imposed in accordance with law.'" State v. Acevedo,
205 N.J. 40, 45 (2011) (quoting Murray, supra,
162 N.J. at 247). A

sentence "not imposed in accordance with law" includes a

"disposition [not] authorized by the Code." Murray, supra,
162 N.J. at 247. However, "mere excessiveness of sentence otherwise

within authorized limits, as distinct from illegality by reason

of being beyond or not in accordance with legal authorization,"

does not render a sentence illegal. Acevedo, supra,
205 N.J. at
46 (quoting State v. Flores,
228 N.J. Super. 586, 592 (App. Div.

1988), certif. denied,
115 N.J. 78 (1989)).

Defendant's Drug Court probationary sentence does not

exceed the ten-year maximum custodial term permitted by the Code

for the second-degree offense for which she was convicted. See

N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6(a)(2). Therefore, the sentence is not illegal

because it does not exceed the punishment authorized under the

Code. Acevedo, supra,
205 N.J. at 45; see also State v. Ancrum,

8 A-2530-16T2

449 N.J. Super. 526, 534 (App. Div.) (stating the Drug Court

sentencing statute, N.J.S.A. 2C:35-14, provides "one of many

dispositions" of offenders under our Criminal Code), certif.

denied, __ N.J. __ (2017); Bishop, supra,
429 N.J. Super. at 539

(finding that a Drug Court sentence "is another authorized

disposition under the Code[]"), aff'd o.b.,
223 N.J. 290 (2015).

Moreover, the sentence was imposed in accordance with the

law because
N.J.S.A. 2C:35-14 expressly authorizes imposition of

the Drug Court sentence here. See Murray, supra,
162 N.J. at
247 (noting a sentence that is not a "disposition authorized by

the Code" is illegal). Defendant's sentence did not violate any

mandatory sentencing conditions. See ibid. (observing that a

sentence is illegal if it violates mandatory sentencing

requirements); see also State v. Baker,
270 N.J. Super. 55, 70

(App. Div.) (finding failure to impose mandatory period of

parole ineligibility rendered sentence illegal), certif. denied,

136 N.J. 297 (1994).

We reject the State's contention that alleged errors in the

court's assessment of defendant's alleged danger to the

community under
N.J.S.A. 2C:35-14(a)(9) rendered the sentence

illegal. A court's assessment of statutory factors in imposing

a sentence relates to the excessiveness of the sentence, "rather

than [its] legality." Acevedo, supra,
205 N.J. at 46 (quoting

9 A-2530-16T2
Flores, supra, 228 N.J. Super. at 596). Thus, any alleged

errors in the court's assessment of the statutory factors under

N.J.S.A. 2C:35-14(a) did not render defendant's sentence illegal

because a Drug Court sentence is an authorized disposition under

the Code. See, e.g., Acevedo, supra,
205 N.J. at 47 (holding

the sentencing court's failure to state reasons for imposition

of consecutive sentences did not render sentences illegal);

Flores, supra,
228 N.J. Super. at 595-96 (finding the court's

alleged improper consideration of aggravating and mitigating

factors and consecutive sentencing guidelines did not result in

illegal sentence).

Defendant's sentence is not illegal. We therefore reject

the State's argument that it has authority to appeal on that

basis. See Ciancaglini, supra,
204 N.J. at 605 (explaining the

State may appeal an illegal sentence).

We next address the State's claim that
N.J.S.A. 2C:44-

1(f)(2) expressly authorizes its appeal of defendant's non-

custodial probationary sentence. See Veney, supra,
327 N.J.

Super. at 460 (finding State has no right to appeal a sentence

unless expressly authorized by statute).
N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(f)(2)

provides that "if the court imposes a non-custodial or

probationary sentence upon conviction for a crime of the first

10 A-2530-16T2
or second degree, such sentence shall not become final for 10

days in order to permit the appeal of such sentence by the

prosecution." See Roth, supra,
95 N.J. at 360 (finding
N.J.S.A.

2C:44-1(f)(2) authorizes the State's appeal of non-custodial

sentences on first or second-degree convictions).

In interpreting N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(f)(2), our "overriding

goal must be to determine the Legislature's intent." Cast Art

Indus., LLC v. KPMG LLP,
209 N.J. 208, 221 (2012) (citation

omitted). "[A] statute's 'words and phrases shall be read and

construed within their context' and 'given their generally

accepted meaning.'" Burnett v. Cty. of Bergen,
198 N.J. 408,

421 (2009) (citing
N.J.S.A. 1:1-1). "To that end, 'statutes

must be read in their entirety; each part or section should be

construed in connection with every other part or section to

provide a harmonious whole.'" Ibid. (quoting Bedford v. Riello,

195 N.J. 210, 224 (2008)).

Applying these principles, we first consider
N.J.S.A.

2C:44-1(f)(2) within the context of the other provisions of

N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1. N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(d) creates a presumption

that first and second-degree offenders will be sentenced to

incarceration. The statute mandates that a court "deal with" a

defendant convicted of a first or second-degree offense by

imposing "a sentence of imprisonment."
N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(d). The

11 A-2530-16T2
presumption of imprisonment, however, may be overcome. Under

N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(d), a first or second-degree offender may be

given a non-custodial or probationary sentence, if "having

regard to the character and condition of the defendant, [the

court] is of the opinion that . . . imprisonment would be a

serious injustice which overrides the need to deter such conduct

by others." Ibid.

The presumption of incarceration for first and second-

degree offenders under
N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(d) "is rarely overcome."

Bishop, supra,
429 N.J. at 539. The circumstances permitting a

finding that there is a "serious injustice" overcoming the

presumption of imprisonment "are extremely narrow" and "should

be applied only under circumstances that are 'truly

extraordinary and unanticipated.'" State v. Jarbath,
114 N.J.
394, 406 (1989) (quoting Roth, supra,
95 N.J. at 358). Where a

sentencing court does not impose the presumed sentence of

incarceration for a first or second-degree offense,
N.J.S.A.

2C:44-1(f)(2) authorizes the State to appeal the non-custodial

or probationary sentence imposed.

The State argues defendant was convicted of second-degree

leaving the scene of a fatal accident,
N.J.S.A. 2C:11-5.1, and

was therefore subject to the presumption of incarceration under

N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(d). The State reasons that because the court

12 A-2530-16T2
imposed the non-custodial sentence of special probation Drug

Court sentence for the second-degree offense, its appeal is

expressly authorized by
N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(f)(2). We disagree.

The State's reliance on
N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(f)(2) is

misplaced. Although
N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(f)(2) authorizes the State

to appeal a non-custodial or probationary sentence for a first

or second-degree offender, we find it does not authorize an

appeal by the State where a court imposes a special probation

Drug Court sentence pursuant to
N.J.S.A. 2C:35-14.

When
N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(f)(2) was enacted in 1978, L. 1978,

c. 95, the only means by which first or second-degree offenders

could be sentenced to a non-custodial or probationary sentence

was if the court made the findings necessary under
N.J.S.A.

2C:44-1(d) to overcome the presumption of incarceration. Thus,

by granting the State the right to appeal a non-custodial or

probationary sentence for a first and second-degree offender,

the Legislature could have only intended to authorize the State

to appeal a court's determination under
N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(d) that

"imprisonment would be a serious injustice which overrides the

need to deter such conduct by others."

Here, the court's imposition of defendant's Drug Court

sentence did not require a determination under
N.J.S.A. 2C:44-

1(d). Defendant's sentence was imposed under a separate

13 A-2530-16T2
statute,
N.J.S.A. 2C:35-14,2 which was not enacted until nine

years after
N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(f)(2). Imposition of a non-

custodial Drug Court sentence under
N.J.S.A. 2C:35-14 requires

an analysis under a wholly different statutory standard than

under
N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(d). Because
N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(f)(2) was

enacted to permit only an appeal of a court's sentencing

determination under
N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(d),3 we find it inapplicable

to an appeal from a determination to impose a non-custodial Drug

Court sentence under
N.J.S.A. 2C:35-14.

In its adoption of N.J.S.A. 2C:35-14, the Legislature

established an exception to the presumption of incarceration for

first and second-degree offenders that is independent of any

determination required under N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(d). Although a

probationary sentence "is almost never appropriate under the

Code's sentencing provisions" for first and second-degree

offenders, a special probation Drug Court sentence "is another

2 L. 1987, c. 106.

3 N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(f)(2) also authorizes the State to appeal a
court's decision to sentence first and second-degree offenders
"to a term appropriate to a crime of one degree lower than that
of the crime for which [the defendant] was convicted." That
portion of the statute has no application here. The court did
not impose the special probation Drug Court sentence based on a
finding defendant should be sentenced to a term appropriate to a
crime one degree lower than the second-degree offense for which
she was convicted. The sentence was imposed based on the
court's determination that defendant was eligible for special
probation under
N.J.S.A. 2C:35-14.

14 A-2530-16T2
authorized disposition under the Code." Bishop, supra,
429 N.J.

Super. at 540-41. "[T]he Legislature created special probation

as a disposition aimed specifically at prison-bound offenders,

who would not be eligible for regular probation." Id. at 540.

For a defendant otherwise eligible for a special probation

Drug Court sentence,
N.J.S.A. 2C:35-14 renders inapplicable the

presumption of incarceration that would otherwise apply to a

defendant under N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(d).
N.J.S.A. 2C:35-14(a)

provides that "[a]ny person who is ineligible for probation due

to a conviction for a crime which is subject to a presumption of

incarceration or a mandatory minimum period of parole

ineligibility may be sentenced to a term of special probation

. . . ."
N.J.S.A. 2C:35-14(a).

The statute further provides that "[n]otwithstanding the

presumption of incarceration pursuant to"
N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(d),

an otherwise qualified defendant may be admitted to Drug Court

provided the court makes findings of nine specified factors.

Ibid. The plain language of
N.J.S.A. 2C:35-14 therefore

establishes a separate and independent standard for the

imposition of a probationary Drug Court sentence for defendants

who would otherwise be subject to the presumption of

incarceration under
N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(d). Bishop, supra,
429 N.J. Super. at 539-40.

15 A-2530-16T2
In its imposition of defendant's Drug Court sentence, the

court did not apply the presumption of incarceration under

N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(d), nor could it. The court never made

findings under
N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(d) permitting defendant to

overcome the presumption of incarceration, and the court was not

required to do so. To the contrary, defendant was sentenced

pursuant to
N.J.S.A. 2C:35-14, which provides an exception to

the presumption of incarceration under
N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(d).

Unlike
N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(f)(2), which permits the State to

appeal a court's determination overcoming the presumption of

incarceration under
N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(d),
N.J.S.A. 2C:35-14 does

not include any authorization for the State to appeal a

defendant's Drug Court sentence. In our view, the absence of

such statutory authorization requires the conclusion that the

State lacks the requisite authority to appeal. See Veney,

supra,
327 N.J. Super. at 460-61.

The State argues
N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(f)(2) authorizes it to

appeal any non-custodial or probationary sentence for a first or

second-degree offender. Acceptance of the State's reasoning

would permit the State to appeal every special probation Drug

Court sentence because a special probation Drug Court sentence

under
N.J.S.A. 2C:35-14 may be imposed only on defendants who

are "ineligible for probation due to . . . conviction[s] for

16 A-2530-16T2
. . . crimes . . . subject to the presumption of incarceration."4

The legislative history of
N.J.S.A. 2C:35-14, however,

undermines the State's position.

A 1999 amendment to
N.J.S.A. 2C:35-14 expressly authorized

the State to appeal the imposition of a special probation Drug

Court sentence under certain circumstances. L. 1999, c. 376.

The amendment provided that a defendant convicted of "any crime

for which there exist[ed] a presumption of imprisonment pursuant

to [N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(d)] or any other statute" was ineligible

for special probation if the State objected to the sentence.

Ibid.; see also N.J.S.A. 2C:35-14(c) (1999). The statute,

however, provided that a court could sentence a person who

committed an offense for which there was a presumption of

imprisonment to special probation, if the court found the

State's objection constituted a "gross and patent abuse of

prosecutorial discretion." Ibid.; State v. Clarke,
203 N.J.
166, 175 (2010). Where the court sentenced a defendant to

special probation Drug Court over the State's objection, the

amendment to
N.J.S.A. 2C:35-14 expressly authorized the State's

right to appeal. Ibid.; see also
N.J.S.A. 2C:35-14(c) (1999).

4
Special probation may also be imposed for individuals whose
convictions otherwise require imposition of a "mandatory minimum
period of parole ineligibility."
N.J.S.A. 2C:35-14(a).

17 A-2530-16T2
The 1999 amendment to
N.J.S.A. 2C:35-14 undermines the

State's position that
N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(f)(2) permits the State

to appeal a special probation Drug Court sentence. If
N.J.S.A.

2C:44-1(f)(2) already authorized the State to appeal special

probation Drug Court sentences for defendants otherwise subject

to the presumption of incarceration under the
N.J.S.A. 2C:44-

1(d), it was wholly unnecessary to amend
N.J.S.A. 2C:35-14 to

authorize a State's appeal of special probation sentences for

convictions otherwise subject to the presumption of

imprisonment.

We presume the Legislature was familiar with the parameters

of its grant of authority to the State to appeal sentences under

N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(f)(2). See State v. Galicia,
210 N.J. 364, 381

(2012) (noting it may be presumed the Legislature is "thoroughly

conversant with its own legislation" (citation omitted)).

Indeed, the 1999 amendment makes express reference to the

N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(d) presumption of incarceration. We also

cannot read the 1999 amendment in a manner rendering meaningless

its grant of authority to the State to appeal special probation

sentences for defendants otherwise subject to the presumption of

incarceration. See State v. Malik,
365 N.J. Super. 267, 278

(App. Div. 2003) ("[I]t is not proper statutory construction to

reach a result which would render a provision completely

18 A-2530-16T2
meaningless."), certif. denied,
180 N.J. 354 (2003). The 1999

amendment to
N.J.S.A. 2C:35-14 was not meaningless. The

amendment included a grant of authority for the State to appeal

special probation Drug Court sentences that did not, and does

not, exist under
N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(f)(2). See In re Expungement

Petition of J.S.,
223 N.J. 54 (2015) ("[A] change of language in

a statute ordinarily implies a purposeful alteration in [the]

substance of the law[.]" (citation omitted)).

Nevertheless,
N.J.S.A. 2C:35-14 does not authorize the

State's appeal of special probation Drug Court sentences. In

2012, the Legislature repealed
N.J.S.A. 2C:35-14(c), and removed

from the statute any grant of authority to the State to appeal a

Drug Court sentence.5 L. 2012, c. 23. Following the 2012

amendment,
N.J.S.A. 2C:35-14 no longer authorizes under any

circumstances the State to appeal a special probation Drug Court

sentence.

We interpret the repeal of N.J.S.A. 2C:35-14(c) as an

unequivocal expression of the Legislature's intent to deprive

the State of statutory authority to appeal special probation

Drug Court sentences. In the absence of any express statutory

5 The 2012 amendments to
N.J.S.A. 2C:35-14 also "directly altered
eligibility requirements and procedures for consideration" of
defendants otherwise subject to a presumption of incarceration
or a minimum period of parole ineligibility. State v. Maurer,

438 N.J. Super. 402, 414 (App. Div. 2014).

19 A-2530-16T2
authority under
N.J.S.A. 2C:35-14 allowing the State's appeal,

see Veney, supra, 327 N.J. Super. at 460-61, or a showing

defendant's sentence is illegal, see Ciancaglini, supra,
204 N.J. at 605, we are convinced we have no jurisdiction to

consider the State's challenge to defendant's special probation

Drug Court sentence.

Dismissed.

20 A-2530-16T2

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