MATTER OF J D W
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NO. 94-140 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 1994 IN THE MATTER OF J.D.W., A Youth Under the Age of Eighteen Defendant and Appellant. APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Twenty-first Judicial District, In and for the County of Ravalli, The Honorable Jeffrey H. Langton, Judge presiding. COUNSEL OF RECORD: For Appellant: Edmund F. Montana Sheehy, Jr., Cannon & Sheehy, Helena, For Respondent: Hon. Joseph P. Mazurek, Attorney General, Barbara C. Harris, Assistant Attorney General, Helena, Montana: George H. Corn, Ravalli County Attorney, Hamilton, Montana Submitted on Briefs: Decided: Filed: July G, 1994 October 4, 1994 Justice Fred J. Weber delivered the Opinion of the Court. J.D.W. First appeals the order of the Youth Court of the Twenty- Judicial District, Ravalli County, transferring this proceeding concerning criminal conduct to district court for treatment of the youth as an adult. We vacate the Order of the Youth Court dated February 9, 1994, and remand to the Youth Court for a hearing on the matter. The sole issue on appeal is whether the Youth Court abused its discretion by ordering the proceeding transferred to District Court. On January 6, the Ravalli County Attorney filed a 1994, petition alleging J.D.W. alleged participation to be a delinquent youth based on his in criminal activity that took place in November and December of 1993. October 24, 1993. criminal (common offenses J.D.W. was sixteen years old on The State alleged that J.D.W. had committed including accountability for criminal mischief scheme), two counts of burglary, accountability for another burglary, conspiracy to commit arson, possession of explosives and three counts of obscuring the identity of a machine. J.D.W. admitted in an interview which took place on December 28, 1993, that he was involved in or participated in each of three separate burglaries of the Porter, Eden and Starr residences, which took place on November 12, respectively. November 26 and December 27, 1993, Also in that interview, J.D.W. told law enforcement authorities about an explosive device that had been constructed at another youth's home. This device was highly explosive and was 2 subsequently dismantled by law enforcement. Testimony at the hearing indicated that the bomb may have been built to blow up one of the three homes burglarized by the youths. Numerous firearms were stolen in each of the three burglaries. In one of the homes, the guns were taken from a safe which was accessed with the aid of power tools. The "machines" involved in the charges of altering machines included a .357 Coonan automatic handgun, a Smith & Wesson Model 422 automatic, and a Colt MK - IV automatic. These were not the only firearms stolen in the burglaries. The Youth Court determined that the residential burglaries committed by J.D.W. and two other youths were premeditated. One of the homes was ransacked during the burglary and had extensive damage done to it during the course of the burglary. In addition, there was testimony at the hearing on this matter that the youths may have intended to sell the guns, after altering the serial numbers, to students at Corvallis School. The firearms were not loaded when stolen, but were loaded at the time of confiscation. Concurrently with the petition alleging delinquency, the State moved the Youth Court to transfer the matter for prosecution in District Court rather than Youth Court, alleging that the offenses committed by J.D.W. were premeditated and of such seriousness and maqnitude that the protection of the community needed to be insured for a longer time beyond that which could be afforded under the Youth Court Act. When charged with the above offenses, J.D.W. was on Youth 3 Court probation rifle, terms be which of in his for a resulted probation possession in for of 1992 shooting the blinding the or of 1992 to use of offense a in connection incarcerated in the with this Kalispell an were firearm, youth eye. that except proceeding Juvenile with The J.D.W. when J.D.W.' s father, and that he obey all laws. revoked another was Detention not hunting he to with has is Center air pertinent probation and an been currently pending its abuse its discretion by ordering transferred to District Court? the outcome. Did the Youth proceedings in this The youth Montana court certain to Court matter Youth Court district circumstances Act court set forth authorizes for in transfer treatment 5 41-5-206, as of an MCA, cases adult as under follows: (1) After a 41-5-206. Transfer to criminal court. petition has been filed alleging delinquency, the court may, upon motion of the county attorney, before hearing the petition on its merits, transfer the matter of prosecution to the district court if: i?i)*the*youth charged was 16 years of age or more at the time of the conduct alleged to be unlawful and the unlawful act is one or more of the following: iEj burglary 45-6-204; iGj or iossession iJj attempt, as acts enumerated in (1) (a) (ii) (1) ; aggravated of explosives burglary as as defined defined in in 45-8-335: defined in 45-4-103, of any of the subsections (l)(a)(ii)(A) through idj the court finds upon the hearing of all relevant evidence that there is probable cause to believe that: (i) the youth committed the delinquent act alleged: (ii) the seriousness of t h e o f f e n s e and the protection of the community require treatment of the youth beyond that afforded by juvenile facilities; and (iii) the alleged offense was committed in an 4 from aggressive, violent, or premeditated manner. (2) In transferring the matter of prosecution to the district court, the court may also consider the following factors: (a) the sophistication and maturity of the youth, determined by consideration of the youth's home, environmental situation, and emotional attitude and pattern of living: (b) the record and previous history of the youth, including previous contacts with the youth court, law enforcement agencies, youth courts in other jurisdictions, prior periods of probation, and prior commitments to juvenile institutions. However, lack of a prior juvenile history with youth courts will not of itself be grounds for denying the transfer. i4j . Upon transfer to district court, the judge shall make written findings of the reasons why the jurisdiction of the youth court was waived and the case transferred to district court. J.D.W. inferences contends from the that evidence the Youth presented Court through incorrectly the drew testimony of Deputy Bruce Hennell, who essentially opined that the burglaries, possession of explosives and conspiracy to commit arson were serious offenses involving loaded firearms which were going to be sold at the Corvallis School. He further contends that the court incorrectly decided that it did not need any evidence on the adequacy of the juvenile facilities and incorrectly assumed that the juvenile facilities were inadequate based on the average length of stay at Pine Hills School for Boys (Pine Hills). J.D.W. maintains that by concluding that the juvenile facilities in Montana are inadequate to deal with a juvenile offender such as J.D.W., the Youth Court completely ignored the rehabilitative purpose of the Youth Court Act and instead focused only on retribution. 5 To begin our discussion, we emphasize that one of the stated purposes of the Montana Youth Court Act is to remove from youth committing violations of the law the element of retribution and to substitute therefor a program of supervision, care, rehabilitation, and, in appropriate cases, restitution as ordered by the Youth Court. Section 41-5-102(2), MCA. Therefore, our review of the Youth Court's Order transferring this case to District Court, where J.D.W. will likely be placed in the custody of the Department of Corrections rather than the Department of Family Services, necessarily must ensure that the Youth Court has determined after careful consideration that the available juvenile facilities in Montana are inadequate in this case. The overall standard of review applicable here is whether the Youth Court abused its discretion in ordering the transfer of the case to District Court for prosecution. In the Matter of J.A. (1992) I 255 Mont. 214, 216, 841 P.2d 1130, 1131. findings of As to specific fact relied on by the Youth Court in making the decision to transfer the case to District Court, the standard is whether such findings are clearly erroneous according to the test set forth in Interstate Prod. Credit Ass'n v. DeSaye (1991), 250 Mont. 320, 323, 820 P.2d 1285, 1287. J.A., 841 P.2d at 1131. The first prong of the DeSave test addresses whether the findings are supported by substantial evidence. In accord with § 41-5-206(l)(d)(i), MCA, J.D.W. conceded there was probable cause to believe he committed the alleged offenses, but argued that the seriousness of the offense and protection of 6 the community did not require treatment beyond that afforded by juvenile facilities. 20G(l)(d)(iii), premeditated acts were premeditated His argument pursuant to § 41-5- MCA, that the offenses were not committed in a manner, is that the Youth Court's finding that the "premeditatedB1 manner." is not the same thing as "in a We agree with the State that this is a distinction without a difference. In addition, we conclude that there is substantial evidence in the record that the offenses were premeditated. The critical determination we are concerned with on appeal, however, is § 41-5-206(l)(d)(ii), MCA--whether the seriousness of the offense and the protection of the community require treatment of the youth beyond that afforded by juvenile facilities. The Youth Court stated: THE COURT: Well, in that regard, I'll take judicial notice of the nature of the Youth Court system and specifically the fact that the most I can do in Youth Court is make an indefinite commitment to DFS. I can't order DFS to retain anybody for any length of time . . . Whereas in adult court, I have more power over the Department of Corrections, and I can make definite commitments timewise to the Department of Corrections, but I simply don't have that ability anymore under the statutes with the Department of Family Services. Furthermore, I'll take notice of the fact that . . . the commitment has to be indefinite, but the average length of time that youths are kept at Pine Hills, as I recall, [is] in the range of three to four months, and it's rare that they're kept longer. At this point, there are really no other youth detention facilities in the state of Montana that are available. So I don't think I need any evidence. The Youth Court took judicial notice of the history of Youth Court commitments in general. No evidence was presented as to whether 7 the treatment and the to be Youth afforded inability the average versus the length of the transferred set forth by the of the (1975) I 167 requirement situation because of that the support the is demonstrated The the 228, now hearing State to are Matter Court MCA, Youth of show argued Court the was 9, that the the 5, offense. inadequate that that need for treatment facilities. The Court had facilities juvenile J.D.W. of discussed in a the similar jurisdiction contended there was facilities the very nature of the of the youth beyond no were offenses available stated: We cannot agree. To assume that juvenile facilities are inadequate from the mere fact that the youth is charged with a serious offense, completely ignores the rehabilitative purpose of the Act . . . and is tantamount to a judicial admission the juvenile facilities in Montana are inadequate to cope with the hard core youth offender. We will not do this. . . . there was no inquiry into the important question of whether Stevenson could be rehabilitated 8 in Stevenson youth because were helpful waived The the findings 41-5-206(l)(d)(ii), § P.Zd the there proceedings treating issue In beyond under if no for In or system conclusion same the commitment the us. 538 a Furthermore, this J.D.W.'s J.D.W. incarcerated court Hills emphasized inadequate are before seriousness presented inadequate. system where transfer evidence juvenile to after Pine for incarcerate be criminal Court. addressing what factual the Youth question to J.D.W. could from court Hills of Mont. 220, of Pine case adequate the system at under Court cases addressing time this be contrary, court the in would Court time out Youth Prior of court were under the Youth length the control To under youth System Court rehabilitation. the within the present structure of the youth system. As a related matter, there was no inquiry into the availability of facilities, programs and personnel under the youth court system and whether he would be amenable to these. Y ea t judicial consideration of this factor , is required by [§ 41-5-206, MCA]. Stevenson, Montana 538 Youth specific P.2d does that finding P-10. Act Court at the rehabilitative programs youth jurisdiction, court carefully by the statute further which of consider cited stated youth imposed on not transfer. article that juvenile along as court most make valid waiver of to the judge other factors set all 538 P.2d at 10. of youth and out Stevenson court jurisdiction judges regard sanction severe a the require personnel the to does waiver court amenable a court the the for with that not is Stevenson, on jurisdiction juvenile it stated that existing but factor further require youth currently an court by this Stevenson waiver that may be because the probability of severe punishment the [and1 confidentiality and individuality of the juvenile proceeding is replaced by the publicity and normative concepts of penal law [and] the child acquires a public arrest record which, even if he is acquitted, will inhibit his rehabilitation because of the opprobrium attached thereto by prospective employers . . . . Stevenson, of 538 Juvenile 583, 586. the youth in 5 which being Court court will to giving waived. held hear MCA, permit at 10, citinq Jurisdiction: Stevenson 41-5-206, findings P.2d that a meaningful reasons why Revisited, proper relating preserve a "[A]11 Kent evidence and F. Thomas Schornhorst, The Waiver that appellate the set 9 Ind. transfer to review forth Law Journal hearing all evidence jurisdiction factors 43 factors in the requires set forth transcript and to the youth court is statute must be of by make written carefully considered and a very deliberate evaluation of each individual case must be effectuated prior to the entry of a waiver order." Stevenson, Subsequently, 180, 538 P.2d at 10. in In the Matter of K.M.H. (1988), 231 Mont. 183, 752 P.2d 162, 164, a case concerning a transfer hearing, we affirmed the order of a youth court transferring the youth to adult court where a medical director from a psychiatric treatment facility testified that the youth in question suffered from a schizotypal personality with a mild dysthymic disorder, recommended that the youth live in a structured environment and received treatment for several years and opined that the youth could have another explosive reaction if faced with a similarly stressful situation. In K.M.H., the superintendent of Pine Hills testified that Hills Pine was not an appropriate place to treat a "psychologically impaired youth who committed a homicide." K.M.H., 752 P.2d at 164. The youth court in K.M.H. considered these and other factors before determining that the Youth Court system was inadequate for the length of time needed for psychiatric treatment of the youth and that the adult court system was in a better position to afford the appropriate psychiatric treatment needed by K.M.H. K.M.H., 752 P.d at 165. In this case, Pine Hills, there was no recommendation from the staff at nor is there any evidence in the record that anyone from that facility or from the Department of Family Services or an appropriate psychiatric facility was ever contacted regarding this matter. What we have here is a summary determination by the Youth 10 Court that the average length of stay at Pine Hills is inadequate for rehabilitation in this case. support this determination. There is nothing in the record to There is no testimony or other evidence from the staff at Pine Hills or anyone else that could indicate that the rehabilitative question--the purpose of the Montana Youth Court Act--was considered by the Youth Court. Therefore, we conclude that the Youth Court's decision to transfer this matter to District Court for the sole reason of retaining control over his length of incarceration is an improper waiver of youth court jurisdiction. We hold the Youth Court abused its discretion by ordering the proceedings transferred to District Court. The Order of the Youth Court transferring this matter to District Court is vacated and the cause is remanded to the Youth Court for a further hearing and redetermination. We Concur:
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