STATE v WILLIAMSON

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No. 85-195 I N THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 1985 STATE OF MONTANA, P l a i n t i f f and R e s p o n d e n t , -vsRICHARD MELVIN WILLIAMSON, D e f e n d a n t and Appel l a n t . APPEAL FROM: District Court of t h e F i r s t J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , I n and f o r t h e County o f Lewis & C l a r k , The H o n o r a b l e Gordon B e n n e t t , J u d g e p r e s i d i n g . COUNSEL OF RECORD: For Appellant: Cannon & Sheehy; Edmund F. Montana Sheehy, J r . , Helena, For Respondent: Hon. Mike G r e e l y , A t t o r n e y G e n e r a l , H e l e n a , Montana Mike McGrath, County A t t o r n e y , H e l e n a , Montana C a r o l y n Clemens, Deputy County A t t y . , Helena S u b m i t t e d on b r i e f s : Decided: Filed: a%& Clerk July 25, 1985 October 9 , 1985 M r . J u s t i c e John Conway H a r r i s o n d e l i v e r e d t h e O p i n i o n o f t h e Court. T h i s i s a n a p p e a l from t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t o f t h e F i r s t J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , S t a t e o f Montana, i n and f o r t h e County o f Lewis and C l a r k , t h e H o n o r a b l e Gordon R. Bennett p r e s i d i n g . The a p p e a l i s from an o r d e r d e n y i n g w i t h d r a w a l o f a g u i l t y p l e a on c h a r g e s o f t h e f t and a r s o n . W e affirm. The a p p e l l a n t , W i l l i a m s o n , was c h a r g e d i n 1983 w i t h t h e a r s o n a l l e g e d t o have b e e n committed on ,January offense of 1983; 11, and with the charge of theft, alleged o c c u r r e d between J a n u a r y 10 and F e b r u a r y 1 2 , 1983. charge was filed information. prior to the filing A f t e r numerous p r e - t r i a l c h a r g e was s e t f o r t r i a l May 3 1 , of to have The t h e f t the arson proceedings, t h e arson 1 9 8 3 , and t h e t h e f t c h a r g e was s e t f o r J u n e 3 0 , 1983. Williamson R i c h a r d J. Pyfer, was represented Esq. Mr. on b o t h o f t h e s e c a s e s by P y f e r f i l e d a motion t o d i s m i s s and a m o t i o n t o s u p p r e s s some e v i d e n c e d e v e l o p e d i n t h e a r s o n These motions w e r e case. court denied t h e motions h e a r d May but 11, 1983. gave Williamson's The t r i a l counsel an o p p o r t u n i t y t o s u b m i t a d d i t i o n a l memorandum on t h e a r g u m e n t s Thereafter t h e D i s t r i c t Court being r a i s e d i n b o t h motions. n o t e d no s u c h a d d i t i o n a l memorandum w e r e e v e r f i l e d w i t h t h e On o r a b o u t May 23, 1983, t h e c o u r t e n t e r e d i t s o r d e r court. d e n y i n g t h e m o t i o n t o d i s m i s s and t h e motion t o s u p p r e s s i n the arson case. Prior to that time, there had been no d i s c u s s i o n between t h e c o u n t y a t t o r n e y ' s o f f i c e and d e f e n s e counsel with regard t o a plea bargain. On or about May 23, 1983, defense counsel was a p p r o a c h e d by t h e c o u n t y a t t o r n e y w i t h r e g a r d t o t h e t r i a l , which was s e t w i t h i n t h e week. A f t e r some d i s c u s s i o n , the c o u n t y a t t o r n e y a d v i s e d c o u n s e l t h a t i f t h e appe'l l a n t would e n t e r a g u i l t y p l e a t o b o t h f e l o n y c h a r g e s , t h e S t a t e would forego seeking increased punishment p e r s i s t e n t felony offender. against him as a I n exchanqe f o r t h e g u i l t y p l e a , t h e S t a t e a l s o s a i d i t would a s k f o r a t e n y e a r s e n t e n c e on each charge to run approached him advised t h e plea of requested that concurrently. with the the Williamson's State's offer. Williamson b a r g a i n on o r a b o u t May 2 5 , county attorney come counsel was 1 9 8 3 , and to him p e r s o n a l l y with h i s counsel t o discuss t h e plea bargain. H e alleged a t t h a t t i m e t h e county a t t o r n e y , i n h i s d i s c u s s i o n o f t h e p l e a b a r g a i n , s a i d i f h e d i d n o t change h i s p l e a by 10:OO a.m. the n e x t m o r n i n g , which was t h e t i m e s e t t o s e l e c t a j u r y f o r t h e a r s o n c a s e , t h e p l e a b a r g a i n would n o t b e o f f e r e d a t a l a t e r date. Williamson, after f u l l discussion with h i s counsel, P y f e r , and t h e County A t t o r n e y , McGrath, d i d a g r e e on May 2 6 , 1983, t o t h e p l e a b a r g a i n and W i l l i a m s o n changed h i s p l e a t o g u i 1t y . The District Court, on July 1983, 27, sentenced the a p p e l l a n t on b o t h c h a r g e s on t h e b a s i s o f h i s g u i l t y p l e a . W i l l i a m s o n r e c e i v e d t e n y e a r s on t h e t h e f t c h a r g e ; and on t h e arson charge suspended, on he received twenty the condition that years he would with pay ten years $36,000 in r e s t i t u t i o n f o r t h e arson. W i l l i a m s o n t h e n s o u g h t s e n t e n c e r e v i e w from t h e Montana S e n t e n c e Review Board. His a p p l i c a t i o n was d e n i e d and h e f i l e d w i t h t h i s C o u r t a p r o se p e t i t i o n f o r p o s t - c o n v i c t i o n relief. pro A t t h e same t i m e , se m o t i o n in t h e D i s t r i c t Court t o withdraw h i s p l e a . T h i s C o u r t on August 3 1 , petition for i n J u l y 1 9 8 4 , Williamson f i l e d a 1984, e n t e r e d an o r d e r h o l d i n g t h e post-conviction relief in abeyance until the D i s t r i c t C o u r t r u l e d on W i l l i a m s o n ' s motion t o w i t h d r a w h i s g u i l t y plea. New c o u n s e l was a p p o i n t e d by the District W i l l i a m s o n t o r e p r e s e n t him o n t h i s motion Court for t o withdraw h i s guilty plea. O November 3 0 , 1984, t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t h e l d a n f u l l h e a r i n g on t h e m o t i o n t o w i t h d r a w t h e g u i l t y p l e a , and on F e b r u a r y 1 2 , 1 9 8 5 , t h e c o u r t e n t e r e d i t s o r d e r and o p i n i o n I t i s from d e n y i n g t h e motion t o w i t h d r a w t h e g u i l t y p l e a . this order of the District Court that Williamson is appealing. i n t h i s c a s e i s whether t h e The s o l e i s s u e p r e s e n t e d District Court FJilliamson's erred guilty in denying plea. The the motion appellant, to in withdraw his pro se motion t o w i t h d r a w t h e g u i l t y p l e a a r g u e s h e was c o e r c e d i n t o e n t e r i n g it and was n o t g i v e n e f f e c t i v e a s s i s t a n c e o f c o u n s e l a t t h e t i m e t h i s m a t t e r was a r g u e d . The coercion argument stemmed from Williamson's testimony t h a t he e n t e r e d i n t o t h e g u i l t y p l e a t o avoid t h e i n c r e a s e d punishment f o r b e i n g a p e r s i s t e n t f e l o n y o f f e n d e r . Five y e a r s p r i o r t o t h e charges t h a t he faced i n t h i s cause, h e had b e e n s e n t e n c e d t o a t e n y e a r p r i s o n t e r m . alleges h i s counsel, M r . Pyfer, Appellant a d v i s e d him t h e S t a t e c o u l d n o t i c e him a s a p e r s i s t e n t f e l o n y o f f e n d e r , which a d v i c e was erroneous. The t e s t i m o n y a t t h e h e a r i n g on t h e w i t h d r a w a l o f t h e plea indicated M r . P y f e r t o l d Williamson a t t h e t i m e t h e p l e a b a r g a i n was made he was n o t c e r t a i n and would c o n s u l t more experienced statute, counsel counsel. agreed However, at after a hearing later c o u n t y a t t o r n e y and t h e d i s t r i c t j u d g e , not have been charged s t a t u t e ' s five-year as a researching held with the the t h e a p p e l l a n t could persistent felon due to the limitation. Williamson contends t h e p l a i n language o f t h e s t a t u t e , S 46-18-501, Mr, Pyfer, Court. MCA, the was m i s c o n s t r u e d by h i s o r i g i n a l c o u n s e l , county attorney's S e c t i o n 46-18-501, "persistent offender who convicted of A MCA, office, and the reads a s follows: felony offender" i s an has previously been is a felony and who District presently being sentenced for a second felony committed on a different,occgsion than the first. An offender is considered to have been previous1 y convicted of a felony if: (1) The previous felony conviction was for an offense committed in this state or any other jurisdiction for which a sentence to a term of imprisonment in excess of 1 year could have been imposed; (2) Less than 5 years have between he commission of the offense and either: (a) the previous elapsed present felony conviction; or (b) the offender's release on parole or otherwise from prison or other commitment imposed as a result of the previous felony conviction; and (3) the offender has not been pardoned on the ground of innocence and the conviction has not been set aside in a postconviction proceeding. It is Williamson's position that having entered a guilty plea to the theft charges, and then pleading guilty to the arson charges, he could not be found a persistent felony offender because the two felonies were committed at approximately the same time and his pleas were entered at the same time. The State's position is the statute's definition of a "persistent felony offender" is not wholly consistent with the statute ' s definition of "previously convicted" and thus the rules of statutory construction require that the statute be read and construed in its entirety. v. Anderson (1972), 160 Mont. denied, 410 U.S. State ex re1 Cashmore 175, 500 P.2d 931, 93 S.Ct. 1372, 35 L.Ed.2d 921, cert. 593. The State submits that this is precisely what Judge Bennett did, and hence no abuse of discretion could be shown. The substantive argument revolves around "commission" and "conviction" of prior and the terms subsequent felonies, which was clearly summarized and decided in Judge Bennett's order: The p r i s o n e r u r g e s t h a t 46-15-501 be c o n s t r u e d t o ban t h e u s e o f t h e s t a t u t e where t h e s e c o n d o f f e n s e was committed p r i o r t o t h e c o n v i c t i o n on t h e f i r s t one. If construction of the statute is r e q u i r e d , it must b e , i f a t a l l p o s s i b l e , construed i n favor of t h e defendant. The statutory definition of the t e r m is crystal clear and needs no construction: "A 'persistent felony is an offender who has offender' p r e v i o u s l y been c o n v i c t e d o f a f e l o n y and who i s p r e s e n t l y b e i n g s e n t e n c e d f o r a second f e l o n y committed on 2 d i f f e r e n t o c c a s i o n t h a n t h e f i r s t . I' (46-18-501) T h i s d e f i n i t i o n , s t a n d i n g a l o n e , would n o t p e r m i t t h e q u e s t i o n now r a i s e d by t h e prisoner. I t simply r e q u i r e s a p a s t c o n v i c t i o n and s e n t e n c i n g on a s u b s e q u e n t one. .. B u t t h e n t h e same s t a t u t e g o e s on t o It define a previous felony conviction. f i r s t d e f i n e s a f e l o n y , which i s t o t a l l y u n n e c e s s a r y (see 45-2-101 ( 2 1 ) ) , and t h e n it d e f i n e s " p r e v i o u s " by l i m i t a t i o n : it i s n ' t p r e v i o u s i f more t h a n f i v e y e a r s e l a p s e d between t h e commission o f t h e c r i m e f o r which a s e n t e n c e i s b e i n g imposed and the previous felony conviction. The p r i s o n e r a r g u e s t h a t h e has, under t h i s s t a t u t e , a s o r t of H e c a n commit "window o f o p p o r t u n i t y . " a l l manner o f f e l o n i e s b e t w e e n t h e t i m e b e commits h i s f i r s t f e l o n y and h i s c o n v i c t i o n t h e r e f o r and b e immune from p e r s i s t e n t felony designation because t h e f i v e y e a r clock d o e s n ' t s t a r t running u n t i l a f t e r the f i r s t conviction. There i s no evidence in the statute, or anyplace else, that the legislature i n t e n d e d t o p r o v i d e s u c h an open s e a s o n . be 7 have o f t e n h e l d , t h e r u l e s o f s t a t u t o r y c o n s t r u c t i o n d i c t a t e t h a t l e g i s l a t i o n must be r e a d a s a who3.e i n o r d e r t o ascertain legislative t h i s i s s u e i s S t a t e v. intent. The most Magnuson recent h o l d i n g on (Mont. 1 9 8 4 ) , 682 P.2d 1365 F i n a l l y , a p p e l l a n t b u t t r e s s e s h i s argument w i t h a vague and u n s u p p o r t e d a t t e m p t t o d i s t i n g u i s h " d i f f e r e n t o c c a s i o n s " from " t h e same t i m e f r a m e . " The s t a t u t e s p e a k s c l e a r l y o f two on d i f f e r e n t o c c a s i o n s , w h i c h f e l o n i e s b e i n g committed are t h e f a c t s i n t h i s c a s e . Appellant d e f i n e s "occasions" a s "time frames" without t h e burden o f any a u t h o r i t y . The t r i a l judge characterized this terminology as "deriving from the Watergate hearings" and refused "to open another window of opportunity under the statute." In his argument appellant cites three recent cases of this Court covering our latest holdings on the problem of a prosecutor's notice of intention to increase punishment to a defendant pursuant to Montana's persistent felony offender statute. State v. Seitzinger (1979), 180 Mont. 136, 589 P.2d 655; State v. Johnson (1978), 179 Mont. 61, 585 P.2d 1328; and State v. Sather (1977), 172 Mont. 428, 564 P.2d 1306. In this case, we find there is no dispute that the appellant was told from the outset the persistent felony offender designation would be sought if no bargain could be struck. In addition, there is no dispute he was free at all times to accept or reject this offer. Although appellant attempts to generate some confusion and to attribute to the State an improper motive, it is clear the State did nothing improper in refusing to give the persistent felony offender notice until after the appellant had been convicted of the first felony, the felony in which he entered a plea. Throughout appellant's retaliation argument he confuses bargaining with coercion. Both this Court and the United States Supreme Court have explicitly rejected this type of "Indeed, acceptance of the basic legitimacy of plea bargaining necessarily implies rejection of any notion that a guilty plea is involuntary in a constitutional sense simply because it is the end result of bargaining process. By hypothesis, the plea may have been induced by promises of a recommendation of a lenient sentence or reduction of charges, and thus by fear of the possibility of a greater penalty upon conviction after a trial. " Johnson, 179 Mont. at 69, 585 P.2d at 1333. Finally performance as of to appellant his original Williamson's defense counsel, allegation P y f e r was Mr. n o t w i t h i n " t h e r a n g e o f competence demanded o f a t t o r n y s i n c r i m i n a l cases'' w e c i t e S t a t e v. 86, 608 P.2d Pyfer's 1074, 1081. supra. Mr. Pyfer ( 1 9 8 0 ) , 187 M o n t 74, The s t a n d a r d s c l e a r l y i n d i c a t e M r . w e r e within actions Rose the consulted range with set other forth in criminal Rose, counsel r e g a r d i n g t h e q u e s t i o n o f a p e r s i s t e n t f e l o n y d e s i g n a t i o n and d i d a l l t h i n g s p r o p e r l y t o d e f e n d t h i s man who f a c e d s e r i o u s criminal charges. We graced note the appellant county a c t i v i t i e s a s an o f f e n d e r . did everything appellant he was to entered not courthouse The r e c o r d possible before this pleas time first doors in his indicates Mr. investigate his the of and Pfyer advise guilty. It the is i n t e r e s t i n g t o n o t e t h a t i n h i s c u r r e n t b r i e f a p p e l l a n t makes no e f f o r t t o a d d r e s s t h e i s s u e o f M r . t h e S t a t e v. P y f e r ' s performance a s failed t o by show M r . P y f e r ' s c o u n s e l i n g was i n a d e q u a t e o r i n c o m p e t e n t o r that the t r i a l judge Rose s t a n d a r d . H e has measured abused h i s d i s c r e t i o n i n n o t g r a n t i n g t h e withdrawal o f h i s p l e a s . The d e c i s i o n o f t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t i s a f f i r m e d . W e concur:

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