WHITEHAWK v CLARK

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No. 8 8 - 5 8 2 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 1989 PHIL WHITEHAWK and CONNIE BELLET, Plaintiffs and Appellants, -VS- STAN CLARK, Defendant and Respondent. APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Sixth Judicial District, In and for the County of Park, The Honorable Byron Robb, Judge presiding. COUNSEL OF RECORD: For Appellant: Karl Knuchel, Livingston, Montana For Respondent: J. Robert Planalp, Landoe, Brown, Planalp and Kommers, Bozeman, Montana Submitted on Briefs: Decided: Filed: April 27, 1 9 8 9 June 29, 1989 J u s t i c e J o h n Conway H a r r i s o n d e l i v e r e d t h e O p i n i o n o f t h e Court. Mr. Plaintiffs, (Whitehawks), Phil appeal from Sixth Judicial D i s t r i c t , Robb presiding, Plaintiffs for the Whitehawk in a jury Connie verdict Bellet rendered in the P a r k County, t h e Honorable Byron L. favor of the initiated the action destruction of and defendant, Stan Clark. s e e k i n g t o r e c o v e r damages personal property. W reverse e and remand f o r a new t r i a l . The Whitehawks r e n t e d a l o g c a b i n and f o u r o u t b u i l d i n g s l o c a t e d n e a r W i l s a l l , Montana, from t h e d e f e n d a n t S t a n C l a r k . The Whitehawks r e s i d e d i n t h e c a b i n and u s e d t h e o u t b u i l d i n g s t o s t o r e various personal i t e m s , instruments, musical i n c l u d i n g a r t work, m u s i c a l recordings and historical documents. Much o f t h e m a t e r i a l s t o r e d i n t h e o u t b u i l d i n g s w e r e u s e d i n c o n n e c t i o n w i t h t h e Whitehawks' m u s i c a l p e r f o r m a n c e s e n t i t l e d " I n s p i r a d a Americana." On A p r i l 28, 1 9 8 5 , Duane C l a r k , son o f t h e defendant, began b u r n i n g d i t c h e s on t h e f a m i l y r a n c h s o u t h e a s t o f property rented hours, s l i g h t b r e e z e c a u s e d t h e f i r e t o move o u t o f a ditches, by burning the brush Whitehawks. and swamp In area the to the e a r l y evening the the northeast. Duane t e n d e d t h e f i r e t h r o u g h o u t t h e d a y and r e t u r n e d home a t 6:00 p.m. f o r dinner. Later, Duane received a phone c a l l from t h e Whitehawks e x p r e s s i n g c o n c e r n o v e r t h e f i r e . Duane r e t u r n e d t o t h e f i e l d and c o n t i n u e d t o watch t h e f i r e u n t i l a p p r o x i m a t e l y 10:OO p.m. The testimony a t t r i a l c o n f l i c t e d regarding the a c t i v i t y d u r i n g t h e n i g h t and t h e f o l l o w i n g morning. testified evening, that when he returned to the field in the fire Duane late t h e f i r e had d i m i n i s h e d t o o n l y embers and smoke. I n a d d i t i o n , Duane s t a t e d t h a t h e viewed t h e f i e l d t h e n e x t morning and extinguished. found the Thereafter, embers Duane and smoke completely l e f t t h e area t o continue work with his father in another portion of the ranch several miles away. On the other hand, the Whitehawks testified that throughout the night, they could see both embers and flames. However, they testified that the following morning, no embers were visible, but a substantial amount of smoke was present. The Whitehawks stated that they remained concerned about the fire, but that a heavy dew, a backburn, a still wind and lack of any embers reassured them that they could leave their residence for a doctor's appointment. Additionally, Mr. Whitehawk testified that he spoke to Duane in the morning and was assured that Duane would continue to watch the area. Duane denied the conversation entirely. During the afternoon, the fire flared up, sweeping across the marshes and open fields. When the Whitehawks returned home in the afternoon, they found three of the four outbuildings completely destroyed and fire threatening the log cabin. Mrs. Janet Clark, Duane's wife, was on the premises when the Whitehawks returned. Immediately, the Whitehawks began fighting the fire. After 45 minutes, the local volunteer fire department arrived and extinguished the blaze. The Whitehawks filed suit against Stan Clark, alleging negligence and strict liability. On September 18, 1987, the Whitehawks moved for summary judgment on the issue of liability, arguing that S 50-63-103, MCA, imposed strict liability upon one who intentionally starts a fire which destroys property, and therefore, they were entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The District Court denied the motion without opinion. On August 29, 1988, the case was tried before a twelve member jury. Upon the completion of testimony, the District Judge met with the attorneys to settle jury instructions and prepare a special verdict form. At this time, the District Court rejected plaintiffs' Proposed Instruction No. 22 c o n c e r n i n g 8 50-63-103, MCA, c o n c l u d i n g t h e s t a t u t e p e r t a i n e d only t o t h e i n t e n t i o n a l burning of excess f o r e s t m a t e r i a l . Thereafter, the jury returned a verdict in favor of the defendant. The Whitehawks a p p e a l t h e f o l l o w i n g i s s u e s : 1. Does S 50-63-103, 2. Did the apply t o t h e i n s t a n t case? MCA, District Court err it when denied p l a i n t i f f s ' motion f o r summary judgment? 3. Did t h e D i s t r i c t Court e r r when it r e f u s e d t o i n s t r u c t t h e j u r y on p l a i n t i f f s ' Proposed I n s t r u c t i o n No. 22 r e g a r d i n g 8 50-63-103, S e c t i o n 50-63-103, MA C? MCA, s t a t e s i n part: L i a b i l i t y o f o f f e n d e r f o r damages and costs. Any p e r s o n who s h a l l upon any l a n d w i t h i n t h e s t a t e , whether on h i s own or on another's land, s e t o r leave any f i r e t h a t s h a l l s p r e a d and damage o r d e s t r o y p r o p e r t y o f any k i n d n o t h i s own s h a l l be l i a b l e f o r a l l damages caused thereby, and any owner of property damaged o r d e s t r o y e d by such f i r e may m a i n t a i n a c i v i l s u i t f o r t h e purpose o f r e c o v e r i n g such damages. Any p e r s o n who s h a l l upon any l a n d w i t h i n t h i s s t a t e , whether on h i s own o r on a n o t h e r ' s l a n d , s e t o r l e a v e any f i r e which t h r e a t e n s t o s p r e a d and damage o r d e s t r o y p r o p e r t y s h a l l be liable for all costs and expenses incurred by the state of Montana, by any f o r e s t r y a s s o c i a t i o n , o r by any p e r s o n e x t i n g u i s h i n g o r p r e v e n t i n g t h e s p r e a d o f such f i r e . (Emphasis added. ) T h i s C o u r t h a s been c a l l e d upon t o i n t e r p r e t t h e s t a t u t e on two o c c a s i o n s . Montana Dept. o f N a t u r a l Res. C l a r k Fork Logging ( 1 9 8 2 ) , 198 Mont. Belue v. Defendant State (1982), 199 Mont. and Cons. v . 494, 646 P.2d 1207; and 451, 649 P.2d 752. contends t h a t our previous d e c i s i o n s c o n t r o l t h e outcome o f t h e f i r s t i s s u e which q u e s t i o n s t h e a p p l i c a b i l i t y of S 50-63-103, MCA. Defendant argues that the statute applies only to the burning of excess forest materials. We find defendant's interpretation unduly restrictive. In Clark Fork Logging, defendants entered into a timber sale contract with the United States Forest Service to log an area in Sanders County. During operation, an employee started a chain saw which backfired and ignited a forest fire. The Department of Natural Resources and Conservation (DNRC), acting under contract with the United States Forest Service, extinguished the fire at a cost of $126,721.80. Thereafter, the DNRC brought suit to recover the cost under theories of strict liability and negligence. On appeal, we affirmed the lower court's grant of summary judgment against DNRC's strict liability count, holding: As they are used in section 50-63-103, MCA, the words "set or leave a fire" refer to the deliberate act of burning excess forest material. The statute does not apply to the instant situation. The --- deliberately fire was not ignited. Rather, it accidentally started when a spark from the chain saw ignited a slash pile. Under these facts summary judgment on Count I was proper. (Emphasis added. ) Clark Fork Logging, 646 P.2d at 1209. Subsequently, this Court issued its decision in Belue. During a severe windstorm, a fire ignited near a slag pile. The fire spread four and one half miles across defendant's property. Relying upon land to plaintiffs ' Clark Fork Logging, we concluded the facts did not support Belue, 649 P.2d at the applicability of 5 50-63-103, MCA. 754. Our decisions emphasized that the statute applied to the intentional setting of a fire. None of the factual circumstances which limited the statute's applicability in Clark Fork Logging, or Belue, are present here. Our review of the statute failed to disclose limiting factors which would render the provision inapplicable to private landowners, or language which i n d i c a t e s an a p p l i c a t i o n e x c l u s i v e l y t o t h e b u r n i n g o f f o r e s t materials. T h e r e f o r e , we c o n c l u d e 50-63-103, (5 may be MCA, applicable t o the i n s t a n t case. Next, t h e Whitehawks contend t h e D i s t r i c t Court s h o u l d have granted liability their issue, motion for summary as l e a v i n g damages decided a t t r i a l . judgment sole issue the on the t o be W disagree. e The s t a n d a r d t h e a p p e l l a t e c o u r t a p p l i e s when r e v i e w i n g a grant o r denial of is the a motion f o r summary judgment same a s t h a t u t i l i z e d by t h e t r i a l c o u r t i n i t i a l l y ; summary judgment i s p r o p e r when it a p p e a r s t h e r e i s no g e n u i n e i s s u e a s t o any m a t e r i a l f a c t and t h e moving p a r t y i s e n t i t l e d t o judgment a s a m a t t e r o f law. Rule 56, M.R.Civ.P.; Union O i l Co. ( 1 9 8 4 ) , 208 Mont. 953. If i s any doubt s h o u l d be d e n i e d . The violation to the propriety v. Montana Dare of the Petroleum of a statute intended to protect the from t h e i n j u r y i n c u r r e d i s g e n e r a l l y h e l d t o be plaintiff negligence v. as 1, 675 P.2d ( 1 9 8 4 ) , 2 1 2 Mont. 274, 687 P.2d 1015. Marketing Co. Cannaday California there it motion, of Reagan v . per se. Taylor, Thon, (Mont. 1 9 8 8 ) , 749 P.2d LaCounte (1986), 219 Thompson 63, Mont. 45 St.Rep. 462, 712 P e t e r s o n v. & 102; ~ e h r i n g P.2d 1329. The d e f e n d a n t ' s c o n d u c t must s t i l l be t h e proximate c a u s e o f t h e harm t o t h e p l a i n t i f f s , and t h e r e remains t h e p o s s i b i l i t y of defenses, such as (Second) o f T o r t s (Mont. contributory § negligence. Restatement 288B (1974) ; M a r t e l v . Montana Power Co. 1 9 8 8 ) , 752 P.2d 140, 4 5 St.Rep. 460. Because t h e s e a r e i s s u e s o f f a c t , summary judgment was i n a p p r o p r i a t e . The D i s t r i c t C o u r t ' s d e n i a l o f t h e Whitehawks' motion f o r summary judgment was t h e r e f o r e p r o p e r . Finally, we address the t h i r d i s s u e on a p p e a l . The Whitehawks c o n t e n d t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t i m p r o p e r l y r e f u s e d t o grant their Proposed Instruction verbatim t h e f i r s t sentence of defendant objected to the § No. 22 which 50-63-103, MCA. instruction and set forth A t trial, argued the Whitehawks abandoned t h e v i o l a t i o n o f s t a t u t e c l a i m b e c a u s e t h e y by f a i l e d t o i n c l u d e i t w i t h i n t h e p r e t r i a l o r d e r . The District the Court d e n i e d statute pertained the only instruction to the and s t a t e d t h a t burning of excess forest material. The purpose of the pretrial is order to prevent surprise, s i m p l i f y i s s u e s and p e r m i t c o u n s e l t o p r e p a r e f o r trial the on basis of the pretrial order. M c I n t r y r e ( 1 9 8 0 ) , 190 Mont. 5 , 617 P.2d 1281. Workman v. This Court has h e l d t h a t t h e p a r t y may n o t r a i s e an i s s u e on a p p e a l which d e v i a t e d from t h o s e s t a t e d i n t h e p r e t r i a l o r d e r . Cremer ( 1 9 8 2 ) , 2 0 0 Mont. 71, 647 P.2d 358. Morse v . Under t h e s e two p r e m i s e s , it a p p e a r s r e a s o n a b l e f o r d e f e n d a n t t o have assumed t h a t t h e i s s u e o f l i a b i l i t y under t h e s t a t u t e would n o t a r i s e a t trial. However, o t h e r f a c t o r s weigh a g a i n s t d e f e n d a n t ' s w a i v e r contention. First, the Whitehawks properly preserved i s s u e f o r appeal a s applied t o jury i n s t r u c t i o n s . M.R.Civ.P., provides i n p a r t t h a t the Rule 51, " [ n l o p a r t y may a s s i g n a s e r r o r t h e f a i l u r e t o i n s t r u c t on any p o i n t o f law u n l e s s he offers an instruction thereon." When the Whitehawks p r e s e n t e d an i n s t r u c t i o n which s t a t e d v e r b a t i m t h e language of S 50-63-103, the MCA, District Court denied the i n s t r u c t i o n a s inapplicable t o the case. In addition, for summary order judgment. denying M.R.Civ.P. t h e s t a t u t e was t h e s u b j e c t o f a motion Notwithstanding summary judgment certification, i s interlocutory. Thus, t h e a p p l i c a b i l i t y o f 5 50-63-103, Rule an 1, MCA, h a s n o t been waived i n s o f a r a s it was p r e s e n t e d t o t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t i n t h e Whitehawks' motion. that the Whitehawks' issue of W t h e r e f o r e a r e persuaded e the failure to instruct is proper f o r appeal. W have h e l d t h a t t h e r e f u s a l t o i n s t r u c t a j u r y on an e important p a r t of a p a r t y ' s theory of t h e case i s r e v e r s i b l e error. Smith v . Rovick (Mont. 1 9 8 8 ) , 751 P.2d 1053, 45 St.Rep. 451; Northwestern Union Trust Co. v. Worm (1983), 204 Mont. 184, 663 P.2d 325. While other instructions addressed the elements necessary to establish negligence, none of the given instructions informed the jury of the effect of a violation of statute. This was an essential part of the Whitehawks' case and therefore they were entitled to have Proposed Instruction No. 22 submitted to the jury. Reversed and remanded for new trial. We concur: + , '

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