TIEDEMAN v COOPER LOGGING INC
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NO. 84-500 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 1985 RONALD TIEDEMAN, Claimant and Respondent, COOPER LOGGING, INC., Employer, and STATE COMPENSATION INSURANCE FUND, Defendant and Appellant. APPEAL FROM: Workers' Compensation Court, The Honorable Timothy Reardon, Judge presiding. COUNSEL OF RECORD: For Appellant : Hughes, Kellner, Sullivan Helena, Montana & Alke; Mike McCarter argued., For Respondent: Utick & Grosfield; Norman Grosfield argued, Helena, Montana Submitted: Decided: Filed: September 25, 1985 October 2 9 , 1955 OCT 3.9 1985 - w Yq6 *. ," + + 1 4& ,Fdgl& + 11/ Clerk ,d Mr. Justice William E. Hunt, Sr. , delivered the Opinion of the Court. The appellant, State Compensation Insurance Fund, appeals from a decision that the respondent, Ronald Tiedeman i s entitled to a lump sum a.dvance of a potential partial . disability a.ward without reduction for permanent partial disability payments made as a result of a prior in-jury to the same body part. We affirm. The issue presented is whether the Workers' Compensation Court erred in holding that the claimant is entitled to permanent partial d-isability benefits without any deduction of a previous permanent partial disability award as a result of a prior injury to the same body part. The respondent, Ronald Tiedeman, has had a history of left knee problems. He underwent knee surgery in 1973 or On March 20, 1980, he suffered a work-related injury 1974. to his left knee when he was butted by a cow. underwent two knee operations. The He then State Compensation Insurance Fund accepted liability for the 1980 injury and paid temporary total disability benefits until February 1982 when the parties entered into a full and final compromise settlement agreement. A portion of this settlement amount was for permanent partial disability benefits. A portion was for retraining in college. The claimant did not complete college. work in early 1983. He returned to He first fell trees, then drove a truck, and finally began logging for Cooper Logging, Inc. On August 25, 1983, he reinjured his knee when he fell off a log while cutting limbs. The State Fund accepted liability and commenced paying respondent temporary total disability benefits. In February 1984 respondent underwent surgery to fuse his left knee. The respondent requested. a lump sum advance on a prospective entitlement. The State Fund resisted. One of the grounds upon which the State Fund resisted was that in computing any prospective indemnity award the prior full and final compromise settlement indemnity award must be deducted. The Workers' Compensat.ion Court held that no consideration is to be given to the prior indemnity award. Section 39-71-738, MCA, provides: 39-71-738. Adjustment of compensation in case of further injuries. Should a further accident occur to a worker who is already receiving compensation hereunder or who has been previously the recipient of a payment under this chapter, his further compensation is adjusted according to the other provisions of this chapter and with regard to his past receipt of compensation. In Pietz v. Industrial Accident Board (1953), 127 Mont. 316, 264 P.2d 709, this Court stated: The capacities of a human being cannot be arbitrarily and finally decided and written off by percentages. The fact that a man has once received compensation, as for example, where he has previously received 250 weeks or half the statutory amount, does not mean that forever after he is in the eyes of the compensation law but half a man, so that he can never again receive a compensation award going beyond the other fifty percent of total. After having received his prior payment, he may, in future years, as in the present case, be physically able to and does resume full gainful employment for several years, and if he does, there is no reason or logic why a disability from an unscheduled industrial accidental injury, which would bring anyone else total permanent disability benefits, should. yield him only half as much. We think the legislature ha.d no such intention in dra-ftingthis Act. Pietz, 264 P.2d at 712-713. In Pietz the prior injury was "to a different segment of his Sody." Pietz, 264 P.2d at 712. The issue in Pietz was whether payment for an injury should be reduced by payments made for the prior injury. The Court in Pietz had before it the predecessor to the statute in issue here. minor Except for rewording the statute is identical to the present version. In Pietz this Court said that Workers' Compensation statutes are to be liberally construed, section 92-838, (1947), now 5 39-71-1-04, MCA, and that the employer R.C.M. takes the employee subject to his physical condition at the time he enters employment. Pietz, 264 P.2d at 712. Based. on these reasons, the Pietz Court held that there would be no reduction of prior awards in successive disabilities. Appellant, on the other hand, cites McDaniel v. Eagle Coal Company (1935), 99 Mont. 309, 43 P.2d 655 in support of its position. McDaniel also interpreted what is now 39-71-738, MCA. In McDaniel the claimant previously lost one eye. the He received 200 weeks of compensation. other eye becoming disability was 500 weeks. 39-71-738, MCA, and already received. He then lost d-isabled. totally His total The Court applied what is now reduced the award by Pietz did not § the § 200 weeks specifically overrule McDaniel or even mention it. The appellant, State Compensation Insurance Fund, argues that 39-71-738, MCA, requires that permanent partial disability payments for the 1980 knee injury be deducted from any final permanent partial disability award for the 1983 knee injury. It cites McDaniel as the proper approach when dealing with 5 39-71-738, MCA. The appel-lant urges us to overrule the Pietz decision, or, if it is not overruled, limit it to the specific facts in the case and apply it only to temporary and permanent total disability cases and not restrict the application of S 39-71-738, MCA, to adjustment in partial disability cases. We hold that Pietz is the controlling 1a.w in this state regarding the application of S 39-71-738, MCA. To give effect to the rule of liberal construction and the rule that the employer takes the employee subject to the employee's physical condition at the time of employment, 5 39-71-738, MCA, can only apply to individual injuries, a. particular injury from a particular accident, not to separate injuries in separate accidents. Pietz is the enlightened approach. Pietz holds that where a claimant, some three years before, had suffered an industrial accident to a different segment of his body and drew compensation for two and one-half months, that compensation paid would not be deducted from a present claim. It is in line with the humane purpose of the compensation act. It is based on liberal construction and the established concept that the employer takes the employee as found. It also recognizes that an injured worker should not be forever reduced in capacity by some percentage in the eyes of the Law. Tiedeman was injured to his left knee in March 1980. He received $198 per week until February 1982 as temporary total disability. At that time he entered into a full and final compromise settlement agreement. included 143 weeks of payments Part of that settlement at $99 per indemnity claim for partial disability. work in January 1983. in August 1983. He week as an Tiedeman returned to He was injured again to his left knee then received temporary total disability benefits. $168.23 per week as Tiedeman then requested a lump sum advance on his future potential awa.rd. The insurer, any State Fund, resisted on the ground that calculation would necessitate reduction for the prior award. The Compensation Court, relying on Pietz, held that there would be no reduction. It said that each new cornpensable injury, though successive, begins a new benefit consideration beginning at zero. We agree. Pietz presents the correct approach and we reaffirm the holding contained therein. Insofar as McDaniel is inconsistent, it is hereby overruled. Affirmed. / i i Justice .JaFL-.= We Concur: Chief Justice Ud 4 ,J /' ( ' , Justices
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