In the Matter of Sheys & Blackburn
Annotate this CaseThe parties were married in August 2005 and were divorced by a New Hampshire court in 2009. When they divorced, both parties lived and worked in New Hampshire. The parties had two children. The parenting plan entered with their divorce decree gave the parties joint decision-making responsibility for the children, who resided primarily with petitioner Mary Sheys. In January 2013, petitioner notified respondent Eric Blackburn that she had to relocate from Manchester to Natick, Massachusetts, because she had been unemployed since November 2012 and had obtained a new job in Natick. After petitioner moved to Natick, respondent filed a motion in which he argued that he should be awarded primary residential responsibility for the children and that petitioner should have been found in contempt for having relocated in violation of the parties’ parenting plan. The trial court denied this relief, finding that although petitioner did not provide respondent with the 60-day notice required by the parties’ parenting plan, she provided him “at least 40-45 days” notice before relocating, which afforded him “ample time to . . . request . . . a hearing as provided by statute.” The court entered a new parenting plan, pursuant to which the parties again had joint decision-making responsibility for the children, who again were to reside primarily with petitioner. Respondent again asked the court to modify the parenting plan and to hold petitioner in contempt. At a scheduled hearing on the contempt allegation, petitioner moved to dismiss, arguing that because she and the children had been Massachusetts residents for a year, and because she had a motion pending in a Massachusetts court regarding the divorce decree and parenting plan, the New Hampshire court lacked jurisdiction. The New Hampshire court dismissed respondent's motion. Respondent appealed the New Hampshire trial court's order granting the motion to dismiss, arguing the trial court’s order was contrary to RSA 458-A:13, I (Supp. 2014), a provision of the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (UCCJEA). Because the Supreme Court agreed with respondent, it reversed and remanded for further proceedings.
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