Robinson v. Dustrol Inc.
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Nebraska Advance Sheets
robinson v. dustrol, inc.
Cite as 281 Neb. 45
45
CONCLUSION
Erickson was not prejudiced by the trial court’s error in failing to instruct the jury that manslaughter is a lesser-included
offense of intentional child abuse resulting in death. The trial
court did not err in denying Erickson’s motion to change venue,
and his sentence is not excessive. Therefore, the judgment of
the trial court is affirmed.
Affirmed.
Charles F. Robinson,
appellant, v. Dustrol, I nc.,
a foreign corporation doing business
in Nebraska, appellee.
___N.W.2d___
Filed January 28, 2011.
No. S-10-045.
1. Directed Verdict: Evidence. A directed verdict is proper at the close of all the
evidence only when reasonable minds cannot differ and can draw but one conclusion from the evidence, that is to say, when an issue should be decided as a matter
of law.
2. Motions for New Trial: Appeal and Error. A motion for new trial is addressed
to the discretion of the trial court, whose decision will be upheld in the absence
of an abuse of that discretion.
3. Jury Instructions: Appeal and Error. Whether a jury instruction is correct is a
question of law, which an appellate court independently decides.
4. Negligence: Proof. The burden of proving negligence is on the party alleging it,
and merely establishing that an accident happened does not prove negligence.
5. Negligence. One is not negligent simply by failing to anticipate the negligence
of another.
6. Trial: Jury Instructions: Appeal and Error. In order to appeal a jury instruction, an objection to the proposed instruction must be made at the trial level.
7. Appeal and Error. An issue not presented to or passed on by the trial court is not
appropriate for consideration on appeal.
Appeal from the District Court for Saunders County: Mary
C. Gilbride, Judge. Affirmed.
Adam J. Sipple, of Johnson & Mock, for appellant.
Stephen G. Olson II and Kristina J. Kamler, of Engles,
Ketcham, Olson & Keith, P.C., for appellee.
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Heavican, C.J., Connolly, Gerrard, Stephan, McCormack,
and Miller-Lerman, JJ.
Heavican, C.J.
INTRODUCTION
Charles F. Robinson filed a suit for negligence against
Dustrol, Inc. Following a jury trial, judgment was entered for
Dustrol. Robinson appeals. We affirm.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Accident
This case involves injuries allegedly sustained by Robinson
following a motorcycle accident which occurred in Wahoo,
Nebraska, where he lived. Robinson had spent the evening
of July 6, 2005, at a motorcycle show in Omaha, Nebraska.
Robinson testified that while at the show, he had some food
and drank one beer. According to Robinson, following the
show, he and his friends went to another establishment for
pizza. While at that establishment, Robinson ate some pizza
and drank another beer. Upon returning to Wahoo, the group
again stopped at a local establishment, where, Robinson testified, he drank a soda.
Robinson left for home on his motorcycle around midnight
on July 7, 2005. He was riding on Fifth Street in Wahoo, heading westbound toward the intersection of Fifth Street and U.S.
Highway 77. Robinson testified that the traffic light was red
as he was headed toward the intersection, but that the light
turned green prior to his reaching the intersection. As such,
Robinson proceeded through the intersection at 20 to 25 m.p.h.
Robinson testified that he did not observe any warning signs or
other indication that construction was being conducted on the
road ahead.
Robinson testified that upon entering the intersection of Fifth
Street and Highway 77, his motorcycle dropped upon hitting an
“edge” or a “mill cut.” Robinson indicated that his motorcycle
“bucked” and that he began applying the brakes. However,
according to Robinson’s testimony, he was unable to bring his
motorcycle to a complete stop before hitting the “west edge” of
the intersection. Robinson then testified:
Nebraska Advance Sheets
robinson v. dustrol, inc.
Cite as 281 Neb. 45
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The motorcycle made contact with the west edge, there
was a big bump, and the back end of the motorcycle
started to come up. At the same time, I’m lunging forward, hanging onto the handlebars. About that time, then
I let go of the brake instantaneous, and the bike popped
up over the ledge. I’m trying to get my rear end down. In
other words, my butt and legs back over the bike down.
I was up over, and I’m trying to get back down to catch
the floorboard. I stuck my left foot out to try to brace the
bike. The bike at that time is starting to fall over.
....
. . . The bike started to fall over. It weighs about 800
pounds, and once it started to go over, I tried putting my
foot down. I couldn’t stop it from going over because I
couldn’t back down in time.
....
. . . I fell on the left side. I was hanging onto the handle
bars, and it launched me over.
Robinson also testified that he hit his head on the concrete.
Robinson testified that he went home following the accident
and woke his wife to tell her about what had happened. He
returned to the scene in the morning to speak with representatives from the various contractors working on the road construction project. The next day, July 8, 2005, Robinson went
to the local emergency room due to pain in his neck, head,
shoulders, and left foot. Since that time, Robinson has been
treated by several physicians and has had surgery, but reportedly continues to suffer from pain which he attributes to the
July 7 accident.
Construction
The stretch of Highway 77 upon which Robinson claimed to
be injured was, at the time of the accident, under construction.
Pavers, Inc., was the general contractor chosen by the Nebraska
Department of Roads to resurface this portion of the roadway.
Pavers had at least two subcontractors on this job: Trafcon,
Inc., which provided construction signs and traffic control, and
Dustrol, which did the milling, or grinding, of the surface to
remove the old asphalt layer.
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The milling process is accomplished by using specialized
equipment to remove, in this case, about 21⁄2 inches of old
asphalt from the surface of the road. In removing this layer,
“edges” are left around utilities like manholes and water valves,
as well as in intersections, because once the milling is complete, the milled surface sits at a level below the utility or cross
street. Those edges can sometimes be of enough depth that they
require “ramping,” a process by which the edges are tapered
to make the transition between the two surfaces more gradual.
And the depth of these edges can sometimes be greater than the
depth of asphalt being milled from the surface.
On July 6, 2005, Dustrol was milling the asphalt surface of
Highway 77, while Pavers was working behind Dustrol to ramp
the utilities. There are three different materials that can be used
for ramping: excess millings, which is the debris left after the
milling process; “hot mix,” which is the material used to pave
the roadway; and “cold mix,” a sticky material which can also
be used to fill potholes. In this case, Dustrol’s milling foreman,
Neil Thoene, testified that it was his understanding that Pavers
was going to ramp all of the vertical edges. Thoene also testified that Dustrol did not have hot or cold mix onsite, that the
excess millings were being hauled away from the site, and that
Pavers did have hot mix available onsite and, in fact, was using
that to ramp utilities.
At the conclusion of the workday, Dustrol pulled its equipment off the road and the crew began equipment maintenance offsite. Because Pavers was still ramping, a few Dustrol
employees remained behind to flag traffic until Pavers was finished. Thoene left for the day around 8 p.m. and drove through
the intersection of Fifth Street and Highway 77 on his way
home. He did not notice that the edges had not been ramped.
Thoene also indicated that he was not driving through the intersection to inspect for such edges.
In contrast to Thoene’s testimony, Pavers’ general manager
testified that his crew was responsible for ramping the manholes in the center of the street, but when asked whether Pavers
was “doing any type of ramping work with the side streets,” he
responded, “I do not believe we were, no.” He further testified
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robinson v. dustrol, inc.
Cite as 281 Neb. 45
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that Pavers was using hot mix to ramp the manholes and that
it had the ability to use the same hot mix to ramp Fifth Street
at Highway 77.
Justin Grusing, a manager with Dustrol, also testified. He
acknowledged that as a subcontractor, Dustrol had a responsibility to comply with the contract between Pavers and the
Department of Roads, and that Dustrol, through its milling,
created the dangerous condition. Grusing testified that the contract between Pavers and the Department of Roads provided
that ramping would be done, but did not state who would do
it. Grusing also testified that although there was “nothing in
writing,” it was his understanding that Dustrol was only milling
the road surface and that Pavers would be doing the ramping
because it had hot mix available. Grusing also indicated that
based on his experience, Pavers would want to do the ramping,
because it was in its best interests to control the ramping so
that it was simpler for Pavers to clean up the ramping when it
was later removed. Grusing additionally noted that it was general practice to not split the ramping: whoever did the ramping
did all of it.
Lawsuit
Robinson filed an amended complaint against Dustrol,
Pavers, and Trafcon, on April 7, 2008. In the amended complaint, Robinson alleged that the defendants were negligent in
failing to (1) warn of the danger of the mill cut; (2) properly
block the millcut from motor vehicle traffic; (3) conform with
applicable standards, regulations, or guidelines relating to the
dropoff resulting from the mill cut; (4) sufficiently separate
the construction work from the general public; (5) adequately
supervise the construction activity; and (6) recognize and correct the pavement edge condition.
A jury trial was held with respect to Robinson’s allegations.
Pavers and Trafcon were not litigants and did not participate
in this trial. The jury was instructed as follows with regard to
Dustrol’s alleged negligence:
Robinson . . . claims that Dustrol . . . was negligent in one
or more of the following ways:
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1. In failing to recognize and correct the dangerous pavement edge condition that existed at the time of
the accident.
2. In failing to properly warn [Robinson] of the danger
associated with the millcut.
3. In failing to conform with reasonable standards in
the road construction industry regarding the protection
of drivers from edge drop-offs and large bumps on the
road surface.
The jury found that Robinson had not met his burden and
entered judgment for Dustrol. Robinson appeals.
ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR
On appeal, Robinson assigns, renumbered, that the district
court erred in (1) overruling Robinson’s motion for directed
verdict on the issues of negligence and proximate cause; (2)
overruling Robinson’s motion for new trial on the basis that
the verdict was not supported by sufficient evidence; (3) giving instructions Nos. 2, 13, and 15 and thus submitting to the
jury the issues of negligence and proximate cause; (4) defining
negligence in instruction No. 10 as what a “reasonably careful
person,” rather than a “reasonably careful contractor,” would
do; and (5) failing to instruct that Dustrol was not excused
from its duty to ramp the edges even if it was more convenient
for Pavers to ramp the edges.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
[1] A directed verdict is proper at the close of all the evidence only when reasonable minds cannot differ and can draw
but one conclusion from the evidence, that is to say, when an
issue should be decided as a matter of law.
[2] A motion for new trial is addressed to the discretion of
the trial court, whose decision will be upheld in the absence of
an abuse of that discretion.
Walton v. Patil, 279 Neb. 974, 783 N.W.2d 438 (2010).
Stonacek v. City of Lincoln, 279 Neb. 869, 782 N.W.2d 900 (2010).
Nebraska Advance Sheets
robinson v. dustrol, inc.
Cite as 281 Neb. 45
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[3] Whether a jury instruction is correct is a question of law,
which an appellate court independently decides.
ANALYSIS
Directed Verdict and Motion for New Trial
In his first assignment of error, Robinson argues that the
district court erred in denying his motion for a directed verdict
and instead submitting the case to the jury. Robinson’s second
assignment is related: He contends the district court erred in
denying his motion for new trial on the basis that the jury
verdict was not supported by sufficient evidence. In particular,
Robinson argues that certain uncontroverted facts establish
Dustrol’s negligence. These facts, as well as Dustrol’s response
to them, will be discussed in more detail below.
Robinson first argues that “Dustrol had knowledge the milling creates excessive vertical edges that are dangerous and
require ramping if too deep” and that “Dustrol had knowledge
the intersection was controlled by a traffic signal, increasing
the risk presented by excessive unramped edges.” Dustrol
responds that
[h]aving knowledge that dangers exist and certain conditions increase risks associated with those dangers does not
conclusively prove the issue at hand — whether Dustrol
knew or should have known that the milling performed
on the project in question created excessive vertical edges
that Dustrol was responsible for ramping.
The record shows that Dustrol knew that milling could create excessive vertical edges and that those edges can be dangerous. But the record also shows that Dustrol had reason to
believe that Pavers was responsible for ramping those edges.
Though there was no agreement in writing, Dustrol representatives testified that Pavers and Dustrol had an oral agreement
that Pavers would ramp the vertical edges. Moreover, Dustrol
did not have the necessary materials on hand to ramp vertical
Sinsel v. Olsen, 279 Neb. 38, 777 N.W.2d 54 (2009).
Brief for appellant at 15.
Brief for appellee at 15.
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edges—excess millings were being hauled away, and Pavers,
not Dustrol, had access to hot mix. And Pavers employees
were still present on the jobsite ramping vertical edges when
Dustrol’s employees were finished milling and began maintenance in preparation for the next day’s work. Finally, there
is no evidence that Dustrol was responsible for reopening the
roadway to the traveling public. For these reasons, reasonable
minds could differ as to whether Dustrol knew or should have
known that the dangerous vertical edge was left unramped
when the road was reopened.
Robinson next asserts that “Dustrol had the means to ramp
any excessive edges with the day’s old millings and had done
so many times in the past.” While the record shows that
Dustrol had used excess milling to ramp at other jobs in the
past, the record also shows that excess millings were being
hauled away from this particular site. Thus, reasonable minds
could also differ as to whether Dustrol had the ability to ramp
the vertical edges.
Robinson next contends that the following facts are uncontroverted: (1) “When Dustrol’s foreman left the job site on July
6, the edges were between two and a half and four and [a] half
inches at the intersection”; (2) “[h]aving done the milling that
day, Dustrol knew or should have known of the four and a half
inch edges”; and (3) “Dustrol’s foreman knew a four and a half
inch edge constituted a dangerous condition and was contrary
to state regulations.”
We first note that as concluded above, reasonable minds
could differ as to whether Dustrol left the jobsite the evening of July 6, 2005, aware that the roadway was left in a
dangerous condition. Moreover, the evidence at trial was that
the mainline of the intersection—where the traveling public
drove—was at a vertical depth of 21⁄2 inches, not the 41⁄2 inches
measured at the curb. In fact, the chief of police for the city
of Wahoo testified that he drove through that intersection on
his motorcycle the morning of July 7. He did not believe a
Brief for appellant at 16.
Id.
Nebraska Advance Sheets
robinson v. dustrol, inc.
Cite as 281 Neb. 45
53
d
angerous condition existed and therefore did not close the
road, although he had the power to do so. It is clear that reasonable minds could differ as to the conclusions one could
draw from this evidence.
Robinson also asserts the evidence shows that Thoene,
Dustrol’s milling foreman, knew the edge was contrary to state
regulations. But Thoene’s only statement to that effect was
that he thought the “State spec is anything over two inches
has to be ramped.” Robinson failed to introduce evidence as
to any actual state regulations, thus no such regulations were
presented to the jury. And the district court declined to give an
instruction with respect to the violation of a state regulation.
Robinson does not now appeal from this failure.
Robinson next argues that “Dustrol’s foreman was one of
the last workers to leave the job site and was both required and
empowered by contract to correct the hazard by using Dustrol
employees to ramp it, by calling Pavers to ramp it, or by calling Trafcon for signage” and that “[t]hough responsible under
the contract to cause the placement of signs warning of existing hazards, Dustrol failed to request or otherwise cause such
signage to be placed.”
Under the subcontract with Pavers, Dustrol was required to
provide a competent person who was capable of indentifying
existing and predictable hazards and authorized to take corrective action to eliminate such hazards. Moreover, Dustrol
agreed to take “responsibility to protect [its] work . . . by
lights, barricades, and signs so as to avoid injury or damage.”
But the contract did not explicitly require Dustrol to ramp any
vertical edges. The record shows that as the general contractor,
Pavers was responsible for overseeing its subcontractors, and
that Dustrol was not generally in the position to oversee other
contractors or subcontractors on a job.
Conversely, Pavers did actually contract with the Department
of Roads that “someone on that job” would ramp vertical
edges. The record demonstrates that at the very least, reasonable minds could differ as to whether Pavers had agreed to do
Id.
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this ramping itself. In addition to the reasons set forth above,
the record also shows that it was in Pavers’ best interests to do
the ramping itself because it was simpler for Pavers to clean up
that ramping when it was later removed. Again, based on the
above, reasonable minds could differ as to the conclusion that
could be drawn from this evidence.
Robinson also asserts that “Dustrol’s foreman was expected
to inspect the area for hazards before leaving the job site, drove
his vehicle through the intersection, but failed to notice the
excessive edges because he assumed Pavers would ramp them
because they had been ramping the manhole covers.” Again,
reasonable minds could differ as to this fact. Thoene did drive
through the jobsite and admittedly did not notice the vertical
edge. But a review of the record shows Thoene complied with
his job duties by making sure that all of the excess millings and
other debris were removed from the road, as well as Dustrol’s
equipment, and that Dustrol’s work had been otherwise completed satisfactorily. Reasonable minds could find that Thoene
did not further inspect Pavers’ work, because Pavers was still
working when Dustrol finished its milling work.
Robinson also contends that “[a]fter a subsequent investigation, Dustrol gave its foreman a written warning for failing
to address the hazard and instead assuming, absent a formal
agreement, Pavers would do the ramping.”10 But a review of the
record on this point shows that a Dustrol representative indicated the written warning was used as a “learning tool.” There
was no finding that Thoene and his crew were actually responsible for ramping the edge, only a finding that Thoene should
have observed the absence of adequate ramping. We note that
finding this “warning” was some proof of negligence provides
no incentive to contractors to improve their safety records. Put
another way, just because it might not have legally been negligence does not mean that Dustrol still does not have an interest
in preventing accidents. Thus, again, reasonable minds could
differ as to the conclusions to be drawn from this evidence.
10
Id.
Id.
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robinson v. dustrol, inc.
Cite as 281 Neb. 45
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Finally, Robinson argues that “Dustrol admitted after investigating the accident it had no information suggesting Pavers
was responsible.”11 But this is not an accurate recitation of the
record. Robinson refers to the portion of the record wherein
Dustrol representatives admit there was no written contract
detailing who was responsible for ramping vertical edges.
There was sufficient evidence presented that Pavers would be
responsible for ramping vertical edges, and in fact, Pavers was
undisputedly ramping utilities in the roadway. There was also
evidence that at jobsites such as this, there was generally not
a split in ramping duties—if you ramped some vertical edges,
then you ramped all vertical edges.
[4,5] The burden of proving negligence is on the party alleging it, and merely establishing that an accident happened does
not prove negligence.12 As is demonstrated by a review of the
record, following the introduction by Robinson of his case in
chief, Dustrol introduced contrary evidence that it was Pavers’
action or inaction that was the sole proximate cause of this
incident. The record shows that it would be reasonable for a
fact finder to conclude that Pavers had agreed to ramp all vertical edges and thus proximately caused the accident. Moreover,
one is not negligent simply by failing to anticipate the negligence of another13; thus Dustrol should not be found to have
proximately caused the accident simply because it failed to
anticipate that Pavers might be negligent.
Because reasonable minds could differ as to the conclusions
to be drawn from the evidence presented, Robinson was not
entitled to a directed verdict and his assignment of error to the
contrary is without merit.
For these same reasons, we also conclude that the district
court did not err in overruling Robinson’s motion for a new
trial. Therefore, Robinson’s second assignment of error is also
without merit.
11
12
13
Id. at 17.
Rasmussen v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 278 Neb. 289, 770 N.W.2d
619 (2009).
Shupe v. County of Antelope, 157 Neb. 374, 59 N.W.2d 710 (1953).
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Instructions Nos. 2, 10, 13, and 15
In his third assignment of error, Robinson assigns that the
district court erred in giving instructions Nos. 2, 13, and 15.
Robinson does not allege that these three instructions were
an incorrect statement of the law, but, rather, argues that the
instructions were in error because the strength of the evidence
against Dustrol suggested that a directed verdict on the issues
covered by these instructions should have been granted. As we
have concluded above, Robinson was not entitled to a directed
verdict, thus it was not error for the district court to submit the
issue of negligence to the jury.
[6] In his fourth assignment of error, Robinson assigns that
the district court erred in giving instruction No. 10, which
defines negligence as what a “reasonably careful person”
would do. Robinson argues instead that the definition should
be what a “reasonably careful contractor” would do. However,
Robinson failed to object to the giving of this instruction. In
order to appeal a jury instruction, an objection to the proposed instruction must be made at the trial level.14 Because no
objection was made, we need not further address Robinson’s
a
rgument.
Robinson’s third and fourth assignments of error are without merit.
Proposed Instruction
[7] In his fifth and final assignment of error, Robinson
argues that the district court erred in failing to instruct the jury
that Dustrol was not excused from its duty to ramp the edges
even if it was more convenient for Pavers to do so. However,
Robinson failed to request this instruction. An issue not presented to or passed on by the trial court is not appropriate for
consideration on appeal.15 Therefore, we need not consider
Robinson’s fifth and final assignment of error.
14
15
Breeden v. Anesthesia West, 265 Neb. 356, 656 N.W.2d 913 (2003).
Countryside Co-op v. Harry A. Koch Co., 280 Neb. 795, 790 N.W.2d 873
(2010).
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shepherd v. chambers
Cite as 281 Neb. 57
CONCLUSION
The decision of the district court is affirmed.
Wright, J., not participating.
Jocelyn Shepherd,
57
Affirmed.
appellant, v. P hyllis Chambers,
director of the Nebraska P ublic Employees
R etirement Systems, and Denis Blank,
chairperson of the Nebraska P ublic
Employees R etirement
Board, appellees.
___N.W.2d___
Filed January 28, 2011.
No. S-10-157.
1. Administrative Law: Judgments: Appeal and Error. A judgment or final order
rendered by a district court in a judicial review pursuant to the Administrative
Procedure Act may be reversed, vacated, or modified by an appellate court for
errors appearing on the record. When reviewing an order of a district court under
the Administrative Procedure Act for errors appearing on the record, the inquiry
is whether the decision conforms to the law, is supported by competent evidence,
and is neither arbitrary, capricious, nor unreasonable.
2. Statutes: Appeal and Error. Statutory interpretation presents a question of law.
When reviewing questions of law, an appellate court resolves the questions independently of the conclusions reached by the trial court.
3. Constitutional Law: Appeal and Error. A constitutional issue not presented to
or passed upon by the trial court is not appropriate for consideration on appeal.
4. Appeal and Error. Errors argued but not assigned will not be considered on
appeal.
Appeal from the District Court for Lancaster County: K aren
B. Flowers, Judge. Affirmed.
Timothy J. Cuddigan, Sean D. Cuddigan, and Jessica Levine
Finkle, of Brodkey, Cuddigan, Peebles & Belmont, L.L.P., for
appellant.
Jon Bruning, Attorney General, and Lynn A. Melson for
appellees.
Heavican, C.J., Connolly, Gerrard, Stephan, McCormack,
and Miller-Lerman, JJ.
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