STATE v ROBBINS

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PJo. 83-317 I N THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE O F MONTANA 1985 STATE O F MONTANA, P l a i n t i f f and R e s p o n d e n t , -vsTERRY LEE ROBBINS, D e f e n d a n t and A p p e l l a n t . D i s t r i c t C o u r t of t h e S i x t h J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , I n and f o r t h e C o u n t y of S w e e t G r a s s , T h e H o n o r a b l e T h o m a s A. O l s o n , Judge p r e s i d i n g . APPEAL FROM: COUNSEL OF RECORD: For A p p e l l a n t : p r o s e , D e e r L o d g e , Montana T e r r y Lee Robbins, F o r Respondent: H o n . Mike G r e e l y , A t t o r n e y G e n e r a l , H e l e n a , Plontana G. T h o m a s B i g l e n , C o u n t y A t t o r n e y , B i g T i m b e r , Montana S u b m i t t e d on B r i e f s : Decided: Filed: $EP June 13, 1 9 8 5 S e p t e m b e r 23, 2 A 1985 /. t . 4 - ',/ L /, f @ .:.w-? -.A&,&-&$#, Clerk 2 - 1985 Mr. Justice John Conway Harrison delivered the Opinion of the Court. This is an appeal of a conviction from the District Court of the Sixth Judicial District, Sweetgrass County. Following a jury trail, Terry Lee Robbins was found guilty of two counts of burglary in violation of § 45-6-204, MCA, and one count of felony theft in violation of S 45-6-301, MCA. He was sentenced to ten years in the Montana State Prison under each of the burglary counts, to run consecutively, and to ten years under the felony theft count, to be concurrently with the sentence for burglary. designated a dangerous offender. Robbins and a served Defendant was We affirm. companion, James Weaver, travelled together in a westerly direction across southern Montana in late July, 1982. They arrived in Rig Timber the afternoon of August 3, 1982, and checked in as guests at the Grand Hotel. They w e e subsequently charged with burglarizing the game room in the hotel and a nearby sport shop in the early morning hours of August 4, 1982. game machines in the hotel The coin doors of various had been pried open and forty-seven pistols were missing from the sport shop. The suspects were arrested by police in Twin Falls, Idaho, on August 6, 1982. offenses charged. Robbins Weaver pleaded guilty to the resisted extradition, but eventually was extradited to Montana and appeared in Sweet Grass County District Court September 20, 1982. The Honorable Jack Shanstrom, District Judge, appointed James Tulley defendant's counsel and a trial date was set. Tulley filed a motion for substitution of judge September 27, 1982. Consequently the trial date was vacated. On September dismissa 1 of disqualified 1982, 30, Tulley. himself moved the meantime, In and Robbins W. Judge jurisdiction over the cause. pro Judge W. Lessley se for Shanstrom assumed During the month of October Robbins filed numerous pro se motions, although at least one of those motions indicated he still considered Tulley to be acting as his counsel. The court acted on Robbins' motion for dismissal of counsel November 8, 1982. Prior to Tulley's dismissal. however, Robbins pleaded not guilty to an amended information. On November 15, 1982, the court ordered Robbins transferred to the custody of Missoula County authorities to answer theft charges against him there. Counsel was appointed for Robbins in Missoula, who negotiated with the Sweet Grass County Attorney regarding a plea bargain on the Missnula County charges. During the time Robbins was in custody in Missoula County, Judge Lessley retired and the Honorable Thomas Olson, newly elected District Judge, assumed his duties January 1, 1983. On January 6, 1983, Judge Olson ordered Robbins returned from Missoula County to Big Timber for a hearing on pending motions. Mr. Karl Knuchel assumed the duties of counsel for Robbins January 7, 1983. date was set for February 23, 1983. A trial Robbins, through his counsel, filed a motion to dismiss for lack of a speedy trial, which the court dismissed. Robbins raises three issues on appeal: (1) Whether he was denied his constitutional right to counsel. (2) counsel. Whether he received effective assistance of (3) Whether h e was a f f o r d e d h i s c o n s t i t u t i o n a l right t o a speedy t r i a l . R o b b i n s a r g u e s h e was d e n i e d h i s c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r i g h t to counsel. contends He n o c o u n s e l was p r i o r t o h i s a r r a i g n m e n t November 8 , was denied his to right c r i t i c a l stage of a p p o i n t e d f o r him 1982, and t h e r e q o r e he assistance of counsel t h e p r o c e e d i n g s a g a i n s t him. shows t h i s i s n o t t h e c a s e . c o u n s e l September 20, Mr. 1982. during a The r e c o r d James T u l l e y was a p p o i n t e d Although Robbins f i l e d a motion t o d i s m i s s c o u n s e l o n S e p t e m b e r 3 0 , 1 9 8 2 , it was n o t a c t e d o n u n t i l November 8 , 1982. Robbins October Tulley. Mr. 6, F u r t h e r a s u b s e q u e n t m o t i o n f i l e d by 1982, Tulley was a r r a i g n m e n t November 8 . of entering Tulley a plea registered stated h e was r e p r e s e n t e d present with Robbins by M r . at his R o b b i n s a c k n o w l e d g e d h e was c a p a b l e and did enter no o b j e c t i o n , plea a of not guilty. with t h e understanding the c o u r t a l l o w Robbins t o f i l e whatever subsequent motions might be necessary. Even i f M r . T u l l e y had b e e n d i s m i s s e d b e f o r e K o b b i n s e n t e r e d a p l e a , t h e r e c o r d i n d i c a t e s R o b b i n s made a n i n t e l l i g e n t and informed p l e a . resulted I n any e v e n t , no p r e j u d i c e from t h e claimed absence o f c o u n s e l . Robbins p l e d n o t g u i l t y t o a l l of t h e c h a r g e s and d i d n o t f o r f e i t a n y o f his rights. In any critical stage of the proceedings a d e f e n d a n t may q u e s t i o n f a i l u r e t o p r o v i d e c o u n s e l o n l y w h e r e potential substantial counsel. Cadena v . prejudice Estelle inheres (5th. Cir. in the absence 1 9 8 0 ) , 6 1 1 F.2d S e e a l s o U n i t e d S t a t e s v. Lacy ( 5 t h C i r . of 1385. 1 9 7 1 ) , 4 4 6 F.2d 511. A c r i t i c a l s t a g e i s a n y s t e p of t h e p r o c e e d i n g where t h e r e i s potential substantial prejudice S t a t e v. Wade ( 1 9 6 7 ) , 388 U.S. 1149; State v. Dieziger to the defendant. 218, 87 S . C t . (Mont. 1982), United 1 9 2 6 , 1 8 L.Ed.2d 650 P.2d 800, 39 St.Rep. was 1734. prejudiced Robbins h a s n o t shown, n o r c o u l d h e show h e in a n y way time a t the of his arraignment November 8. C o u n s e l was n o t a p p o i n t e d f o r Robbins b e f o r e September 20 b e c a u s e h e was i n I d a h o f i g h t i n g e x t r a d i t i o n t o Montana. C o u n s e l was a p p o i n t e d f o r him a t h i s f i r s t c o u r t a p p e a r a n c e Robbins c l a i m e d a c o n f l i c t o f i n t e r e s t on t h e September 20. p a r t o f c o u n s e l and on September 30 f i l e d a m o t i o n f o r h i s dismissal. The r e c o r d shows c o u n s e l had d o n e a " s u b s t a n t i a l amount" o f i n v e s t i g a t i v e work p r i o r t o h i s d i s m i s s a l November 8. I n o t h e r words, September 20 u n t i l conflict of asked that November interest, he be transferred Robbins was r e p r e s e n t e d by c o u n s e l from The c o u r t d i d n o t 8. find a b u t d i s m i s s e d c o u n s e l b e c a u s e Robbins dismissed. t o Missoula On November 15, Robbins was County where h e was r e p r e s e n t e d by c o u r t a p p o i n t e d c o u n s e l on t h e t h e f t c h a r g e s p e n d i n g t h e r e . T h i s c o u n s e l was a c t i n g on R o b b i n s ' b e h a l f on t h e Sweet G r a s s County c h a r g e s by a t t e m p t i n g t o have t h e c h a r g e s d i s m i s s e d a s p a r t o f a p l e a b a r g a i n on t h e M i s s o u l a County c h a r g e s . When Robbins was r e t u r n e d from M i s s o u l a , K a r l Knuchel was appointed discovery. Mr. counsel and immediately filed Knuchel had s i x and o n e - h a l f prepare for trial is essential to the prepare. to indicate for Adequate t i m e S i x t h Amendment guarantee of e f f e c t i v e representation of counsel. nothing motion weeks t o p r e p a r e f o r t h e t r i a l s c h e d u l e d t o b e g i n F e b r u a r y 23. to a There i s h e had i n s u f f i c i e n t t i m e a d e q u a t e l y t o Had c o u n s e l been a p p o i n t e d e a r l i e r i t would have been d i f f i c u l t t o p r e p a r e f o r t r i a l w i t h Robbins i n M i s s o u l a . Finally, t h e r e i s no e v i d e n c e Robbins was p r e j u d i c e d by t h e l a t e appointment o f counsel. The delay intentional. in appointment After Mr. of jurisdiction, retired jurisdiction over t h e case. case within a day was T u l l e y had b e e n d i s m i s s e d , was t r a n s f e r r e d t o M i s s o u l a County. assumed Knuchel Mr. or Mr. two not Robbins J u d g e L e s s l e y , who had and Judge Olson assumed Knuchel began w o r k i n g on t h e after Robbins returned from afforded his Missoula. is It clear constitutional that rights Robbins t o counsel was a t a l l c r i t i c a l stages of t h e p r o c e e d i n g s a g a i n s t him and any c l a i m e d d e n i a l o f c o u n s e l f o r a n y p e r i o d o f t i m e d i d n o t r e s u l t i n p r e j u d i c e t o him. Finally, " [ a ] ny error, defect, irregularity, or variance which d o e s n o t a f f e c t s u b s t a n t i a l r i g h t s s h a l l b e d i s r e g a r d e d [on a p p e a l ] violation ," $ of 46-20-702, his right Robbins h a s f a i l e d t o show MCA. to counsel during the proceedings a g a i n s t him and t h e r e f o r e h i s c l a i m i s d e n i e d . Robbins a r g u e s h e d i d n o t h a v e e f f e c t i v e a s s i s t a n c e o f counsel. This contention, record. The right to however, counsel i s c o n t r a d i c t e d by t h e i s guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment t o t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s C o n s t i t u t i o n and by A r t . S 2 4 o f t h e Montana C o n s t i t u t i o n . these guarantees to mean 11, The c o u r t h a s i n t e r p r e t e d effective S t a t e v. Bubnash ( 1 9 6 1 ) , 139 Mont. assistance of 517, 366 P.2d counsel, 1 5 5 , and h a s adopted t h e "reasonably e f f e c t i v e a s s i s t a n c e " test s t a t e d a s follows: "Persons accused effective assistance of of crime are entitled counsel a c t i n g within to t h e range of competence demanded o f a t t o r n e y s i n c r i m i n a l c a s e s . " v. (1980), Rose Challenging burden on committed the a by 187 Mont. affective defendant a lawyer to 74, 86, 608 assistance show resulted of "that in the P.2d State 1074, counsel error prejudice the to 1081. places a allegedly him and stemmed from n e g l e c t o r i g n o r a n c e r a t h e r t h a n professiona 1 deliberation. 6 5 6 P.2d " S t a t e v. 1 8 5 , 1 8 9 , 39 St.Rep. Robbins' specific from i n f o r m e d Morigeau (Mont. 1982) , 2311, 2317. allegations of various failures There i s appointed counsel simply do n o t w i t h s t a n d s c r u t i n y . no evidence witnesses. i n t h e record is There counsel refused no evidence that of t o c a l l defense even had certain w i t n e s s e s b e e n c a l l e d t h e y would h a v e been more t h a n " a f t e r the witnesses. fact" is, That the relevance of their t e s t i m o n y a s t o f a c t s s u r r o u n d i n g t h e commission o f t h e c r i m e would h a v e b e e n minimal a t b e s t . appointed counsel opened the The r e c o r d d o e s n o t show door to evidence of other crimes. Nor d o e s t h e r e c o r d s u p p o r t t h e need f o r a c h a n g e o f venue. Defense counsel a c c o m p l i c e Weaver's verdict The for record Robbins' testimony, lack of shows argued lack of corroboration and h e moved corroboration of corroborative of for a directed accomplice testimony. evidence was presented. c h a r g e t h a t c o u n s e l f a i l e d t o move f o r s u p p r e s s i o n o f c e r t a i n e v i d e n c e b o r d e r s on t h e r i d i c u l o u s . The p r i m a r y e v i d e n c e was t h e s t o l e n g u n s , which w e r e s e i z e d p u r s u a n t t o a properly issued search warrant. Robbins a c t u a l l y v o l u n t e e r e d t o a r r e s t i n g o f f i c e r s t h a t h e had a gun on h i s p e r s o n . w e r e no i r r e g u l a r i t i e s i n R o b b i n s ' a r r e s t . There I n f a c t , defense c o u n s e l ' s d e c i s i o n n o t t o move t o s u p p r e s s i s i n d i c a t i v e o f sound professional judgment, not ineffective assistance. A l l e g a t i o n s o f i n e f f e c t i v e a s s i s t a n c e o f c o u n s e l "must be grounded from the on record allegations. ineffectiveness f a c t which a p p e a r i n o r a r e e a s i l y deduced and which There on the go beyond must part be of a . . . mere showing counsel." conclusory of S t a t e v. actual Lewis (1978), 177 Mont. 474, D i G i a l l o n a r d o v. B e t z e r Robbins did not 485, 5 8 2 P.2d 346, ( 1 9 7 3 ) , 163 Mont. demonstrate the 353. See a l s o 1 0 4 , 515 P.2d alleged errors to support instances. his Rather, allegations the with allegations specific reveal his and He i s o m i s s i o n s o f h i s c o u n s e l r e s u l t e d i n p r e j u d i c e t o him. unable 705. factual counsel e x e r c i s e d p r o f e s s i o n a l judgment o f o n e who z e a l o u s l y d e f e n d e d his client. Nor did Robbins meet t h e Morigeau standard, supra, o r t h e reasonably e f f e c t i v e a s s i s t a n c e test. The U n i t e d S t a t e s Supreme C o u r t r e c e n t l y a d d r e s s e d t h e issue of ineffective assistance of counsel, applying an o b j e c t i v e standard of reasonableness. convicted defendant' s claim that c o u n s e l ' s a s s i s t a n c e was s o d e f ~ c t i v ea s t o require reversal of a conviction h a s two components. First, the defendant must show that counsel ' s p e r f o r m a n c e was d e f i c i e n t . This r e q u i r e s showing that c o u n s e l made e r r o r s s o s e r i o u s t h a t c o u n s e l was n o t f u n c t i o n i n g a s t h e "counsel" guaranteed t h e defendant by t h e S i x t h Amendment. Second, t h e d e f e n d a n t must show t h a t t h e d e f i c i e n t performance p r e j u d i c e d t h e defense. This r e q u i r e s showing t h a t c o u n s e l ' s e r r o r s were so serious as to deprive the d e f e n d a n t o f a f a i r t r i a l , a t r i a l whose result is reliable. Unless a defendant makes b o t h s h o w i n g s , it c a n n o t b e s a i d r e s u l t e d from t h a t t h e conviction a breakdown i n t h e a d v e r s a r y p r o c e s s t h a t renders t h e r e s u l t unreliable. A . .. ... S t i c k l a n d v. Washington Robbins has (1985), failed to U.S. demonstrate I at his 104 counsel's p e r f o r m a n c e was s o s e r i o u s l y d e f i c i e n t t o c o n c l u d e he was n o t f u n c t i o n i n g a s t h e c o u n s e l g u a r a n t e e d by t h e S i x t h Amendment. He has f a i l e d t o show h i s c o u n s e l ' s p e r f o r m a n c e p r e j u d i c e d h i s d e f e n s e t o t h e e x t e n t h e was d e n i e d a show p r e j u d i c e : fair trial. To The d e f e n d a n t must show t h a t t h e r e i s a reasonable probability that, but for unprofessiona 1 errors, the counsel 's r e s u l t o f a p r o c e e d i n g would h a v e been d i f f e r e n t . A reasonable probability i s a probability sufficient to undermine c o n f i d e n c e i n t h e outcome. 104 S.Ct. Strickland, h a s n o t done t h i s . would b e a t 2068, 80 L.Ed.2d a t 698. Robbins H e h a s n o t shown t h e outcome o f h i s t r i a l d i f f e r e n t had counsel performed d i f f e r e n t l y . The test of effective assistance i s not acquittal. Finally, Robbins constitutional right S i x t h Amendment 11, S 24 validity of of investigates to a he speedy was not trial guaranteed Montana claim of and Constitution. lack of balances four a In 514, delay; 92 (2) set factors S.Ct. 2182, reason for the 33 the L.Ed.2d delay; 101: (3) t h e Court by the ( 1 9 7 2 ) , 407 (1) l e n g t h the and the of defendant's (4) prejudice Length o f d e l a y i s o f primary importance. t o t h e defendant. it i s by forth Wingo a s s e r t i o n o f h i s r i g h t t o a speedy t r i a l ; Unless his analyzing speedy t r i a l , U n i t e d S t a t e s Supreme C o u r t i n B a r k e r v. U.S. afforded t o t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s C o n s t i t u t i o n and A r t . the a contends sufficiently long t o be p r e j u d i c i a l t o t h e defendant, deemed presumptively t h e r e i s no need t o c o n s i d e r the other factors. What l e n g t h w i l l b e deemed p r e s u m p t i v e l y prejudicial on depends S t a t e v. Worden The the facts ( 1 9 8 0 ) , 188 Mont. Sixth Amendment has in each individual 94, 611 P.2d no case. 185. application until p u t a t i v e d e f e n d a n t i n some way becomes a n a c c u s e d . the Until. a c i t i z e n becomes an a c c u s e d h e s u f f e r s no r e s t r a i n t s on h i s l i b e r t y and i s n o t t h e s u b j e c t o f p u b l i c a c c u s a t i o n . States L.Ed.2d v. Marion 468. (1971), 404 U.S. 307, 92 S.Ct. United 455, 30 Robbins a r g u e s t h a t t h e t i m e s h o u l d b e g i n t o r u n when t h e a r r e s t was made, August 6 , 1982. I n S t a t e v. Smith (Mont. 1983), 670 P.2d 96, 100, 40 St.Rep. 1533, 1537, we said the clock begins to run when arrested or when the complaint is filed. the defendant is This is consistent with State v. Larson (Mont. 1981), 623 P.2d 954, 957-58, 38 St.Rep. 213, 215, where we said once a person is accused and subject to criminal prosecution that accusation may be by arrest, the information. filing of a complaint, or by indictment or It is at this time the person is afforded the constitutional protection of a speedy trial. See also State v. Ackley (Mont. 1982), 653 P.2d 851, 39 St.Rep. 2091. The real issue, however, is whether Robbins or the State should be charged with the time Robbins was in Idaho resisting extradition to Montana. Robbins argues this time should be weighed against the State because he was being held on a Montana warrant and therefore was subject to Montana's jurisdiction. The State argues this time should not be weighed against the State because Robbins was not subject to Montana's in personam jurisdiction. We agree with the State. During the forty-five days from Robbins' arrest August 6 in Twin Falls, Idaho, until his appearance in court in Big Timber, Montana, he was resisting extradition to Montana. That time is attributable to him and he therefore waives any right ". . . to complain of lack of a speedy trial. [D]elay[s] in bringing a defendant to trial caused or consented to by defendant are considered to constitute a waiver of the right to be tried within the time fixed by statute or required by the constitution." (Idaho 1983), 658 P.2d 920, 924. State v. Talmadge See also State v. Balla (Idaho 1976) , 544 P. 2d 1148, where the Idaho court decided extradition tolls the calculation of the length of the delay. P r e v i o u s h o l d i n g s on t h i s i s s u e a r e i n c o n f l i c t . State v. Ackley, extradition, supra, though the defendant waived t h e t i m e between h i s a r r e s t i n Oregon and h i s initial appearance against him. defendant even In In in Missoula v. State County, Smith, resisted extradition, Montana, supra, weighed however, where p r o c e e d i n g s which c o n t i n u e d f o r n e a r l y s i x t y d a y s a l s o weighed a g a i n s t t h e d e f e n d a n t . S t a t e v. Armstrong (Mont. 1 9 8 0 ) , 616 P.2d 341, In 37 St.Rep. 1 5 6 3 , t h e C o u r t i s c l e a r , when computing l e n g t h o f d e l a y it d o e s n o t i n c l u d e t h a t t i m e i n which t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t d o e s n o t have j u r i s d i c t i o n t o engage i n proceedings l e a d i n g t o a t r i a 1. Diligent prosecution a defendant, extradition of includes a timely demand for and e x t r a d i t i o n p r o c e e d i n g s a r e s u f f i c i e n t r e a s o n f o r d e l a y i f t h e S t a t e h a s been d i l i g e n t . S t a t e v. Smith, The r i g h t o f a d e f e n d a n t t o r e s i s t supra. formal e x t r a d i t i o n , however, cannot be charged t o t h e S t a t e when computing t h e l e n g t h o f d e l a y f o r s p e e d y t r i a l , S t a t e i s a c t i n g i n good f a i t h . defendant to accused. Marion, court a t h e n must speedy trial Smith, acquire Balla, supra. in The r i g h t o f a commences when Larson, and personam i f the h e becomes Ackley, supra. jurisdiction a c c u s e d t o engage i n p r o c e e d i n g s l e a d i n g t o a t r i a l . an The over the I f the a c c u s e d i s o u t o f s t a t e , t h e S t a t e must a c t d i l i g e n t l y and i n good f a i t h t o acquire jurisdiction. A t t h e same t i m e , accused has a r i g h t t o resist e x t r a d i t i o n . however, he loses length of delay. the When h e d o e s s o , t h o s e d a y s he r e s i s t s from c o m p u t a t i o n o f When an a c c u s e d d o e s n o t r e s i s t , t h o s e d a y s s h o u l d n o t b e weighed a g a i n s t him when t h e S t a t e i s a c t i n g d i l i g e n t l y and i n good f a i t h . For t h i s reason, i n c l u s i o n o f t h o s e d a y s i n computing t h e l e n g t h o f d e l a y , a s was done i n will Ackely, no longer be the rule. Only those days accused a c t i v e l y resists e x t r a d i t i o n w i l l be included. i n which t h e c o u r t d o e s n o t o r c a n n o t , an Days through t h e S t a t e ' s e f f o r t s , a c q u i r e j u r i s d i c t i o n over an accused w i l l be counted a g a i n s t t h e a c c u s e d and w i l l n o t b e i n c l u d e d i n computing t h e l ength of delay. When a p p l y i n g t h e B a r k e r t e s t , i t i s f i r s t n e c e s s a r y t o c o n s i d e r whether prejudicial Robbins was i s presumptively t h e d e l a y which o c c u r r e d t o Robbins. arrested brought t o t r i a l , the t i m e 201 d a y s e l a p s e d between August 6, 1982 and February 23, 1983. time the he was During f o r t y - f i v e t h e s e d a y s Robbins was i n I d a h o r e s i s t i n g e x t r a d i t i o n . of As n o t e d e a r l i e r t h e s e d a y s c a n n o t b e weighed a g a i n s t t h e S t a t e , and w i l l n o t b e i n c l u d e d i n computing t h e d e l a y . 156 d a y s elapsed from t h e time of Robbins' a p p e a r a n c e i n B i g Timber September 20, began February further delays, 23, 1983. During initial court 1982, u n t i l h i s t r i a l this some o f which w e r e Therefore, period there were c a u s e d by Robbins. On September 2 7 , he d i s q u a l i f i e d Judge S h a n s t r o m , which c a u s e d a delay. On counsel and September he attempted f i l j - n g motions began r e p r e s e n t i n g himself and as both to as he w e r e though disqualify though he his were represented by Some o f t h e s e m o t i o n s w e r e r e s p o n d e d t o a s t h o u g h counsel. he 30, were representing transferred to himself. Missoula November On County to answer resulting i n a further delay of fifty-two should not holding in weigh against Armstrong. the Even State, if the 15 charges days. consistent entire he was there, This delay with delay our between September 27 and November 15 d o e s n o t weigh a g a i n s t R o b b i n s , t h e r e i s a d e l a y o f o n l y 104 d a y s , which i s w e l l w i t h i n t h e C o u r t ' s g u i d e l i n e s f o r a c c e p t a b l e l e n g t h of d e l a y , and i s n o t presumptively three factors prejudicial of the t o Robbins. Barker t e s t need Therefore not Robbins c a n n o t complain h e was n o t g r a n t e d be the other considered. a speedy t r i a l . The c o n v i c t i o n o f t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t i s a f f i r m e d . W e concur: ilyl i h Just ces P M 8 &$xLL,h I

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