ESTATE OF ALLEN

Annotate this Case
Download PDF
No. 8 8 - 5 6 0 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATF OF MONTAbTA 1989 IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF J A K R. ALLEN, Deceased. !C APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Ninth Judicial. District, In and for the County of Toole, The Honorable R.D. McPhill-ips, Judge presiding. COTTNSEL OF RECORD: For Appellant: Selden S. Frisbee, Cut Rank, Montana For Respondent : Marc Buyske; Anderson, Reattv Montana 5 L- 3 2 . ,' - . 8 0 LLI & RuysFe, Shelhv, Submitted on Briefs: Decided: March 23, April 19, 1989 Mr. Justice F . C. McDonough delivered the Opinion of the . Court. This appeal from the Ninth Judicial District Court, Toole County, concerns the exercise of a power of appointment granted Lillian E. Allen by the 1-ast will and testament of her husband, Mack R. Allen. Both Lillian and Mack were domiciled in Minnesota at the time of their deaths. The present proceeding concerns the exercise of the power in regard to property situated in Toole County, Montana. The only issue is whether the District Court correctly concluded that Lillian failed to exercise the power. We affirm. Mack's will created a marital deduction trust and a residuary trust for the benefit of Lillian. The will directed that 50% of the assets OF Mack's adjusted gross estate be used to fund the marital deduction trust, and that the rest of such estate be used to fund the residuary trust. The will also provided that on the death of Lillian, the remainder of the residuary trust be distributed to Robert S. Allen and Marjorie W. Allen. The remainder of the marital deduction trust under the terms of Mack's will was also to pass to Robert S. Allen and Marjorie W. Allen unless Lillian exercised the power of appointment in her will. This dispute arose after the death of both Mack and Lillian. At the time of his death, Mack owned a royalty interest in minerals in Toole County, Montana. No mention of the royalties was made in the probate of either Mack's or Lillian's estates. Following Lillian's death, the royalties were discovered and this proceeding was initiated. Respondents argued that the royalties should pass entirely to Robert S. Allen and Marjorie W. Al-len as part of the residuary trust. Appellants contended that half of the royalties should be considered to be part of the marital deduction trust and thus pass to the heirs of TJillian as directed by the general residuary clause of her will. The District Court held that. the royalties were part of the residuary trust, and thus they passed to Robert S. Allen and Marjorie W. Allen upon termination of the trusts. We affirm for a different reason. It makes no difference which trust contained the royalties if Lillian failed to exercise the power of appointment in the language of her will. We find that- und.er Montana law, T.,illianfailed to exercise the power. Appellants argue that Montana law does not control the issue because the Minnesota Probate Court decreed that the will. exercised the power, and Montana courts are hound h7 : this determination. This argument ignores the rule that the intention of the testator in devising an interest in land is 16 Am. Jur. 2d, controlled by the law of the situs. Conflict of Laws ยง 72 at 114 (2d ed. 1979). Lillian's will does not specifically exercise the power granted under her husband's will. residuary clause reading: Her will does provide a All of the rest, residue and remainder of my estate of every kind and nature, wheresoever situated and whether now owned by me or hereafter acquired by me, I give, devise and bequeath unto THE FIRST as NATIONAL RANK OF MINNEAPOLIS . . Trustees ... . In many jurisdictions, a will with a general residuary clause does manifest an intent to exercise a power. See Comment, Uniform Probate Code, S 2-610. However, Montana has adopted 5 2-610 from the Uniform Probate Code as S 72-2-518, MCA, which provides the contrary rule: No i m p l i e d e x e r c i s e o f power o f a p p o i n t m e n t . general residuary clause i n a w i l l o r a w i l l making g e n e r a l d i s p o s i t i o n o f a l l o f t h e t e s t a t o r ' s p r o p e r t y d o e s n o t e x e r c i s e a power o f a p p o i n t m e n t h e l d by t h e t e s t a t o r u n l e s s s p e c i f i c r e f e r e n c e i s made t o t h e power o r t h e r e i s some o t h e r i n d i c a t i o n of intention t o include the property subject t o the power. A The r e a s o n f o r r e q u i r i n g a s p e c i f i c e x e r c i s e o f a power i s s t a t e d i n t h e Comment t o 3 2 - 6 1 0 , Uniform P r o b a t e Code: Although a s u b s t a n t i a l number o f s t a t e s have legislation t o the e f f e c t t h a t a w i l l with a g e n e r a l r e s i d u a r y c l a u s e does manifest an i n t e n t t o e x e r c i s e a power, t h e c o n t r a r y r u l e i s s t a t e d i n t h e p r e s e n t s e c t i o n f o r two r e a s o n s : ( 1 ) t h i s i s s t i l l t h e m a j o r i t y r u l e i n t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s , and 2 ) most powers o f a p p o i n t m e n t a r e c r e a t e d i n m a r i t a l d e d u c t i o n t r u s t s and t h e d o n o r would p r e f e r to have the property pass under his trust i n s t r u m e n t u n l e s s t h e donee a f f i r m a t i v e l v m a n i f e s t s a n i n t e n t t o e x e r c i s e t.he power. The p u b l i c p o l i c y o f t h i s S t a t e t h e r e f o r e r e s o l v e s t h e i s s u e i n favor of the power finding t h a t T,illian E. of appointment Thus, w e a F f i r m . / Justices granted Allen d i d n o t e x e r c i s e by her husband's will.

Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.

This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.