J M v MONTANA HIGH SCHOOL ASSOCIA

Annotate this Case

Download PDF

No. 93-463 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA :.?I., JR. individually an3 by his parents, an3 next friends, J.M. and S . X . , APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Second Judicial District, In and for the County of Silver Bow, The Honorable James E. Purcell, Judge presiding. COUNSEL OF RECORD: For Appellants: Jock 0. Anderson, David C. Dalthorp, Gougn, Shanzhan, Johnson & Katerman, Helena, Montana For Respccdents: lavid J . Klng, Butte, Montana Submitted on Briefs: 3ecided: ??arch 13, 1394 Way 5, 1994 This is an appeal from the Second judicial District Court, Silver Bow County, granting a preliminary injunction against the defendants, the Montana High School Association (XMA), the Board of Control of HHSA, and Butte Central High School (Butte Central), enjoining them from enforcing NHSA's maximum eligibility rules against the plaintiff. participation MHSA and the Board of Control appealed, asking this Court to dissolve the injunction. We reverse, remand and dissolve the injunction. ISSUES This appeal involves two issues which relate to whether the District Court erred in applying the statutory rights and renedies of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 20 U.S.C. 5 1400 et. seq., (IDEA), to enjoin MHSA from enforcing its eligibility rules against the plaintiff, J.M., Jr. The two issues are as follows: 1. Whether rights arising under IDEA afford protections to stud en:^ who m y be learning disabled but uho do not have a written Individualized Education Program (IEP), and are not otherwise participating in a special education prograin prescribed under IDEA. 2. lihether the principles enunciated in T.H. v. Montana High School Ass'n. (D. Mont., Sept. 24, 1992), CV-92-150-BLG-JFB, apply to students who have exhausted their allotted eligibility under MHSA's rules. BACKGROUND This case involves an eighteen year old Butte Central st~.ident 2 : h claims learnin2 disabilities, and who ran afoul of 143S.4'~ ic maximum parr-icipation eligibility requirements. Lnder those rules, he was ineligible to play football or to wrestle during his senior year of high school. MHSA is a non-profit incorporated under the laws of Kontana. association Merr.bership in MHSA is xroluncary, and is comprised of public and private high schools in Kontana, including 3utte Central. MHSA has the exclusive authority and responsibility for supervising and controlling all phases of interscholastic programs among its member schools. MHSA prohibits member schools interscholastic from allowing any athletics if that student student to is participate in ineligible to participate under MHSA rules and bylaws, and it has the power to sanction and penallze member schools which allow ineligible students to participate. The two MESA rules at issue in this case are called "maximum participation rules," in that they delineate the maximum semesters or seasons of eligibility for student participants in interscholastic contests. The first rule prohibits students from parricipating in any MHSA regulated activity for more than eight semesters. The "eight senester" rule provides: No student shall be eligible to participate in an Association Contest who has been in attendance in any An secondary school more than eight (8) semesters. attendance of tln'enty (20) days during a semester shall canstitute one senester's attendance under this section. . . . Fo-.tana High School 3-ss'n. Cfficial Handbook (i993-1991), By-La;;s, .Z.rticle 11, Section (9), p . 19. The s e c a d rule, or "four season" rule, provides: No student shall be eligible to participate in an Association Contest during more than four seasons in any one sport. . . . Nontana High School Ass'n. Official Handbook (1993-1994), By-Laws, Article 11, Section (ll), p. 20. Inasmuch as students gain physical and mental naturity each season that they participate in sports and thereby gain the advantage of size, strength, and speed over younger students, MHSA established these maximum participation rules t3 promote safety, interscholastic competition, the opportunity to compete, and to insure that students do not delay graduation for athletic purposes. The student involved in this case, J.M., Jr., had participated in four seasons of football prior to the 1993 fall season. Jr.'s J.N., high school football career began in 1989, when he played freshman football at Helena High School. In late October of 1989, J.X., Jr. and his family moved to Missoula. d i ~ ~ : ,,,culties, Because of educational J.M., Jr. finished the remainder of the 1989-90 school year in the eighth grade. In the summer of 1990, J.M., Jr. moved vith his family to Butte. He enrolled as a freshman in Butte Central, a grivate school, and played football for Butte Central for the 1990, 1991, 1992, seasons, thereby playing four seasons of football. Because J . . , Jr. had already participated in fcsr seascns of football, he was ineligible to play football in the fall of 1993 at the connencexent of his senior year, by reason of the MSSA four seasons rule. J.M., Jr. also wrestled for3;tte Central, co~~eting during the spring semesters of 1991, 1992 and it apFears, althongh not completely clear froa the record, spring semester of 1993. Secause of the eight semester rule, J.X., Jr. would have been ineligible to compete in spring semester wrestling durinq school year 1993-94. In January 1993, in anticipation of J.M., Jr.'s porentiai ineligibility, his parents requested a formal ruling from MHSA regarding their son's eligibility to play football and to wrestle, for the 1993-94 sctool year. executive director, Dan In February 1993, MHSA, through its Freund, ruled that because the fall sexester of 1993 would be J.M., Jr.'s fifth season of fall sports, and the spring semester would be his ninth semester of school, J . . Jr. would be ineligible to participate in any interscholastic activities for the 1993-94 school year. appealed this decision to MHSA's J.., Jr.'s parents Board of Control, the governing body responsible for the interpretation and enforcement of MHSP rules Subsequent co an eligibility hearing held in mid-April, 1993, the Eoard of Control denied J.M., Jr.'s request to waive the four seascn rule for the fall senester of the 1993-94 school year, but apprcved the request for a waiver of the eight sexester rule for the spring semester. The Board of Control based its decision on the fact that J.M., Jr. had already competed in four seasons of fall spcrts, but had only corrpeted in three seasons of sprlng Sports. Tl-e follo.ding chart illustrates J.M., Jr.'s participation in h g h schoci athletics and the expiration of his eligibility under EKA's four season and eight semester rules. 1989-1990 1990-1991 1991-1992 1992-1993 (9tin/8th grade) (9th grade) (10th grade) (11th grade) Total Semesters/Seasons of eligibility before 1993-1994 school year 4 J . Y . , Jr. was nat found to be ineligible for any other reason, i.e., because of age limitations, or academic performance. He was denied eligibility solely because his eligibility had expired under the four season rule. On September 3 , 1993, J.M., Jr.'s parents filed a complaint in District Court alleging, primarily, that he had constitutional rig3ts and statutory rights under IDEA which participate in fall semester sports. allowed hin to On this same date, J.M., Jr.'s parents moved for, and were granted, a temporary restraining order, restraining KHSA and the Board of Control from enforcing its rules against J.M., Jr., thereby pernitting him to participate in fifth season football during the pendency of the order. ' h e defendants moved to dissolve the temporary restraining order, and an evidentiary hearing was held on September 9 , 1993. After considering the parties' testimony and other evidence, the District C o ~ r t filed on September 20, 1993, its Amended Findings of Fact, ~onclusiocsof Law and Order dated Septenber 10, 1993, xhich ~reiiminarilyen3oined !WSA from enforcing its four seasons rule against ?,M., jr. and from imposing sanctions against W t t e Central, pending a further good faith, meaningful hearing by X X A icto the propriety of waiving the rule. The District Court also crdered H3SA to reconsider its action as it affects J.E., Jr., in wrestling, so as not to deny him permission to begin practice for h-restling tluring the fall semester. The complaint also raised other claims not at issue here. The District Court based its order on the protections afforded ky IDEA, and the holding set forth in T.H. v. Montana High Scho-l Ass'n. (D. Mont., Sept. 24, 1992), CV-92-150-BLG-JFB. appeal from the District Court's order and Defendants request that the preliminary injunction be dissolved. STANDARD OF REVIEW Granting a preliminary injunction is within a trial court's discretion, 2nd we will not interfere unless manifest abuse is shown. Frane v. Frame (1967), 227 Mont. 439, 444, 710 P.2d 655, 659. However, no discretion is involved when the court arrives at a conclusion of law, and we review the district court's conclusions of law to determine whether the district court's interpretation of the lab 1s correct. 245 Yr: o,. Steer, Inc. v. Departnent of Revenue (1990), 470, T 4 , 8 0 3 P.2d 601, 603. In the instanr case, be conclude that the District Court's interpretation of the law h-as erroneoss and that, accordingly, the preliminary injunction xas improperly granted. DISCUSSION The District Court found thar. J.M. , Jr. had rights under IDEA. p,:S A l, i ..-.. guarantees that. all child.ren with disabilities have available to them a free appropriate public education and related services to meet their u n i q ~ eneeds. IDEA provides federal funding 20 U.S.C. 5 1400(c). for states which provide students with disabilities, special education services according to the Act. 20 U.S.C. 55 l400(b) (9), 1412, 1413. The Act is implenented through both the "State education agency" and through "local education agencies," the public school system. 20 U. S. C. 5 5 :431(a) ( 7 ) & ( 8 ) , 1412(6), 34 C.F.R. 5 300.2 (b) (1992). The State and local education agencies are required to guarantee procedural safeguards for handicapped children, in providing a ap2ropriate public education. 20 U.S.C. 5 1415(a). free and Central avong the safeguards is the development of a written IEP for each child. 20 U.S.C. 5 1401(a)(20), 34 C.F.R. 5 300.130(a), W.G. v. Board of Trustees of Target Range School D. (9th Cir. 1992), 960 F.2d 1479, 13. '3 The IEP is a formal, written statement wnich delineates the dlsabled srudent's unlque educational c~rricului-,and related services. 20 U.S.C. goals, g objectives, 1401(a)(20), 34 C.F.R. 5 300.335 (1992). IDZA and the Code of Federal Regulations specify the mechanism by :~;hich a persan is deternined to be learning-disabled and by i.,:hich he or she qualifies for education-related benefits under IDEA. In surmary, that process includes: (1) the identification af the stcdent potentially in need of special education services; (2) the appointment of a Child Study Team (CST) which determines e t h e r the student qualifies for such services, 34 C.F.R. 95 300.531, .532, .540 (1992); (3) the addition of the parents of the student to the CST, assuming the student is initially found to be qualified by the CST, 34 C.F.X. 300.345 (1992); (4) the determination of the student's special needs and services which are necessary t o provide the student with an appropriate education, 34 C.F.R. 5 5 300.341 -.345 (1992); and, (5) the incorporation of the student's special needs and necessary services into a formalized, xritten IEP which controls the student's curriculum, 34 C.F.R. $ 5 300.341, .346 (1992). I~pcrtantly, IDEA's regulations require that a student receive special education related benefits only pursuant to an IEP. 34 C.F.R. $ 5 300.340, .342(5) (1)(1992). Under the federal regulations implenenting IDEA, "[aln individualized education program nust: (1) Be in effect before special education and related services are prov2de.j. to a child." 34 C.F.R. 5 300.?42(b) (1)(1992). The requirexent of a written IEP, insures that those students truly in need of special education receive services designed to meet their individual needs. 20 U.S.C. 5 5 1401(a)(20), 303.340 - .349 (1992). 1412(2)(c), 34 C.F.R. It is clear, that a formal, written IE? developed pursuant to the Act is a critical component of IDEA. In fact, the Act requires that an IEP be in effect, before special education services are provided to a child. 34 C.F.R. 9 5 303.340, .342 (1992). In its decision, thc District Court relied on T.H. v. Montana Xiqh School Ass'n. (D. Mont., Sept. 24, 1992), CV-92-150-BLG-JF3. In that case, a 19 year old learning disabled high school student became ineligible to play sports during his senior year because of ?1HSAfs "age rule," codified at ~ r t i c l e 11, 5 8 of the MHSA By-Laws. That rule prohibits any student who becomes 19 years of age on or before midnight of August 31, of a given year, from participating in any interscholastic sports contest. T.H. applied for a waiver of the age rule based upon his special needs as a learning disabled student. T H (D. Mont., .. MHSA denied the waiver, Sept. 24, 1992), CV-92-150-BLG-JFB at 5. and the student sought a preliminary injunction in Federal District Court. T.H. (D. Mont., Sept. 24, 1992), CV-92-150-3LG-JFB at 1, 6. The Federal District Court granted the preliminary injunction, holding that the student had a federally protected right under IDEA, as his IEP reauired that he participate in interscholastic sports as a motivational tool. CV-32-150-BLG-JFR at 9. (D. Mont., Sept. 24, l992), The Federal District Court in T.H., found that the guarantee to a free and appropriate public education and related services for handicapped children, extends to interscholastic sports when such participation is included as a conponent 3f their IEP. T.H. (D. Mont., Sept. 24, 1992), CV-92- 150-EX-JFB at 9. As the Federal Court observed in student has no constitutional T a ,generally .. right to speaking, a participate in interscholastic sports, it is a privilege which may be withdrawn by the school or by a voluntary association whose rules the school has agreed to follcw. T.H. (D. Mont., Sept. 24, 1992), CV-92-150-EL2';- 3FB at 9. (Citations omitted.) Furthermore, limitations on maximum participation have been generally upheld. eligibility for Smith v. Crim (Ga. 1957), 240 S.E.2d 884; Mitchell v. Louisiana High School Athletic '.ssln. (5th Cir. 1970), 430 F.2d 1155; California Interscholastic federation"^. Jones (Cal. App. 1988), 243 Cal. Rptr. 271; Alabama High School Athletic Ass'n. v. Medders (Ala. 1984), 456 S.2d 284: Furtaugh v . Nyquist (N.Y. Sup. 1974), 358 N.Y.S.2d 595; David v. Louisiana High School Athletic Ass'n. (La. App. 1971), 244 S.2d 292; Burtt v. Nassau County Athletic Ass'n. N.Y. S.2d 172. (N.Y. Sup. 1979), 421 In State ex rel. Bartmess v. Board of Trustees of School Dist. No. 1 (1986), 223 Mont. 269, 726 P.2d 801, we determined that academic eligibility standards as a condition of participation in extracurricular activities were lawful. However, once interscholastic sports are offered, they acquire the protection from an unconstitutional deprivation. Bartmess, 726 P.2d at 804-605. "[":hen In T.H. the Federal District Court concluded that participation in interscholastic sports is included as a component of an IEP as a 'related service', see 20 U.S.C. 9 1401 (l), (17), the 'privilege' of competing in interscholastic sports is transformed into a federally protected right." T H (D. Icont., .. Sect. 24, 1992), CV-92-150-ELG-JFB at 9. The Federal District Court also ruled that requires that the KHSA conduct an "due process individualized inquiry to determine whether any of the four stated concerns underlying the age rule are implicated 2nd violated by [the learning disabled student's] participation in interscholastic sports, before it may deny a waiver of that rule." T.H. (D. Mont., Sept. 24, 1992), CV- As a result of the decision in m, MHSA's Board of Control established a rule codifying rhe hearing process for addressing the concerns underlying the age rule. The rule provides that the student requesting the hearing prove that: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) the student does not create a safety risk to other players, and the student does not skew the overall competitiveness of the particular activity(ies) for which the student will participate, and the student's participation will not result in the exclusion of other eligible players, and the student meets all other criteria necessary for participation in MHSA activities, and the student has an IEP in compliance with OPI requirement standards, and the petition for a hearing must be initiated sufficiently in advance of the affected school year to allow the KHSA a reasonable opportunity to make an inforned decision .... Montana High School Ass'n. Official Handbook (1993-1994), By-Laws, Article VII, Section (?), p. 30-31. In the instant case, relying on T H , . . the District Court found that, although J.M., Jr. did not have a foraalized IEP, there was evidence indicating that there was an unwritten IEP in effect for 4 , Jr. at Butte Central which had been formulated by his teachers, principal, counselcr, private doctor and parents. Therefore, the District Court concluded that J.M., Jr. had rights under IDEA. The District Court granted the preli2inary injunction alloving J.H., Jr., to participate in a fifth season of football and, since the XHSA hearing process developed pursuant to T H had .. nor been available to J.M., Jr., the District Court also directed KHSA to hold an individualized inquiry into the propriety of waiving the maximum participation rules with respect to J.M., Jr. At the outset, we note ., that T H involved a maximum participation rule based on age, unlike this case, where the maximum participation rules are based on the nunher of seasons played or number of semesters attended. However, since the basic rationale for maximum participation rules and the legal principles discussed are the same, we conclude that distinction is not material for purposes of this opinion. Furthermore, whether J.M., Jr., is learning disabled and, therefore, eligible for special education benefits and services under IDEA, and if so, whether Butte Central, the Butte Public School District or the State, (the latter two entities not being parties to this litigation), are required to provide those special education benefits and services to him, is not before us and, we do not address those issues here. Respondents argue that J.M., Jr. was entitled to have special education and related services provided to him at public expense pursuant to the provisions of IDEA, 20 U.S.C. They also claim that education agency, i they had sought f a written § 1413(a) (4)(B)(i). involvement of the local IEP would have been developed. Assuving, arguendo, that thelr conclusions are correct, it remains tnat J . . Jr.'s parents did not seek the involvement of the appropriate State or local education agencies; that the statutory and administrative mechanism for identifying J.M., Jr., as learning-disable2 and qualifying him for IDEA benefits an3 services was not implemented; and that a formal, written IEP requiring his participation in interscholastic sports was not adopted to govern J.M., r .s curriculum. Although J.M., Jr., had a specialized educational progrart, he was not participating in a formal, written ZEP established under the statutory and administrative mechanism mandated by IDEA and its impleneLting regulations. That point is dispositive for purposes of the issues addressed in this opinion. The Federal District Court's grant of the preliminary injunction in T H and its requirement for a further .. individualized inquiry was premised on the fact that the disabled student in that case had been placed in a formal, written IEP tailored to meet his particular needs, in accordance with IDEA. T.WL (D. Mont., Sept. 24, 1992), CV-92-150-BLG-JFB at 4. One important and integral component of that IEP was a requirement that he participate in interscholastic sports. 24, 1992), CV-92-150-BLG-JFB at 4. T H (D. Mont., Sept. .. The coxbination of those two factors led the Federal District Court to conclude the "privilege" of competing in interscholastic sports was transformed into a federally protected right which could not be abrogated, absenc a case-specific factual inquiry into T.H.'s waiver request and denial cn a sufficient evidentiary basis. T H (D. Mont., Sept. 24, .. 1992), CV-92-150-BLG-JFB at 9-10. That the Federal District Court xas duly mindful of the potentially serious ramifications of its decision and the necessity for carefully following the mechanism for adopting and ccnsidering the components zf the fcrmal IEE is evident in the Court's decision: As an aside, and as a final matter, the Court would strongly encourage the Fairview High School, and other schools developing IEPs under the IDEA, to exercise prudence when including as a component of an IEP any activity for which a student is ineligible because of the KHSA age rule or any other factor beyond the control of the school. By doing so, the school is potentially naking a promise it simply cannot keep, and is setting students like T.H. up for disappointment and failure when and if valid restricrions on eligibility are ultimately enforced. T H (D. Mont., Sept. .. 24, 1992), CV-92-150-BLG-JFB at 13. We conclude that the District Court's reliance on instant case was error. The student in =, m,in the had a written IEP developed according to the requirements of IDEA that required his participation in interscholastic sports as an integral component, h-hereasJ.M., Jr. did not. to elevate J.M., Jr.'s It was improper for the District Court privilege of participating in interscholastic sports to the level of a federally protected right under IDEA and to afford him the individualized inquiry referenced in Tn, . . and codified in Article VII, Section (4) of MHSA Official Handbook's 3y-laws, when J.M., Jr. had not followed the statutorily and adninistratively mandated mechanism for identifying and qualifying him under IDEA and for developing his f o r ~ a l , r i t t e ~ w IFF, assuming that he did qualify. Moreover, whether his formal, written IEP would have mandated J.M., Jr's, participation in interscholastic sports as an integral component of the prograr,, thereby elevating his privilege to participate to the status of a federally ~rctected right cith concomitant individualize:! hearing rights, is simply academic unless an3 until J.K., Jr. first qualifies for ICEA benefits and services and until a formal IEP incorporating that requirement is, i? fact, adopted. Here, J.M., Jr. seeks to avail himself of rights under a particular statutory scheme even before he has complied with the requirements of those very laws which, arguably, might bring those rights into existence. J.M., Jr., has put the cart before the horse. Furthermore, NHSA is not a State or local education agency as defined under IDEA. JFB at 12-13. T H (D. Mont., .. Sept. 24, 1992), CV-92-150-BLG- MHSA has no obligation under IDEA to identify or evaluate J.M., Jr.'s special education needs. reluctant to impose upon MHSA the Therefore, we are obligation to conduct an inZividualized hearing, with the potential for further litigation if the hearing decision is not to the liking of the respondents, absent J.M. , Jr. 's request for waiver being prenised on a federally prctected right to participate in interscholastic sports contests under a formal, written IEP developed in accordance with IDEA ~andates. Accordingly, we hold that it was improper for the District Court to grant the preliminary injunction and to require E I S A to conduct an individualized inquiry into the propriety of waiving its ~ a x i m u m partici2ation rules when J.X., Jr. had not first established a federally protected right to participate in interscholastic sports in contravention of those rules. The disseEt contends that the issues presented on appeal are m ~ c tbecause the Diszrict Court's restraining order was only in effect during the fall semester of the 1993-1994 school i7ear, and it is now April, 1994. We disagree and conclude that although the time has lapse3 on the Districc Court's preliminary injunction, the mootness doctrine does not bar our review. Aside from the fact that J.M., Jr., did not argue that we should not rule on the merits of this appeal because of mootness, we also note that given the amount of tine inherent in the litigation process, and given our reluctance to entertain original proceedings and special writs except under extracrdinary circumstances, it would be nearly impossible for any case such as this to ever reach this Court, via the usual litigation/appeal process, within the tine during which the injuaction was in effect. To mechanically apply the doctrine of mootness under such circurstances would effectively deny the remedy of appeal. Where MHSA will, undoubtedly, be faced with future challenges to its maximum participation rules on issues and facts such as those presented here, it has a right to a final decision of this Court on the merits of its appeal. For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the District Court's order . dated Septe~ber 10, 1393 and , dissolve the preli~inary 1n3unction. To the extent that other issues rerain to be resolved under respondent's conplaint, we l e Concsr: i 17 Justice William E. Hunt, Sr., did not participate in this action. Justice Terry N. Trieweiler dissenting. I dissent from the majority opinion. The District Court's preliminary injunction pertained only to athletic activities during the fall semester of the 1993-94 academic year. As I review the majority's proposed opinion, it is April 18, 1994. The District Court's restraining order is no longer in effect. The issues raised on appeal are moot. The majority's opinion is merely advisory and has no direct bearing on the respective interests of the parties who are before the Court. Therefore, I would dismiss the appeal and not reach the merits in this case. For these reasons, I dissent from the majority's decision to issue an opinion which has no effect on the rights of either party in this case.

Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.

This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.