StoreVisions v. Omaha Tribe o Neb.
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Nebraska Advance Sheets
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281 nebraska reports
award”26 in favor of Falls City which was in fact vacated by
the first appeal. We find no merit in this argument. The district
court properly considered the judgment in favor of Falls City
in determining its percentage relationship to the entire amount
of the judgments initially awarded, and then taxed that percentage of the costs against Falls City because it “failed to carry its
claim and it should bear the costs associated with it.” Dibbern
and Haase also argue that their costs should not have been
apportioned because they were never sued by APEA. But they
do not challenge the finding of the district court that they did
not incur any costs which were unique to them and separate
from those incurred by Stauffer and Ward.
In sum, the district court provided a reasoned and logical
explanation for the manner in which it apportioned the costs
taxed against Falls City. It did not abuse its discretion.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons discussed, we affirm the judgment of the
district court.
Affirmed.
Wright and Miller-Lerman, JJ., not participating.
26
Brief for appellees on cross-appeal at 16.
StoreVisions, Inc.,
appellee, v.
also known as
Omaha Tribe of Nebraska,
Omaha Nation, appellant.
___ N.W.2d ___
Filed March 25, 2011. No. S-10-280.
1. Jurisdiction: Appeal and Error. A jurisdictional question which does not
involve a factual dispute is determined by an appellate court as a matter of law.
2. Motions to Dismiss: Jurisdiction: Appeal and Error. Aside from factual findings, the granting of a motion to dismiss for a lack of subject matter jurisdiction
is subject to a de novo review.
3. Jurisdiction: Final Orders: Appeal and Error. For an appellate court to acquire
jurisdiction of an appeal, there must be a final order entered by the court from
which the appeal is taken; conversely, an appellate court is without jurisdiction to
entertain appeals from nonfinal orders.
Nebraska Advance Sheets
storevisions v. omaha tribe of neb.
Cite as 281 Neb. 238
239
4. Final Orders: Appeal and Error. An order is final for purposes of appeal if it
affects a substantial right and (1) determines the action and prevents a judgment,
(2) is made during a special proceeding, or (3) is made on summary application
in an action after judgment is rendered.
5. Actions: Statutes. A special proceeding includes every special statutory remedy
which is not in itself an action.
6. Actions: Judgments. A judgment rendered by the district court that is merely a
step or proceeding within the overall action is not a special proceeding.
7. Actions: Statutes. A special proceeding entails civil statutory remedies not
encompassed in chapter 25 of the Nebraska Revised Statutes.
8. Actions. Examples of special proceedings include juvenile court proceedings,
probate actions, and workers’ compensation cases.
9. Motions to Dismiss: Actions. A motion to dismiss is merely a step or proceeding
within the overall action, and is not a civil statutory remedy, such as a juvenile
court proceeding, a probate action, or a workers’ compensation case.
10. ____: ____. The denial of a motion to dismiss does not occur within a special proceeding.
11. Final Orders: Appeal and Error. To fall within the collateral order doctrine,
an exception to the final order rule, an order must (1) conclusively determine
the disputed question, (2) resolve an important issue completely separate from
the merits of the action, and (3) be effectively unreviewable on appeal from a
final judgment.
12. Principal and Agent. Apparent authority is authority that is conferred when the
principal affirmatively, intentionally, or by lack of ordinary care causes third persons to act upon an agent’s apparent authority.
13. ____. Apparent authority gives an agent the power to affect the principal’s legal
relationships with third parties. The power arises from and is limited to the
principal’s manifestations to those third parties about the relationships.
14. Principal and Agent: Proof. Apparent authority for which a principal may be
liable exists only when the third party’s belief is traceable to the principal’s manifestation and cannot be established by the agent’s acts, declarations, or conduct.
Manifestations include explicit statements the principal makes to a third party or
statements made by others concerning an actor’s authority that reach the third
party and the third party can trace to the principal.
15. Principal and Agent. For apparent authority to exist, the principal must act in
a way that induces a reasonable third person to believe that another person has
authority to act for him or her.
16. ____. Whether an agent has apparent authority to bind the principal is a factual
question determined from all the circumstances of the transaction.
Appeal from the District Court for Thurston County: Darvid
D. Quist, Judge. Affirmed.
Ben Thompson and Amanda J. Karr, of Thompson Law
Office, P.C., L.L.O., for appellant.
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Michael J. Whaley and Elizabeth M. Skinner, of Gross &
Welch, P.C., L.L.O., for appellee.
Heavican, C.J., Connolly, Gerrard, Stephan, McCormack,
and Miller-Lerman, JJ.
Heavican, C.J.
INTRODUCTION
StoreVisions, Inc., brought an action alleging that the
Omaha Tribe of Nebraska (the Tribe) breached several contracts entered into between the parties. The Tribe filed a motion
to dismiss, arguing that it had not waived its sovereign immunity. The district court denied the motion to dismiss, and the
Tribe appealed.
We conclude that we have jurisdiction over this appeal under
the collateral order doctrine. We further conclude that the Tribe
waived its sovereign immunity, and therefore we affirm the district court’s denial of the Tribe’s motion to dismiss.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Between April 4 and July 21, 2008, StoreVisions, a general
contractor, and the Tribe entered into 11 different agreements
related to plans the Tribe had to expand its casino operations.
Per those agreements, StoreVisions agreed to provide certain
material and labor to the Tribe in return for payment. Prior to
the execution of the contracts, StoreVisions requested that the
Tribe execute a document waiving its sovereign immunity. That
document was signed by the Tribe’s council chairman and vice
chairman at a meeting held on January 7, 2008. The meeting
included representatives of StoreVisions and five of the seven
members of the Tribe’s tribal council.
On October 9, 2009, StoreVisions sued the Tribe in Thurston
County District Court, alleging 11 causes of action related to
the breach of 11 different agreements. On November 19, the
Tribe filed a motion to dismiss, which indicated that the Tribe
was appearing “for the limited purpose of this motion,” and
further alleged that “[t]he Court does not have jurisdiction of
the subject matter of the action because the action is against a
sovereign tribal government that has not waived its immunity
from suit in this action . . . .”
Nebraska Advance Sheets
storevisions v. omaha tribe of neb.
Cite as 281 Neb. 238
241
Following a hearing at which the district court permitted
both parties to admit affidavits into evidence, the district court
denied the Tribe’s motion to dismiss, concluding that the chairman and vice chairman had apparent authority to act on behalf
of the Tribe and that therefore the Tribe had waived its sovereign immunity. The Tribe appealed.
Initially, the Nebraska Court of Appeals dismissed without opinion the Tribe’s appeal, concluding that the denial of
a motion to dismiss was not a final order. The Tribe filed a
motion for rehearing, contending that the district court’s order
was reviewable because it raised the issue of the Tribe’s sovereign immunity. The Court of Appeals reinstated the Tribe’s
appeal, reserving the jurisdictional issue. We then moved this
case to our docket pursuant to our authority to regulate the
dockets of this court and the Court of Appeals.
ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR
The Tribe assigns, restated and consolidated, that the district
court erred in (1) concluding that the Tribe was not entitled to
sovereign immunity and (2) converting the Tribe’s motion to
dismiss into a motion for summary judgment without proper
notice to the Tribe.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
[1] A jurisdictional question which does not involve a factual dispute is determined by an appellate court as a matter
of law.
[2] Aside from factual findings, the granting of a motion to
dismiss for a lack of subject matter jurisdiction is subject to a
de novo review.
ANALYSIS
Jurisdiction: Final Order.
We are first presented with a jurisdictional question. On
appeal, StoreVisions contends that the Tribe’s appeal is not
See Neb. Rev. Stat. § 24-1106(3) (Reissue 2008).
Williams v. Baird, 273 Neb. 977, 735 N.W.2d 383 (2007).
See City of Fremont v. Kotas, 279 Neb. 720, 781 N.W.2d 456 (2010).
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from a final order, and further argues that contrary to the
Tribe’s assertions, the collateral order doctrine is inapplicable.
We consider each in turn.
[3] For an appellate court to acquire jurisdiction of an appeal,
there must be a final order entered by the court from which the
appeal is taken; conversely, an appellate court is without jurisdiction to entertain appeals from nonfinal orders.
[4] An order is final for purposes of appeal if it affects a
substantial right and (1) determines the action and prevents
a judgment, (2) is made during a special proceeding, or (3)
is made on summary application in an action after judgment
is rendered.
We note that the order denying the Tribe’s motion to dismiss
did not determine the action or prevent a judgment, because the
denial allowed StoreVisions’ action to proceed. In addition, the
order was not made on summary application in an action after
judgment was rendered. Thus, the initial question presented in
this case is whether the district court’s order was made during
a special proceeding.
[5-8] A special proceeding includes every special statutory
remedy which is not in itself an action. A judgment rendered by
the district court that is merely a step or proceeding within the
overall action is not a special proceeding. Generally, a “special
proceeding” entails civil statutory remedies not encompassed
in chapter 25 of the Nebraska Revised Statutes. Examples of
special proceedings include juvenile court proceedings, probate
actions, and workers’ compensation cases.
[9,10] A motion to dismiss is merely a step or proceeding
within the overall action, and is not a civil statutory remedy,
such as a juvenile court proceeding, a probate action, or a
Williams v. Baird, supra note 2.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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storevisions v. omaha tribe of neb.
Cite as 281 Neb. 238
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workers’ compensation case.10 The Court of Appeals has specifically concluded that the denial of a motion to dismiss does
not occur within a special proceeding.11 We agree and conclude
that this appeal does not present us with a final order for the
purposes of § 25-1902.
Jurisdiction: Collateral Order.
[11] Indeed, the Tribe appears to be in agreement that the
district court’s order is not final. Instead, the Tribe asks this
court to address its appeal under the collateral order doctrine,
an exception to the final order rule.12 To fall within the doctrine, an order must (1) conclusively determine the disputed
question, (2) resolve an important issue completely separate
from the merits of the action, and (3) be effectively unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment.13 We set forth these elements in Hallie Mgmt. Co. v. Perry.14
Applying the above factors to the order denying the Tribe’s
claim of sovereign immunity, we initially note that the first
two factors are met in this case. The order in question was an
order denying the Tribe’s motion to dismiss on the ground that
the Tribe was entitled to sovereign immunity. In denying the
Tribe’s order, the district court explicitly concluded that the
Tribe had waived its immunity in this case. In addition, the district court’s order is separate from the merits of the case, which
deals with whether the Tribe breached a series of contracts
entered into between the Tribe and StoreVisions.
We also conclude the third factor—that the order be effectively unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment—is met
in this case. Federal courts, including the U.S. Supreme Court,
which have addressed this issue have concluded that like
claims of qualified or absolute immunity, a claim of sovereign
immunity is based in immunity from suit and is not simply a
10
11
12
13
14
See, Qwest Bus. Resources v. Headliners–1299 Farnam, 15 Neb. App. 405,
727 N.W.2d 724 (2007); Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-1902 (Reissue 2008).
See id.
See Williams v. Baird, supra note 2.
Id.
Hallie Mgmt. Co. v. Perry, 272 Neb. 81, 718 N.W.2d 531 (2006).
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defense against liability.15 As such, those courts have concluded
that such orders are immediately reviewable.16
StoreVisions relies on our decision in Williams v. Baird17
to argue that this court should not review a nonfinal order
under the collateral order doctrine if questions of fact must be
decided and that this case presents such issues. The basis for
this portion of our holding in Williams was the Supreme Court’s
conclusion in Mitchell v. Forsyth18 and Johnson v. Jones19 that
immunity appeals interfere less with the final judgment rule
when limited to issues of law.
While the propositions StoreVisions cites are properly stated,
this case does not present any disputed questions of fact. The
parties are in general agreement about what happened; the issue
is whether that set of facts gave rise to a waiver of immunity.
Thus, this court is presented with a question of law and not a
question of fact. As such, this court has jurisdiction under the
collateral order doctrine to consider the Tribe’s appeal.
Waiver of Sovereign Immunity.
Having concluded that the district court’s order overruling
the Tribe’s motion to dismiss is reviewable under the collateral
order doctrine, we turn next to the question of whether the
Tribe waived its sovereign immunity so as to make it amenable
to suit by StoreVisions.
In its brief, the Tribe focuses on the fact that it is a separate sovereign with immunity from suit. But contrary to the
15
16
17
18
19
Puerto Rico Aqueduct and Sewer Authority v. Metcalf & Eddy, Inc., 506
U.S. 139, 113 S. Ct. 684, 121 L. Ed. 2d 605 (1993); Burlington Northern
& Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Vaughn, 509 F.3d 1085 (9th Cir. 2007); Osage Tribal
Council v. U.S. Dept. of Labor, 187 F.3d 1174 (10th Cir. 1999); Tamiami
Partners v. Miccosukee Tribe of Indians, 63 F.3d 1030 (11th Cir. 1995).
Cf., Prescott v. Little Six, Inc., 387 F.3d 753 (8th Cir. 2004); Sault Ste.
Marie Tribe v. State of Mich., 5 F.3d 147 (6th Cir. 1993).
Id.
Williams v. Baird, supra note 2.
Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 105 S. Ct. 2806, 86 L. Ed. 2d 411
(1985).
Johnson v. Jones, 515 U.S 304, 115 S. Ct. 2151, 132 L. Ed. 2d 238
(1995).
Nebraska Advance Sheets
storevisions v. omaha tribe of neb.
Cite as 281 Neb. 238
245
Tribe’s discourse in its brief, there is no dispute that the Tribe
is a separate sovereign and generally entitled to immunity from
suit.20 Nor is there any dispute that this immunity exists unless
limited by Congress21 or waived by the Tribe.22 And no one
disputes that any waiver of that immunity must be expressly
made.23 The only question in this case is whether such waiver
was made.
The Tribe’s primary contention is that its sovereign immunity can be waived only by a resolution of the tribal council
and not by the independent acts of the chairman and vice chairman of the council. The Tribe contends that its bylaws provide
no authority to the officers of the Tribe, save those delegated
by the tribal council. As a result, according to the Tribe, the
document signed in January 2008 purporting to act as a waiver
was ineffective since the chairman and vice chairman cannot
waive the Tribe’s immunity.
Rush Creek Solutions v. Ute Mountain Tribe,24 a case cited by
the district court in its order, is instructive. In that case, Rush
Creek Solutions, Inc., and the Ute Mountain Ute Tribe (Ute
Tribe) entered into a contract wherein Rush Creek Solutions
would provide the Ute Tribe with computer software and support. The Ute Tribe’s chief financial officer (CFO) signed the
contract on behalf of the Ute Tribe. The contract included
a provision in which the Ute Tribe waived its immunity
from suit.
The Ute Tribe later allegedly breached the contract, and
Rush Creek Solutions brought suit. The Ute Tribe filed a
motion to dismiss, alleging that although the CFO had the
authority to enter into the contract, he lacked authority to
waive the Ute Tribe’s immunity. The Ute Tribe’s constitution
20
See, e.g., Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 98 S. Ct. 1670, 56
L. Ed. 2d 106 (1978).
21
Id.
22
Native American Distrib. v. Seneca-Cayuga Tobacco, 546 F.3d 1288 (10th
Cir. 2008).
23
Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, supra note 20.
24
Rush Creek Solutions v. Ute Mountain Tribe, 107 P.3d 402 (Colo. App.
2004).
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and bylaws were similar to those in this case; namely, the Ute
Tribe’s council had the authority to prescribe the duties of the
Ute Tribe’s officers, but was silent concerning the authority
regarding the waiver of sovereign immunity.
The trial court did not reach the issue of whether the CFO
actually had the authority to exercise a waiver of the Ute
Tribe’s immunity, instead concluding that at the very least, the
CFO had the apparent authority to do so. The court noted that
[a]t all relevant times, the CFO was authorized to enter
into contracts on behalf of the [Ute] Tribe. The contract
at issue here designates the [Ute] Tribe as the customer.
The CFO signed the contract on behalf of the customer on a line above the statement, “authorized signature.” The [Ute] Tribe’s Constitution and personnel policy
are silent concerning procedures for signing contracts,
waiving sovereign immunity, or authorizing persons to
sign waivers.25
On this basis, the district court concluded that the Ute Tribe’s
motion to dismiss should be denied.
In arguing that Rush Creek Solutions is inapplicable, the
Tribe contends that it is not appropriate to apply agency principles in a sovereign immunity analysis. While the Tribe cites to
cases purporting to support that proposition, we have reviewed
those cases and find them inapplicable. We adopt the reasoning of Rush Creek Solutions and apply agency principles, specifically the principles of apparent authority, to the purported
waiver in this case.
[12-14] Apparent authority is authority that is conferred
when the principal affirmatively, intentionally, or by lack of
ordinary care causes third persons to act upon an agent’s
apparent authority.26 Apparent authority gives an agent the
power to affect the principal’s legal relationships with third
parties. The power arises from and is limited to the principal’s
manifestations to those third parties about the relationships.27
25
Id. at 407.
Koricic v. Beverly Enters. - Neb., 278 Neb. 713, 773 N.W.2d 145 (2009).
27
Id.
26
Nebraska Advance Sheets
storevisions v. omaha tribe of neb.
Cite as 281 Neb. 238
247
Stated another way, apparent authority for which a principal
may be liable exists only when the third party’s belief is traceable to the principal’s manifestation and cannot be established
by the agent’s acts, declarations, or conduct.28 Manifestations
include explicit statements the principal makes to a third party
or statements made by others concerning an actor’s authority that reach the third party and the third party can trace to
the principal.29
[15,16] For apparent authority to exist, the principal must
act in a way that induces a reasonable third person to believe
that another person has authority to act for him or her.30
Whether an agent has apparent authority to bind the principal
is a factual question determined from all the circumstances of
the transaction.31
The record in this case shows that the separate waiver signed
by the chairman and vice chairman was entered into in the
presence of five of the seven members of the tribal council at
the Tribe’s headquarters. In addition to the waiver, the Tribe’s
chairman, vice chairman, or both, executed all other contracts
between the Tribe and StoreVisions. And a review of the
record shows that in resolution No. 08-74, the tribal council
acknowledged that it had entered into these previous contracts
with StoreVisions. Moreover, because the Tribe’s constitution
and bylaws are silent as to the method of waiving sovereign
immunity, it was reasonable for StoreVisions to rely upon
the words and actions of the Tribe with respect to the waiver
of immunity.
We note that no source of tribal law beyond the constitution
and bylaws was presented to the district court, nor was the district court asked to take judicial notice of any sources. As such,
this court will not judicially notice, or otherwise seek out, any
authority that might support either position in this litigation.
28
Id.
Id.
30
Id.
31
Id.
29
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The situation presented by this appeal is virtually identical
to the one presented in Rush Creek Solutions. One difference
is that, in this appeal, the Tribe and StoreVisions entered into a
separate waiver prior to entering into the underlying contracts.
As noted, this separate waiver was signed in the presence of
five of the seven members of the tribal council and lends even
more weight to an appearance that the signatories to the document—the chairman and vice chairman—were vested with the
authority to waive the Tribe’s sovereign immunity.
Like the Rush Creek Solutions court, we decline to address
the question of whether the chairman and vice chairman had
actual authority to waive the Tribe’s sovereign immunity,
instead concluding that the two had apparent authority to do so
based upon the undisputed facts. The Tribe’s first assignment
of error is without merit.
Conversion of Motion to Dismiss to Motion
for Summary Judgment.
In its second and final assignment of error, the Tribe contends that the district court erred in converting its motion to
dismiss into a motion for summary judgment without proper
notice. The Tribe cites to Neb. Ct. R. Pldg. § 6-1112(b) and
Crane Sales & Serv. Co. v. Seneca Ins. Co.32 in support of this
argument. Both are inapplicable, and the Tribe’s argument is
without merit.
The basis of the Tribe’s assignment of error is § 6-1112(b),
which provides in relevant part:
If, on a motion asserting the defense numbered (6) to
dismiss for failure of the pleading to state a claim upon
which relief can be granted, matters outside the pleading are presented to and not excluded by the court, the
motion shall be treated as one for summary judgment and
disposed of as provided in §§ 25-1330 to 25-1336, and all
parties shall be given reasonable opportunity to present all
material made pertinent to such a motion by statute.
32
Crane Sales & Serv. Co. v. Seneca Ins. Co., 276 Neb. 372, 754 N.W.2d
607 (2008).
Nebraska Advance Sheets
Riggs v. Nickel
Cite as 281 Neb. 249
249
The Tribe’s motion to dismiss is not based in § 6-1112(b)(6),
but instead on § 6-1112(b)(1) for lack of jurisdiction over the
subject matter. Thus, this language in § 6-1112(b) and this
court’s opinion in Crane Sales & Serv. Co. are inapplicable.33
We additionally note that when the Tribe filed its motion,
that motion indicated it would be supported by affidavit, and
in fact, such affidavits were presented by the Tribe. We therefore question whether the Tribe was truly without notice as to
whether the motion to dismiss would be converted to a motion
for summary judgment.
The Tribe’s final assignment of error is also without merit.
CONCLUSION
The decision of the district court is affirmed.
Wright, J., not participating.
33
Affirmed.
Cf. Washington v. Conley, 273 Neb. 908, 734 N.W.2d 306 (2007).
K enneth R iggs
and
LeAnn R iggs, husband and
Gary Nickel, appellee.
appellants, v.
wife,
___ N.W.2d ___
Filed March 25, 2011. No. S-10-459.
1. Summary Judgment. Summary judgment is proper when the pleadings and
evidence admitted at the hearing disclose that there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact or as to the ultimate inferences that may be drawn from those facts
and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
2. Summary Judgment: Appeal and Error. In reviewing a summary judgment, an
appellate court views the evidence in the light most favorable to the party against
whom the judgment is granted and gives such party the benefit of all favorable
inferences deducible from the evidence.
3. Trial: Witnesses: Evidence. Where a party without reasonable explanation testifies to facts materially different concerning a vital issue, the change clearly being
made to meet the exigencies of pending litigation, such evidence is discredited
as a matter of law and should be disregarded. In applying this rule, the important
considerations are that the testimony pertains to a vital point, that it is clearly
apparent the party has made the change to meet the exigencies of the pending case, and that there is no rational or sufficient explanation for the change
in testimony.
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